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Interview with
Mr. Clyde C. Childress
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Place of Interview: Dallas, Texas
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Oral History Collection

Clyde C. Childress

Interviewer: Dr. Ron Marcello

Place of Interview: Dallas, Texas

Date: February 15, 1972

Dr. Marcello: This is Ron Marcello interviewing Mr. Clyde Childress for the North Texas State University Oral History Collection. I'm interviewing Mr. Childress in order to get his reminiscences and experiences and impressions while he was an American guerrilla in the Philippines on Mindanao during World War II. Mr. Childress, to begin this interview would you very briefly give me a biographical sketch of yourself. In other words, could you tell me where you were born, when you were born, your education, and things of this nature. You don't have to go into a lot of detail, but just be rather brief.

Mr. Childress: I was born in Fort Worth, Texas, on July 22, 1917, and attended schools in Southern California and attended high school at Staunton Military Academy in Staunton, Virginia, where I was in R. O. T. C., and I got my commission in the Army from Staunton. After Staunton, I attended one year at the University of Texas. After one year I worked for a short time and entered the Army in 1940.

Marcello: Why did you enter the Army? Was there any particular reason for this?

Childress: Well, that time, as you probably know, was during the depression, and there wasn't a great deal going on, and I received a letter one day from what was known as the War Department at that time, asking me if I would like to go on two years' active duty. It sounded pretty good so I accepted.

Marcello: Incidentally, this is one of the common answers that I receive. Usually, most people that I've interviewed say they entered the service either because they couldn't find a job or had no work, or they were poor boys that wanted to see the world, and this presented an opportunity for them to do so, and obviously in your case it was the fact that you had not been able to secure any type of employment. When did you go to the Philippines?

Childress: Well, I went to the Philippines in April of 1941, after having been stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, from 1940 to that time. About the job situation, I was working but a chance to go in the Army as an officer was more appealing. Remember that in those days being in the Army was not as common as today.

Marcello: What particular unit were you in? Could you designate your unit or identify it?

Childress: In the Philippines?

Marcello: Right.

Childress: Well, let me give a little build-up to this. When I was at Fort Benning, I decided I wanted to see a little of the world. At Fort Benning I was a 2nd lieutenant and an instructor in the infantry school teaching scouting and patrolling to other lieutenants like myself who came in the Army after I did. I wanted some action and excitement. So I wrote a letter to the War Department asking to be transferred to the Philippines, and at that time the only foreign stations that the United States had was Panama, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, or the Philippines.

Marcello: I would assume that the peacetime Army overseas was not a bad place to be. Is that correct?

Childress: Well, no, it wasn't a bad place to be. I requested the Philippines, and within six weeks I received my orders and went by ship from Charleston, South Carolina, to New York and boarded the liner Washington, which had just been taken off the New York - Hamburg run, and still had all of the personnel on it that the passengers had enjoyed in the trans-Atlantic run. I went from New York through the Panama Canal to San Francisco in a stateroom just like a paying passenger, and then when we got to San Francisco we were met by crews of workmen. They changed the liner Washington from an

ocean liner into a troopship. A large number of troops were placed on board and the next stop was Honolulu and then we sailed to the Philippines.

Marcello: Why did you pick the Philippines? Was there any particular reason?

Childress: Well, yes, it seemed to be the farthest away, and had an interesting history. And I had an idea of going to the Philippines and staying there for two years, and during my leave periods I thought I would visit China and Japan and then on my way home I would try to go home through India and on through the Middle East to the United States.

Marcello: At that particular time did you feel that within a very short period the United States would be involved in a war with Japan?

Childress: We had no idea that we would ever be in a war. I had a car. I had a 1940 Plymouth, bought it brand new just a short time before I went to the Philippines. They shipped my car over there, and I was assigned to the Philippines with the Philippine Department, unassigned, which meant that. A regimental assignment had not been made yet. When the ship pulled into Manila Bay, a contingent of officers from the various outfits came on board, and we were told what regiment we were to be in. I was assigned to the 31st Infantry Regiment of the Philippine Division, and others on board were

assigned to the 57th Philippine Scouts and the 45th Philippine Scouts or the various other regiments in the Philippine Division of which General Wainwright was in command.

Marcello: Would you explain just a little bit about the Philippine Division? What was it, how did it function, what was its job?

Childress: The Philippine Division was an infantry division consisting of the 45th Infantry Regiment, Philippine Scouts, the 57th Infantry Regiment, Philippine Scouts, the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, and the 31st Infantry Regiment, United States Army. And the difference between a Philippine Scout regiment at that time was that the soldiers, the enlisted men, were Filipinos although they were in the United States Army with a special classification. They would never serve any other place except in the Philippines, and the officers were regular United States Army officers. The 31st Infantry that I was in was an American regular Army regiment. The 31st was called the "Foreign Legion Regiment" of the United States. It had never been in the United States. It was formed in 1917 during the Russian Revolution and was sent to Vladivostok to patrol the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and then it was brought back. I'm not familiar with all the intimate history of the regiment, but they had been in the Philippines

for many, many years.

Marcello: What sort of function did you have with this particular division?

Childress: I was a second lieutenant, and at that time there were no draftees in the Philippine Department. It was all regular Army. I was assigned as a platoon leader in C Company of the 1st Battalion of the 31st Infantry. Then a short time later I was made battalion adjutant of the 1st Battalion. There were no officers quarters on the post. As a matter of fact there was no post. The 31st Infantry Regiment was spread all over town. The 1st Battalion was in a place called the Cuartel de España. It was in the old Intramuros. The Intramuros is the old walled city of Manila. The original city dates back to when the Spaniards first came there. The Cuartel de España was the old Spanish barracks that the Spanish troops occupied before the United States took over the Philippines in 1898, I believe. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were at the Estado Major, which was another barracks in another part of town on the Pasig River. The Philippine Scout Regiments were at Fort William McKinley, a few miles outside of Manila. The service company was in the Santa Lucia barracks which was another old Spanish barracks in the Intramuros.

Marcello: When you got to the Philippines and were assigned to

this particular division, what was the state of combat readiness of this division? First of all maybe I should ask when did you get to the Philippines?

Childress: I arrived in Manila on the eighth of May in 1941.

Marcello: And now, what was the combat readiness of the division at that time?

Childress: The division was not in any state of combat readiness. It was a peacetime, garrison-type regular Army regiment or division with all regular Army soldiers who were professional soldiers who had been over there, many of them, for many years. There was a great regimental spirit and tradition in the regiment, something that has disappeared, as I understand, from the service of today. It was a regiment that now-a-days might be called a spit-and-polish regiment, but it was a lot of fun for a young man to be in an organization of that type. The first sergeant of our company had been a sergeant longer than I had been alive. All of the sergeants were much older than the lieutenants, and a lot of the other enlisted men were older than we were.

I'd like to make some remarks about what happened when I arrived there. We were taken ashore, and the first thing that we did--the party that met us on the ship took us ashore--was to be taken to a Chinese tailor shop. They had uniforms, dress uniforms, made for us

because they were having a party that night, as was the custom in the Philippines. They called it a bienvenido, which means a welcoming party, at the Army-Navy Club, and we had our uniforms that these Chinese tailors had made for every officer that arrived on that ship. By that evening we had full uniforms with white mess jackets and everything that went with it, and we were ready for the party that night.

Marcello: When you got to the Philippines and after you were assigned to your units, were there feverish preparations taking place for the eventuality of a war with Japan?

Childress: No. There was never any mention at our level at that time of any war with Japan. I will say this though. The wives and families were sent back to the states on the ship I arrived on. It was just peacetime service. I had an apartment downtown, and at that time in the Army you did just a half day's duty. You reported for duty at seven o'clock in the morning for reveille and did your drill or whatever it was on through until about twelve-thirty in the afternoon, and there was officers' call, and then you were off the rest of the afternoon. They had some schedules for athletics. We played softball sometimes in the afternoon, and at night people went to the Jai Alai and just had a nice life, except for one thing. The 31st Infantry was known among the

men there as the 31st Foot Cavalry, though. We did a fifteen-mile march every Thursday night. We cleared the compound at Quartel de Espana at six o'clock in the evening, and we were back in the Quartel at midnight, and that was a pretty hot walk. We marched up Dewey Boulevard along the edge of Manila Bay and circled around through the town and just took a fifteen-mile march and came back.

Marcello: I gather from what you've said that it was mainly business as usual. Is that a good term to use?

Childress: Business as usual. And the regiment at that time had not even been issued, as I recall, the new M-1 rifles or any of the later model weapons. They came in while I was there.

Marcello: I gather for the most part the troops there were still equipped with the old Springfield 03. Is this correct?

Childress: Yes. And then soon after I got there the pace began to change.

Marcello: I was going to ask you when things started to change.

Childress: It was within, I would say, about six weeks that the pace began to change. A shipload of P-40 airplanes arrived for the Air Corps there, and new weapons arrived, and a large number of recruits were brought in. At that time the recruits were not trained in infantry replacement training centers like they were

in World War II. They were actually brought to the regiment, and they were trained by corporals, and corporals in the Army at that time had considerable authority, same as a sergeant. Then during that early period we went on maneuvers for eleven days down into Batangas Province. We occupied the positions that we were supposed to occupy in case the Philippines were attacked. They had a maneuver schedule that was called Orange Plan Three, which designated what every organization, where they were supposed to report for their place of duty in case the island was attacked.

Marcello: I gather that in general outline Orange Plan Three planned for the Army in the Philippines to conduct more or less a holding operation, isn't that correct? In other words, you were supposed to fight a holding operation until rescued by reinforcements from the United States or by the United States Navy or whatever it might be. The Philippines were considered to be a rather vulnerable outpost, was it not?

Childress: Well, yes, it was a vulnerable outpost because we were 11,000 miles from the mainland.

Marcello: And much, much closer to Japan.

Childress: We were very close to Japan. And as a matter of fact, even the horses that were in the 26th Cavalry and the mules that were in the Quartermaster pack trains had

to be supplied with fodder brought from the United States. The animals could not subsist on the grains and grasses in the Philippines. So even the animals had to be supplied from the outside. There was one special transport ship, the General Meigs that did nothing but transport hay, oats, and replacement mules and horses between the states and the Philippines.

Marcello: Did you ever have very much contact with Japanese civilians or Japanese nationals, I suppose we could call them, while you were in the Philippines?

Childress: The only contact I had with Japanese nationals was in one apartment building in which I lived. In the first apartment building there were several Japanese. To me, as I look back, they were very clean-cut looking. They looked more like military or naval officers in civilian clothes than Japanese businessmen, and they used to eye us considerably when they would see us moving about in our uniforms.

Marcello: Was there quite a bit of talk about a possible fifth column movement on the Philippines by Japanese nationals? In other words, were there ever any alerts? Alerts perhaps isn't a good word to use, but did the Army prepare for sabotage of some sort?

Childress: Yes, we had alerts, and every person who lived off the post had to supply the duty officer with their telephone

number, and many times during the night the phone would ring, and the duty officer would say, "The post of Manila is ordered on alert," and we had just a very few minutes to get dressed and report to our companies. These were all practice alerts, but they would have the trucks drawn up, and we would load up the mess equipment and ammunition and prepare to move out before the alerts were called off.

Marcello: I would assume that these alerts increased in frequency as one got closer and closer to December 7.

Childress: Well, I imagine they did, but I left there in the latter part of August. At that time the Philippine Army was mobilized, and a number of officers from the Philippine Division was sent out as instructors to the Philippine Army. I was one of them. I was sent to the Island of Panay when the 61st Infantry, Philippine Army, was mobilized.

Marcello: Would you describe some of the activities which occurred on the Island of Panay while you were there?

Childress: I sailed down there on an inter-island ship and reported to the . . . I don't remember the name of the town now or the name of the post, but we got there the day before the Filipinos were supposed to arrive, and we checked the camp out. As for the organization of the Philippine Army at that time, they had in the 61st

Regiment three battalions consisting of rifle companies and one machine-gun company. At that time in each battalion there was one American captain who was assigned as the rifle company instructor, and one lieutenant assigned as the machine-gun company instructor, which was my job. After the Philippine Army was mobilized, the battalion I was with was sent to the town of Dingle, where I stayed almost three months. And at that time we were on detached service to the Philippine Army only for three months. We were supposed to return to our organizations in Manila at the end of the three months.

Marcello: What was the difference between the Philippine Scouts and the Philippine Army?

Childress: Well, the Philippine Scouts were actually United States soldiers, and they were trained and had been in the Army--many of them--for many, many years. They were Filipinos under American officers and would serve only in the Philippines.

Marcello: And I would assume they were strictly volunteers, is that correct?

Childress: They were volunteers, and the Philippine Scouts were an elite organization, and the Philippine Scout soldiers were highly trained, and their morale was extremely high. They were very proud to be in one of those Scout regiments. The Philippine Army soldier was the Filipino farmer.

Marcello: He was the draftee, a conscript.

Childress: He was a draftee, a conscript, and they were the little Philippine farmers who had never been anywhere except in their village. Most of them were rice farmers and came from the rural areas and had very little contact with the military. They didn't know anything--the type of people that lived by a stream and did all their washing in the stream and washed their animals in the stream and plowed with a carabao. They were just simple farmers.

Marcello: I would assume that you ran into all sorts of special problems in trying to train a person of this sort in modern warfare.

Childress: Well, yes, we did because most of these people were illiterate. They could speak English to some extent. A lot of them could speak very little English. The Philippine Army officers were a proud lot, but they were not from an industrial-type country, and it was difficult to put across the training that we wanted to impart to them. And then the main thing was that the Philippine Army had no modern weapons. The rifle was the old Enfield rifle that was issued back in World War I to the United States troops. The heavy weapons companies were equipped with the old Stokes mortar. It was the old World War I weapon. They used the old

water-cooled machine-guns and the old water-cooled .50 caliber machine-guns.

Marcello: Well, could you train these people very much beyond being a rifleman? In other words, you couldn't make a truck driver out of them, for example. They couldn't handle any sophisticated equipment.

Childress: No, we didn't have any trucks. Actually, we had two trucks per battalion. It was a mess and baggage truck. The Philippine Army battalion was hardly any more effective as a fighting unit in modern warfare than a high school R.O.T.C. cadet battalion.

Marcello: Did you realize this at the time you were training these people?

Childress: Well, we did but we didn't think at the time that we were actually going to have to go into battle with these people, which we found ourselves doing in just a few weeks.

Marcello: Well, how long do you think it would have taken you to turn out a competent soldier using this type of material?

Childress: Well, it would be difficult to answer that question. At the time we were training them we didn't know. We didn't know ourselves that we were going to be competent soldiers, because we had never been in action, and we

learned many things later on after the war began. This Philippine Army battalion, we trained it there in Dingle for approximately two and a half months, and then the entire division was brought together, and we were transferred from the island of Panay to the island of Negros to a big cantonment that was built there. I say cantonment, but the houses were all grass shacks, as we would call them, and at that time the Philippine Army was federalized, and the American officers who were . . .

Marcello: In other words, it was kind of like a National Guard unit up to that point.

Childress: That's right. Then they were federalized, and the American officers, who formerly had the capacity of instructors only, were given command assignments with the Philippine Army. The captains who had been the instructors for the three rifle companies of the battalion were made the battalion commanders, and the lieutenants who were the machine-gun company instructors were made battalion staff officers, and as luck would have it, the captain that I was with at Dingle, Captain Van Nostrand was the senior captain, so he was made the regimental executive officer, and fortunately I was in the right place--I got a promotion to captain and was made commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 61st

Philippine Army Regiment.

Marcello: Incidentally, at this time were you keeping pretty well abreast with world events? In other words, by this time did you at least have a feeling that sooner or later some sort of hostilities might break out with the Japanese?

Childress: To be real truthful, no, because communications in those days were not as good as they are now.

Marcello: In other words, you didn't have access to a daily newspaper, perhaps.

Childress: No, we didn't have any daily newspapers. Our contact with the outside world was by short-wave radio, and we didn't have the habit of keeping abreast of day by day world developments then as people do now.

Marcello: Okay, so what happened when you got to Negros?

Childress: Well, the three battalions were brought together in one place to form the regiment, and a boatload of lieutenant colonels were shipped out from the United States, and these men were assigned as the regimental commanders of these various Philippine Army regiments. The officer assigned as our regimental commander was a Colonel Eugene Mitchell from Austin, Texas, who I understand has passed away now. He had been stationed at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio. As I recall he had been the provost marshal there, and many of these

officers were men who had never gone to the Command and General Staff School and had held jobs as provost marshalls, range officers and various other types of officers. Before World War II, to become a colonel in command of a line regiment you had to have completed the Command and General Staff School. Well, very few of these officers that were sent out to command the Philippine Army regiments had ever been to the Command and General Staff School.

Marcello: I would assume that there perhaps was no love lost between the people who had been there for awhile and these new officers. Maybe respect would be a better word to use.

Childress: Well, there was not much relationship between these officers. They came directly off the boat to the Philippine Army. They didn't have a chance, and it was not a very good thing for these people because they didn't have an opportunity to acclimate themselves to the climate and customs in the Philippines. They went directly from the ship to the Philippine countryside--way out in what we called the boondocks--and living was rather primitive. Even though we were in a cantonment, the facilities that many of these men had been used to no longer existed.

Marcello: Well, as I recall, there's not a whole lot on the island of Negros, is there? Is there really a major

city there of any kind?

Childress: Well, no big city. There are a lot of sugar plantations, and there are some nice homes. There are some well to do homes there, but the part where the cantonment was located was quite a way out in the country, an undeveloped area, and about two weeks after we arrived on Negros the war started.

Marcello: Do you remember what you were doing at the time that you heard about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?

Childress: Yes, I remember exactly what I was doing. I had been taking my battalion out in the field in the morning on certain maneuvers--tactical exercises--and talk was beginning to circulate that we were getting close to some sort of a problem, and on this particular morning Major Van Nostrand, who was the regimental executive officer . . . well, as I started to take my battalion out in the field, he came up to me and said, "Clyde, don't go out very far today. We're expecting trouble." And so we went out just maybe a mile or two, and later that morning he came out and said we are at war with Japan, that Pearl Harbor had been bombed, Manila and Davao had been bombed, Capiz had been bombed, and we were to move out, and he said, "Bring your battalion in. The men will be fed, and load them up and clear the cantonment area." I brought the men in, and within an hour and a half we had left the

cantonment and headed out down the highway.

Marcello: What were your thoughts when you heard the news about Pearl Harbor?

Childress: When I was at Fort Benning I had read a lot about the Japanese Army in the infantry school library. I had a fair background of the capabilities of the Japanese Army and what they were capable of doing, and I was elated in a way. You have a feeling of elation when you're going into a war. It's like jumping off of a high diving board, actually. But I knew that we were in for a lot of trouble. I knew that the Japanese would overrun the Philippines, that we didn't have the supplies or the capability of holding off a modern army, and I just wondered at that time what was going to happen to us. There was a feeling of foreboding.

Marcello: This is a very interesting observation that you have made because most of the enlisted men that I've talked to--and obviously they were probably less educated than you--simply assumed that, "Well, it's going to take us about six months to wipe 'em up. Then it's going to be all over."

Childress: Well, that's a good feeling. It's nice to have people with that because everyone wants to do the best he can, but still it's good to be able to reason for yourself and to know what is going on and to be able to be aware

of what is happening.

Marcello: But, nevertheless, you had some rather ugly premonitions about what was to follow.

Childress: Yes, I did.

Marcello: So what happened next then? You heard about the attack on Pearl Harbor. You had this conversation with your immediate superior. What happened then?

Childress: I moved the battalion out, and we bivouacked out in the countryside for several days, and we saw Japanese aircraft the first day, and we tried to stay under cover. We didn't know where the Japanese would attack, and we were moving to the city of Bocolod, which was a small but modern city in Negros, where there was an airfield, and my battalion was assigned the job of guarding the airfield.

Marcello: Now you had no training, I gather, with anti-aircraft weapons or things of that nature.

Childress: No. We had two air-cooled .50 caliber machine-guns besides our other weapons, and we put a perimeter around. We stationed troops around the airfield, and there was a small airline operating in the Philippines called INAEC. That's initials for Iloilo Negros Air Express Company. And Iloilo is the name of the principal town on Panay. They had a Sikorsky amphibian and a Fokker tri-motor, and they actually brought that tri-motor in there after war was declared, and they quit

flying it shortly after. We guarded the airfield there for, oh, maybe a week or two. I don't remember exactly.

Marcello: I would imagine that the airfield wasn't big game for the Japanese.

Childress: No, no. Just a little grass field. And it was decided to ship the division to the island of Mindanao. So my battalion went across the mountains first to eastern Negros to the town of San Carlos.

Marcello: Now all this time you had had no contact at all with the Japanese--no direct contact.

Childress: No, no contact with the Japanese. We boarded ships in San Carlos and sailed to Mindanao. We landed at the town of Iligan on the north coast of Mindanao, and we were almost blown out of the water by our own troops that were stationed in Mindanao. There were several ships in our convoy, and when we came up to Iligan, they didn't know if we were Japanese, and they were ready to blow up the pier and open fire on us.

Marcello: I would assume there was a lot of this sort of thing going on in the Philippines.

Childress: There was. There was considerable confusion.

Marcello: Incidentally, I suppose that one of the major Japanese thrusts was expected to come on Mindanao, and that's why you were being sent there.

Childress: Yes, well, one of the major thrusts was at Davao in

southern Mindanao . . .

Marcello: Right.

Childress: The hemp fields in Davao were a Japanese operation before the war, and they immediately occupied Davao. There was a wonderful harbor there, and they made a big naval base out of it.

Marcello: I've interviewed some of the prisoners who worked on that naval base and airstrip there, so I am familiar with it.

Childress: After landing in Iligan, my battalion was ordered to go to Malabang. It was in the southern part of Lanao province, which is the Moro province, and there was an airfield there that we were supposed to guard.

Marcello: What was the terrain like on Mindanao in the area where you were guarding?

Childress: The terrain was very forested and mountainous, and there were some very beautiful lakes in the area--Lake Dapau and Lake Lanao. The Moros keep very neat farms, and the first night I went from Iligan to a town called Ganassi and spent the night in a constabulary barracks which was surrounded by high barbed wire. The Moros were quite a fierce people.

Marcello: Now they were Moslems, were they not?

Childress: Moslems, yes, and they carried wicked-looking knives, and they were quite a fierce-looking people, and the Christian Filipinos--the Constabulary troops were

Christian Filipinos--are quite afraid of the Moros.

