10 SEDBERRY V. JONES. [Tyler Term,
Statement of the case.
The averment in the indictment of the fact, without setting
out his commission, being sufficient to show that
Griffin was a justice of the peace, the court judicially knows
that he was authorized to administer the oath, if he had
jurisdiction of the particular case alleged to have been instituted
before him by the complaint on vhichl the perjury
has been assigned. That it is unnecessary to allege that
the justice had jurisdiction, by reason of the parties or the
subject-matter of the suit being within the territory to
which his jurisdiction extended, is clear, and it has been
often so held where the particularity of the former English
precedents to which we have adverted is not required.
(Commonwealth v. Knight, 12 Mass.; State v. Newton, 1
Green, 160; People v. Phelps, 5 Wend. 9; 6 Ind., 9.)
The formal conclusion usual in indictments of this kind
is a mere deduction by the pleader from the necessary
averments which precede it, and gives no aid to them if
they are insufficient. It is not therefore essential, and its
omission cannot be regarded as fatal.
For the error of the court in sustaining the exceptions
to the indictment, the judgment is reversed and the cause
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
NW. J. SEDBERRY V. LUCINDA JONES
PRACTICE-OPENING DEFAULT.-It was error to overrule a motion to
set aside a judgment by default snppol'ted by affidavit of a meritorious
defence, and of an agreement to compromise the suit, opposed by
affidavit denying the agreement to compromise, but not negativing
tlhe belief f such agreement by the defendant.
APPEAL from Morrison. Tried below before the Hon. J.
Texas. Supreme Court. Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of Texas, during the latter part of the Tyler term, 1874, and the first part of the Galveston term, 1875. Volume 42.. St. Louis, Mo.. The Portal to Texas History. http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28531/. Accessed July 13, 2014.