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Interview with
John Plath Green
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Interviewer: Dr. Ronald E. Marcello

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Oral History Collection

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Dr. Marcello: This is Ron Marcello interviewing John Plath Green for the North Texas State University Oral History Collection. The interview is taking place on February 6, 1974, in Denton, Texas. I'm interviewing Mr. Green in order to get his reminiscences and experiences and impressions while he was one of the officers in charge of the American team that went into Japan at the conclusion of the war and liberated the American and other Allied prisoners who were in Japanese prisoner-of-war camps.

To begin with, why don't you just very briefly give me a biographical sketch of yourself. In other words, tell me where you were born, when you were born, your education, your occupation--things of that nature. Be very general and brief.

Mr. Green: I was born in Dallas, Texas, on what was called "Ignorant Hill" on Sunday, December 11, 1910.

Dr. Marcello: What was the name of the hill?

Green: "Ignorant Hill."

Marcello: "Ignorant Hill?"

Green: It was known as "Ignorant Hill." It was down close to the old Dallas Power and Light Company, Griffin Street plant, close to the waterworks that purified the water for the city of Dallas. It's now occupied by the football stadium owned by the Dallas Independent School District, the P. C. Cobb Stadium. I am a product of the Dallas Independent School District--it was the City of Dallas schools then--and went to work following graduation from high school. I went to work for Western Union because I didn't think I had any opportunity to go to college. I had met, during my last years in high school, a man by the name of Grady Spruce. When the depression hit in its fullest, about 1933, we had a force reduction at Western Union, and I was laid off.

During this period of time, Mr. Spruce talked me into going to The University of Texas to mark time. I might as well invest the time during the depression, and that I did. I went there five years. At that time, you could have two years undergraduate work and three years in law school. I received my LL.B. degree

from the University of Texas in May of 1938. I had already received my license to practice law a month or two earlier.

I went to work for R. G. Storey, who later became the dean of the law school at SMU. I was with him for ten years. I was a partner with him. Then I left him after World War II--I think about 1948, I'd been with him about ten years--and struck out on my own.

I have been by myself and was associated with others. One of the greatest that I was associated with was Lewis B. Lefkowitz, one of the sons of a wonderful rabbi, David Lefkowitz. David Lefkowitz was his father. On his death we formed a firm which now I am the head of, the Green, Gilmore, Crutcher, Rothpletz, and Burke. I might say that my son and daughter are seventh generation Texans. We have been here that long.

Marcello: Your roots go back a long way in Texas history then.

Green: That's right.

Marcello: When did you enter the service?

Green: On Friday, February 13, 1942. I was inducted in Dallas, Texas, put on a bus for Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and when I

arrived there, I was assigned to Barracks 13. So we had Friday the thirteenth, and the thirteenth started me off in the Army. Actually, I think it was probably lucky for me. If you were a crap-shooting man, a dice-throwing man, you would say that I got an impossible point, Barracks 13, and I crapped out the next day with Barracks 7 (chuckle).

Marcello: What was your unit's designation at this time, and did you stay in this same unit for the duration of your service time?

Green: Let me back up a second. My draft number was sixty-seven. Because of my age, I'd been given an I-H designation. But when Pearl Harbor occurred, I tried to volunteer, but the draft office said that they would reach me faster if I were to go through the draft rather than to volunteer. So I ended up by being drafted, but I had wanted to volunteer. I was stationed at the Reception Center on Friday night, February 13. There they processed me to find out my background. They found out that I was a lawyer. They found out also that I could type. Colonel Reuben G. Lewis was the commanding officer of the reception center. When he saw my Form 20, which is the form

that was used, when he saw that I could type, that I was a college graduate, he pulled me out for me to be his private secretary. Because I asked him to let me go through the infantry school for combat, and because on my Form 20, which showed that I used to tutor math at The University of Texas, he put me into field artillery. I had never had any basic training in artillery. I never had seen a cannon, never had seen a cannon fired. So he sent me to the Officer Candidate School at Fort Sill. You want me to keep on going?