Marcello: What sort of loyalties did these Moros have, incidentally? When I say loyalties, were they on our side, were they on the Japanese side, or really didn't they care?

Childress: The Moros' loyalty to a great extent is to themselves. However, the Moros had great respect for Americans because, considering themselves to be fierce people, they expected others to be afraid of them, and it seems that the Spaniards, when they occupied southern Mindanao, had never pacified the Moros, and when their garrison at Malabang would have a changing of the guard at their outlying outposts they would use a whole company of soldiers, so the story would go--and the Moros had no respect for them. But there were several old Americans that went into Lanao province alone and opened up coconut plantations and hired the Moros, and the Moros thought the Americans were pretty brave people to come in among them alone. I imagine it was just like in the early days with the Indians in the United States.

Marcello: I would assume that in this Philippine Army there were no Moros, however.

Childress: I don't think there were any Moro units. I'm not sure. I know that the Filipino soldiers in my battalion from Panay were Christian Filipinos, and they were very

frightened at being sent to Mindanao and particularly frightened at being sent to Lanao where the Moros were. We went down to the airfield in Lanao at Malabang, and we set up our defensive positions. Unfortunately we were there during the dry season, and there are two rivers in the area, and the malarial season is during the dry season, and a large number of my troops came down with malaria.

Marcello: Did you have quinine or any other medical facilities available?

Childress: We had very little quinine. We had very few medical facilities, and I was fortunate. I never contracted malaria.

Marcello: Incidentally, was this a major airfield?

Childress: It was a large airfield, a very large airfield, but it was just a field.

Marcello: In other words, there were no military planes on it?

Childress: No, no military planes on it. There were no installations on it. There wasn't anything there. Malabang was just a little village with a few houses. It was a very out-of-the-way place, and I spent six months in Lanao before the Japanese ever came there. Once in a while there would be a big contingent of Moros brought in to supposedly attack the Japanese in Davao, but I heard those operations never got anywhere.

Marcello: This place was somewhat inland, I gather.

Childress: Malabang?

Marcello: Right.

Childress: No.

Marcello: It was on the coast?

Childress: It was right on the coast, on Illana Bay.

Marcello: But you had no contact with the Japanese nearly for six months after they had landed.

Childress: No. No contact at all.

Marcello: How do you explain that?

Childress: Well, there are a lot of islands in the Philippines.

Marcello: Sure, over 7,000.

Childress: It's over 500 miles from Mindanao to Manila, and they had their objectives, and they took their objectives, and then Bataan slowed the Japanese down. They were pretty busy on Bataan and Corregidor to bother with us.

Marcello: I see. In other words, they considered Bataan and Corregidor and Luzon, perhaps, much more important than Mindanao. It was a matter of taking first things first.

Childress: Yes, except for Davao.

Marcello: What did you do in the meantime? You had obviously heard some news about the Japanese landing, the initial landings on Mindanao.

Childress: Oh, we knew where they were. There was fighting around Davao. I knew some of the people that were involved in that, and we were busy. We prepared defensive positions all up and down the road. There were some Air Corps units that were bivouacked near where we were, and there were some P-40's that landed on Malabang Airfield and were serviced there, but most of our planes had been destroyed, you know, in the initial strikes in the Philippines.

Marcello: What did you do during that six-month interim while the Japanese had landed? Was there anything in particular that you had done to prepare for some sort of an onslaught or something?

Childress: Yes, we dug all kinds of defensive positions. We dug pits and put sharpened bamboo stakes in them, and we built roadblocks and cleared fields of fire, and on up the highway soon after I'd been in Malabang for a few weeks another battalion was moved in, and I was pulled back, and then while they occupied the airfield, my battalion moved up the road and prepared defensive positions up the road. In the event that the Japanese attacked, we could fight delaying actions up the highway.

Marcello: Do you think that the Japanese knew where you were?

Childress: We had an idea that they knew exactly where we were.

Marcello: When you say you have an idea, would you care to elaborate on that?

Childress: Well, actually, I'm sure they knew where we were because they might have had some spies, but I don't want to be inconsistent because on May 10 when the Japanese attacked us, we had two battalions on a line. Major McLish's battalion, the third battalion, was guarding the highway going into the interior, and my battalion was on his right covering a trail going into the interior, Major Hill's battalion was farther up the road. As I mentioned, a large percentage of our troops were sick with malaria. We had absolutely no transport except for one mess truck and one baggage truck for a battalion of over 500 men. We had no way of moving. If we marched, there was no way to carry the food to supply us. As an Army we were an immobile Army. We were just a lot of us there. That's all it amounted to. And the Air Corps personnel that was bivouacked there, most of those boys were sick with malaria, so there was nothing they could have done. And when the Japs attacked, they came up to our lines, and when we opened fire on them we held them at that road junction for almost twenty-four hours.

Marcello: Incidentally, when you say you opened fire on them, what did you have to open fire on them with? Did you have any heavy weapons at all?

Childress: No. Well, we had two 2.95 mountain guns. They were an

old British gun because the artillery for the Philippine Army had been sunk on the ship while being delivered to us.

Marcello: In other words, it was to come after you got there?

Childress: Right. We had no artillery, but the Japanese, you must remember, had never encountered a modern army before, and even in China the Chinese were a rather primitive army and didn't have any heavy weapons. But when the Japanese met our forces on Bataan, Bataan was held by 155 millimeter howitzers. They called them "Long Toms," and it was the first time the Japanese had ever encountered any heavy artillery like that. The artillery positions were zeroed in. I mean they were surveyed in. They knew where every possible enemy assembly area was. They knew the range to these assembly area. The Philippine Scout troops on Bataan had patrolled thoroughly, and whenever they would find a Japanese division assembling for an attack, they would get the message back, and these "Long Toms" . . . it was one of the few times in our history of warfare where they've had all the ammunition that they ever wanted. They had it to burn, and they would shoot a whole battery at a truck from what I've heard. Well, it made believers out of the Japanese, that artillery. And the reason, I found out later from Colonel Mitchell, who was captured, and after the war

was over I talked with him in the United States, and we were discussing about the day that we were attacked there, and we were curious why the Japanese had not gone through us because we really had nothing to hold them with. He told me every prisoner that they captured they kept interviewing, "Where's the artillery? Where's the artillery?" They were afraid that they were being drawn into a trap, that we had artillery there like they had on Bataan, that we were just going to really clobber them.

Marcello: In other words, this initial Japanese thrust on Mindanao was a rather cautious one. Perhaps we could even call it a probing type of attack.

Childress: Right. We figured it was a reinforced Japanese regiment, and they had some tanks that attacked us.

Marcello: How about air power? Were you subjected to any bombardment or strafing?

Childress: Well, one time while we were on the airfield at Malabang about fifteen bombers . . .

Marcello: Were these "Betty" bombers?

Childress: I don't know if they were "Betty" bombers. They were pretty good-sized, and they bombed the airfield there, and there were some craters. I guess they must have used at least 500 bombs because they left some huge craters on the airfield.

But in the attack they used aircraft as observation planes, and they could always pick our flanks. The principal Japanese ground tactic was an envelopment, and they used their aircraft to determine where our flanks were, and then they would envelop us.

Marcello: How long were you able to hold out against the Japanese before they finally broke through, or enveloped you, whatever the case may have been?

Childress: Well, that part gets to the interesting personal part of my story.

Marcello: Chronologically, at what time are we speaking now?

Childress: We're talking about the 10th of May, 1942.

Marcello: By this time then, Corregidor had fallen and Bataan had fallen.

Childress: Corregidor had fallen and Bataan had fallen.

Marcello: So far as major installations or major groups in the Philippines are concerned, you were the last ones holding out.

Childress: Yes, that's right. The Japanese are mopping up now.

Marcello: They could concentrate their full power on Mindanao.

Childress: Yes, and on the other islands.

Marcello: Right.

Childress: The central islands.

Marcello: Right.

Childress: Well, they attacked us about two o'clock in the morning, and there was desultory firing all day, and we had a meeting up on the road, myself and McLish and Colonel Mitchell and the other officers, and we decided to take the pressure off of McLish's battalion which was getting the brunt of the attack. My battalion off on the right where it would counterattack across the front, which we did, and it took, oh, until two o'clock in the afternoon to get this thing organized and move out, and the Japanese were waiting for us. They held their fire. We were moving across kind of scrubby brush, just level ground. Then they suddenly opened up with mortars and automatics.

Marcello: How were your troops performing?

Childress: Some performed excellently; others, we found that a lot of them had civilian clothes hidden in their packs that we didn't know about, and they just melted away. And we withdrew back to our original positions, and by that time night had fallen, and I went back up on the road where the command post was to find out what was going on. It was very still. It was a bright, moonlit night. There was no firing, and as I walked across the flat ground to the hill . . . the road was on a ridge, and I climbed up to the ridge where the command post was. I couldn't find anybody, and I had a couple of Filipinos

with me. On the edge of the ridge there was a trench with a platoon of McLish's battalion in it. They were still in position, and Lieutenant Siquoia was in command there, but he didn't know what the situation was, so I went up on the ridge and walked up and down along the road and couldn't see a soul. I went into the motor pool on the side of the road, and there was a truck in there loaded with ammunition, cans of gasoline. The .50 caliber machine-guns were in it. Some of McLish's personal stuff was in it, and I couldn't understand what was going on, and I sent runners to have the company commanders meet me there. I walked up and down the road, and then I came to realize that I was behind the Japanese lines. This was an eerie feeling and I still shudder when I think about it. That afternoon everyone had pulled back, and then when I came up there the Japanese were there, and they were just quiet. We waited in the motor pool until all the company commanders showed up.

Marcello: Your whole unit was behind Japanese lines?

Childress: Behind the Japanese lines, yes.

Marcello: How did they get past you without detecting you?

Childress: Well, I was way over on the right.

Marcello: I see.

Childress: When I came back from this counterattack to my original position and then walked back up on the road, the troops that had been on the road that morning had fallen back.

Marcello: And the Japanese were sticking mainly to the roads, I gather.

Childress: Right, and then just before daylight we were in the motor pool, and the Japanese attacked us in the motor pool, and we fell back down the ridge and withdrew up the Porog trail that my battalion had originally been guarding.

Marcello: Incidentally, all this time had you known about the fall of Bataan and Corregidor?

Childress: Oh, yes.

Marcello: What did this do to your morale? Or had you more or less expected it?

Childress: Well, we expected it, but when we knew that Bataan and Corregidor had fallen, we knew that it wasn't going to be long before we were next.

Marcello: What were your own feelings with regard to being captured? Had you heard stories that the Japanese took no prisoners, that you would all be killed? This was a rumor that was common among the enlisted men.

Childress: Well, no. I never believed that the Japanese would kill the prisoners, just massacre the prisoners, but I knew that anyone that was taken by the Japanese would

not have a very good go if it.

Marcello: Had you determined from the very beginning that if worse came to worse you were going to try to head for the hills?

Childress: Oh, yes. McLish and I had determined that we would. And some of the older . . . there was a Major Forte, who owned a plantation at Malabang. He had been in the constabulary back when the Americans were the Constabulary officers. And our division commander was also named Forte, and he was presently a brigadier general in the Constabulary. These two old-timers had talked about taking herds of cattle and going up behind Lake Lanao and building a redoubt up there and all that, but we didn't think that was feasible.

Marcello: But at least you had some people who knew the terrain and knew the countryside fairly well, and this was mountainous countryside.

Childress: Very, very mountainous countryside, very rugged terrain. And when I got up the Porog trail and got up to Lake Dapau, I found out that our regiment had been dispersed. Colonel Mitchell was captured. McLish had been . . . he wasn't wounded, but he was just overcome with fatigue, and they'd taken him up the trail in another direction. My battalion was about intact, and I headed out towards

the north coast, to the Christian settlements and I met up with . . . where I was fortunate, I had a platoon of Philippine Constabulary assigned to my battalion.

Marcello: And these would have been local people, is that correct?

Childress: Yes. They're like a state police force, but their organization is like soldiers. They carry rifles and so forth, but they are policemen.

Marcello: In other words, it's a paramilitary force, I suppose we would call it today.

Childress: Right, and they were familiar with the Moros, and they captured two Moros, bound their hands behind them and forced these Moros to guide us right out through the forest . . . this was my first taste of spending the night in the tropical rain forest without camping equipment and getting leeches on me . . . and up to the north coast. And there was a whole group of Constabulary had assembled at a place called Cebuana Barracks in the northwestern part of Mindanao, and I went up there, and I found the Sindangan company of the Constabulary. Major Teano was going to take that company and go across the northern neck of Zamboanga province to the town of Sindangan, and I arranged to go with him.

Marcello: Would you describe this trip or this journey?

Childress: It took eight days to go across that neck of Zamboanga through country that it's doubtful that a white man has

ever gone through. It was very rugged and difficult to traverse.

Marcello: You were born in Fort Worth and raised in California, you said, and you'd been in the Philippines for a short while, not a tremendous amount of time. How were you faring personally?

Childress: Well, fortunately, I had had six months, at least, with the Philippine Army, living in the field with the Philippine Army, eating their food, and so it was no great transition for me to go from that to guerrilla warfare. A lot of the Americans who had been back in headquarters and such as that and who had been living on canned goods and eating American-style food did have trouble adjusting. Then the doctors had talked so much about getting dysentery from drinking the water and eating certain leafy vegetables that they had most of the boys afraid that if they went out in the countryside where sanitation as we know it is nonexistent and flies cover everything that they would contract some tropical disease, which wasn't true. You had to be careful, but having lived with the Filipinos, I wasn't a bit worried about going off on my own.

Marcello: At this time were you living off the countryside, or did you have a stock of Army supplies?

Childress: No, we had no supplies. I was in the battle. I had changed my clothing from my khaki Army clothing to the blue denims which the Filipino troops wore, and the biggest one I could get was too small for me, and I made the mistake of going into battle wearing my old shoes instead of my new shoes, so within a few weeks I was barefooted with no clothing.

Marcello: What was this trip like? Let's get back again to this eight-day trip.

Childress: Alright. It was through a very rugged country. We spent the night with the people who lived there called Suvanos. Suvo is a Filipino word meaning river, and the Suvanos were river people. They are a pagan tribe of people, and they have some quite individual characteristics. You could spend a whole evening just talking about the Suvanos and their customs. They ferment a liquor which . . . in going through the high forests in the Philippines it's cool and you're wet. It rains every day and you're wet, and you come in at night tired, and you sleep in one of these Suvano houses on this split bamboo floor. I had no blanket, no mosquito net. I was just down to my shoes coming apart and my clothes coming apart. I had a rifle, a pair of field glasses, and my automatic pistol. We ate just rice and whatever we could get and some of this fermented wine that they

made, and you'd get a few swigs of that and you'd be warm enough to sleep at night, and I got through to Sindangan, and Sindangan was the end of the road, and further on down is a town called Liloy, but before I get to that, there was an American who had a plantation near Sindangan and there were several of us that went up and stayed up with him, and he had an evacuation plan behind his house on the road.

Marcello: Incidentally, at this point how many were in your group?

Childress: When I went across the mountains in Zamboanga, there were two other Americans with me.

Marcello: And you did have a group of Filipino Constabularies with you.

Childress: I was with a Constabulary company.

Marcello: But there were just two other Americans in addition to yourself?

Childress: Yes, right. When I got to Sindangan I went up into the evacuation place of this American plantation owner. He had a little house built two or three miles behind his house. He had a piano and he was all set up, you know, to spend the war like that, and he had cattle, and it looked like the climate was good back there, and if nothing bothered us, it looked as though we'd be alright, and we were there about two weeks before the Japs flushed us out.

Marcello: What did you do during that two week period--just kind of take things easy?

Childress: Yes, right, and wondered what was going on, get acquainted, acclimated.

Marcello: How much faith did you have in the loyalty of the Filipino native?

Childress: We didn't know. That was a factor that we really didn't know. We didn't know what the Japanese would do; we didn't know what the Filipinos would do; we didn't even know what we would do. It was a period of great uncertainty--what was going to happen.

Marcello: How much ammunition and things of that sort did you have at this time?

Childress: Oh, just what you could carry in your pocket.

Marcello: Which wasn't too much, I gather.

Childress: No.

Marcello: Well, anyhow the Japanese flushed you out.

Childress: Right, and the humorous thing was that we had a box of dynamite caps in the house where the piano was, and we had warnings--the Filipinos had seen the Japanese, and they warned us just in time--so we could grab a handful of stuff and get out, and the Japanese opened fire on the house, and they set it on fire, and, of course, when the fire hit those dynamite caps they went up with a tremendous roar. That held them back. We went high up into the forest, and we stayed up there for, oh, I

can't recall how long, but at least a couple of months. That was the low point. We had very little food and lost a lot of weight, got sick and all that.

Marcello: Did you establish some sort of a base camp up in the hills, or were you constantly on the move from place to place, one step ahead of the Japanese?

Childress: No, we established what you could call a base camp. There were five American servicemen at the place where we were flushed out, and all of us went up into the hills, and the landowner and his family went farther back, and we stayed up on a high ridge, and we were up there with very little to eat and high in the mountains-- couldn't see anything. As I say, that was the low point. I decided that I had to get out of there, but the American who owned the property was afraid that if we showed ourselves that we would attract the Japanese. So we were having problems with him, and at one time he even threatened to shoot any of us that tried to get away, you know. All this was based on the fact that he was afraid that if we showed ourselves down in the valley the Japanese would learn that he and his family were in the hills and that possibly they would come up there.

Marcello: Well, what did you want to go down in the valley for in the first place?

- Childress: Well, in the first place there was a war going on, and I was useless where I was. Secondly, I wouldn't have lasted very long up there. Our health was deteriorating.
- Marcello: What was your own physical condition at this time?
- Childress: I was very weak. I was down to probably 120 pounds.
- Marcello: And your average weight was what?
- Childress: I originally weighed 150-155 pounds. We were starving to death. If we had stayed and if we had contracted some illness, we wouldn't have made it.
- Marcello: How many were in your group at this time?
- Childress: Of the servicemen there were five of us in the base camp up on the ridge.
- Marcello: Now were there any Filipinos with you at this time?
- Childress: We had a couple of Filipinos with us. They were used as interpreters. A young boy that stayed was kind of a servant. He could interpret with the Suvanos that came by, and he'd help build the fires.
- Marcello: I assume that your original group, therefore, had split down into fewer numbers or several groups.
- Childress: My Filipinos from my battalion had dispersed and returned to Panay. To them the war was over.
- Marcello: In other words, they pulled out their civilian uniforms, and they were civilians once again, perhaps.
- Childress: Well, yes. They just went home. When the islands were

captured, they went home. When we were at Cebuana Barracks before crossing the mountains to Sindangan we learned that the Japanese were calling for the Americans to surrender, and Cebuana Barracks was quite some distance from where the surrender point was to be. As I recall, we were supposed to walk into the surrender point with our rifles pointed to the ground and other things, and I just wasn't about to walk a considerable distance just to turn myself in. But getting back to our evacuation place in the mountains, we could not stay in that isolated place indefinitely just because the American settler was afraid the Japs would learn of his whereabouts so I finally left that high mountain place and heard there was another old American farther down the coast. I went down there, and this old man . . .

Marcello: Now were you along, or were you with . . .

Childress: One of the other Americans went with me. We went way down the coast. It was wild country, no roads or anything, and we just walked along the beach, and I found this old American. He was seventy-three years old. He was in poor health, but he'd been in the United States Marine Corps prior to the Spanish-American War, so he told me some interesting stories. Too bad you can't get that on tape.

Marcello: I'll bet.

Childress: Yes, very interesting. While I was staying with him . . .

Marcello: How long were you with him altogether?

Childress: Oh, probably not more than a month or two. His food situation was pretty bad too.

Marcello: In the meantime you'd lost the Japanese.

Childress: Lost the Japanese, lost contact. If you can imagine this, I am in a very remote corner of the world . . .

Marcello: How old were you at the time?

Childress: I was twenty-three. A very remote corner of the world, in enemy occupied territory completely out of touch. I was ragged, barefooted, half-starved.

Marcello: What sort of thoughts were going through your mind?

Childress: Well, you just wonder what you're going to do. There's no corner drugstore to go to. There's no radio to go turn on. It's almost as bad as being Robinson Crusoe on a desert island. You're left to your own devices. I had absolutely no medicine, no idea where I would sleep that night, where my next food would come from, or what danger my next encounter would bring.

Marcello: At this stage, I would assume that you were no longer interested in fighting the Japanese. At this stage it became a matter of staying alive, of surviving.

Childress: It was a matter of survival, and you're in a vacuum. You're starving for news. You want to know what's going on and what's going to happen. And some Filipinos came

down the coast and said there was an American general who had arrived by submarine farther up the coast and was forming a guerrilla organization.

Marcello: How much credence did you put in the information that Filipinos passed out? Well, maybe at this stage anything was good news.

Childress: I have no idea, but it was just an indication that something was going on, and I was going to go up and find out what it was. So I hiked up to the town of Sindangan. And then they got an automobile out of hiding somewhere, and I rode in a car from Sindangan--that's where the road began--to a town called Dipolog, on around to a town called Oroquieta in Occidental Misamis Province. I found an officer there named Fertig, and he was not a general. He was a reserve officer like I was. He was a major in the Corps of Engineers. He had come down from Bataan where he had worked on building the airfield on Bataan. He had come to Mindanao, and he had holed up in the mountains behind Oroquieta like we had done near Sindangan.

Marcello: Was he alone or did he have a group with him?

Childress: Well, he had another American with him. But Fertig was a mining engineer by profession, and he had worked in the Philippines as a mining engineer before the war. He was an older man. I found out that his idea was to

form a guerrilla group, and my old friend McLish was there. He had come in from another direction. He had gone up in the hills and had similar experiences to what I had had in another location, and we met where Fertig was in Oroquieta, and we discussed forming a guerrilla group on the other part of the island. So McLish and I got in a sailboat and we sailed across the bay, across over to a place called Balingasag.

Marcello: Was this a rather eventful trip? I would imagine that you had no experience sailing, or am I wrong?

Childress: No, we didn't sail it ourselves. The sailboat was a fisherman's boat called a banca. It's a big outrigger sailboat. And we sailed across in a banca, and it took us several days to get across.

Marcello: I would assume that that did quite a bit for your morale when you met McLish, somebody that you knew.

Childress: Oh, yes. We were getting back into making things happen again. We went across to Balingasag and started organizing a guerrilla group there. There were several Americans in Balingasag. Clyde Abbott was there. He had drawn the first blood. He had killed a Japanese patrol, a Japanese officer called Okomura. And we started organizing the guerrillas in that area.

