The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 107, July 2003 - April, 2004 Page: 80
660 p. : ill. (some col.), maps, ports. ; 23 cm.View a full description of this periodical.
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Southwestern Historical Quarterly
McGeorge Bundy told the CIA's Ray Cline in August.40 "It is quite appar-
ent," wrote Maxwell Taylor, "[that] he does not want to lose South
Vietnam before next November nor does he want to get the country into
war."41 The Tonkin incident offered LBJ a chance to do what his critics
have suggested: boost his political standing by demonstrating his commit-
ment to peace and firmness, all the while planning for war. While there
seems no doubt that Johnson would have won the election regardless of
the Tonkin incident, his skillful use of the crisis to reinforce his political
image undoubtedly contributed to the immense margin of victory.
LBJ also manipulated the incident to gain passage of the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, authorizing him to "take all necessary measures to
repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to
prevent further aggression."42 The administration had been planning to
go to Congress with just such a resolution since the spring, but was wait-
ing for the right time to act. The Tonkin Gulf attacks now presented
that opportunity. Still, with an eye toward public opinion and the
upcoming elections, administration officials cloaked the resolution
behind a wave of half-truths and deceptions. Spokesmen insisted, for
example, that the Maddox had been the innocent victim, operating a
routine patrol that fell victim to an unprovoked attack. Secretary of
Defense McNamara explained that "Our Navy played absolutely no part
in, was not associated with, was not aware of, any South Vietnamese
actions, if there were any. "4s Questions surrounding the legitimacy of
the alleged second attack were also dismissed. Although it appears that
the administration genuinely believed that this attack had occurred, at
least initially, this was likely the product of their own wishful thinking
more than realistic analysis, as evidence, including doubts raised by the
ship's captain, should have suggested otherwise.44 That LBJ should have
harbored his own doubts became clear six weeks later when McNamara
reported that a similar attack had occurred. "Now Bob," Johnson
responded, "I have found over the years that we see and we hear and we
imagine a lot of things in the form of attacks and shots. ... and I think
that we ought to check that very, very, carefully, and I don't know why
40 Logevall, Choosing War, 217 (quotation).
4' "Memorandum of Conversation between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President," Forezgn
Relations of the United States, 1964-68, vol. I, Vietnam, p. 129.
42 Congressional Record, vol. 111, Aug. 5, 1964, p. 18132-33-
" McNamara quoted in Ellsberg, Secrets, 18.
44 The general consensus within the staff of the Joint Chiefs, as well as within various levels of
intelligence analysis, was that the attack had not occurred. And within days, it appears that even
the president had his doubts. "Hell," LBJ told Undersecretary of State George Ball, "those dumb,
stupid, sailors were just shooting at flying fish." See Logevall, Choosing War, 203 (quotation) and
Morse, Tonkin Gulf and theEscalation of the Vzetnam War, 242-244.July
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Texas State Historical Association. The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 107, July 2003 - April, 2004, periodical, 2004; Austin, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth101224/m1/98/: accessed April 19, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Texas State Historical Association.