1884.] IiICS v. I. & G. N. R'Y Co. 41
Opinion of the court.
the United States for the western district of Texas, placed in the
hands of R. S. Hays as the receiver of said railroad company, and
that at the time of said injury for which plaintiff sues, the said Hays
was still acting as the receiver of said railroad company under the
order of the circuit court of the United States for the western district
of Texas, then the plaintiff cannot recover, and if you so find,
you will find for the defendant."
This charge was general in its terms, but considered in the light
of the uncontroverted facts in proof, which showed that the railway
was under the exclusive control and management of the receiver at
the time appellant was injured, it was not erroneous.
Any liability which may have existed to the appellant was a liability
of the receivership, to be enforced against any fund in his
hands subject to its payment. The claim which appellant sought
to enforce was not one personally binding on the railway company,
although its property while in the hands of the receiver may
have been subject to its payment; this being true, the facts that all
the property was subsequently sold by the receiver, under proper
orders of the court that appointed him, and was purchased by other
persons, who subsequently reconveyed the same to the railway company,
could not create an obligation on the company which before
such reconveyance did not exist.
If the claim of the appellant had been one for which the company
was primarily liable, as the appointment of a receiver did not destroy
its corporate existence, it would still be liable. The claim,
however, as before said, was not one for which the appellee was
liable as a corporation; and it could not become liable by the repurchase
of property which it had formerly owned. By the sale
made by the receiver, it not being shown to be collusive, the title
to the property, the income of which while in the hands of the receiver
must have been subject to the payment of appellant's claim,
had it been established against the receiver, passed to the purchaser
freed from the claims of those persons holding claims against the
receiver, and so the appellee, under the facts shown in this case,
It is not shown in this case that the appellee undertook in any
way to satisfy such claims as persons held against the receivership,
as it was shown in the case before referred to.
It does not become necessary for us to consider in this case
whether the appellant might have brought his suit in a court of law
to establish his claim against the receivership, without the consent
of the court that appointed the receiver.
Texas. Supreme Court. Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, during the latter part of the Austin term, 1884, and the Tyler term, 1884. Volume 62.. Austin, Texas. The Portal to Texas History. http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28512/. Accessed May 3, 2015.