Marcello: How did you go about organizing guerrillas in this area?

Childress: Well, a lot of the Filipinos who had been in the

Philippine Army and who had been demobilized kept their weapons, and they started grouping together in bands. Of all of our problems--this was an interesting side effect of this thing--was that many of the Constabulary officers started brigandage. They were the ones that were our enemy, not the Japanese. There were few Japanese around, but these Constabulary officers were rather powerful politically, and they had armed groups with them.

Marcello: They were like local warlords, I guess you could say.

Childress: Local warlords, exactly. And so we really started forming guerrilla groups for our own protection, for our strength.

Marcello: Also, I suppose this was a good way to win the support of the countryside, which any guerrilla organization needs.

Childress: Right. Right. And we were finding that the Filipinos were 100 per cent behind us.

Marcello: I was going to ask you awhile ago what the motivation was for these former Philippine Army people to join your group, and apparently it was for some sort of protection against these Constabularies.

Childress: Right. They came back to us, and I glossed over something. I had a run-in with a Constabulary officer in Sindangan, and he tried to disarm me, and he had his

Constabulary company there in Sindangan. He tried to disarm me, and I was staying in a Filipino house there, and he sent a messenger to me to turn in my sidearm, and I told this boy that I refused to do it but that I would come over to where this officer was in ten minutes. Well, I went over there and found that this officer had deployed his company. He had some of them standing on the veranda of the barracks and some behind trees, and this officer was standing out on the sidewalk in front of his headquarters with an insolent look on his face and his hand on his holstered pistol. I don't want to sound melodramatic, but it was kind of like one of these "high noon" encounters because I really didn't know what was going to happen. Anything could have happened because you have to imagine that there's no law. These people are the law, you know. It isn't civilized like this country. And I looked around, and I caught the eye of the first sergeant and he smiled, and I knew that the troops were on my side, and then I asked this officer what he thought he was doing, and I told him I wasn't going to turn my pistol over to him, and he backed down, and the crisis was over. The whole thing was the signal that I could see the first sergeant giving. I knew these men. We had even had parties during the few days I was there, and I knew that there was no hostility

between me and this group. It was just this officer, and that's the way these other Constabulary officers were, but we had a perfect rapport with the people and the troops, but not with their officers.

Marcello: Why do you think this was so?

Childress: I don't know. In all phases of life in the Philippines almost, the Americans were able to get along with the Filipinos. We were not like the Spaniards. We lived with them and we liked them, and they liked us, and we got along very well. The Filipinos are very hospitable people, and I can't speak highly enough of them. As a matter of fact, I've said this and anybody that I've known that was over there with me would say that if it had not been for the Filipinos, we would not be here now. They sustained us in the days when the food was short and life was pretty hard. They shared everything they had. I just wonder that if the circumstances were reversed if we would be as hospitable to those people as they were to us.

Marcello: So anyhow, you were now organizing your guerrilla unit, and we were talking about how you went about organizing this unit. You were getting recruits from the former Philippine Army people.

Childress: Right. As they would come in, we formed companies and platoons and squads and assign them organizations, and we made out rosters, and we would assign them certain

areas where they would guard this place or guard that place, and it was very informal in a way. It's funny how as you appoint more people and get more typewriters and more paper how formal your organization suddenly becomes. You find that the organization is running itself, you know, like a bureaucracy, later on which it finally became, but in the early days it was rather informal.

Marcello: It was a rather makeshift organization, I gather?

Childress: Makeshift, yes.

Marcello: What did you do for arms, ammunition, the procurement of food, and this sort of thing in the early organizational stages?

Childress: Well, the Filipinos shared with us their rice and camotes and fish and chickens and such as that, and we got together a pretty large group, and we thought, well, if we were a guerrilla group we had better go fight the Japanese.

Marcello: How many men were there in your group altogether by this time?

Childress: Oh, there must have been well over a thousand. I don't recall now, but there were a lot of them.

Marcello: Now who was in command of this group--you and McLish?

Childress: Yes. We called it the 110th Division. See, the United

States before World War II was divided for military administration into what we called Corps Areas, and in the Philippines they had for the same purpose military districts, and Mindanao was the old 10th Military District. Well, Fertig assumed command of the 10th Military District, and so we called our guerrilla organization the 110th Division, and McLish was the division commander and I was the chief of staff (chuckle). There were other such divisions formed in other parts of Mindanao under other officers reporting to Fertig. So we had a number of Americans that joined up with us. They had been hiding out in various places in the hills and had their stories of privations and starving. Some of them died, and some were wounded, and some were attacked by pagan natives and were seriously injured, and they all had malaria, and some of them had been very sick, and some were still sick. A lot of them had beriberi and were suffering from diet deficiency ailments. All of them had had a pretty rough time.

Marcello: How did you go about maintaining discipline in a motley group such as this?

Childress: Well, the discipline was never a problem. The Filipinos are not a difficult people. They are a very easy-going people, and you can maintain discipline. The only thing

is you have to learn to do things their way. It's one of the problems with Americans, and I think it's one of the things that's a problem in Vietnam and so forth. We try to impose our way of doing things on an alien people, and those of us that were over there long enough to have gained some experience and to have profited by this experience learned to get along with the Filipinos as Filipinos, and we adopted their customs to the extent that we knew what they wouldn't do or didn't like to do, and we found that you could never force a Filipino to do anything. I've always said that under certain circumstances you could beat a Filipino to death, and if he didn't want to do something he wouldn't do it. So under those circumstances you lead them into doing things you know they will do and not try to make them do something that you know darn well they're not going to do. The Americans with us for the most part were professionals and good ones, especially the ones who survived to join with us.

Marcello: How could you identify one another? Was there some sort of an identifying mark or insignia or badge that you had?

Childress: No, there was quite a feeling, I guess . . . what's the word . . .

Marcello: Camaraderie?

Childress: Camaraderie, yes. We didn't have to worry about any

infiltrators. The Filipinos took care of that. They knew who was questionable and who wasn't, and they took care of it. We didn't have to bother with that, and we noticed there were some liquidations, but that . . .

Marcello: That was their business.

Childress: That was their business. We didn't have to fool with that. As a matter of fact, they didn't even want us to know anything about it. They looked after us pretty well.

Marcello: Well, now you said there were over a thousand men. Obviously you weren't all at one place, were you?

Childress: No, no. They were scattered around. We did bring them together.

Marcello: How did you bring them together? In other words, what was your communications network like?

Childress: Runners, and there were telephone lines still up, and the old hand-cranked telephones, and you could hand-crank a call to another barrio, and there were a few radios still around. In the Philippines the postal service had the telegraph business; you'd go to the post office to send a telegram, so there were a lot of telegraphers about, you know. You could send a message by Morse code. We decided we were going to attack the Jap garrison at Butuan in Agusan Province, which is down the coast a ways. So we got all this big bunch together,

and we attacked Butuan, and the Japs holed up in a concrete schoolhouse, and we had quite a day there. But we captured some launches, and we drove them out of town, and that was our big fight and our big victory.

Marcello: Well, how did you go about arranging this attack? Describe exactly what it was like.

Childress: Well, we got the various unit commanders together and told them, "You attack from this direction, you attack from that direction." The group I was with was going to attack from one part of town, and we went all night through a swamp to get to the area where we were going to attack, and when it came time to attack another American named Leonard Money and myself and my boy . . . and I don't use that word to be derogatory. I had a Filipino with me named Loloy Damyao--I don't know how to spell it--but I called him Louie, he was my orderlie, and Louie was like a shadow to me. He took care of my laundry and took care of my needs, he was my interpreter. He was never out of my sight at all, and he was a good soldier. He was a staff sergeant in the Philippine Army. He had a Garand rifle. Well, the three of us got into Butuan, got into town, and our troops melted. They didn't go in.

Marcello: They had cold feet in the first encounter.

Childress: Yes. They just disappeared.

Marcello: Same old story over again like it had been at Malabang.

Childress: Same old story. Louie and Money and I got into Butuan, and here we are in a fortified Japanese town up in a building drinking coffee in the morning with Japs all around us and we stayed in town all day. They set the town on fire, and we got out that night.

Marcello: Apparently, the rest of the guerrilla units had been doing their jobs.

Childress: Yes, well, they kept the Japs . . . there was a lot of firing going on. We didn't have any heavy weapons to shoot them out of the concrete schoolhouse.

Marcello: But I would assume you were attacking in overwhelming numbers, were you not? Surely there weren't that many Japanese there.

Childress: Oh, overwhelming numbers, but really it was a foolish thing to do. We were just like a rabble, and we had some men killed, and the tragedy was that we had absolutely no medicine, and when a man would be shot, just a simple . . . well, I remember one fellow had a bullet wound in his shin. He died of gangrene, and I've seen several instances like that. So where we were foolish because any type of wound would have been fatal. We had absolutely no medicine, no doctors, no nothing.

Marcello: Again, I assume that these are things that you have to learn as you go along.

- Childress: Well, that was our foolish period when we were just playing games. I mean, we thought we were trying to do something, but we had no purpose. We didn't know what we were doing.
- Marcello: You know, they say experience is the best teacher, but I guess a better way of putting it is that it's the only teacher. I assume this victory, however, did wonders for the morale despite the fact that it was a rather lucky victory.
- Childress: Oh, yes, it did wonders for our morale.
- Marcello: It was a rather lucky victory.
- Childress: Right. Well, we were desperately trying to find a radio, a transmitter, that we could get in touch with Australia, and we did get one in operation at the lumber company that had a large transmitter. We found that and got it in operation. We did get contact with Australia.
- Marcello: How did you replenish your stocks of ammunition and that sort of thing?
- Childress: We didn't. Oh, we had some comic opera things happen. We got launches--some pretty good size launches--in the battle at Butuan, and we made some raids on some other islands where we learned through the grapevine that there were caches of ammunition left over from before the islands fell.

Marcello: But at this point let me interject something. I would assume that the goodwill of the local population plus the information that they could provide was perhaps your greatest asset.

Childress: Yes. I think one of the reasons why the Filipinos flocked to us was because we represented some stability to them. They knew that the Americans, for the most part, were not corruptible like the Constabulary officers were, that we were not going to try to extort their possessions from them or force them to do things they didn't want to do. And they figured that it was better to join up with us because the Filipinos are very patriotic, and they did not like the Japanese. They didn't buy that Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere propaganda of the Japs. They didn't buy that at all.

Marcello: I would assume, then, that you were welcomed in this town with open arms after you had ousted the Japanese.

Childress: Oh, yes. Right. We were welcomed everywhere. The Filipinos are very hospitable, and they like parties and festivities, and when we would go into a town it was always an occasion for a big fiesta-like deal. It was their way of showing their solidarity for our side.

Marcello: I would assume also that the Japanese only held the urban centers, and the countryside belonged to the guerrillas.

Childress: Exactly. They owned the seaport towns like Butuan, Surigao, Cagayan, Davao, places like that. And we put perimeters around those towns, and we had the full run of the countryside, up and down the coast, anywhere. We had boats, and we went to other islands, but we took chances because the Japanese did patrol in boats and launches, and they did have some naval vessels. I've gone to Camiguin Island, I've gone to Bohol, and I was up in Leyte several times. Leyte is where we later made the invasion. That's quite a ways up there to go.

Marcello: You were using mostly these launches that you had captured from the Japanese and so on?

Childress: Well, yes. Some of them were river launches. The Agusan River was a big inland river with launches on it. We had some river launches and some sea-going launches. Some were lumber tugs--wooden lumber tugs. We had one lumber tug that could go to any of the inner islands.

Marcello: Did the size of your force increase as time went on, or did it remain rather stable?

Childress: It remained rather stable. It got up to a certain size and, you know, people come and go. But anyway, getting back to this radio, we established contact with

Australia.

Marcello: Now was this shortly after this initial attack?

Childress: Shortly after.

Marcello: And you still didn't really have any overall battle plan yet. You were just kind of hit and miss.

Childress: Hit and miss. We were trying to establish an identity-- a purpose--and we even talked about it. We had to have some reason for doing this, you know. So that's why we finally decided to attack Butuan. But we did get contact with Australia, and they sent a submarine to Mindanao.

Marcello: How did they go about doing this? This sounds like a very interesting story.

Childress: Well, I don't know the full story about the thing. Fertig was one of the ones who was instrumental in operating this radio, and they asked questions about who your people were. You know, they established identity. They did establish identity to determine it was not a Japanese station trying to lure them, so they did send a submarine up, and an American naval officer named Chick Parsons, who was also a Manila businessman. He was a reserve officer. He came off that submarine, and I took him around, and he stayed in Mindanao for some time, and he went back to Australia and came back again on the submarine.

Marcello: In other words, they sent the initial submarine to check things out.

Childress: To check things out.

Marcello: They wanted to see what kind of an outfit they were going to supply.

Childress: Right. They did bring a few supplies on that initial submarine.

Marcello: How would they do this? Did the submarine come in at night?

Childress: Come in at night.

Marcello: And then would they ferry supplies in from the submarine?

Childress: Fertig was over near Lligan, where I first went to Mindanao on the western part, and McLish and I were over in the eastern part of Mindanao, and the first submarine went over there. And then, to answer your question, we did unload a submarine, the Narwhal, at the mouth of the Agusan River one night. We took almost a hundred tons of supplies off of it. You see, in the United States Navy prior to World War II, we had three extra large submarines. You had the Narwhal, the Nautilus and the Argonaut. They were three of the largest submarines ever built up until that time. They were much larger than the average fleet-type sub. They have two six-inch deck guns, and they were so large that they were not really very practical as a fleet-type sub. Well, they would bring

up all these supplies, and then we had quite a number of . . . a lot of the Air Corps enlisted men never surrendered, and whenever a submarine would come up, we would load a number of these boys on it and ship them out. As a matter of fact, I could have left Mindanao way back in early 1943.

Marcello: I was going to ask you if you had a choice?

Childress: I had a choice, yes. It became a duty assignment then after I had stayed there. I got my promotions in rank.

Marcello: Why did you decide to stay?

Childress: Well, you get involved and it becomes a job. This is your work, you know, and you take an interest in it. You want to see the thing through, and that's what it was. What Chick Parsons came up and told us . . . he have us this story. He said, "Now, look, what headquarters in the Southwest Pacific--General MacArthur's headquarters in Australia--what they want you people to do is to lay off the Japanese. We can kill lots of Japanese a lot more efficiently than you can. We want you to stabilize the population here. Keep them on our side. Gather intelligence and build up an organization so when we get ready to invade the area you've got some of the groundwork already laid." And that became the job, our assignment.

Marcello: How much confidence did they have in your units? Did

they see a real value in your unit?

Childress: Yes, they did because here was the value: The Navy in return for sending these supply submarines out there . . . they didn't do that out of the goodness of their heart, this supplying an Army outfit. They wanted something from us, which we supplied. They kept a fleet-type submarine on war patrol in the Mindanao Sea. They kept submarines on patrol, like in the Surigao Strait. A submarine is blind; that is, it's range of observation is limited and could possibly go its patrol and fail to see enemy ships in the area so they wanted someone up in those hills spotting ships. They sent up radios to us and little books of silhouettes of Japanese ships, and we set up coast-watcher's stations all around the perimeter of Mindanao. Chick Parsons and I took a coast watcher team up to the southern tip of Leyte to cover the Surigao Strait. We had a harrowing trip back because of a storm and the launch almost capsized. We sent a team down into Davao Gulf, and they reported every Japanese ship that went in and out of Davao for darn near three years.

Marcello: I think this is perhaps one of the least publicized and most important operations of the entire Pacific war, and what I'm referring to is the activities of those submarines.

Childress: Yes.

Marcello: The amount of damage they did to Japanese shipping was simply phenomenal.

Childress: Right.

Marcello: It was disastrous as far as the Japanese were concerned.

Childress: And the coast-watcher program that we set up was very successful.

Marcello: I think that's an extremely important point to get into the record--just exactly the part that the guerrilla outfits played in helping these submarines. I think it's something that you usually don't think of a guerrilla outfit as having performed.

Childress: Yes. Here's a point I would like to bring out. There's something I would like for you to imagine now. Here are these fellows that have been in Mindanao ever since the fall of the islands. The only supplies that those submarines brought in to us were some clothing, some weapons, a little bit of ammunition, radios, and not enough food to even have a Thanksgiving dinner, and we lived off that country and sustained ourselves off that country. We lived in extremely isolated places. If you look at Mindanao on a map of the world, it's a really isolated place, and we were in isolated areas of Mindanao.

Marcello: I assume that it was quite well suited, however, for the type of operations that you were carrying out.

Childress: Perfectly suited. As a matter of fact, it couldn't be done any more because I knew a fellow who had been back there, and the logging industry has stripped Mindanao. We wouldn't have had the cover, and it's become modern. More roads have been cut, and we couldn't have done now what we did then because it was still rather primitive. But the thing is that we were there for years. I mean, one year would go by and another year would go by, living under those conditions with no medicine, no proper food, no nothing. I'm not trying to make a case out of that, but I just wanted to explain that people can live and operate under those primitive conditions.

Marcello: This is true, I think, but again I get the impression from all these people that I've talked to that they were tough men. I'm not trying to build you up or anything, but I get the distinct impression that they were tough men. That's the only way you can put it.

Childress: Well, let me tell you about some of the things I've heard from fellows I've talked with. I met a Philippine Scout officer. He was one of the few Filipinos who was an officer in the Philippine Scouts. He was a regular United States Army officer whose branch of the service was the Army Corps of Engineers. The Japanese appointed him, when he was taken prisoner, as the engineering officer at Camp O'Donnell, one of the death

march camps up there on Luzon. He told me that in June, July, and August of 1942 that over 3,000 Americans and 27,000 Filipinos died in those three months. According to the fellows that I've talked to that were in the prison camps, the ones that were going to die went fast. The ones that didn't die could take anything, and that was the way it was with this bunch. The ones who stayed--the ones who could hack it--nothing else seemed to bother them at all.

Marcello: How did you constantly keep motivating these people, or was it necessary to continually keep motivating them?

Childress: No, it was a good group of men, a fine bunch of Americans and Filipinos, and they were enthusiastic and excited about what they were doing. It was just a pleasure to really be there working with those people during that period, even with all the hardships and privations--the poor food and being just on the borderline of malnutrition all the time. I was lucky that I never contracted malaria or dysentery, but a lot of the other fellows did. I've seen some of the Americans that were pitiful. They were so sick, and yet they would keep going.

Marcello: Now you had procured your radio, and Parsons had come in acting more or less as a liaison between you and the Navy or between you and MacArthur's headquarters. He had given you these instructions that you were to

lay the groundwork, I suppose you could say, for a future invasion. Did you have very many contacts with the Japanese after this, or did you try to stay away from them as much as possible?

Childress: We tried to stay away from them as much as we could. Oh, there was some contact. Whenever they would patrol, we tried to keep them from getting too aggressive, you know, and it was kind of a hit or miss thing. We didn't want to do too much where they would mount an offensive against us, but still we didn't want them to get too lackadaisical where they thought they could wander over the countryside if they wanted to. It was kind of a stalemate there for quite awhile, but in the latter part of 1943 they reinforced Mindanao very heavily, and they forced us away from much of the coast. Beginning in the latter part of '42 and, oh, there for about a year, things were rather quiet. We had plenty of time to organize. Then from the middle of late 1943 on it got pretty tough.

Marcello: Well, when you say it got pretty tough, could you describe in what ways it got pretty tough?

Childress: They would send heavily armed patrols through the area.

Marcello: Were they still on the roads or were they getting off the roads?

Childress: No, they came off the roads. They came through the

trails. We lost men and material through ambushes.

Marcello: I gather then, that you weren't necessarily looking for the Japanese, but after awhile they came looking for you.

Childress: They came looking for us, yes.

Marcello: Well, I assume that you constantly had to keep moving and changing camps and this sort of thing.

Childress: Well, Fertig had his headquarters over in the western part of Mindanao originally and that's near the Moro country. It's not as healthful nor were the guerrilla units as well organized there. So he came up the Agusan River where I was, and by that time I had left McLish because they had formed another division, and I was made division commander of that, and Fertig moved his headquarters up into my area. It became my job to protect him and to bring food up there because by this time Fertig had established quite a large headquarters. He had quite a large communications net. All the coast-watcher stations reported to him, and then he relayed the messages out from there. When a coast watcher sighted a Jap ship they reported it to Fertig's headquarters. He relayed it to the Navy in Australia who in turn informed the patrolling U.S. submarine of the target. So he had a large radio. We had a big diesel engine to run the power plant, and we had a lot of code

clerks and radio operators in his headquarters staff. You get a large group like that, and you can't just move that thing, you know. So we got pinned down and we had to hold what we had. Only one time did Fertig get flushed out, and that was by airplanes, not by the ground forces. The Japanese would circle with these "Charlies" as we called them--little observation planes. If we ever saw one of those things circling, we knew the next day we'd get dive-bombed, and he was in the town of Talacogon up on the river, and he had his headquarters set up there, and the Jap planes saw the activity and circled. So we got all the launches up there right away and moved out all during this night, and we moved all that stuff. We moved it up to another area, and the next day the dive bombers came over and leveled that area where headquarters had been.

Marcello: What are the problems that a divisional commander encounters in an operation of this sort? Now you've mentioned that by this time you had become a divisional commander. What sort of problems or what sort of duties does a divisional commander of a guerrilla outfit encounter?

Childress: Well, we get into politics. By this I mean that I would entertain a provisional governor. We actually set up the old political system with the old provincial governors,

and we even started printing our own money. When Corregidor where the mint and the printing office is located was isolated from the rest of the islands during the siege genuine Philippine currency just ceased to exist, so the Philippine government before the Philippines fell set up what they called an Emergency Currency Board, and they had a legally constituted board there in Mindanao to print money on butcher paper or whatever they could get. We found these same people--the legal Emergency Currency Board--and had them continue printing money, and we circulated that. And then I had a Philippine Constabulary officer as one of my regimental commanders, and I had to keep him happy. You know, when you get an organization like that you've got to keep people happy. There'll be animosities and jealousies and all the little petty things. You've got to pat this guy on the back and lean on this fellow over here to keep them apart and keep the Americans happy, and you were pretty busy.

Marcello: Did you ever have to arbitrate feuds, between groups or families or this sort of thing?

Childress: Yes, sir. You're doggone right. That's what I mean by politics. You put it correctly.

Marcello: I would assume that in a case like this you were usually damned if you did and dammed if you didn't.

Childress: Well, oh, sometimes, but they're easy to get along with. It really never got to any serious things, but we did have problems with personalities and so forth that had to be arbitrated, as you put it.

