The Congressional Globe, Volume 14: Twenty-Eighth Congress, Second Session Page: 102
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CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE.
setts; and in no State had Schemes for the dis-
memberment of our Union been so often agitated as
in that. During the war of 1812, the sons of Vir-
ginia and South Carolina were found defending those
frontiers which Massachusetts patriotism was not
sufficiently enlarged to comprehend within the
scope of its vision. Mr. Y. here referred to
■various threats of disunion that had come from
the New England States, and particularly to
the manifesto put out by certain members of Con-
gress at the head of which was Mr. John Quincy
Adams, threatening a dissolution of the Union in
case Texas was admitted into it. Looking at New
England, he saw her plains made fertile and her vil-
lages springing up by the bounties wrung from the
Eeople of the South. He saw the battle-fields of
■exington and Bunker's Hill; but the spirits that
ennobled those days slept in the grave. Men were
now to be found there, who, forgetful of their fa-
thers, were seeking to weaken the bonds of the
Union, and were content to live on the plunder wrung
from the sweat of southern brows. They spoke of
the effects of slavery on the southern character, and
stigmatized the southern people as slavebreeders—as
those who sold the image of Christ. Pictures had
had been made to represent the South in the most
odious light; and England, our ancient enemy, had
been invited to our shores to make the South more
moral. The effect of slavery in the southern char-
acter! Though the New England man might be
more keen in his hunt after lucre, in what qualities
of the head or heart was he superior to the, sons of
the sunny South? From what clime did our great-
est men, and men who have enjoyed the greatest
share of the confidence and affections of the people,
come? Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe,
and Jackson, were all southern men, and slavehold-
ers; and yet no men of this country and of this age
had ever obtained, in as great a degree as they did, the
confidence and affections of the people. Which of
these slaveholders ever failed to secure the approba-
tion of the American people?
Here the Chairman's mallet fell, cutting short
Mr. Yancey in this part of his argument.
Mr. BAYLY next' obtained the floor, and pro-
ceeded to say that the fate of the annexation of
Texas will depend upon the decision of Congress,
as to its power to accomplish it by bill or joint reso-
lution; for if Texas is not annexed in this manner,
it will not be in any other. No one now hopes for
a majority of two-thirds of the Senate in its favor.
The great question, therefore, is, Can foreign terri-
tory be, acquired by bill or joint resolution of the
two houses of 'Congress? and I proceed at once
(said Mr. B.) to the discussion of it.
Under our political system there are two leading
classes of powers conferred upon the general gov-
ernment—the one relating to our foreign, the other
to our domestic relations. In all questions growing
out of the former, the interests of the different sec-
tions of the country are inseparable. In our do-
mestic affairs they are as variant as the soils, cli-
mate, productions, and pursuits of the people of the
several States. In all that relates to the former, the
statesmen of every part of the country are equally
well informed. The latter are only understood by
the people they immediately concern. In reference
to the first, the national legislature can legislate
wisely. To the last it cannot, without cer-
tain mischief. Hence, in our wise system,
there is a plenary delegation of power to the gener-
al government, in all that concerns our external
affairs, and a specific delegation in what relates to
our domestic. A different rule of construction,
therefore, ought to prevail, as the power sought to
be exercised belongs to the one class or the other
—strict construction is the rule in the latter case,
and a liberal construction in the former. This dis-
tinction grows out of the character of the constitu-
tion itself; was recognised by Jefferson and Madi-
son; and the propriety of it will not, I fancy, be
questioned by any one. Bearing this is mind, Ijmo-
ceed to point out the clauses of the constitution
in which the authority of Congress to pass the
resolution before the committee may be found.
In my opinion it may be formed in two—in the
clause authorizing Congress to declare war, and in
the one permitting the admission of new States into
the Union; and also in the general power, which I
shall show to exist to make alliances and confedera-
tions^; Let it not be said that, in referring the power
to two clauses of the constitution, I make it vagrant,
and disprove its existence in either; for, in the lan-
fuage of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Gib-
ons and Ogden, "the idea that the same measure's
might, according to circumstances, be arranged with
different classes of powers, was no novelty to the
framers of our constitution. All experience shows
that the same measure or measures, scarcely distin-
guishable from each other, may flow from distinct
powers."