Marcello: Yes, go right ahead.

Green: I was a private then. I'd been in the Army about three months, and he promoted me. He had to promote me to corporal to go to Officer Candidate School. I went to an officer candidate prep school for ten days at Fort Sill. I have momentarily forgotten the number of the field artillery unit, [18th FA] Regular Army, that I had to train with for a while. Then when the Officer Candidate School Number Twenty-seven opened, I went in for ninety days there and came out a second lieutenant in, oh, the latter part of August, 1942. [27 August 1942] Because of my age again, I was sent

to the training center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, rather than into combat. When I got into the training center, they put me in a "Baker Battery," they called it, where I was just an ordinary line officer.

Because of my law practice, law degree and all, somebody thought that I belonged in the training center school. I was sent up to be an instructor at the training center school. Though I was older than most of them, I was the youngest in grade. So I got the worst assignment, which meant that I had to teach the kids, young kids coming in, methods of instruction--MIT. It was so dull and dry that I hit upon the idea of having each one of these sergeants . . . in a field artillery section, you have a section chief, a sergeant, and you've got his gunnery corporal, you've got number one cannoneer, and then you've got your other cannoneers, down to seven, that help to operate the cannon, shoot the cannon, prepare for action. We had to teach these brand new soldiers the "cannoneer's hop." This was one portion of it. So I would have them bring their cannons on the night before they were to give a demonstration . . . they would stay on the campus of the training center school, sleep there--

the whole section would--that night. Next day, I would watch them carry out what they should have learned and would grade them on that. On map reading I'd do the same thing. Whatever we taught, I would try to teach . . . see, I was teaching the sergeants, I was teaching the officers, how to teach when they went back to their units. I realized that demonstration and application . . . in other words, they not only had to look at it, but they had to go through it, so they'd remember it a whole lot more for it.

As a result of it, the lieutenant general of the ground forces in I think it was Alabama someplace, Georgia . . . it was reported to him, and he began to send generals. At first it was captains, then majors, then colonels, then generals that he would send to be my students. Anyway, it was a lot of fun.

Marcello: You mentioned awhile ago the "cannoneer's hop." Is that correct?

Green: That was our common name for it, that's right. It was common knowledge to us.

Marcello: The "cannoneer's hop."

Green: The "cannoneer's hop." It was actually like foot drill.

Marcello: Oh, I see.

Green: We had to teach these kids . . . in combat the field artillery battery would be traveling down a highway. When the executive officer or the commanding officer of the battery would say, "Prepare for action," we were moving twenty or thirty miles an hour. We had to come to a sudden halt and move the cannon by hand out to a place, site. Then the soldiers had to split the trails, set it, level the bubbles, level the tube, and report back, "Ready for action." We had to train them so well that from the time that the order came, "Prepare for action," and then when he saluted that he's ready, it could not be longer than forty-five seconds. So you see, we had to just train them and train them and train them. We'd drill them. Of course, they were hopping; all the time, they were hopping. So we just called it the "cannoneer's hop" because everybody was hopping.

Marcello: In other words, it was the routine that they had to go through or the procedures that the crew of an artillery piece had to go through in order to prepare that gun for action.

Green: That is right. We had to do it fast because you didn't

know where the enemy was going to be. So you had to do it in a hurry (chuckle).

Marcello: Now how long were you at this training camp, at Fort Sill, or in this training center?

Green: I was there for . . . by the way, as I witnessed the kids who came up to me who were the instructors, and I found out how incompetent they were or how poorly trained they were, and as I would visit through the training center and would see the drill sergeants or the officers reading funny books and the . . . we were expected . . . at this particular time, Rommel was active in North Africa with his Afrika Korps, and we were supposed to prepare a postal clerk, a drugstore cowboy, and make him as competent a soldier as Rommel's trained and seasoned people because they were being shipped from Fort Sill over to North Africa. To me, it was murder not to teach these kids how to defend themselves and how to be competent in their work. So I began to make . . . I asked if the commanding general of the training center would send me, at the eleventh week of training, the students who were to be graduated out and sent out. They sent them to me, and on a grade schedule of 100, the average grade was 15. They just

didn't know anything. So I showed this to the commanding general, and he blew his top. Thereafter, he dismissed every officer who was of a higher rank than I.