Marcello: I would assume that you did have to do some moving around as the Japanese took over the coast.

Childress: I did a lot of traveling. I traveled. I spent a great deal of my time just circulating from outpost to outpost and from headquarters to headquarters, visiting people, and keeping the thing moving.

Marcello: Your division, then, was broken down into outposts and groups or what have you.

Childress: Right. It was not like a military division where you have a mass of troops in one area. The division was more of a geographical or political subdivision almost than a military organization, although I did have military troops that were assigned to that division.

Marcello: In other words, then, you did have to combine both military and political functions as a divisional commander of this guerrilla outfit.

Childress: Right and supply problems.

Marcello: Well, how did you go about getting supplies after the Japanese had more or less taken control of most of the coast? I would assume that made it rather hazardous for submarines, did it not?

Childress: Well, we got supplies. We had submarines come in at remote places, and we had submarines that were scheduled to go to a certain place, and then they would change it, and then it would be diverted to another place. We organized a lot of farming endeavors. That was part of the thing, getting people in this area to plant their rice, you know, because before they had not been planting it. We're going to protect you, so you plant your rice. We need it, you know. We got the fish industry going in this other little town, and got somebody else over here making salt, you know, and there was just always something going on to keep the thing going. There was a lot of business activities involved in it.

Marcello: How did you motivate these people? Were you paying them with the money that you were producing?

Childress: We paid them or promised them or appealed to their patriotism.

Marcello: Did you have to threaten them?

Childress: No, we never threatened anybody. As a matter of fact, that's a point that I want to make. You know, this Vietnamese war has gotten to be such a dirty, murderous, little war. It was never like that in the Philippines. There were some liquidations, and I know of a murder or two because of some Filipino jealousies, and I know

one American that got into trouble, but we were almost free from any type of any problems of that nature. We didn't lean on anybody, and we didn't force anybody to do anything. We got what we wanted more by leading the people, selling them on the idea, and just trying to induce them through higher motives to do what they did, and it worked. We got a pretty good job done with our methods.

Marcello: Did you ever receive any mail from the outside world, let us say from family and what have you?

Childress: I think I got one letter. I was reported missing in action. I have copies of my father's letters. That's an interesting thing. My father was working in Venezuela at the time when I was reported missing in action, and after we got the guerrilla thing going and our identities established in Australia, my father was called before the military attaché in Caracas, Venezuela, and was told that they had some information that was to be given to him. And they got out this regulation about secrets, you know, the Secrets Act or whatever it is, and made him read it, say that he understood it, and made him take an oath that he would not divulge what he was about to receive, and then they told him where I was. Then for a couple of years after that, every time he ran into some of our friends, "Well,

have you heard anything about Clyde?" "No." He said it was the hardest thing he ever had to do--telling them he hadn't heard anything when he had.

Marcello: Well, in a remote situation like this did you think a lot about home, or don't you have time to think about those things?

Childress: No.

Marcello: Or don't you allow yourself to think about such things?

Childress: I try to be philosophical, you know, when I think back. When you're in a situation that you can't get out of, you're in a completely other world. You're completely disassociated with your life in the States, with any life that you've ever experienced before. You're an entirely different person leading an entirely different life. You're forced back on your basic ideals, and that's about all you have. You don't have any stimulation from your former life at all.

Marcello: Well, I assume that through your contacts with the submarines and through your radio you were able to more or less follow the course of the war. You knew all along what was happening.

Childress: Right. For instance, we knew when the action began at Guadalcanal, and our problem was trying to figure out where Guadalcanal was. We weren't that familiar with it. We didn't have a map, and we couldn't quite under-

stand what was going on down there, and then later on we did finally get a pretty good picture of what was going on in New Guinea. By the time the action had moved to New Guinea we could follow fairly well the action. We didn't get much about what was going on in Europe.

Marcello: What part did your guerrilla outfit play in the liberation of the Philippines? Maybe we're skipping too far ahead here.

Childress: Well, I guess one of the greatest contributions that our guerrilla organization played was that we kept Australia appraised of the Japanese activities in Mindanao, and the original landing in the Philippines was scheduled for Mindanao, and that was diverted to Leyte.

Marcello: Well, this is what I was leading up to. You apparently in no way got over to Leyte, then, to play a direct role in the invasion that took place on Leyte.

Childress: No. The landings were made at Leyte. However, one of the things in warfare is that as great as our forces became in this island-hopping, they had a set pattern of doing things, and there was very little that we could do. Now I have a copy of a study that we made for Mindanao. It contained recommendations for certain tactical operations in Mindanao that we felt would head

off certain problems that would arise when Mindanao was invaded by U. S. Forces. We sent it to Australia, but it was ignored. They had their own ways of doing things. We supplied them information that, generally speaking, they reached conclusions that it would be better to land at Leyte than Mindanao, but that was a strategic decision. But as far as any tactical decisions, they would never have paid any attention to us at all.

Marcello: What difficulties would they have had in landing on Mindanao?

Childress: Well, I imagine one of the biggest things was that they probably figured that the area around Tacloban, Leyte, where they landed offered them better landing facilities and better dispersal facilities and better logistics than someplace in Mindanao. But principally, our intelligence reports had indicated that Mindanao had been reinforced expecting an invasion while Leyte was lightly held by the enemy. They eventually did land in Mindanao shortly after Leyte was secured. They landed in southern Mindanao and moved over and took Davao.

Marcello: I would assume that with a group of men living under these conditions it brings out both the best and the worst in individuals. Is this perhaps a fair statement to make?

Childress: Well, I would say that mostly it brings out the best in them because I've never been associated with a group of men like this that had so few bad apples in it. They were all a rather fine bunch, and a lot of them performed duties that, I guess, if they'd been asked to do these things in a regular military organization they would have thought they were being put upon, but they cheerfully did them under very adverse circumstances.

Marcello: Would you care to mention any individuals by name for some of the outstanding contributions that they made? Now I'm sure everybody made a contribution of some sort, but are there any which particularly stand out in your mind?

Childress: Well, the man that stands out in all of our minds that was there is a fellow named Bill Knortz. This brings out a certain thing that happened, but I've got to tell the whole story. When the Japanese captured Mindanao, the fellows that surrendered were collected at a town called Dansalan, which is a Moro town on Lake Lanao, and this was a collection point before the Japs moved them to their permanent prisoner-of-war camp. Knortz and two or three others escaped, and the Japs the next day took out Captain Price, who was the artillery officer of the artillery section supporting my battalion at Malabang. They took Colonel Vesey,

who was in command of the 62nd Regiment, a warrant officer and a master sergeant whose names I don't know. They took them out and shot them--killed them--just because these other boys escaped. Knortz was quite a physical specimen. He was an enlisted man in the Air Corps. He had been stationed in Hawaii and had become a black belt jujitsu expert and was a tremendous physical specimen, and he was a walking arsenal. One time when we had a set-to with a Constabulary officer at Balingasag, Knortz's group was the one that overcame this Constabulary officer's group and disarmed them. Bill Knortz was very active in the early guerrilla organizing and unfortunately was out in the Mindanao Sea in a Launch, and a squall came up and the launch was swamped, and he was drowned. It always bothered Knortz that those men were executed in reprisal for the escape he took part in.

Marcello: Are there any other individuals that stand out in your mind?

Childress: Well, Bill Money was Knortz's sidekick for a number of years there, and Money always used to carry an old-style, drum-type Tommy gun, and that was considered his trademark. McLish was very instrumental . . . he was very simpatico, I guess is the word, with the Filipinos, and was very instrumental in the early organizing

days of getting the organization going.

There were many outstanding Filipinos. Some like Captain Firmaciòn, a former inter-island steamship captain and his wife, who lodged and boarded a large number of Americans in the early guerrilla days, which took a lot of courage and faith because the Japanese dealt harshly with any Filipino they found helping the Americans; the Dongallo brothers who were excellent combat officers; Ramon Buhay who was relied on heavily as the chief administrative officer of the 110th Division and kept our records from the earliest days; Cruz Rosario who procured supplies and oil for operating our launches; Captain Muñoz, our doctor who did his best to patch us up and cure our ills although he had few instruments and fewer medicines. I would never forget Captain Zapanta, skipper of a big two masted diesel powered banca Athena, who would transport us anywhere, anytime, under any conditions. It would take too long to name the dozens of competent and dedicated Filipino officers and enlisted men and civilians who doggedly carried out their duties under trying conditions never doubting that "the aid was coming" meaning that General MacArthur would keep his word by retaking the Philippines.

A veteran of the Spanish American War, Mr. McCarthy,

helped all he could as well as have three sons in the guerrillas, two of them killed in action. His third son, Joe, helped us immensely in foraging for supplies. Fred Fiegel was my good friend and quartermaster officer in the 107th Division. He was killed in an ambush by a Japanese patrol. Swede Swanson was sorely wounded while Ramon Buhay escaped unscathed in the same ambush. Tall and competent Dick Lang was always agreeable to any assignment from manning an isolated outpost on a trail or helping build a banca. Waldo Neveling fought in the Kaiser's Army in World War I and distinguished himself in our guerrillas as commander of an armored banca mounting a 20mm cannon with which he shot down a Jap "Betty" Bomber. Captain Tom Baxter was our combat expert. Wherever trouble was, he was in the thick of it. Bob Spielman and Paul Marshall, escapees from the Davao Prison Camp, remained in Mindanao to fight with the guerrillas and did an excellent job of organizing and commanding the 113th Regiment in Surigao. Tony Haratik, now deceased, commanded the 107th Division Special Troops, my strike force guarding the headquarters area. Mark Wohlfeld killed a guard with a shovel at Davao Prison Camp, ran into the forest and eventually served as a guerrilla. Father Antonio Bevers, the Catholic chaplain of my division, had reason to hate

the Axis--his brothers were slave laborers in Germany and he had to be sternly dissuaded from taking active part in combat patrols. Commander Sam Wilson, a Naval Reserve officer and wealthy Manila businessman was with the guerrillas and very sympathetic and helpful toward their activities.

There were dozens of others such as the PT boat sailors, the officers and men serving in other parts of the island and the specialists who were later sent in by submarine. Each man's individual story would be most interesting.

All hands did an outstanding job under most primitive conditions. We all remain good friends to this day, visiting each other's homes whenever possible and meeting once every two years in convention of the American Guerrillas on Mindanao.

Marcello: Are there any other individuals that you want to talk about?

Childress: Well, there are but that brings to mind . . . I'd forgotten about the group of fellows that escaped from the Davao Penal Colony that came out and joined up with us. Along in 1943 Commander McCoy, who was later Admiral McCoy, Major Mellnik, who is now Brigadier General Mellnik . . . there were three Air Corps officers--Captain Sam Grashio a retired colonel; Captain Ed Dyess, who was killed in a plane crash shortly after he came back to the States

and whom Dyess Air Force Base is named after in Abilene, Texas; Captain L. A. Boelens was killed in Mindanao. He was an Air Corps officer. There were three Marine officers--Major Austin C. Shofner, who is now a retired brigadier general; Captain Jack Hawkins, a retired Marine colonel; Captain Mike Dobervick, who's a retired Marine colonel; Robert Spielman, who was a staff sergeant in the coast artillery on Corregidor; Paul Marshall, who was a sergeant in the coast artillery on Corregidor. Those fellows escaped from the Davao Penal Colony. They had planned their escape. They didn't know that there were any guerrillas on the outside, and they didn't know what the circumstances were, and they had planned their escape very thoroughly. As a matter of fact, McCoy had even made up his own navigation tables. Their ideas were to get to the coast, steal a boat, and sail to Australia, and, of course, when they got outside the camp, they were picked up by our patrols and brought in. They stayed with us awhile, and unfortunately Boelen was killed. One of the activities that we did was to build airfields, and Boelen was scouting out one of these fields when a Jap sniper saw him and killed him. This group except for Spielman and Marshall was then sent back to the States on a submarine, and a number of people might remember that there was an

article in Life magazine about these fellows, but they couldn't tell the circumstances of how they got out of the Philippines because it would jeopardize our guerrilla operation.

Marcello: Incidentally, did the guerrillas keep a pretty close watch on any of the prisoner-of-war compounds? Now you mentioned the Davao Penal Colony. I'm not sure if there were other prisoner-of-war installations on Mindanao or not.

Childress: No. That's the only one. Bob Spielman went down there and left some ammunition as a token to let the people in the camp know that there was somebody on the outside, but we were advised to stay away from the camp.

Marcello: For fear that the Japanese might kill the prisoners there?

Childress: Yes. During the latter days some weather squadron people were sent in on the submarines, and a doctor was sent in, and some communications technicians were sent in, and there was . . . I don't know whether you call this man an O.S.S. man or not, but he was sent in. His mission was to go down to Davao and scout out the prison camp.

Marcello: I was just wondering if any of the Filipinos or if any of your group ever infiltrated the prison. Did any of them ever get into this prisoner-of-war camp? I know this was done in some of the other camps.

- Childress: No. As far as I know, no one got into the prison camp at all. I had been in Davao. I was down in Davao one time and watched American planes bombing Davao, but I never went in the prison camp. We were unable to help the prisoners and contact with them would have been harmful if the Japs found out.
- Marcello: I would assume that there was no way that the Americans could ever infiltrate any of the Japanese-held cities. It seems to me you'd have stuck out like sore thumbs if you had gone in.
- Childress: Oh, yes. There would have been really no purpose to it. We were able to get all of the intelligence information out of it. For intelligence purposes thousands of pesos of synthetically aged, genuine, Philippine currency was sent in to us, and we sent intelligence teams into Davao, and they came out with rather detailed sketches. We knew where all their oil storage was. We knew where all the airplanes were parked. We sent out mailbags full of intelligence information on Davao with every submarine that left.
- Marcello: I gather that the Japanese printed their own money that they used in these occupied towns. Is that correct?
- Childress: They did, yes.
- Marcello: Did you ever attempt to undermine their currency by producing counterfeit money or anything like that?

Childress: No, but their money was not acceptable anywhere but right in the town that they occupied, and we printed our own money. One thing we did enforce very strongly was that we required that our emergency currency not be discriminated against, and we did have penalties for that. That is probably the only rigid enforcement that we imposed on the civilian population.

Marcello: What sort of threats would you make to the civilians if they had discriminated against it? What sort of reprisals?

Childress: Well, there was very little we could do except to just pressure them verbally. We could put them in jail. We did one time. There was a Catholic priest in one of the towns in Surigao Province that had refused to acknowledge the emergency currency, and we got word to his bishop in Surigao City which was occupied by a Jap garrison and the bishop took care of it for us.

Marcello: This brings up another interesting question. At least in the Christian areas the Roman Catholic church was probably a power or a force to be reckoned with. What sort of aid did they, or could they, give the guerrillas? And I assume you did receive some information or what have you from the Roman Catholic priests.

Childress: Well, what you're mentioning is an interesting side of this. There were several Catholic orders in Mindanao.

There were American Jesuits; there was an order of Dutch priests; there was an order of Irish priests; and there were several odds and ends priests there who were evacuated there from China. The Dutch priests . . . I don't recall the name of their order, but they came there for life, and they maintained their parishes in some of those very remote, very primitive areas, and it was in a way almost sad that these highly intelligent men were living in those areas. As a matter of fact, we had one priest who I mentioned before who was the chaplain in my division--Father Antonio Bevers from Holland. By avocation he was a musician, and he was well trained in classical music, and the best he could do . . . he had no facilities for attending concerts, so he'd just teach a choir, you know, in this little church--teach the Filipino children to sing--and I lived with Father Bevers for quite some time, and we were in a place one time, an abandoned school house, that had a large, unabridged dictionary, and many times I'd wake up in the wee hours of the night and see Father Bevers in one of the other rooms with this dictionary spread out on the table with a ring of candles around it. For lack of anything else to exercise his mind he'd be studying this dictionary.

Marcello: This brings up another interesting question. What did

the Americans do in their spare time, that is, if you had any spare time. What did you think about? What did you talk about? What did you do, perhaps, to get your mind off the war, if you ever could do so?

Childress: That's a good question. We used to talk a lot. As an example, one time there was a funny incident. We had a naval officer sent in to us, and these submarines that brought us supplies had let us have some of their boats--motor whale boats--and one time I was going up the river to Fertig's headquarters, and he sent this naval officer in one of these whale boats to pick me up, and there were four or five Americans with me. It rained heavily all the way up, and we were in this open boat, and I could see that this naval officer thought that we were kind of a little out of our minds because here we were soaking wet and all we were doing was chattering and joking and laughing among ourselves all the way up there.

Marcello: I'll bet food was a constant topic of conversation.

Childress: Right. We always had a lack of food and medicine. Our diet was very limited. We ate a lot of rice, and when we now get together we always eat a lot of rice, and our wives often wonder why we like rice so well after having eaten so much of it in the Philippines.

- Marcello: Well, anything you add to it makes it taste better.
Isn't that what they used to say?
- Childress: Yes. Food was a problem, and I guess we did spend a lot of time talking about food.
- Marcello: Well, let's talk about the events leading up to . . . I hate to say your liberation because you were never really captured. Let's talk about the events leading up to your reunion, I guess you could say, with the American troops coming in during the invasion of the Philippine Islands. Do you remember the events surrounding the eventual liberation of your particular island?
- Childress: Well, I left Mindanao before Mindanao was reinvaded. The invasion of Leyte was in October of 1944, and I requested to be repatriated in January of 1945, about three months later, and there were eleven of us that left Mindanao at the time. And to leave, I floated down the Agusan River in a dugout canoe, and by that time Butuan had again become a big Japanese garrison, and just as dawn was breaking we floated right by the wharf where the Japanese were and went on farther down. Butuan was situated a few miles inland from the mouth of the river, and we went down to a town called Cabadbaran and had a rendezvous with a PT boat squadron that picked us up, and then I went to Tacloban, Leyte.
- Marcello: Why did you decide to ask to be repatriated at this time?

Did you feel that your work had been about done in the Philippines?

Childress: I felt that the organization was getting big, and it was getting to be bureaucratic, and it wasn't the same. The personal feeling about it was leaving. The Filipinos were assuming more control.

Marcello: By the time that the organization got this big, did factions form? Did rivalries form?

Childress: No, no. Because of the Japanese encroachments, some of the units disintegrated, and others were formed in other places. The situation had changed considerably. It was getting to be a status quo situation.

Marcello: What sort of discipline could you maintain in an irregular military organization of this sort?

Childress: The discipline was not the type of discipline that you would imagine--not a strong awarding of punishment sort of a thing. Filipinos are very sensitive. Americans can be hard boiled among themselves, but you can't be that way with Filipinos. Their feelings are very easily hurt, and you can ruin your relationship. If you insult a Filipino he doesn't like you anymore, and you can't do anything to reestablish any sort of a relationship with him, so you have to be very careful in your dealings of them. And you can discipline them in several ways but not by strong punishment, unless they have done something

that is of a criminal nature.

Marcello: I assume that there were no discipline problems among the Americans, or would there be from time to time?

Childress: No, we never had any problems. We had one American that on another island was involved in a criminal offense, but with the Americans that I know of and that I associated with we had no disciplinary problems at all. The whole operation as far as the relationship among the Americans seemed on a very high level.

Marcello: Was desertion ever a problem? Now you mentioned that during that initial encounter with the Japanese your unit had virtually melted away. Was this a constant problem, or as time went on did desertion also diminish? Or cowardice or running away . . .

Childress: Well, we didn't take the attitude toward desertion and cowardice as would be considered in a more modern civilization. Actually our first engagements were like a shakedown. We separated the effectives from the shirkers who just melted away anyway. Those who remained turned out to be pretty fair fighters in any man's army. You have to remember that many of these people were rather simple people. As an example, with an European or an American army we'll say we're going to hold this line, we're going to hold it to the death, you know. And we actually kid ourselves; we believe we're going

to do that. And if you want to see your Filipinos run, just tell them they're going to do that. The way you get along with them, you say, "We're going to hold this line as long as we can, and then we're going to retreat back to this line," and they'll stay there, but if you tell them they're going to have to stay there or else, they won't do it. We had to consider what we were working with and do the best with the material that we had.

Marcello: As you look back on your experiences--and maybe this is an unfair question, but I'll ask it anyhow--what do you see as being the key to your survival? What do you figure more than anything else pulled you through or gave you the will to continue?

Childress: Well, for one thing, I was rather free to look after myself. I was in a position through my rank, you might say, to fairly well take care of myself and also to take care of the people who were with me. By doing that, I was able to provide the best environment that we could enjoy under the circumstances. And then as far as my own health is concerned, I think one of the main things that sustained me is that I would eat anything. I wasn't a bit squeamish about . . . I've eaten some pretty ripe meat and some pretty ripe fish, and any variety of food that was edible I would eat it. I guess I had a pretty strong faith and a will to survive.

Marcello: Incidentally, did you eat a lot of wild game and things of that nature? Were you down to the point where you ate snakes, lizards, and that sort of thing?

Childress: No, I never did but some of my men did. We had an outpost up on the trail going into Davao, and we had to keep this trail guarded. And it was difficult to supply these outposts, and I just don't know how people survived. I mean, we put them up there and left them to fend for themselves. I got a message from Dick Lang one time that he was on the Adgaoan River. He wrote me a letter and he said, "We had some 'Adgaoan ground steak' yesterday." So the next time I saw him I asked him what an "Adgaoan ground steak" was. They had caught a python and had skinned it and cooked it, and he said the only problem was they had to boil it because they didn't have any fat to fry it in.

There are some conclusions that I have arrived at. These may not be the most earthshaking political things, but I would like to make these part of the record. That there were a number of us who went to the Philippines under military orders, under military discipline, and had been trained as soldiers. The enlisted men that I served with were in the regular services. They performed all the duties and customs of the service, and that was

what I was trained in. And we found that many of the older men--and we were all quite young at the time and somewhat inexperienced, and a lot of us were not too well educated--but we were controlled by a group of men who had military rank but who were not military people. They had business connections in the islands, and they had business relationships with each other, and a lot of their decisions and a lot of the things that they did and a lot of their manipulations and a lot of the control that they had over us were motivated by some of their business reasons rather than military reasons.

Marcello: Now you're talking about the pre-war days here. Is that correct?

Childress: No. I'm talking about some of the people--the civilians and some of the military people--that we dealt with during the guerrilla organization days.

Marcello: These are mainly Filipinos.

Childress: No, sir--Americans who were in the islands. They were in many instances as much a problem to us as the Japanese were.

Marcello: In the sense that they were trying to protect their economic interests?