• It has always been admitted, in the administra-
tion of the government, that the power to declare
war carries with it the power of doing whatever
tends directly to prevent it. In the language of
Chief Justice Taney, in the Supreme Court, "every
thing that concerns our foreign relations that may
be used to preserve peace or wage war has been
committed to the hands of Congress." 1 do not
say it carries with it the power to do any thing
which a visionary might fancy would tend to pre-
vent it; bat it certainly does every thing which im-
mediately and directly tends that way. It was in
this manner the constitutionality of the embargo
and non-intercourse laws, adopted in advance of the
late war, was defended. And the power is derived
from the admonition "in time of peace to prepare
for war.'_^ Our southwestern frontier is exceedingly
exposed, "as I shall hereafter show; and as far as
our constitutional authority goes, we might erect
fortifications upon its whole extent. This no one
will question. Such being the case, cannot we,
with the consent of the people to whom the inter-
vening territory belongs, extend our boundary to
the Rio Grande, which, "in connection with tho
mountainous desert which skirts it, forms the first
class of military obstacles, and which would afford
us better protection from invasion in that quarter
than a cordon of fortifications from the mouth of the
Sabine to our utmost northern limits." The im-
portance of Texas as a means of military defence,
and its consequent intimate connection with the war
power, 1 shall show hereafterT
From the days of the Roifian eagle, indeed long
before them, to this time, the leading object
has been to acquire or defend territory. When
the power was confered upon Congress, in general
terms, to declare war, it carried with it all of its
usual incidents; and it is impossible to believe that
the framers of the constitution meant to withhold
from the government the power to accomplish by it
what had been the great object for which most of
the wars with which the world has been scourged
has been waged. I infer, therefore, that we can
unquestionably acquire territory by conquest. If
this be true, the whole question is settled; for if we
may take the territory of the Texians from them
by force, surely we may do it peaceably, with their
consent. If we can rob them of it, surely we can
take it as a gift. If we should march an army to-
morrow to Texas, for the purpose of capturing their
country, I presume there would be no occasion for
fighting, provided the Texians were willing that
we should accomplish our purpose without blood-
shed.
Mr. Clay, in his celebrated letter from Raleigh,
upon the subject of Texas, says:
"If any European nation enteitain any ambitious designs
upon Texas, such as that of colonizing her. or in any way
subjugating her, I should regard it as the imperative duty
of the government of the United States to oppose to such de-
signs the most firm and determined resistance, to the extent,
if necessary, of appealing to arms, to prevent the accom-
plishment of any sach dewgns."
-A If we might goto war to prevent Texas from
falling into the hands of a foreign government, may
we not still more effectually provide against, by her
peacable acquisition?
.But the power of Congress to annex Texas by
joint resolution may also be derived from the author-
ity given to Congress to admit new States into the
Union. The power is general, without any other
limitation than that "no new State shall be farmed
or created within the jurisdiction of any other State;
nor any State be formed by the junction of two or
more States or parts of States, without the consent
of the legislatures of the States concerned as well as
of Congress." The imposition of tKis limitation,
upon the most familiar rules of construction, ex-
cludes the idea of the intention to impose any other.
I know an attempt is made to impose another by
implication, and to confine the power to admit new
States to such as might be carved out of the territo-
ry within the limits of the United States at the time
of the adoption of the constitution. But such a con-
struction is contradicted by the plain import and ob-
vious meaning of the constitution itself, and also by
the history of its passage through the ^convention
which framed iCj
"In the resolutions offered by Mr. Edmund Randolph, as &
basis for the new eoriBtitution, and which contained the first
propositions of that character which were submitted toft,
the power in question was described as follows, viz: that
provision ought to be made for the admission of States law-
fully arising within the limits of the United States, whether
arising from a voluntary junction of government or other-
wise, with the consent of a number of voices in the legisla-
ture, less than the whole. In Mr. Charles Pinkney's draft,
it was proposed, that "the legislature shall have power to
admit new States into the Union on the same terms with the
original States, provided two-thirds of the members
present in both Houses agree' leaving out the clause
m respect to the character of the territory. Mr.
