Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, during the latter part of the Tyler term, 1885, and the Galveston term, 1886. Volume 65. Page: 36
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36 I. & G. N. AND Mo. PAc. RIY Co's v. GRAY. [Tyler Term,
Opinion of the court.
not prohibited so to do, yet circumstances may impose such restrictions
upon the right, or to authorize a finding that excessive speed at
a certain time or place will be negligence on the part of the company.
Thomas v. R'y Co., 8 Tex., 729. Here not only circumstances, but
positive regulations required the train to go slow at or near the
point of collision.
Whilst statutory law imposes certain duties upon these corporations
for the protection of life and property at points of the greatest danger,
they owe duties to the general public which require that they exercise
proper care to avoid injury to any of its individual members. The
omission to perform these duties may be the highest degree of negligence,
and the facts as to their omission, and as to whether this constitutes
negligence under the particular circumstances, should be left
to the jury.
When the company have invariably obeyed the law in reference to
the signals to be given at a particular crossing, and have, at the same
time, rules which require its trains to run slowly on that part of its
track (which rules have usually been complied with), the public may
have a right to conclude that the law and rules will be observed on
any given occasion, and to act accordingly in their lawful use of the
railway track. Not only so, but the employes operating a train,
being chargeable with notice that reliance will be placed upon their
obeying the statute law and the rules of the company, the latter
should be held liable for any failure to do so from which damages have
resulted to person or property.
It has been held that when a train has been uniformly run and
operated in a certain manner, it is evidence of negligence not to run
it in the same way at any particular time; and that one who had the
right to act upon the belief that it would be so run and operated, and
who was injured because it was not, could recover. Shultz v. C. &
N. W. lRy Co., 44 Wis., 638. The usual manner of operating the
train, neglected on that particular occasion, was to ring the bell
before starting, and to run the train at a reasonable rate of speed.
It is not contributory negligence not to anticipate that another will
violate the law in a given particular, and in not providing against
such possible violations of it. 2 Thompson on Neg., p. 1472, sec. 18.
Though the rules of the company may have required that the handcar
keep out of the way of trains, and send out flagmen when by
reason of short curves risk was involved, it certainly was not contemplated
that they should anticipate danger when it could not
possibly arise except by reason of a violation of rules on the part of
the trainmen, and, through them, of the company itself.
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Texas. Supreme Court. Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, during the latter part of the Tyler term, 1885, and the Galveston term, 1886. Volume 65., book, 1886; St. Louis, Mo.. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28509/m1/52/: accessed April 19, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; .