Childress: Yes, sir. There were some who even induced some of the men to surrender, and these may be strong accusations, but the point I wish to make known to someone studying

this at some future time. When we're engaged in war where it is difficult to separate political activities from military activities, in many instances more pure military control should be kept over troops and circumstances such as these and civilian interests should not be allowed to inject themselves.

Marcello: Do you know if there were ever any reprisals taken against these people after the war was over?

Childress: No. No charges or accusations were made. Most of us just wanted to go home. We had been there a long time.

I left Mindanao in the way I wanted to--with my life, my health, and my reputation. When things were at their bleakest, I would always say to myself, "If only I can get out of this with my life, my health, and my reputation, that is all I ask." I started the war as a 1st lieutenant and left Mindanao as a lieutenant-colonel.

After a fourteen-hour thrilling ride on a PT boat, I landed at the concrete pier at Tacloban, Leyte, without getting my feet wet like General MacArthur did when he came ashore in Leyte. I spent thirty days in a replacement depot in Tacloban getting processed and explaining what I had been doing for the past three years. Then they flew me to Hollandia, New Guinea, where I waited for five days in another replacement depot for sea transportation back to the states.

Even after idling time for two months in camps and at sea with little to do but eat and sleep I weighed in at only 142 pounds.

My greatest memories despite the inconveniences, the hazards, the hardships and the long years are of the fellowship of my comrades and the kindnesses and steadfastness of the Filipino people.

After twenty-three miserable days on an overcrowded troop ship I was back in San Francisco walking down Market Street like nothing had happened. What a letdown!

A P P E N D I C E S

May 1959

Sponsored by Congressman Frank J. Becker 3rd Dist. New York H. R. Bill 1783

Sponsored by Congressman Leo O'Brien 30th Dist. New York H. R. Bill 3873

Sponsored by Congressman Samuel S. Stratton 32nd Dist. New York H. R. Bill 4540

In support of the enactment of the above legislation, the following letter is reprinted below.

REPRINT

109 Poplar Drive
Falls Church, Virginia

May 1, 1956

The Honorable Frank J. Becker
New House Office Building
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Becker:

Allow me to express my personal appreciation of the amount of time you are devoting to H. R. 5395, (86th Congress, H. R. Bill 1783), which you have introduced to ameliorate inequities resulting from the War Claims Act of 1948. This Act offered a premium to those who surrendered to the enemy, and denied this to all those who, in the finest tradition of young American soldiers and officers willingly risked death and torture evading capture in order to continue active resistance against the enemy. The contribution of these evaders, particularly those who engaged in the local resistance movements that sprung up in the various areas, has never been properly assessed.

From my own experience, I confine my remarks to the Philippine Islands, where a handful of American Service men organized and actively led 200,000 Filipino guerrilla troops, preventing the Japanese from fully occupying the Islands and exploiting their tremendous resources in support of the Japanese war effort. In addition, these guerrillas provided military intelligence of inestimable value which assisted our returning forces under

May 1, 1956

General MacArthur to strike at points of weakness (Leyte) instead of making costly attacks on fortified positions such as Davao Gulf. Frequent and accurate reports of enemy ship and aircraft movements were made to Headquarters, GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area, and to the Commandant, Seventh Fleet, enabling both the U. S. Navy and Air Force to counter expected and anticipated attacks accurately and effectively. Yet this group of Americans existed on strange and unfamiliar foods, without adequate medicine or clothing, fighting a well-armed enemy with make-shift weapons until the controlled Japanese war press admitted that they dared not move troops off main high-ways because of damage inflicted by unconverted "bandits."

Supplies were meagre throughout the three years of guerrilla warfare, which was led in Mindanao, and parts of Luzon (the two major islands of the Philippines) exclusively by American evaders. The effectiveness of this effort impressed the U. S. Navy to such an extent that they allotted their only two large "fleet-type" submarines, the USS Narwahl and USS Nautilus for the exclusive purposes of moving supplies into the Philippines and evacuating American and allied military and civilian personnel to Australia. The supplies brought in by this method consisted of arms, ammunition, radios and parts, medicines, propaganda material -- "I Shall Return - MacArthur" with less than 4% devoted to food or quartermaster items. This meant that at no time were the evaders adequately fed, properly housed, or medically protected, even by meagre substandards of the jungle life.

The bright picture of Philippine guerrilla activities against the Japanese would never have resulted had it not been for a handful of "evaders." Yet when these evaders returned to normal life in the United States, they found themselves penalized by subsequent legislation for having evaded capture and taken part in resistance and guerrilla activities against an enemy whom the United States was still at war.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Wendell W. Fertig
Wendell W. Fertig
Colonel, USA-Ret.
(Former CO, Tenth Mil. Dist.)

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In support of the enactment of the above legislation, the following has been extracted from 'The True Story of the Fighting Submarineers of World War II' entitled "Pig Boats" by Theodore Roscoe.

"The campaign to reoccupy the Philippine Islands began long before American landing craft nosed up against the Leyte beaches. United States submarines had never surrendered the usage of Philippine waters, and early in 1943 they began to visit the islands on special missions that were as intriguing as the "Sealed Orders" under which the captains sailed. The guns were still slamming on Guadalcanal when the first of these missions was undertaken by Gudgeon. January 14, 1943, this submarine, under Lieutenant Commander Stovall landed a party of six Filipinos captained by Major I. A. Villamor, and one ton of equipment near Catmon Point on the Island of Negros.

Tambor (Lieutenant Commander S. H. Armbruster) landed a Lieutenant Commander C. (Chick) Parsons, USNR, and party, (Charley Smith), with 50,000 rounds of .30-cal. ammunition and 20,000 rounds of .45-cal. ammunition, plus \$10,000 cash, near Pagodian Bay, Mindanao, on March 5th, 1943. (1st submarine landing in support of Guerrillas on Mindanao).

In April, Gudgeon was back again, this time under Lieutenant Commander W. S. Post, on a mission to land an officer, three men and three tons of equipment near Pucio Point, Panay. Post was never the man to let a mission interfere with the war of attrition. Putting first things first, on April 28 he drove Gudgeon in to attack a target no submarine would wish to overlook. So the Japanese lost Kamakura Maru, 17,526-ton transport, the biggest to go down to date in the Philippines. This sinking had a sequel on May 12 when Gudgeon, her mission completed, torpedoed and sank Sumatra Maru, 5,862 ton freighter.

May 26, Trout (Lieutenant Commander A. H. Clark) landed a party of agents with \$10,000 and two tons of equipment on Basilan Island, P. I. On June 12 she was in Pagodian Bay on the south coast of Mindanao, unloading 6,000 rounds of .30-cal. ammunition, 2,000 rounds of .45-cal. ammunition, and a party of five under Captain J. A. Hammer, USA. From this hidden cove, Trout evacuated five officers (who had escaped Davao in POW camp in early 1943: Mellnik, McCoy, Dyess, etc., later wrote about "Death March of Bataan"). One of these, Lieutenant Commander C. (Chick) Parsons, USNR, seems to have had a peculiar penchant for submarine rides in the Philippines. Revisiting Mindanao on July 9, Trout picked up Parsons and carried him on another inter-island excursion.

On July 31, Grayling (Lieutenant Commander J. E. Lee) delivered a ton of supplies and equipment to certain parties at Pucio Point, Pandan Bay, Panay. Under Lieutenant Commander E. Olsen the same submarine arrived in Pandan Bay on August 31 with two more tons of cargo, and on October 20, Cabrilla (Commander D. T. Hammond) was at Negros to take aboard four men and the aforementioned Major Villamor.

These activities, had they been noticed, would have led the Japanese to suspect that things which did not meet their eyes were happening in the southern Philippines. Who, they might have asked, was this Major Villamor? And the busy and mysterious Lieutenant Commander Parsons who rode submarines around the Philippines as though they were taxis around Times Square! Presently, reports did begin to filter into General Homma's headquarters. A Japanese scouting party shot down - an outpost raided - a motor convoy ambushed in the jungle. Homma was aware that all the Americans in the Philippines had not been captured, and native guerrilla fighters were beginning an organized resistance. It took him longer to learn that undersea boats were supplying the "Underground" War.

Of all the submarines that left Australia to go to the Philippines on special mission, the veteran Narwhal engaged in the greatest number of these "cloak and dagger" exploits. Late in October she headed out on her first secret mission - a run to the Island of Mindoro with peripatetic Lieutenant Commander Parsons, 46 tons of stores and two parties of F. D. Latta, who had been on her bridge when she transported a company of Army Scouts to Attu.

Narwhal was in good hands. Any Naval captain who could name a submarine's four engines "Matthew", "Mark", "Luke", and "John" was an officer of unusual capacities. The Biblical Diesels responded by outrunning two Japanese A/S vessels in the Mindanao Sea. And presently Narwhal was moored alongside a Japanese registry schooner, the Dona Juana Maru, unloading part of her stores.

This extraordinary business was followed by a junket even more remarkable. Leaving Mindoro, Narwhal proceeded coolly to Nasipit Harbor, Mindanao (where she went aground in 20 feet of water, and got off not quite so coolly), then tied up at Nasipit Dock where a Filipino band played "Anchor's Aweigh" as the supplies brought in by the submarine were unloaded. If the strains of "Anchor's Aweigh" marching off in the Philippine sunshine sounded a little fantastic to the invading submarineers (where was the war?) the 32 evacuees, including a baby, who came aboard for the return voyage to Australia, could assure Narwhal's crew that Jap soldiery cracked the whip in Manila. Someone brought aboard a copy of the Manila Tribune, dated November 11, 1942, featuring a story that the old Sealion had been raised and was in Dewey drydock, her interior dismantled and her hull undergoing study. Sealion - that must have been a century ago. And Wainwright's men - or what was left of them - were still in the prisons and stockades in the interior. But help was on the way, coming aboard such submarines as Narwhal.

In Australia Narwhal received another set of sealed orders. Again she headed for the Philippines, this time loaded with 90 tons of ammunition and stores, and carrying a party of eleven Army operatives. "Matthew", "Mark", "Luke", and "John" made the run in good time, and on December 3, the submarine was unloaded near Cabardaran, Mindanao. There, a party of eight (including Lieutenant Commander Parsons) was picked up for the return trip. Narwhal then proceeded to Alubijid, Majacalar Bay, to take aboard three women, four children and two men. Latta stepped up the four engines to 17 knots as the submarine left this bay - the place had an unhealthy look. Latta noted, "These special missions are trying".

Fought by the Filipinos and Americans of the "Underground", the Guerrilla War spread through the Philippines in the winter of 1943-44 like a brush fire eating through a forest. Landing arms, equipment and secret agents on isolated beaches; U. S. submarines supplied the Guerrilla forces with the wherewithal for war. Information brought out by these secret mission submarines implemented and influenced invasion operations when the drive to retake the Philippines was finally launched."

Page 324 - The Leyte Campaign (Philippines)

"King Two" the opening move of a fast gambit-started a swift game that was to cost the enemy the Philippines. The success of the mid-September raids convinced Halsey that the Central Philippines were ripe for a smash. His conviction was supported by information from a number of sources. One source was photographic reconnaissance. Another was the patrol report of submarines such as Narwhal, Nautilus, Angler and Redfin.

The landing of secret agents and guerrilla supplies supported the amphibious Philippines offensive. By the autumn of 1944, the guerrilla war was going like a forest fire on Mindanao, Negros and Samar. The submarines which stoked this fire with incendiary war materials blazed the trail for MacArthur's invasion forces.

Crevalle, Bonefish, Narwhal, Nautilus, Seawolf, Stingray and Redfin conducted guerrilla supply missions in the Philippines in the spring and summer of 1944. They went in with weapons and war gear and came out with evacuees. All these missions were dangerous ones for submarines. Above all, they were dangerous for the Japs.

During 39 such missions, over 1,325 tons of war supplies were placed in the hands of guerrilla fighters. The word to them was "Very soon now, Joe".

(Extract) Loss of Seawolf (A Tragedy of Errors) On September 21, 1944, the Seawolf left Brisbane to begin her 15th patrol. She was captained by Lt. Commander A. L. Bontier. Eight days later she arrived at Manus in the Admiralties. At this base she received a special mission assignment. She was to carry Army stores and Army personnel to the east coast of Samar in the Central Philippines. She was lost about 3 October 1944 enroute to the Philippines.

END

April 1959

Sponsored by Congressman Frank J. Becker 3rd Dist. New York H. R. Bill 1783
Sponsored by Congressman Leo W. O'Brien 30th Dist. New York H. R. Bill 3873
Sponsored by Congressman Samuel S. Stratton 32nd Dist. New York H. R. Bill 4540

In support of the enactment of the above legislation, the following case history covering the Guerrilla Organization, and commanded by an "evader" (Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, 10th Military District, Mindanao and Sulu Islands, Philippines), the text below has been written.

"The concept of guerrilla operations against the Japanese forces developed during the period spent in the jungle following the surrender of the Philippines in May 1942. The Tenth Military District in its new form was activated on September 15, 1942, at which time Lt. Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, Corps of Engineers, issued a proclamation declaring that a state of war existed between the troops under his command and the Imperial Japanese Army. This was done in order to regularize the forces being organized and assure them the protection of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.

During the next nine months, an area equal in size to the State of Maryland, Misamis Oriental, Mindanao, was recaptured from the enemy and continued to serve as a base of operation for the guerrilla troops. Recognition was given by General Douglas MacArthur and Colonel Wendell W. Fertig was confirmed in his command of the Tenth Military District (Mindanao and Sulu) and also charged with responsibility for the collection of intelligence in the Islands of Samar and Leyte. Authority to act as his personal representative was granted by President Quezon and civil government of the Free Philippines was organized in the areas as liberated. Emergency currency was printed under this authority. Scheduled radio communication had been established and new radio equipment delivered by submarine (Tambor) on March 5th, 1943.

The Japanese attacked in force in June 1943, recovering a small part of the area under guerrilla control, but were unable to retain their gains and again withdrew to a few seaport garrisons that could be supplied by sea.

Encouraged by the growing strength of the guerrillas, the frequency of attacks was increased until the Japanese were deprived of all except "forced support" of the Filipinos actually under control within their garrisoned areas. As they controlled much of the coast areas, shipments by submarine arrived more regularly, and in much greater volume as the Navy recognized the importance of their intelligence coverage of the coastal areas. In October 1943, both the USS Narwahl and Nautilus were assigned exclusively to transport additional tonnage of supplies. These vessels were capable of carrying more than 100 tons each trip and could complete a round-trip on the average of once each six weeks.

For the first time adequate atabrine was available to bring epidemic malaria under control; a means of evacuating civilian refugees or medically-incapacitated military personnel; transportation for voluminous intelligence reports and documents; shipment of sufficient radio equipment to provide wide-spread communications within our own area as well as with GHQ and 7th Fleet in Australia, all were now possible. Sixty-five ship watchers stations were established on Mindanao alone and about twenty on adjacent (Visayan) islands. This network

enabled them to track the Japanese merchant ships so accurately that one of our submarines waited for its expected prey just as a hunter waits in his blind. The sinkings rose to such an extent that needed supplies no longer reached the extended lines of the Japanese in the Solomons and New Guinea.

About this same time, March 1944, additional Japanese divisions were moved into Mindanao to wipe out the headquarters (Surigao) of the Tenth Military District. The men survived by means of guerrilla tactics, maintaining constant mobility of both headquarters and communication facilities, but the situation worsened as they were driven inland from more coastal areas where most of their food was grown. In spite of these difficulties, the troops held firm and the Filipinos continued their loyal support. Submarine rendezvous continued but were fraught with much greater danger due to increased Japanese aerial activity.

As the advance of the U. S. Military Troops continued, it was obvious that it could be expected the troops would return late in 1944. To be ready for this, emergency landing-fields were built in strategic areas, not only so that fields would be available for emergency landings of any damaged U. S. aircraft but to support the Allied Missions in the Pacific.

Starting from an idea, guerrilla warfare had grown until the units on Mindanao controlled 95% of the entire island, and Leyte was chosen for the initial landing. All orders issued by 10th Military District Headquarters covering appointments and promotion of officers were approved by the War Department as of the date of issue. At this time, 10th Military District units numbered 128 American officers and enlisted men, only 16 of whom had been infiltrated and the remaining 112 still being classed as "Missing in Action" and under the Armed Services definition for joint usage were "evaders". Under their command was an organized force of 35,000 Filipino troops organized into 7 divisions comprising Hqs Tenth Military District and "A" Corps. These troops were hardened by more than two years of jungle warfare, and when properly supplied were capable of meeting the best of the Japanese forces on equal terms. In fact as the conquest of the Philippines continued, General Walter Krueger, Commanding General 6th Army, wrote: "You will not be given any assistance by my command at this time except continued and increasing amounts of supplies. I have the utmost confidence in your ability to protect my flank". This was written to Col. Wendell W. Fertig, Commanding, 10th Military District.

(SGD, NY)
1 May 1959

Sponsored by Congressman Frank J. Becker 3rd Dist. New York H. R. Bill 1783
Sponsored by Congressman Leo W. O'Brien 30th Dist. New York H. R. Bill 3873
Sponsored by Congressman Samuel S. Stratton 32nd Dist. New York H. R. Bill 4540

In support of the above legislation, the following has been prepared:

1959 GEOGRAPHIC LISTING OF 'THE AMERICAN GUERRILLAS OF MINDANAO' (PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC
1942 - 1945)

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GUATAMALA

THOMAS, Chandler A.

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%Former Prisoners of War of the Japanese, most of them escaped from the camps.

Joe Coe, survivor of Japanese Prisoner of War Ship that was sunk by an American submarine in August 1944, was one of 78 survivors out of over 780 men.

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Paco, Manila, P. I.

**WENDOVER, Royce F.

Siokon, Zamboanga City, Del Morte, Mindanao, P. I.

%FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR OF JAPANESE.(ESCAPEES).

**CIVILIANS: OR MILITARY PERSONNEL THAT ARRIVED
IN PHILIPPINES BY SUBMARINE DURING 1942-45.

TOTAL NUMBER	101
NON-MILITARY(CIV)	<u>11</u>

MIL.PERS.EFFECTED BY BILL 90

END

GUERRILLA HISTORY

I was in command of the 2d Bn, 61st Infantry Regiment, Philippine Army, stationed at Malabang, Lanao. (See Par 1, incl. 1). The 3d Battalion, Major Earnest E. McClish, commanding, was astride the Malabang - Ganassi road. The 2d Battalion was on the left covering the Baras - Porog trail, at 3:00 AM, 30 April 1942. The Japanese attacked the 3d Bn with the intent of driving up the Malabang - Ganassi road. The 2d Battalion was ordered to make a counter attack across the front of the 3d Bn, the attack beginning at 2:00 PM, the enemy meeting the attack with fire superiority which was causing the forward elements to disintegrate. I ordered a withdrawal. Upon returning to my C.P., I met Lt Dominado, Regimental S-2, who had verbal orders for me to withdraw my battalion and to report personally to the regimental commander, Colonel Mitchell, at the motor pool on the road. Lt Dominado did not know the situation. There was bright moonlight and no firing. I issued my withdrawal orders to Lt Beloya, the Battalion Executive Officer, (see par 5, incl. 2) and ordered the company commanders to meet me at the motor pool for further orders. Upon reaching the right flank trenches of the 3d Bn, I met Lt Senquoia, still in position. He said he had received no orders to withdraw and assumed that the situation was the same as it had been in the afternoon. I then climbed the ridge to the road, passing through the old 3d Bn C.O., which was deserted. I walked up the road to the motor pool which was deserted, but Major McClish's car containing his personal effects, a trunk loaded with tins of gasoline, a fifty caliber machine gun, and other undestroyed supplies were lying about. Not seeing anyone, I assumed that the troops were still in the front line trenches, based on the fact that Lt Senquoia's platoon was still in position. I walked down the road to where the

