Reports of cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas during Austin term, 1854, and a part of Galveston term 1855. Volume 13. Page: 80
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159-160 SUPREME COURT.
Harper v. Nichol.
the passage of the statute. That [159] the Act was intended to be limited to
judg.ments of a (late anterior to its passage is obvious, and especially so front
the provisions of the fourth section, (Art. 1628,) by which limitations are impoeudl
on all suits which may be brought an foreign judgment. , decrees, or adjullil.tions,
requiring these suits to be brought in so many days and months
a ft cr the passage of the Act, the utmost limit being one year for judgments
under two years' standing at the date of the Act. No other judgments were
contemplated by the law but those already rendered, and upon these limitations
were placed. No provision or limitation was affixed to those subsequently
to be rendered. They were not the subject of any even remote allulusion,
and we mut infer that they were not embraced in the Act nor intended
to be affected by its provisions. Antecedent to the passage of the Act
suits could not have been brought upon foreign judgments, and the scope and
object of the statute appears to have been to provide a remedy where none had
previously existed and on judgments of a past date, leaving consequently suits
upon judgments of other States of a subsequent date to be regulated, (after
annexation, then in progress, should be completed,) by the general laws in relation
to suits upon judgments and the provisions of the Constitution and laws
of the United States upon the subject matter. It was not necessary in any of
our previous decisions on this statute to consider whether it embraced judgments
other than those anterior to its passage, and no intimation is to be found
in any of them to that effect. The question in those cases was whether the
limitations of the statute were after annexation effectual against judgments anterior
to the Act, and the affirmative decision of that point cannot avail the
position of the appellant in this case. (4 Tex. R., 278; 8 Tex. R., 74, 250,
25'3.)
We are of opinion that the first ground was not well taken and that there
was no error in refusing to dismiss.
The second ground of error was the overruling of the demurrer.
[160] The special cause of exception was that the residence of the plaintiff
was not set forth with sufficient certainty. The statute requires the plaintiff
in his petition to set forth the names of the parties and their residence, if known.
(Hart. Dig., Art. 671.) The object of requiring the plaintiff to specify the place
of his residence is not very apparant. His place of domicile can affect neither
the remedy nor the right. It may afford some guide to his locality should
judgment be against him on the merits or for costs, but there is no certainty
that his place of residence at the commencement of suit will be his domicile at
its termination, and the successful defendant might be compelled to seek elsewhere
for the satisfaction of his judgment.
There is more of substance and benefit in the requisition that the defendant's
place of residence should be specified. This is the locality in which the suit
must be brought, unless authorized or required to be instituted elsewhere
under some of the exceptions of the statute; and it might appear on the face
of the petition whether the suit in this particular was brought in conformity
with law. The plaintiff in the petition described himself as a resident citizen
of the State of Tennessee. This we deem sufficiently specific. If the defendant
had desired. to secure the payment of costs in the event that judgment
should be eventually against the plaintiff, lie could have attained that object by
requiring security, and in that event a knowledge of the precise locus of the
plaintiff's domicile could have been of no possible advantage to the defendant.
There was no error in overruling the demurrer.
The third ground is the admission of the transcript in evidence to the jury.
The objections to the transcript are twofold, viz:
1st. That it was not properly authenticated, &c.
2d. That the Court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction of the cause.
The objection to the authentication is that the transcript [161] purports to
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Texas. Supreme Court. Reports of cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas during Austin term, 1854, and a part of Galveston term 1855. Volume 13., book, 1876; Houston, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28561/m1/88/: accessed April 18, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; .