Randolph's proposition, containing the restriction
confining the power to States lawfully arising within
the limits of the United States, was at one time adopted in
Committee of the Whole, and, in that state, referred with
others to the committee of detail. In a draft of a constitu-
tion, reported by that committee, the article upon this sub-
ject contamined the following propositions: 1st. That new
States, lawfully constituted or established within the limits
of the United States, might be admitted by the legislature
in this government. 2(1. That to such admission, the coa*
sent of two-thirds 0/ the members present in each House
should he necessary. 3d That if a new State should arise
within the limits ot any of the present States, the consent
of the legislature of such States should also be necessary to
its admission. 4th. That if the admission was consented to,
the new States should be admitted on tke same terms with
the original States; and 5th. That the legislature might
make conditions with the new States concerning the public
debt then subsisting. The-2d, 4th, and fifth clauses were
stricken out by the votes of the convention; and after that
had been done, the following was adopted as a substitute
for the whole, viz: 'New States may be admitted by the
legislature into theUnion; but no new State shall be erect-
ed within the limits of any of the present States, without
the consent of the legislature of such State, as well as of the
general legislature1—leaving out that part of the first clause
which related to the domestic character of the territory;
and this substitute was subsequently revised and amended,
so as to make it conform in its phraseology to the section
as it now stands in the constitution. These proceedings
show that the proposition to restrict the power to admit
new States to the territory within the original limits of the
United States, was distinctly before the convention, once
adopted by it, and finally rejected in favor of a clause ma-
king the power in this respect general."
But it is unnecessary to dwell further on this
point. Mr. Clay, who embodies in himself, ac-
cording to their own admission, the opinions of the
whig party, admits no such fanciful limitation.
The President elect of the democratic party scouts
it. Mr. Van Buren's argument against it makes a
clear elucidation of its absurdity impossible. And
the repeated action of every department of the
government, in the most solemn form, settles the
question forever.
> It is insisted, however, that the power is to admit
"new States," and that it does not authorize Con-
gress to acquire territory. That, it is said, can
only be done by a national compact, which is a
treaty, the power to make which is confided exclu-
sively to the President and the Senate.
, The first answer to this argument is, that au-
thority for the admission of new States carries with
it everything which is necessary and proper to ac-
complish it; and Congress may take such initiatory
steps as may be necessary, preparatory to the ad-
mission of the new State into the Union upon equal
footing with the rest. There is nothing in the con-
stitution which shows that the framers of it sup-
posed that it was indispensable that the new State
should spring into the Union full armed, like
Minerva from the brain of Jove. If they had,
they would have found no analogy for sucn pro-
ceeding except in heathen mythology. They
certainly would not in the natural world, where
everything progresses gradually from infan-
cy to age. If we bring Texas under our jurisdic-
tion as a territory by the passage of a bill, in which
provision shall be made for its future admission into
the Union as a Stats, what hereafter shall be
done each step in the proceeding, will be part and
parcel of the same transaction and constitute but
one act. Those who agree that we may admit a
foreign State into the Union as a State, but deny
that we may bring it in as a territory, involve them-
selves in the absurdity of maintaining that the
lesser power is not included in the greater; and that,
although we may exercise the last, we cannot the
first.
If it be true that, under the power to admit new
States, you may not first, in the case of a foreign
State, bring such State under the jurisdiction of
our laws as a territory, then the whole clause au-
thorizing Congress to admit them in practice would
be nugatory. The constitution of any foreign State,
suited for its government as an independent power,
would, for that very reason, be uusuited for its gov-
ernment as a member of this confederacy; and with
it unchanged, such State could not be admitted into
this Union. And it is exceedingly improbable that
an independent State would consent—as it is very
certain Texas will not—to break up her form of gov-
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United States. Congress. The Congressional Globe, Volume 14: Twenty-Eighth Congress, Second Session, legislative document, 1845; Washington D.C.. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth2366/m1/118/: accessed April 25, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.