2.95 mountain guns had been emplaced. They were gone. I continued on down the road to the front line positions, which were deserted. I then realized that I was behind the Jap lines. I returned up the road for at least two kilometers without seeing anyone and then returned to the motor pool, where my company commanders were supposed to meet me. I had to wait to warn them. It was all ready past midnight. At 4:30 AM, 1 May, Lt Estiban Bernido, Company Commander of "G" company, arrived at the motor pool. At the first light of dawn, a Japanese patrol opened fire on our group in the motor pool. We withdrew down the ridge into the valley below, and headed up the valley in the direction of the Baras - Porog trail. Arriving at the trail, I set up an outpost to apprehend stragglers and sent runners to locate the remainder of "G", "F", and "H" companies. Except for a few stragglers the other companies could not be located. The stragglers were then formed into columns and marched up the trail toward Posog. That night the party became lost while passing through Moro farms where the trail was plowed over. On 2 May at about 8:00 AM, my group converged with "F" company under Lt Elvas who had with him some elements of "G" company and the Malabang Constabulary detachment. Lt Elvas had not received the orders to withdraw, the runner of Lt Beloya having failed to reach him. Elvas withdrew up the Baras - Porog trail when he had heard that the fighting had advanced up the Malabang - Ganassi road. At noon, 2 May, my group which now consisted of "F" company, the Malabang Constabulary detachment and stragglers from "G" company reached Lake Dapau, where there were hundreds of disorganized troops from the 84th Prov. Bn., and the 1st and 3d Bns of the 61st Regiment, who had had a short engagement at Lake Dapau the night before. The Japanese column had advanced on

toward Ganassi. Here, at Lake Dapau, I met Captain Soulik of the 84th Prov. Bn. and Major Mora, CO of the 1st Bn, 61st Regiment. These two officers informed me that the 61st regiment was completely broken up with nothing left but a mob of stragglers, all bent on getting out of the Lanao hostile Moro country to the Christian settlements on the north coast. Knowing that I could not catch up with the Jap column and that my troops would have mutinied if I had tried to force them to remain in Lanao, I led them out toward the north coast. Late in the evening, two platoons of the machine gun company under Lt Cruz ("D" Co), caught up with the 2d Bn. That night we bivouaced in the forest. On 3 May, the remnants of the 2d Bn passed through Namingan, Lanao, where many Moros were seen carrying Enfield rifles. Late in the afternoon, the column emerged from the forest and gained the uncompleted portion of the proposed road from Maranding to Ganassi. That night the column bivouaced at a settlement. On 4 May at noon, I reached Maranding, Lanao, which is the junction of the proposed road to Ganassi and the National highway along the coast. Here, I learned that there was a Constabulary Bn holding a position at Cebuana Barracks, 36 kilometers to the west. Although, I had already hiked at least 15 kilometers that morning, I left orders for the 2d Bn to Vivouac at Maranding and collect all stragglers, while I went to Cebuana Barracks to reconnoiter the situation. I reached Cabuana Barracks at about 10:00 PM. During the hike, I wore many blisters on my feet. At Cebuana Barracks, I learned that Major Teano was about five kilometers inside, bivouaced in the forest. I sent a runner to notify him that I was there. On 5 May, Major Teano sent a truck after me. I had a conference with Teano and learned that he had been ordered to report to the vicinity of Lake Dapau several days before

by Brig. General Guy R. Fort, CO, 81st Division, to organize a guerrilla warfare. Teano had disregarded this order and remained at Cebuana Barracks with his battalion, which was composed of the Sindangan Co, Pagadian Co, Kolumbugan Co, Misamis Co and the Cebuana Barracks Co. He had no immediate plans but was just waiting to learn what the situation was. I asked him for trucks to bring my battalion to Cebuana Barracks. He was not much in favor of letting me have the trucks, but gave in finally, granting me permission for one trip, but I used the trucks to transport the entire battalion. On 6 May 1942, the 2d Bn was being transported to Cebuana Barracks. In the evening a Constabulary soldier brought me a warning order to initial, stating that the Constabulary Battalion with my Battalion attached would move to a place 8 kilometers further inside. On 7 May, the Constabulary Battalion with the 2d Battalion moved to a Subano (non-Christian tribe) settlement, about 18 kilometers inside from Cebuana Barracks. From 29 April until 7 May 1942, I had been constantly on the move with little sleep and scarcely any food. Heretofore, I had had sufficient American canned food, but since the invasion, I had subsisted on comotes, roasted corn and the like at odd intervals. The long hike, especially from Maranding to Cebuana Barracks had badly blistered and bruised my feet. Arriving at the Subano settlement, I remained in bed for three days. During this time, Pvt Earl Cook and Corporal Robert Hage of the 14th Bomb Sq joined me at the Subano settlement. They had been on a flank patrol to the right of the 72d Regiment, Lt Col Vesey commanding, at Bacolod Grande and had seen the Japs pass through the front line of the 72d Regiment. Cut off, they also had headed for the north coast, eventually joining up with the Constabulary Battalion behind Cebuana Barracks. Japanese planes flew over the area behind Cebuana Barracks where the Constabulary Battalion

was bivouacing, dropping copies of General Wainwright's surrender order. From reports of straggling soldiers, that all USAFFE personnel, American and Filipino's and from leaflets dropped by the Jap planes, it was believed, that Mindanao was now completely in the hands of the Japanese. Major Teano, PC, called a conference of his officers and decided to return the various companies of his battalion to their former stations. My officers were requesting that the battalion be broken up to form communal farms so that the men could subsist until the situation was favorable for organizing and carrying on the war against the Japs. Major Teano ordered the PC companies back to their stations and planned to hike through the mountains to Sindangan, Zamboanga, to his farm, taking with him the Sindangan Constabulary company. I was still not satisfied reports of the general situation, although I knew that both Corregidor and Bataan had fallen and that the Japanese had occupied Cotabato and had penetrated as far as Dansalan, Lanao. I had no doubt that Mindanao would be completely controlled by the Japs in a few days, but my greatest desire was to get to a radio and hear some definite reports. Major Teano offered to take me and Pvt Earl Cook and Corporal Robert Hage, 14th Bomb. Aq., to Sindangan with him where he said it would be comparative safe for us. Before leaving, I left orders to my battalion to stay intact until I could reach the coast, hear the news, and then make a definite decision about disbanding. Major Teano, myself, Cook and Hage and the Sindangan company left for Sindangan on 12 May 1942 or thereabouts. The trip to Sindangan took eight days from Cebuana Barracks. I stopped at the plantation of an American planter named, John Rhoemer, who was evacuating with his family in temporary quarters about five miles in the foothills behind his house at Siari, 12 kilo-

meters north of Sindangan. Arriving there, I met 2d Lt Thomas, a pilot of the 14th Bomb Sq and Sgt Lee Ragsdale, formerly of the Philippine Ordnance Depot, Headquarters, Philippine Department. Mr. Rhoemer had a radio operating; we found that the Japs were completely in control of Mindanao and that most of the Americans and Filipino personnel of the USAFFE had surrendered. Rhoemer invited Cook, Hage, and myself to remain with him, his family, Thomas and Ragsdale, stating that he had sufficient food stuffs from his plantation to accommodate us. I decided to stay here for the time being, to observe the intentions of the Japs and the reactions of the Filipinos. I hired a civilian to take a message back to my battalion at Cebuana Barracks ordering them to disband and organize communal farms to subsist themselves until they heard from me again. When the messenger returned, he brought the information that my officers disbanded as soon as I had left, many of them having left the island by sailboat heading for Panay, the home island of most of the 61st Regiment's soldiers. Although numerous full field inspections did not disclose it, many of the Filipino soldiers had hidden civilian clothing in their packs. When the battle of Malabang began on the morning of 30 April, many troops changed to their civilian clothes and deserted. On the counter attack that was to be launched on the afternoon of 30 April, many troops hid instead of going into battle. After the counter attack was launched, the troops were uncontrollable and did not fire when contact was made with the enemy. They had to be withdrawn, which resulted in a very disorderly movement. Many of the soldiers were sick of malaria, some units being almost 50% depleted. It was many kilometers to the nearest Jap garrison, but I had already made up my mind that under no circumstances would I surrender myself to the Japanese Imperial Army. I

could not imagine just walking alone for a hundred kilometers or so up to a Japanese outpost and saying "Here I am; I am surrendering; what are you going to do with me." My plans were to lay low until I could join up with some spirited organization that was intent on fighting the Japs; or if a suitable opportunity arose to get a boat to Australia. I would try to get to American troops. I was surprised that so many Americans had surrendered because we knew that soon we would be over run after Corregidor fell and many talked of becoming guerrillas. Until the fifth of July, 1942, I continued to live very uneventfully at the evacuation place of Mr Rhoemer with the other American personnel mentioned above. The radio news from San Francisco was very optimistic at that time; and there was very little local news that filtered to our area, as Siari, Sindangan, Zamboanga, is rather a remote place. However, all during the month of June I could not walk or wear shoes because of numerous sores that broke out on my feet and legs due probably to leech bites and skin lesions on my feet received during the hike through the mountains after the battle of Malabang. Also I was in a very weakened condition due to the lack of food I was accustomed to (I had just changed over to the rice diet) and the great exertion during the invasion battle. On the 5 July, 1942, a Japanese motor patrol stopped at the house of Mr. Rhoemer on the beach. That very night our whole party moved out of the temporary evacuation quarters to even more temporary quarters about a mile further back in the hills where we planned to stay until the Japs left. Two days went by without the Japs attempting to penetrate the interior. Thomas, Ragsdale, and Cook decided to return to the original evacuation quarters. At four thirty the next morning, 8 July 1942, the Japs came up there and announced their presence by opening fire. Cook

was sleeping on the porch in his coveralls with his pistol in his belt on the floor. He grabbed his gun, ducked into the room and out the back window. Thomas was sleeping in his shirt and shorts inside the room with his pistol under his pillow. He grabbed his pistol and ducked out the back window. Ragsdale was sleeping inside the house in shorts. He ducked out the window as he was. All three of these men escaped into the forest and eventually rejoined the main party in a day or so in the new location. They were badly lacerated and sunburned from walking through sharp cogon grass without clothes or shoes. The party then evacuated deep into the mountains in an area inhabited by a non-Christian tribe known as Subanos, who are not generally hostile. Food was scarce and living conditions were very poor in this place. Soon tempers were getting short and relationships between different members of the party were getting strained. Ragsdale and myself were in fair physical condition. We decided to take a reconnaissance down the coast to see what we could learn. We hiked through Sindangan to a place called Liloy, forty kilometers to the west, where we met an old American named Winters, who had operated a cattle ranch there. He invited us to stay with him for awhile. It was at this place that I developed some sores on my buttocks similar to the sores I had had on my legs. Mr. Winters had some carbolic acid, the only medicine that was available. A small amount of this applied to my leg sores worked as a fair disinfectant. Asking Ragsdale if he would apply a small amount to the sore on my buttocks, he poured a liberal amount that so seriously burned me that I could not sit down for three weeks. It was at this time that I developed a small tropical ulcer on my ankle that further hindered my moving about. It was also about this time, September 1942, that I heard that the

Sindangan Constabulary company had returned to town and that there was a movement afoot to form some sort of an organization inimical to the Japanese occupation. I was still incapacitated due to the tropical ulcer on my ankle and the burns from the carbolic acid. Ragsdale left Mr. Winters place and returned to Sindangan, where he met Thomas; and the two of them went on to Occidental Misamis. Just as soon as I was well enough I rode a horse to Sindangan, where I learned from Capt Quejada, CO of the Sindangan Constabulary company that there was an American named Brig. General Fertig, who had come from Australia on a submarine sent by General MacArthur to organize the guerrillas in Mindanao. Fertig had contacted Major Teano and had ordered him to organize the troops on the north coast of Zamboanga province and Occidental Misamis into a regiment. Fertig had heard that I was somewhere along the coast of Zamboanga and had sent word to Teano to contact me and have me report to him in Occidental Misamis. Teano was planning to go to Dipolog, Zamboanga, in a few days by car. From Dipolog, I was informed that there was a truck operating as far as Oroquieta, Occidental Misamis. I waited in Sindangan almost two weeks for Teano to get his car in order to make the trip. I then drove to Dipolog, where I had to wait three days for the truck that took me to Oroquieta, where I learned that Fertig was in Jimenez, nineteen kilometers further south. The next day I obtained a tartanilla (pony cart) and rode to Jimenez. At Jimenez I met Fertig and learned that he had not come from Australia but had been living in the mountains somewhere in Lanao and had recently come out with a plan to organize all the remnants of the unsundered USAFFE soldiers into unified guerrilla command. He had assumed the rank of Brig. General for prestige. Later when he had established himself, he reverted to his old rank of Lt Colonel and was later promoted to Colonel. Also at

Jimenez, I met Lt Colonel Earnest E. McClish, who had commanded the 3d battalion of the 61st Regiment. McClish had evaded surrender by escaping from the hospital at Dansalan, Lanao, when the Japs came in. Fertig assigned McClish the task of organizing the eastern portion of the island of Mindanao into a unified command designated as the 110th Division. I was assigned as the Chief of Staff of this division. McClish and I left Jimenez on or about the 20th of November 1942, and headed for Balingasag by sailboat, the trip taking five days. We established our Hqs at Balingasag and began looking about for suitable officers to form the division staff. Balingasag was also the headquarters of the 110th Regiment, activated a short time previously by Fertig with Capt. Pedro D. Collado, a former constabulary Lieutenant, commanding. There were numerous American Army and Navy personnel in the area of the 110th Division who had not surrendered. During the month of September 1942, there had been a spontaneous movement on the part of the Filipino's, former USAFFE soldiers and armed civilians, coming down to the barrios on the coast and forming armed bands under natural leaders. There was usually not much connection between these bands who were organized for various reasons--personal aggrandizement, banditry, desire to fight the Japs, law and order vigilantes, protection against the Moros, etc. Likely as not these early disorganized bands fought against each other as well as against the Japs. The guerrilla band that was to form the nucleus of the 110th Regiment was formed at Balingasag sometime in September, 1942, when a group of armed men under Pvt Clyde M. Abbott, 14th Bomb Sq and Lt Pedro D. Collado, (PC) attacked a Japanese patrol which visited Balingasag to set up the Japanese Puppet Government. The Jap commander, Capt Okamura and several Jap soldiers

were chased into a church, which was set afire to get the Japs out. Capt Okamura jumped from an upper story and broke his leg. He was boloed to death by the civilians while the other Jap soldiers burned to death. There were other such groups located at many of the municipalities of Oriental Misamis, Agusan, Surigao and Davao, which were the provinces that were to be organized into the 110th Division. The job in organizing the 110th Division was to unify all these separate groups, suppress crime and banditry, guarantee property rights, and establish some sort of civil government based as closely as possible upon the old Commonwealth Government. This work went on from 20 November 1942 until the present. Capt Collado attempted a mutiny to overthrow the authority of the American officers. In a contest to determine who would have the ascendancy and command, the Americans disarmed Collado and his men, confining him and some of his closest henchmen. Capt Collado escaped from confinement at Cabadbaran, Agusan, sometime in July 1943. Evidence of murder was uncovered concerning Collado and two of his bodyguards. These records are in the files of the 110th Division. From that period, December 1942, there was never any more question over jurisdictional control. All recalcitrants were apprehended and unattached organizations were organized into the 110th Division, 10th Military District. By March of 1943, the 110th Division consisted of two regiments and a Division Special Troops Battalion. All of the little guerrilla bands between the Tagoloan river in Oriental Misamis and Punta Diwata, the boundary between Agusan and Oriental Misamis, were organized into companies and battalions, according to the Philippine Army table of organization. Capt Luz, PA, commanded the 110th Regiment. The Division Special Troops Battalion was commanded by Captain Rosaurio

P. Dongallo. The 113th Regiment was formed from the little guerrilla bands of armed men that collected in the barrios and municipalities of Agusan province, Nisipit, Buena Vista, the upper Agusan valley and Cabadbaran. The dominating character in this area who was responsible for the unification of these guerrilla units was an Assyrian mining engineer named Khalil Khodr, who was assigned as regimental commander of the 113th Regiment with the rank of Captain, later promoted to Major. At this period the Division Headquarters salvaged a small towing launch, the "Rasalia" and a large inter-island passenger launch, the "Treasure Island." The Division Quartermaster, Capt Cruz Ronario, obtained diesel oil from a mine storage tank in Surigao to operate these launches. In March 1943, when the two regiments were organized, there arose the question of what purpose was there for the existence of guerrillas. At that time there was no radio contact with the outside and the guerrillas were being supplied by loyal civilians. To justify an existence, it was decided it was necessary to attack fortified garrisons of the Japanese. Butuan, Agusan was the first garrison attacked. After a nine day battle during which the guerrillas besieged the Japs in a fortified concrete school building and suffered considerable losses from the daily bombing and strafing attacks. Jap reinforcements arrived and being short of ammunition the guerrillas withdrew. Several Americans distinguished themselves in this battle, Capt William A. Knortz and Lt Thomas Baxter. Knortz took a launch to Bohol where he was able to obtain more ammunition. During the battle of Butuan, two more launches were stolen from the Japs, the tug "Nara" and the river launch "Agusan." Later on Capt Knortz and myself made an unsuccessful attempt to get more ammunition from Bohol. We learned that an American submarine had landed in April in Occidental Misamis. We

went there and met Commander Parsons, USN, at the Hqs of Colonel Fertig. He informed us that General MacArthur desired that the guerrillas use their energy in gathering information of the enemy instead of attacking Japanese garrisons, although we were allowed to harass the Japs with pure guerrilla tactics of sniping, ambushing, etc. In the meantime the 110th Division Hqs had been moved to Medina, Oriental Misamis. Capt Luz, CO of the 110th Regiment had been relieved of his command for incompetence and Capt Dongallo was made CO of the regiment. Agents of the Division Hqs were being sent to Surigao and Davao to contact the guerrilla leaders there to bring them into the unified command of the 10th Military District. Emergency money was being printed by the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board. With this money available, it was now possible to pay the soldiers and to purchase supplies. As the Chief of Staff of the Division, I had much administrative work to handle in the organization of the Division. The organization in Burigao was progressing slowly. In May 1943, Capt Knortz was sent to Surigao where he was able to unify all the unattached guerrilla bands and organize the 114th Regiment, which he commanded until he was drowned in September 1943, in a launch accident. Capt Paul H. Marshall and Lt Robert Spielman, who had escaped from the Japanese prisoner of war camp at Pavao in April 1943, were assigned to help Capt Knortz organize the 114th Regiment. Upon Knortz's death, Marshall was given the command of the 114th Regiment. Due to Jap air activity it was necessary to change the location of the Division Hqs periodically. In June 1943, the Hqs was moved to Daanlungsod, Oriental Misamis. In July 1943, Capt Claro L. Laureta, a Constabulary officer formerly station commander of Camp Victa, Davao, organizer of the Davao guerrillas, reported to the Division Hqs. His

unit was activated as the 130th Regiment. In November 1943, Colonel Fertig established his Headquarters in the upper Agusan valley. At this time the last unattached guerrilla band that operated on the southeast coast of Davao was contacted. This organization was activated at the 111th Prov. Bn with 1st Lt Owen P. Wilson commanding. On 15 November 1943, a submarine landed over eighty tons of supplies at Nisipit; on 3 December 1943, a submarine landed over eighty tons of supplies at Cabadbaran, Agusan; on 3 March 1944, another submarine landed over eighty tons of supplies at Butaan, Agusan. These supplies were distributed to units on Mindanao and on other Visayan Islands. By now all Division and Regimental Hqs were connected by radio. The District Hqs had the net control stations for the many coast watcher stations and the station handling traffic with SWPA and the organizational stations on Mindanao. In November 1943, the area of the upper Agusan between the 113th Regiment on the north coast of Agusan and the 130th Regiment in Davao was not occupied by troops and was vulnerable to enemy penetration from the east coast of Surigao. Using weapons brought in by submarine, a force was organized and activated as the 112th Provisional Bn under Capt Anton Haratic. In May 1944, the 110th Division now consisted of the 110th, 113th, 114th and 130th Regiments and the 111th, 112th Prov Bn and Division Special Troops Battalions, comprising almost half the island of Mindanao. There was much administration connected with operating so large a force. Lt Col McClish since the latter part of 1943 had centered his attentions on the 110th, 113th and 114th Regiments in the north while I worked with the 111th and 112th Provisional Battalions and the 130th Regiment in the south. In May 1944, the 110th Division was divided in half when the 107th

Division was created comprising the 111th, 112th Prov Bns and the 130th Regiment with myself commanding. During 1944 a far reaching intelligence net was organized to cover all Jap occupied area, principally Davao. Exact locations of all Jap positions were forwarded by radio to the District Hqs. The A C of S, G-2 of the 107th Division had permanent office in Davao where he organized and operated an intelligence net. In October, United States forces landed in Leyte. Soon air coverage of Mindanao by US planes was precluding the necessity of intelligence coverage, which had become general routine. All organization was complete and running smoothly, ready to be taken over by the Philippine Army. My work for the preceding three months had been routine administration and inspection trips throughout the division area. I asked for repatriation and was relieved of command on the 29 December 1944. Lt Col Naureta, CO of 130th Regiment, took command of the Division. I proceeded to the vicinity of Cabadbaran, Agusan, where on 12 January 1945, I boarded a PT boat with a group of other repatriates from the 10th Military District and was taken to Tacloban, Leyte, arriving on 12 January 1945. I reported to G-3 of the Philippine Section, where I remained until 16 January 1945. On 16 January 1945, I reported to Col Melnik, G-2, Philippine Section of GHQ to give technical assistance in writing a study of the guerrilla organizations. I reported at the Fourth Replacement Depot on 19 January 1945.

22. Wounds received (physical location, cause, geographical location, date, by whom treated, when and where, disabilities claimed if any):

None

23. Illnesses (nature of illness, geographical location in which incurred, dates, by whom treated, when and where, disability claimed, if any):

I received painful blisters on my feet as a result of a long hike of approximately 32 miles on 4 May 1942. I did not receive any treatment for this. During the months of June, July and August 1942, I developed a number of sores on my body. I was not able to treat these as I had no medicines. I am not aware of any disabilities as of this date.

24. Decorations, citations, awards:

I am entitled to the American Defense Service Medal, with one bronze star on the service ribbon. I am entitled to the Asiatic-Pacific Theater Medal with one bronze star on the service ribbon for Philippine Campaign from 7 Dec 1941 to 7 May 1942. I am entitled to the Distinguished Unit Badge with two oak-leaf clusters. Authority: G.O. 14, W.D., 9 Mar 42 (2 citations); G.O. 22, W.D., 30 Apr 42.

Malaybalay, Bukidnon, P.I.
July 14, 1942

SUBJECT: Action of the 61st Infantry (P.A.)

TO: Commanding General, 81st Division

1. Prior to April 29, 1942, the 61st Infantry occupied the Ganassi-Malabang Sector of Lanao Province. Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion less detachments were at Ganassi. One rifle battalion (1st Bn at start of hostilities) was bivouaced at Porog on the Ganassi-Malabang road. Two rifle battalions occupied positions in the vicinity of the Malabang Airfield with beach positions and a main line of resistance near the Ganassi-Malabang-Zamboanga Road Junctions (2nd Bn on the right, 3rd Bn on the left on April 29). Until about April 23, the left was covered by the first battalion, 84th Infantry in the town of Malabang. When this unit was withdrawn one company of the 3rd Battalion and one company of Constabulary took over its sector. A detachment of the 81st Field Artillery (two 2.95 Mountain Guns) were in position near the Ganassi-Malabang Road to cover the Malabang Airfield. The combat company was attached to the 3rd Battalion. Communication was by telegraph from Regiment to Battalions and by telephone between the front line battalions and to beach outposts. Demolitions were prepared at three bridges near the main line of resistance, at a bridge at Km 56 on the Ganassi-Malabang Road. Materials were available for burning of other bridges on the Ganassi-Malabang Road. Commanding Officers: Regiment - Col. Mitchell; Headquarters Battalion - Captain Katz; First Battalion - Major Mora; Second Battalion - Captain Childress; Third Battalion - Major McClish.

2. April 29th - Word was received that the enemy had landed in force at Parang and Cotabato. All units of the regiment were alerted. Division refused permission to blow the bridge on the Parang Road.

Brief: Action of the 61st Infantry (Cont)

Demolitions were inspected. Colonel Mitchell moved to his advance Command Post with the Front Line Battalion.

April 30th - About 3:00 AM enemy tanks arrived in Malabang. Bridge at KM 84 was not destroyed - reason unknown. The enemy met no resistance in Malabang. The enemy made contact with the left of the Third Battalion at the Matling River with tanks and infantry estimated as a reenforced Battalion. The left greatly reduced in effective strength by malaria and the necessity of holding troops to cover the wide and the vulnerable right, successfully held the superior enemy until dark, producing many casualties among the enemy. The enemy pushed back but was unable to break the center of the Third Battalion. A counterattack by the Second Battalion at about 2:00 PM failed and its leading elements were cut off by enemy mortar fire. Our mortars and one .50 Cal. Machinegun were lost during the action. They were rendered unserviceable by their crews. At about 4:00 PM, the 2nd Battalion was ordered to withdraw to the rear of the Third Battalion to be used for counterattack on an extension of the left. The enemy was found to be extending his right considerably up the Matling River. The First Battalion was ordered forward on motor transportation. A coordinated attack against our left was commenced as the moon came up by a force estimated as two reenforced battalions. The 2nd Battalion was cut off by enemy infiltrations. Captain Childress is believed to have been shot by the enemy while attempting to get through to the regimental CP. The left of the 3rd Battalion was broken at about 8:00 PM and a counterattack by the first company of the Reserve Battalion to arrive failed. Withdrawal to the next prepared

Brief: Action of the 61st Infantry (Cont 3)

position at KM 63 was ordered. Contact with the enemy was broken and the position organized according to plan by the 1st Battalion and remained of the 3rd Battalion (One company of the 3rd Battalion was in Malabang and withdrew up the trail toward Lumbatan).

