The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 62, July 1958 - April, 1959 Page: 309

The Problem of Command in the Texas Army

309

At an intermediate level, jealousy between John C. Hays and
Mathew Caldwell, over who would command their combined
forces, permitted General Adrian Woll to withdraw without a
serious fight from his weak position near Salado Creek. Such a
dispute was possible because there was vagueness in orders or
regulations, or because neither feared higher authority.
After the autumn of 1842, Texas had no real army problem
since it had no army. In the last attempt to retaliate against
Mexico, while seeking to profit from the Santa Fe trade, the gov-
ernment washed its hands of the Snively Expedition by authoriz-
ing it but denying it official status.
In seeking to show what the Texans did to try to get a military
force that was adequate but docile, this study has avoided the two
loudest complaints the soldiers had: food and pay. At no time
was there enough of either during the two periods of greatest
crisis, 1836-1837 and 1842, but good food and good pay could
have neither prevented nor corrected the evils of insubordina-
tion and self-aggrandizement which plagued the Texas army.
Three things which the Texans did, stand out as heavy contrib-
utors to the problems of command in the army of the young
republic. The first in time and likely in magnitude of conse-
quences was the failure of the Consultation to take command of
the army of volunteers at San Antonio in the fall of 1835. In
Stephen F. Austin the army had chosen as its commander surely
the best man to lead the men to accept the authority of the Con-
sultation, but that body, while acknowledging its responsibility
for the volunteers in the matter of pay, disclaimed authority over
them. In a time of revolution the decision lies where the power
is, and the power usually is in the army. The Volunteer Army
of the People was not much in numbers, military arts, or equip-
ment, but it contained a large part of the available manpower
and was the only army Texas had. Consequently, it is the more
incredible that any revolutionary government or quasi govern-
ment should allow the army to escape its control through default.
Related in its effects to the failure of the Consultation to take
charge of the army was the split between Governor Henry Smith
and the General Council, especially in view of the provision of
the Consultation that the commander in chief should be subject