May 1st - Outpost Company was driven back at about 8:00 AM and enemy scouts and snipers had passed the position out of range and sight on both flanks. Enemy action on the road was fairly light but the position was widely outflanked and threatened to be surrounded from both flanks. Withdrawal to the next prepared position at KM 54 was ordered at 10:30 AM. The 1st Battalion, 84th Infantry was ordered to move up to the same position. The left of the position was organized by the 3rd Battalion and one company of the 1st Battalion, and enemy scouts were in contact by 12:00 noon. Company "A" did not receive the order to withdraw from the previous position and held during a diving bombing attack until surrounded by the enemy at 12:30 when the company commander (Lt. Diosana) withdrew his company in the direction of Lumbatan. One company of the 1st Battalion occupied the Regimental Reserve Line. The mortars of the 73rd Infantry and one 2.95 gun were placed in position. The 84th Infantry moved into position all afternoon. Firing was sporadic. The Chief of Staff ordered that there was to be no withdrawal from this position. The enemy coordinated attack with a force estimated as a reinforced regiment commenced shortly before dark. Enemy snipers infiltrated through the 84th Infantry on the right, and the left of the 3rd Battalion was enveloped. Soldiers started to leave the position as early as 7:00 PM, later tanks were employed by the enemy and artillery fire (mostly overs) increased. The Regimental Commander with the last elements withdrew at 11:00 PM. The

Brief: Action of the 61st Infantry (Cont 4)

enemy did not maintain close contact.

May 2nd - The Chief of Staff ordered the 61st Infantry for form a line on the north of Lake Dapao at about 2:30 AM. A few minutes later a motorized column of the enemy, led by tanks, moved past toward Canasi. Only scattered units of the regiment resisted the enemy advance. Colonel Mitchell was taken prisoner. Major McClish has been evacuated to the hospital at Dansalan.

Later, two small groups of the 61st Infantry, under Major Hill and Major Legaspi reached Dubong. Many soldiers are known to have been killed and detained by the Moros. No information is available concerning the remainder.

RICHARD F. HILL
Major, Infantry
Executive

A TRUE COPY:

/s/ JUAN A. RIVERA
/t/ JUAN A. RIVERA
Major, Infantry
Adj. Gen., and G-1
Lanao Sector Force

/B

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

THOMAS A. BOGARD,
1st Lt., AGD,
Asst. Adjutant General.

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE 2ND BN., 61ST INF.

The defense of Malabang, Lanao, is so planned and confined from or about the town proper to extend about five kilometers west along the beach in width, and to include Kilometer Post 64 in depth. It was defended by the 61st Infantry, a detachment of the 81st Artillery and a detachment of Philippine Constabulary, who took charge of the flanks outpost guards. The 61st Infantry was disposed such that two rifle battalions are in line in front and one battalion in rear as reserve.

The Second Battalion being in front is the right flanker. It occupied an area to defend to include the Malaband landing field to extend in width westward or to Zamboanga about 4 and 1/2 kilometers approximately. And in depth from the beach to the noses of the ridges running perpendicular to the beach. The Battalion is disposed such that two rifle companies are in line and one rifle company in rear as reserve. The Machinegun sections were attached to every rifle company. A rifle platoon from the reserve and the fourth section of the Machinegun Company was assigned as a combat unit. We are to expect of an attack to the front from the direction of the beach, that our defense position and defenses were centered that way.

On the night of April 29, 1942, the inevitable happened. Found later, the enemy landed not in the front but landed at Banago, about 8 or more kilometers east of Malabang. Here, the attack of Malabang started on or about 3:00 AM, April 30. The outpost and the left flank of the Third Battalion (left flanker) was attacked silently, and the enemy penetrated the town and up to Matling River and to include the left side of the landing field. At about 4:00 in the morning the bridge

Brief: Account 2nd Bn 61st Inf. (Cont 2)

guards at Matling Bridge was attacked by enemy tanks. That was the time when we first heard the enemy 50 cal. M.G. put in action. From that time we are at the state of emergency, although previous to that our Battalion Commander issued an order placing our battalion in the state of alertness. The firing was made by bursts and it lasted for almost 10 minutes and from that time there was a lull up to or about 5:00 o'clock in the morning. Immediately, our Battalion Commander sent a patrol of nine men with one officer in charge to find out what happened. Our patrol took advantage of the lull and went as far as left side of the landing and even up to the kitchen area of the Third Battalion near the bank of Matling River. During this time being a Company Commander of the Machinegun Company, I was with our Battalion Commander at his Cp, waiting for order. By this time we are at our battle forward CP. We kept in contact with the CP of the 3rd Battalion by telephone keeping informed of what happened before our patrol returned. The first phone report we received is that enemy tanks and some foot troops attacked our bridge guards and have already crossed the Matling Bridge, and were deployed on the river bank at our side, which was tallied by the report of our patrol. Immediately our Battalion Commander issued an order to withdraw all units on the beach to the position at the Main Line of Resistance as prearranged.

At about 8:00 AM all our elements were on their respective positions at the MLR, with the exception of some, detailed as Combat Patrol and Outpost Guards. By this time we transferred our CP to our Read Battle CP on the ridge overlooking the Barras Beach, the landing

Brief: Account 2nd Bn 61st Inf. (Cont 3)

field and the road junction of the Malabang-Fanasi and Zamboanga Road. Here we are able to observe every movement of the enemy to the front. At about 9:00 AM, we received another from the Battalion Commander of the Third Battalion (Major McClish) asking reenforcement. Our Battalion Commander (Capt. Childress) in turn without further ado relayed the message to the CO of the "E" Company to report to the CO of the Third Battalion. Our battalion then was composed of two rifle companies and a Machinegun Company. From 9:00 to noontime we were the frequent target of the enemy planes. Enemy penetration on our side is not so imminent except some enemy snipers and scouts. At noon we received another message instructing our battalion commander to plan for a counterattack at two o'clock PM. In return our Battalion Commander called all his company commanders or representatives and issued his plan and instruction of the attack. The counterattack consisting of two rifle companies ("F" and "G" Companies) and one Machine Gun Section attached to every company and one other section to cover the attack assembled at the point of assembly near the Malady Bridge. All attack elements passed the line of departure exactly on time. The attack element had barely cleared the line of departure and still in squad column formation, when enemy plane hovered low and attacked us. The men immediately were deployed in skirmish position and ordered to take cover. As soon as the plane left and had taken its prey we continued forward movements by leaps and bounds because we are only approximately four hundred yards from enemy position. Our scouts and snipers were not yet fired upon although they were as close as 50 yards from enemy lines. A little later the plane left us, and enemy

Brief: Account 2nd Bn 61st Inf. (Cont 4)

tank again rolled toward us passing the Zamboanga Road. This is the time when the MG Section assigned to cover the attack commenced firing at the tank paired by one of our 50 Cal. Machine Guns. The tank fortunately turned its back and immediately enemy artillery and mortars were aimed and fired at us. A platoon of "F" Company and a MG squad and our mobile CP, was bracketed. By this time our forward echelon were about 150 yards or a little more from the enemy outpost line of resistance. Some scouts returned with information about the enemy and same was given to our Battalion Commander, who in turn signaled commence firing right away. Every leader designated targets for his men, and every man fired at his target. There was an exchange of rifle shots for almost five minutes and enemy rifles fire stopped momentarily. At this flank from wooded area came instantly burst of enemy small caliber MG fire. We knew afterwards that enemy strong outposts were driven back to their main position, covered by these MG fire. It was by this time that we found out that enemy was strongly and securely entrenched in our old trench running parallel to the kitchen of the 3rd Bn. The enemy fire on our front was superior and intense, that our central elements was withheld for a moment. Our left flank units however reached its objective because they were covered or screened by a section of Machine Gun. At about 4:00 PM the enemy fire is getting superior, that our battalion commander ordered for a general withdrawal and to reorganize at the MLR. We inflicted many casualties on the enemy side. The confusion and the disposition of the covering units of the withdrawal delayed the company reorganization.

Brief: Account 2nd Bn 61st Inf. (Cont 5)

The "from time to time" report of every company commander is not completed up to 5:30 in the afternoon. It was then that the combined breakfast-dinner and supper was served in the trenches.

At about 6:30 reports from our outpost at the Maladi Bridge (newly destroyed), stated that enemy snipers were swarming our front, and enemy organized attack was in progress at our front and as far as the "pocket" at our right most flank. Preparations then were made not to cut us from the Regimental CP. But as a timely interruption, Lt. Rito Dominado from the Regimental CP came with a verbal message from the regimental commander (Col. Mitchell) instructing our battalion commander to withdraw his command immediately and to report himself to the Regimental CP near the vicinity of the Motor Pool. The Battalion Commander in turn issued an order to all his company commanders to the effect and where to report. Then left Lt. Beloya, his executive to take charge and together with Lt. Dominado proceeded to meet the Regimental Commander.

About fifty percent of my men arrived, they being the nearest to our CP. With these men I was ordered by Lt. Beloya to go ahead with Lt. Herrera. So I did, leaving my 1st Sgt and Lt. Artase my second in command behind to take charge of the remaining men. He took the same trail Capt. Childress and Lt. Sominado took, being the only trail to the designated place, but when we are on the top of the ridge (the last one to the road) we were fired upon. We pushed and took cover for a while and when I heard we were fired upon. We pushed and took cover for a while and when I heard people talking in a foreign tongue, to be sure they were Japanese, I told Lt. Herrera who

Brief: Account 2nd Bn 61st Inf. (Cont 6)

was then guiding his horse to go down the ridge and to proceed farther and report to KM 64. He approved and so we did. When we reached the other ridge to our surprise we were joined by Lt. Beloya alone. I asked him about the other men. He said that they were following. A little farther more we were again joined by some men from the 3rd Battalion. They informed us that the enemy had penetrated to the Motor Pool and as far as KM 64. It was then 9:00 o'clock in the evening. So we proceeded our way taking the Barras trail.

Before we left our battle CP we knew that the enemy had penetrated as far as KM 64, then we concluded that they were taking us by a pincer movement. So we planned to follow the Barras Trail till we reached Lake Dapao (Purog). So we did. At twilight the following day, May 1, 1942, we found ourselves off the trail leading to KM 54, or Calanoan. Here I told Lt. Herrera if we were to strike the road. He said it is more safer for us to report to Purog. So we proceeded again as approved by Lt. Beloya, our Executive Officer. We reached Purog at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, with some short halts to take cover when an enemy plane or planes came over. There at Purog, we found out that enemy was very near because of the preparations made by officer in charge of this particular place.

When all of us (I mean those who are with me when we withdraw from Malabang), arrived, (it took about twenty minutes after the first man arrived to complete my group, because some passed in the thick woods above the lake, some took the banca and the rest passed by the lake edge which sometimes you have to swim a little cause the water

Brief: Account 2nd Bn 61st Inf. (Cont 7)

is overhead deep.) I reported to the most ranking officer at this place (Purog) and which no other but Capt. Katz. It was then 5:30 PM Capt. Katz ordered me to mount all my guns on strategic points by the side of the lake. I did with much haste so as to give my men a short rest. Here we were served our second meal within 48 hours. I barely finished my "chow" when Capt. Katz again called for me, shouting as he ran on the road. He ordered me to give Major Mora, CO, 1st Bn. all my contingents with me. So I ordered Lt. Flores to take charge of a section of Machine Gun, Lt. Isidoro with his 30 riflemen and Lt. Cruz with his platoon. Major Mora with these men left for KM 52. Shortly after they left we heard an explosion just a little over us. We found out that we are the target of the enemy mortars on the other side of the lake opposite us. So we move a little distance to the rear, to be exact to KM 48. There we deployed with the men of Capt. Pastrana and some detachment of the 81st Engineers. Shortly afterwards the men of Major Mora were withdrawing on to the rear hurriedly. They told us that enemy is near Purog Bridge. That time the bridge was burned and some storage. We too withdraw up to Pualas where a general reorganization took place under the command of Major Forts. We were again reorganized into three battalions and the 2nd Bn. is under the command of Lt. Reloya with about 120 men. Each battalion is given a sector to defend under Major Forte's defense order. Our battalion was assigned to defend the saddle on the Ganassi Peak.

It was then 11:00 in the evening. After we have deployed our

Brief: Account 2nd Bn 61st Inf. (Cont 8)

men in their positions we waited patiently for the enemy to come. At about 1:00 o'clock in the morning we are attacked. Then the battle of Pualas was fought. With the same reason in favor of the enemy (that is their superiority, their weapons) we were again forced to withdraw. That was the last engagement of the 2nd Battalion with the exception of some small astray group encounters.

Accounts told by:

(SGD.) ANTONIO DE OCAMPO
1st Lieut., Infantry
Commanding, Machine Gun Co.
2nd Bn., 61st Inf.

A TRUE COPY:

/s/ JUAN A. RIVERA
/t/ JUAN A. RIVERA
Major, Infantry
Adj. Gen. and G-1
Lanao Sector Force

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

THOMAS A. BOGARD,
1st Lt., AGD,
Asst. Adjutant General.

GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION OF THE 110th DIVISION

TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT

1. The 110th Division, 10th Military District, was activated in November 1942, Lt. Colonel Earnest E. McClish commanding, to comprise the provinces of Surigao, Davao, Agusan, and that portion of Misamis Oriental east of the Tagaloan River. The original guerrilla bands which eventually were to form this division came down from the hills in a spontaneous movement which began in September 1942. These little groups were composed of the soldiers living in the barrios or municipalities in which the band was to be formed. The members were a mixture of civilians, ex-USAFFE soldiers, Philippine Constabulary soldiers, a few Philippine Scouts, and American Army and Navy personnel. Usually there were no connections between these bands, who were led by natural leaders for various reasons - personal aggrandizement, banditry, desire to fight the Japs, establishment of law and order, protection against the moros, and the formation of a large guerrilla organization along the lines of military hierarchy. Likely as not these organizations in the early days fought against each other as well as against the Japs, one Filipino leader refusing to submit to another. The first bonafide casualties inflicted against the enemy by these little groups were the murdering of the Japanese civilians left to be mayors of the municipalities by the Japanese when they tried to set up their puppet government.

2. Lt. Col. E.E. McClish had organized a guerrilla group at Imbatug, Bukidnon, to fight the Japs. 2nd Lt. Robert Ball, Pvt. Anton Haratik, and Cpl William A. Knortz were sent by McClish to Balingasag on a reconnaissance. While enroute, this group stopped long enough to

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 2)

raid the Japanese garrison at Cagayan. Upon arriving in Balinasag, Knortz sent for McClish to come, which he did. McClish and Ball then went by sailboat from Balingasag to Misamis Occidental to meet Colonel Fertig, who ordered Lt. Col. McClish to return to the vicinity of Balingasag to organize the eastern portion of the island of Mindanao into an integrated organization to be designated as the 110th Division, Ball remaining to become Fertig's communications officer. Major Clyde C. Childress happened to be at Colonel Fertig's headquarters when McClish arrived and was ordered to accompany him back to Balingasag as the Chief of Staff of the 110th Division.

3. The headquarters of the 110th Division was set up at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, during the latter part of November 1942. Balingasag was also the location of the headquarters of the 110th Regiment, activated a short time before by Colonel Fertig with Captain Pedro Collado, a former Constabulary lieutenant, commanding. The guerrilla band which was to form the nucleus of the 110th Regiment was started at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, sometime in September 1942, when a group of armed Filipinos led by Pfc Clyde M. Abbott, 14th Bom. Sqdrn, and Lt. Pedro Collado (PC) attacked a Japanese patrol which had visited Balingasag to set up the Japanese puppet government. The Jap Commander, Captain Okamura, and several soldiers were chased into the church. In the ensuing firefight, a couple of Filipinos were wounded; so it was decided to fire the church. Captain Okamura jumped from the upper story of the church breaking his leg and was boloed to death by the civilians, the remainder of the Japs burned to death in the church. Sometime in the month of September 1942, a small guerrilla band under

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 3)

Omangdang flourished around Gingoog, Talisayan, and Esperanza. This group killed the Japanese military mayor of Talisayan and then proceeded to loot property of different industrial firms and civilians in the area, pretending to be soldiers. The Anakan Lumber Company and the Sta. Claro Lumber Company lost a considerable amount of fuel to this band who wasted it driving around to parties and other nefarious activities. This fuel could have been used to great advantage later on by the legitimate organizations. Omangdang was overthrown and jailed by Lt. Willard Money, USFIP, (USAC) who had hidden in the mountains behind Anakan until he heard that there were some guerrilla organizations being formed. Lt Money jailed Omangdang and his lieutenants. Other small groups in the vicinity of Bobontogon and Claveria were organized by Master Sergeant McIntyre, USAC, who reported to the 110th Division and was recommended for commission and assigned to the 110th Regiment, where he became a battalion commander. Another group from the vicinity of Santa Ana and Malitbog were organized by Master Sergeant Fernandez, USAC, who reported to the 110th Division, where he also was recommended for commission and assigned to the 110th Regiment, where he also became a battalion commander. Lts. McIntyre and Fernandez have been active officers in the guerrilla since November, 1942, and both have been wounded in action. It was soon evident that Capt. Collado was highly resentful of the organization of a higher headquarters in his area. His decorum and the action of his men was not even friendly, much less the relationship to be expected between a Regimental Commander and a Division Commander. Collado set up a whispering campaign among the civilians that the American officers were interlopers and they had no power, etc. Hoping that this ill

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 4)

feeling could be cleared up and not wishing an incident to arise to hinder the early growth of the division, the headquarters was moved to a more suitable location, Medina, Misamis Oriental.

4. At this early time from December to February, the 110th Division Headquarters consisted of Lt. Colonel McClish as a Division Commander; Major Clyde C. Childress, Chief of Staff and AC of S, G-3; Major Dionisio Velasco (PC) the Adjutant General and AC of S, G-1; Captain Virgilio S. Aguilar, AC of S, G-2; 2nd Lieut. Richard Thomas, USFIP (USAC) AC of S, G-4; Captain Cruz Ranario, QMS, Quartermaster; Captain William A. Knortz, USFIP (USAC), Liaison Officer; 1st Lieut. Willard Money, USFIP (USAC), attached; 2nd Lieut. Frank Noel, USFIP (USN), Provost Marshal. Major H.D. Woodrull, formerly of the 62nd Regiment (PA) of Iloilo, did not surrender and went into the mountains in the vicinity of Claveria. When he reported to the C.O., 110th Division, he was assigned in command of the Claveria Detachment, which was to become part of the division concentration camp.

5. The early guerrilla bands that were to eventually be activated into the 113th Regiment in the Butuan - Cabadbaran area were the small groups that sprang up at Nasipit, Buena Vista, the lower Agusan River, and Cabadbaran. These small units which had been having encounters with the Japs around Buena Vista and Libertad, Agusan, were brought under control of a unified command by an Assyrian mining engineer named Khalil Khodr, a highly intelligent, brave, forceful leader. His integrity and energy are responsible for the organization of the 113th Regiment, which had at least 900 arms in 1943. This officer is held in very high esteem by both Americans and Filipinos. Many of the leaders of the small bands in this area reported individually to the Headquarters, 110th Division,

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 5)

for recognition, but were grouped together to form the 113th Regiment, Khalil Khodr commanding, with the USFIP rank of Captain, later to become Major.

6. The work of the 110th Division in the early days was the organization of the unattached guerrilla bands into the USFIP, the suppression of crime, and the carrying on of attrition against the Japs. One of the American officers who was to figure predominantly in the organization of the 110th Division was Captain William A. Knortz, a former Corporal in the 14th Bom. Sqdrn. Knortz surrendered to the Japanese with the forces of Brig. General Guy R. Fort, C.O. of the 81st Division (PA), at Dansalan, Lanao. He escaped and joined Lt. Col. McClish at Imbatug, Bukidnon. Knortz was a perfect physical specimen, having engaged in rigorous athletics all his life, and being black belt jiu jitsu artist. He was absolutely fearless, and with tireless energy went about the work of active field organization of the 110th Division.

7. During the month of December, the Division being only a month and a half old, Captain Collado was becoming increasingly insubordinate. News was reaching the Division Headquarters that Collado was openly defying the Division Headquarters in Balingasag and was telling the civilians that he had forced Lt. Col. McClish to move his headquarters out of Balingasag. This turn of events was becoming so notorious that the division commander's prestige would be seriously damaged unless something were done. It was known that Collado had ordered the movement of certain troops nearer to Balingasag and had collected his automatic rifles to his headquarters which indicated that he was preparing armed

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 6)

resistance. Lt. Col. McClish ordered Collado into the Division Headquarters to explain his activities. Collado came to the Headquarters with a heavily armed body guard which he threw as a cordon around the headquarters building where the conference with the Division Commander was to take place. His attitude during the conference was arrogant. All the while the talk was going on one of Collado's body guards kept a Garand rifle covering McClish from the top of a staircase nearby. Lt. Col. McClish and Major Childress chose not to notice anything out of the way and kept the conversation on general subjects until Major Childress, who had been riding, unobtrusively mounted his horse, rode around for a few minutes in view so as not to arouse suspicion, and then rode to the telephone station where he called Knortz in the next barrio. Within two hours Knortz and his men arrived, disarmed Collado and his whole party. Since then Captain Collado had been under restraint. Investigations of his conduct brought to light evidence that he had been connected with several mysterious deaths. He was held in confinement until he escaped and went to Leyte in November 1943. The case of Collado is the only one concerning open antagonism towards the Division Headquarters. There were many cases of small bands refusing to submit and having to be forced to do so by agents of the Division Headquarters as the policy was to consider any unattached band as bandits.

8. During the month of January 1943, Captain Knortz with Lt. Money went to the Upper Agusan to Talacogon, passing near the Japanese garrison of Butuan and outpost of Libertad. Using the native dugout canoes called borotos they paddled against the swollen current of the Agusan River for almost two weeks before reaching Talacogon, where information stated that there was still a large amount of USAFFE supplies

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 7)

left there by Col. Chastaine at the time of the surrender. At first the civilians denied that there were any arms or ammunition in the vicinity. Knortz, not to be easily dissuaded, lined up all the men in the barrio including the mayor and the Chief of Police and walked up and down the line slapping faces. Soon there were confessions. When Knortz departed from Talacogon he had on his several rafts, the former transmitter of the Anakan Lumber Company, which consisted of the transmitter itself, a steel cabinet two feet square by six feet high, a generator and many other pieces of personal equipment such as packs, canteens, bayonets, etc. All this equipment was floated down the Agusan River to Amparo, 7 Kilometers above Butuan, where it was transferred to a convoy of 15 carabao sleds and hauled practically under the nose of the Japanese outposts at Libertad, Agusan, and always within easy patrol distances of the Butuan garrison. The help of Khalil Khodr caused the success of this operation. These supplies were taken to the beach at Manapa, Agusan, where the motor banca "Athaena" picked up the party and carried it to the division headquarters at Medina. The "Athaena" is a large two masted sailing banca with outriggers, owned by a Filipino named Vicente Zapanta, who reported for duty with the 110th Division in November 1942, turning his banca over to the army although he had been making a huge profit from it in the commercial trade. He was commissioned as a 2nd Lt. but rapidly rose to the rank of Major in the USFIP. He has proved a valuable man to the organization. His banca was originally armed with a homemade smooth bore cannon but was later equipped with a 20mm cannon and 50 cal. machineguns, but the banca never saw action on its many trips

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 8)

distributing submarine supplies about the Visayan Islands and other coastal points in Mindanao.

9. Up to this time this organization did not have contact with the Southwest Pacific Area by radio. It was the desire of everyone in the organization to construct a radio in order to gain contact with General MacArthur. The large radio transmitter that was brought down from the Upper Agusan was thought to be the answer; however, merely having a transmitter was not enough. Someone familiar with radio procedure was necessary. Mr. Cecil Walter, the manager of the Anakan Lumber Company, had always implied that he had influence with General Royce of the U.S. Air Corps. He said that his own radio operator had been operating the set for the Air Corps at Anakan and that his operator still knew the frequencies, etc., and that if we brought the set back to Anakan, he would get contact with General MacArthur for us. The radio was then turned over to Mr. Walter, who was offered a commission as Captain and a position as Signal Officer of the 110th Division, which he refused. However, he was able to get the radio into operation and contacted the War Department through a system of using serial numbers of American soldiers to establish identity.

10. It was evident at the very beginning that in order to organize all the small guerrilla bands in the eastern portion of Mindanao it would be necessary to obtain a fast means of water transportation. Two launches were found on the seacoast of Misamis Oriental, one, the "Rosalia", was a light tug powered with a 50 HP diesel engine, and the other an inter-island passenger launch, the "Treasure Island", with a high superstructure and a 75 HP diesel engine. These launches were put into commission in February, 1943. With launches in operation, it

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 9)

was necessary to locate an oil supply to provide fuel. Captain Cruz Ranario, Division Quartermaster, solved this problem by building a kilometer long pipeline from the oil storage tank of the Surigao Consolidated mine at Siana, Surigao, to Tubay creek, where the oil was placed in oil drums which were floated down the creek to Tubay River, carried by baroto down the river to Tubay, where the oil was picked up and carried to fueling station. It was estimated that this oil storage tank, which was never touched by the Japs, contained over 200 tons of diesel oil which was more than sufficient to operate the 110th Division's launches for two years. An additional 60 tons of bunker fuel was siphoned out of the hulk of the SS Mayon sunk at Nasipit Harbor, but 52 tons of this oil was dumped by an American who thought bunker fuel was worthless.

11. During the early days of the guerrilla, after the 110th Regiment, now under the command of Captain Luz, and the 113th Regiment, under the command of Captain Khalil Khodr, were fairly well organized, but before any outside contact was made, there arose the question of what is the purpose of the existance of the guerrillas. At the time, the organization had no money and was supported by contributions of loyal civilians; therefore, it was necessary to do something to justify the existance of the organization. Fighting the Japs seemed to be the principle reason for existance. It was planned to attack the Japanese fortified garrison of Butuan, Agusan. The entire 110th Regiment of over a thousand rifles and the 113th Regiment of at least 900 rifles moved to attack the town from all sides. Units were soon able to enter the town and to confine the Jap garrison to a concrete school building,

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 10)

which was heavily fortified with breastworks. Our troops, having only 30 caliber rifles and not being trained in assault, could not carry the building, but just wasted their meager supply of ammunition potting at the windows. During the nine day battle, Jap planes bombed and strafed the guerrilla positions causing numerous casualties. On the ninth day, when Jap reinforcements arrived, our troops were too short of ammunition to resist and had to retire. Several men distinguished themselves during this engagement. The original plan was for four columns to enter Butuan from different directions before daylight to capture certain objectives. The column led by Major Childress was supposed to enter from the northwest, fight its way to the docks and cut away the Jap launches and steal them. However, the column arrived at its jump off after dawn while heavy firing was going on. Thinking that he was late and all his companions were already inside, he ordered the column across the road and inside the town. Only Major Childress, Lt. Money, and about 25 Filipinos got in and spent the entire day inside the fortified town, at one time drinking coffee inside a house with the first canned cream either Childress or Money had seen for over a year while the Japs were walking about not two blocks away. About four in the afternoon other troops got inside. Mortar fire set the flimsy nipa houses afire. Soon the whole town was burning and Childress and Money and their men were forced to flee through the burning buildings while Japs fired on them. Capt. Knortz during this battle exposed himself many times to direct fire trying to organize assaults to storm the school building. During the first few days of the attack he was always inside the town. He and Capt. Anton Haratik were able to steal two

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 11)

launches, the tug "Nara" and the river launch "Agusan". Later he came back and tried to organize the assaults on the school building, exposing himself within a few feet of the schoolhouse windows in such a manner to show that he was utterly disdainful of the Jap fire. Lt. Tom Baxter manned an automatic rifle during the battle, staying on the firing line during the entire nine days. He was seen to stand up at close range of the school building with an automatic rifle firing full automatic spraying the windows and screaming at the Japs to come out and fight. Captain Rosaurio P. Dongallo, CO Div. Sp. Trp Bn. distinguished himself as a fearless fighter and a good leader of men. During the last day of the battle when it was evident that the ammunition supply was becoming exhausted, Captain Knortz took the launch "Rosalia" and went to Bohol, where a reliable source had reported that a certain individual had collected a large amount of ammunition after the surrender, but was holding it in secret from the Bohol force, because there was some kind of disagreement between the two parties. Capt. Knortz contacted this individual and was able to obtain 8,000 rounds of ammunition and brought back the individual who knew the source. This ammunition was taken back and distributed to the troops. As Knortz had been pressed for time, he was not able to get all the hidden ammunition in Bohol. Major Childress and Capt. Knortz decided to return to Bohol and get the remainder. Upon arriving in Jagna, Bohol, Childress in the launch "Treasure Island", and Knortz in the "Nara", it was discovered that the commanding officer of the Bohol force had learned of our ammunition raid and was very angry about it and had taken steps to prevent the taking of any more. However, while a conference was held with the officers of the Bohol forces, it was possible to send men up into the hills to get another 2,000 rounds.

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 11A)

The decorum of the Bohol guerrillas was such as to indicate that they might start shooting, so the party from the 110th Division boarded their launches and returned to Mindanao.

12. The party stopped off at Mambajao, Camiguin Island, and heard from the civilians the story that a submarine had landed in Misamis Occ. Sending the "Treasure Island" on to Mindanao, Knortz and Childress took the motor launch "Nara" to Misamis Occ. where in the headquarters of Colonel Fertig, they met Commander Parsons, who had just come from Australia. Commander Parsons gave the information that General MacArthur wanted the guerrillas to spend their energy gathering intelligence information of the Japanese and not to be wasting ammunition by carrying out frontal attacks against fortified garrisons. It was all right for the guerrillas to carry out pure guerrilla tactics of sniping, ambushing, etc. Upon returning to the Division Headquarters, it was discovered that Lt. Col. McClish had gone to Masgad, Surigao, with the intention of leading an attack against Surigao, but was persuaded to return, meeting Commander Parsons at Anakan. Capt. Knortz went to Surigao to organize the guerrilla bands there, which were slow to organize and were showing signs of giving trouble. Major Childress went with Commander Parsons on an inspection trip of the Bukidnon forces. Later Commander Parsons visited Anakan Lumber Company and examined the radio in the possession of Mr. Walter that had been furnished him by the 110th Division and suggested that this radio be used as a relay station and standby for Colonel Fertig's station, which was located in Lanao. When this plan went into effect, this radio was removed from the control of the 110th Division and was turned over to the custody of

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 12)

Mr. Walter, who used army personnel to operate it as a standby station of the 10th Military District.

It was soon apparent that Capt. Luz was incapable of commanding the 110th Regiment. He lacked initiative and was a coward. He actually did not know where his companies were located. Capt. Luz was relieved and reverted to civilian status. Capt. Rosaurio P. Dongallo, who had proven his valor and ability to lead men in the Butuan battle was appointed Commanding Officer of the 110th Regiment. Soon after he was promoted to Major and has done an excellent job, the efficiency of the Regiment being greatly increased since he has been the Regimental Commander.

13. It looked as though Surigao was going to present a more complex picture than had the north coast of Misamis Oriental and Agusan. On the west coast of Surigao, the local leader was Macario Diaz whose headquarters was at Masgad, Surigao; some forces in the north central part of the province were headed by Major Garcia; Lt. Joe McCarthy controlled Cantilan south to Tago; Captain Tomanning had a small group of men at Lianga; Lt. Villarín commanded the Lingig Detachment; Sammy Goode had a notorious band at Barobo. 1st Sgt Jovita Pedraya was in control of the Caraga area. These small groups were inefficient, commanded for the most part by weaklings, men who cared not to fight the Japs but who inflicted heavy damage against property, refused to submit to each other, gave the guerrillas a bad name in general and used up precious stocks of supplies which could have been of value to the later organizations. These were the conditions that faced Captain

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 13)

Knortz when he went to Surigao to organize these little groups into the 114th Regiment. Learning that most of the arms were in the hands of the little unimportant units in the southern part of the province, while the main Japanese garrison was in the north, Knortz went by launch to Lingig, where he learned that Villarín had heard of his coming and had posted his men on the beach to attack Knortz's party; however, Knortz surprised Villarín by entering Lingig by land from the rear and disarmed the whole group. Knortz continued organizing group by group. About this time Lts Robert Spielman and Paul H. Marshall who had escaped from the Japanese prisoner of war camp in Davao, were assigned to the 114th Regiment and proved of valuable service to Capt. Knortz in organizing the regiment.

American civilians coming to the Division Hqrs from the Upper Agusan reported that Barobo, Surigao, there was a bandit gang under the command of an individual known as Sammy Goode, an American mestizo, who had several Americans under him, two notorious ones being Whiteside and Turner, former US Air Corps enlisted men. Whiteside liked to play with his gun; and he and Turner practiced rapid drawing of a pistol from its holster several hours a day in front of a mirror. Goode had passed the word around that he was going to clean out the Americans who were evacuating at the Gomoco Mine in Agusan, where Mr. McCay, Manager of the Mindanao Mother Lode Mine, was reported to have hidden many thousands of pesos. Whiteside is reported to have killed one of his companions, an American soldier named Wren, in their mountain hideout in Surigao shortly after they had arrived on the east

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 14)

coast after hiking in from Bukidnon. Whiteside and Turner were reported to have killed a Filipino officer in the Hinatuan jail, where the officer was locked in the cell. Capt. Anton Haratik was sent to Barabo to apprehend Sammy Goode and bring him to the Division Hqrs. Near Tandag, Haratik encountered the men of Sammy Goode who opened fire. In the ensuing fight, Goode was able to make his escape although several of his men were killed in the gun battle. Sammy Goode was later apprehended and confined. Whiteside and Turner were disarmed and confined by Capt. Knortz. Turner was later released, but Whiteside was killed by one of the prison guards.

During the time that Major Childress was in Bukidnon with Commander Parsons, Capt. Cruz Ranario, the Division Quartermaster, convinced the Division Commander that it would be much easier to supply the entire division with foodstuff if the different units were not scattered all along many miles of coastline but concentrated into a division cantonment. The site offered for the division cantonment area was Jabonga, Surigao, on the banks of Lake Mainit. Ranario promised that enough rice could be carried over the mountain from Surigao and enough fish could be caught in Lake Mainit to supply the whole division. Lt. Col. McClish ordered work begin in constructing buildings at Kitcharao, Surigao, and began moving to that area. This particular move would have greatly jeopardized the guerrilla organizations and by pointing out certain factors to the Division Commander, he was easily dissuaded to give up the plan of a division cantonment at Jabonga.

During the early days of the organization of the 110th Division,

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 15)

information reached the division headquarters that Captain Claro L. Laureta, C.O. of the Camp Victa, Davao, Company of Philippine Constabulary, had never surrendered to the Japanese and had taken his men to the hills of Kapalong, where he had organized a guerrilla band for carrying on the war against the Japs. Letters were sent to Laureta to join his organization with the 110th Division. In July, 1943, Laureta personally reported to the Division Commander. His unit was activated as the 130th Regiment, and he was promoted to a USFIP Major.

A machine shop was opened up at Port Lamon, Surigao, in the old Port Lamon Lumber Company's yard, which was destroyed in the 1942 hurricane. At this shop were 2nd Lt. Richard B. Lang, and Waldo Neveling. The purpose of this shop was the construction and repair of launches and bancas. The first launch to be constructed in this shop was the "Albert McCarthy" named after the brother of Lt. Joe McCarthy, who was killed in an ambush near Surigao City while on patrol against the Japs.

14. Captain Knortz sailed this launch to the Division Hqrs at Linoqus, Misamis Or, and then sailed with Lt. Baxter and Major Childress to Liangan, Lanao, to get submarine supplies from Colonel Fertig. The supplies were received and the party returned, stopping at Balingasag, while Knortz in the launch, continued on up the coast. A telephone call was received that the Japanese had just landed at Gingoog and had taken control of the town. That same afternoon, Captain Dobervick, USMC, arrived in Balingasag with a truck. A platoon of soldiers from the 110th Regiment Combat Company were sent

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 16)

immediately by truck to Gingoog to engage the Japs. At Talisayan the M/L "Albert McCarthy" was found anchored and it was learned that Captain Knortz and his armed party had proceeded toward Gingoog on foot. The launch was unloaded and hidden and the supplies were loaded on the truck and sent to Medina, where the combat company troops unloaded and marched toward Gingoog. It was learned that Knortz had entered Gingoog and killed eight Japs at close range with his tommy gun and then had retired through the mountains. The troops arrived late and set up an outpost at Lunao crossing. During the night a large Japanese patrol attacked the outpost and broke through it. Lt. Pritz bringing the truck with the supplies to the outpost was ambushed by this Jap patrol and was killed. Someone had left the sub supplies aboard the truck which was lost. Captain Knortz returned to Liangan, Lanao, arriving just after another sub had arrived and was able to get the largest shipment yet allotted the 110th Division; however, he overloaded his small launch, having on board 13 people in addition to their weapons, packs, and submarine supplies. About midway between Camiguin Island and Punta Diwata, the launch floundered and sank. Six Filipinos were the only survivors.

When the Japs occupied Gingoog and Anakan, on the 1st of September, 1943, they evacuated Butuan. Our forces immediately occupied Butuan and discovered that the Japs had left on the river bank a good river launch and a 200 ton wooden lighter that was formerly owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Company. The launch was easily repaired and put into service on the Agusan River bearing the name "Captain Knortz". The barge was also repaired and floated. This lighter was

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 17)

used on the 3 of December and the 34d of March to unload a hundred tons of submarine supplies.

15. The Division Hqtrs was moved from Linogos to Rizal, Agusan. Upon the death of Captain Knortz, Captain Paul H. Marshall was assigned as Commanding Officer of the 114th Regiment in Surigao, as Marshall with the help of Lt. Robert Spielman had done most of the organizing of the 114th Regiment in the northern part of the province, many times going along armed with an automatic rifle into the camp of guerrilla leaders known to be hostile to submit and convince them to join the 114th Regiment, USFIP. Marshall and Spielman are well known in Mindanao for the efficient fighting organization that they have built. Spielman is particularly famous as a great guerrilla fighter, fearless in action and a good leader of men. He has personally dispatched many Japs in his numerous encounters.

In October 1943, Captain Robert Ball arrived in the Division Hqrs and to survey Nasipit Harbor and Port Lamon Bay for use as a submarine rendezvous. Captain Ball and Major Childress went up the Agusan River by launch, and up the Gibong River by baroto via Prosperidad to Los Arcos and then to Lianga via the Lianga-Los Arcos Road and then to Port Lamon by sailboat. Completing the survey, the party returned to Rizal. The motor banca "Athaena" was sent for by Colonel Fertig, who returned and set up temporary headquarters at Rizal. Major Childress returned to Surigao to inspect the 114th Regiment and to survey the possibility of establishing a food transportation route from Surigao to the interior of Agusan via the Lianga-Los Arcos Road-Gibong River route. On 15 November 1943, a submarine

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 18)

landed at the pier in Nasipit Harbor and discharged one hundred tons of cargo. The 110th Division orchestra was present to serenade the sub crew with "Anchors Aweigh" as the sub was getting under way. These supplies were distributed to the western portion of Mindanao and to other of the Visayan Islands on Zapanta's banca "Athaena".

16. During the latter part of November, Colonel Fertig established his headquarters at Esperanza and on the Agusan River. The Division Headquarters was aware that there was yet one unassimilated guerrilla organization on the east coast of Davao, farther south than any of the division's contact men had gone. This group was headed by 1st Sgt Jovita Pedraya, a former 1st Sgt of the Constabulary. It was also known that there were two American soldiers in that area, Sgt Owen P. Wilson and Pvt Hays. Refusing to acknowledge any mail sent to them to report to the Division Headquarters, it was finally necessary to send Captain Haratik to Carago, Davao, with Captain Reese A. Oliver, former Division Superintendent of Schools for Agusan. These two officers contacted Wilson and Hays who came to the District Hqs at Esperanza in December 1943. Sgt Wilson, a radio operator, was given a radio station to install on the east coast for a coast watcher station. Wilson was commissioned and assigned as Commanding Officer of the guerrilla unit of Pedraya, which was activated as the 111th Prov. Bn., with Pedraya as the Executive Officer. Up until this time the area of the Upper Agusan and the east coast of Surigao south of Tandag was not very heavily garrisoned. Colonel Fertig realizing that sometime in the future it would be necessary to have a garrison in the

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 19)

Upper Agusan to guard his headquarters, appointed Captain Anton Haratik, who had shown great ability in apprehending recalcitrants, as Tactical Commander of the Upper Agusan Defenses which consisted of one company of the 113th Regiment station at Talacogon and a detachment of the 114th Regiment stationed at Lianga, Surigao. Captain Haratik, showing great initiative, organizing ability, and energy began enlisting and training civilians which he organized into platoons as fast as he could get arms to supply them and officers to lead them. In about three months, Haratik had ten of these platoons that were outpostting all the principal entrances to the Upper Agusan Valley from the north and west, the 130th Regiment being assigned the mission of guarding the approaches from the south. This force was activated into the 112th Provisional Battalion.

17. The 110th Division was now fully organized and covered an extensive area. In January 1944, it was agreed between Lt. Col. McClish and Major Childress that there would be a delegation of authorities, McClish to center his attentions upon the business connected with the 110th, 113th and 114th Regiments in the north, and Major Childress to supervise the 111th and 112th Provisional Battalions and 130th Regiment in the south, where most of his attention had been centered during the organization of these units.

A member of the 114th Regiment in civilian capacity is a German citizen, Waldo Neveling, who has been out of Germany for over twenty years and is not affiliated with the Nazi Party of Germany. Mr. Neveling hates the Japanese and desired to fight them although he said that he would not care to fight Germans. At the Port Lamon machine shop, Neveling built a two masted banca christened the "So

Guerrilla Organization (Cont 20)

What", powered with a 25 horsepower diesel engine and mounting a 20mm cannon. It was with the 20mm cannon on this motor banca that Neveling shot down a Japanese Betty bomber, which crashed a few kilometers distant near Hinatuan.

18. Colonel Fertig moved his headquarters to Talacogon. Beginning in the latter part of February the Japanese became very active in the eastern portion of Mindanao. Butuan was invaded again. There was hot fighting on the west bank of the Agusan River and at Rizal by the Division Special Troops Battalion. On the west bank of the river the Japs were repulsed by the 113th Regiment after a three day fight to take the 20mm cannon emplaced on the top of Vitos Mountain. The Japs were able to finally take this position but were repulsed immediately due to heavy shelling from our 37mm emplaced across the river which opened up as soon as the Japs entered the emplacements. Although a naval gun on a permanent mount, the 20mm cannon on Vitos Mountain proved very effective against ground troops. The 20mm cannon was recovered and restored to use. The Japs did not attempt to cross to the east bank of the Agusan River for two months. During this time the 113th Regiment heavily outposted the east bank of the river up as far as Esperanza. Japanese positions were periodically shelled by 81mm mortars and 20mm cannons.

19. On the 1st of May 1944, the 107th Division was activated to include all the troops of the 110th Division south of a line running east and west through Lianga, Surigao, which included the 111th and 112th Prov. Battalions and the 130th Regiment with Major Childress as the Division Commander.

Guerrilla Organization (cont 21)

20. During the entire organization of the guerrilla, the Filipino civilians have been most cooperative and have backed up the army to their utmost ability. Without the aid of the civilian population, such an organization that now exists in Mindanao would be impossible. There are many cases of personal sacrifice and loyalty on the part of particular civilians that are too numerous to mention here.

21. All the organizations of the Tenth Military District are carefully recorded. Each company prepares a monthly roster which is forwarded through channels through battalion regiment and division headquarters to the District Headquarters monthly. Station lists of regiments and divisions are prepared monthly and forwarded to District Hqs. G-2, G-3, and G-4 monthly periodic reports are prepared by all organizations and forwarded to the District Hqs monthly. Accurate medical records are kept. Records of events diaries are kept by each organization and recorded in the Divisional Adjutant General's files. Each officer has a 201 file which includes his oath of office. Each soldier has a complete enlistment record, a copy of which is forwarded to the 10th Military District Adjutant General and a copy kept on file in the Division Adjutant General's file. Complete finance records have been kept. Records have been kept of all Quartermaster transactions.