I became then director of the school when I was a captain and put all younger people than I under me to carry out . . . he made me . . . he asked me to prepare practical tests on every phase of field artillery, the weapons. For instance, on the breechblock of the 105 howitzer I had to write the tests, the practical tests, on the disassembling of the breechblock blindfolded. The soldier had to be blindfolded. He would disassemble the breechblock, and then he would reassemble it in just a very few minutes. I forget exactly how it was. I had to draw the tests so that every field artillery soldier in the entire United States Army in a training center would have to take Johnny Green's test in order to pass (chuckle).

Anyway, this fellow, General Ralph McT. Pennell, had so much confidence in what I was trying to do that he promoted me as fast as he could. Then when the Army regulations . . . I'd been there at Fort Sill

about eighteen months, and he said, "Now I want to send you wherever you want to go. Where do you want to go?" I said, "I want to go to the officers' advanced course in field artillery in Fort Sill, Oklahoma." I went there. That was Officers' Advanced Course Number Twenty-four. There one of my instructors was General John Torrey, who is now the executive director of the Dallas Council of World Affairs here in Dallas. By the way, Reuben G. Lewis, Colonel Lewis, is now my client in Dallas, Texas.

After I finished Officers' Advanced Course, General Pennell called me in his office and said, "Now where do you want to go?" I said, "I want to go to a new division that was being cadred out." He says, "I'm not going to let you do that." He said, "I want you to go to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas." I said, "General, I am a captain. I cannot go over there." He said, "I am a general. You can go there." So I said, "Yes, sir." I went to the Command and General Staff School, Class Number Seventeen, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for another thirteen weeks.

When I left there, I came back to General Pennell, and he sent me then to a combat unit. Because of my having been graduated from the Command and General Staff School, which is the highest school in the Army you could get at that time, I was sent to the 4th Army in Memphis, which cadred out as the 8th Army. We were sent then to where the coconuts grow. I wanted to go to Europe. I kept asking the senior officers where we were going to go. One said, "Well, you're just going to see a lot of coconuts. That's all I can tell you (chuckle)."

Marcello: So when did you ship out then for the Pacific?

Green: It was in the summer of 1944. I went to Camp Stoneman, California, and was there until I could get aboard the General . . . oh, the name of the ship was General . . . I can't think of it now. [General Pope] It had all of the officers and cadre of--that's the enlisted men--of the 8th Army. We had absolutely no fighter protection. We had no escorts. We sailed out from Camp Stoneman through the Golden Gate out into the Pacific.

Marcello: If I may interrupt, does this tell you perhaps something about the course the war was taking?

Green: No. They were experimenting with us. This ship had the capability--I'll remember its name in a minute--this ship had the capability of more knots per hour than any of the Japanese battleships or destroyers or any other equipment, so all we needed to do was to keep our radar out for where they were and let the intelligence tell us where they were. Then we would just avoid them, and if they ever picked us up, we could just outrun them.

So we went down by Guadalcanal, down to Milne Bay, which is the tail of the "Guinea" in New Guinea. Then we sailed northwestward up the back of the "Guinea" until we got to Hollandia. Hollandia was our 8th Army headquarters. We met our General Eichelberger there, who was removed from the I Corps, the First Corps, and became the lieutenant general of our Army. I was then made the Army Artillery Intelligence Officer for the 8th Army.

Marcello: Being a Texas boy, did you get seasick on your trip across the Pacific at all?

Green: No, I didn't. No, I didn't. The only time I ever got seasick was when we were making our ship-to-shore landing in Zamboanga. We were in a flat-bottomed boat.

It was rather hectic. We were riding the cradle of the waves instead of against the waves. I lay on my bunk the whole time. We had to get up off of our bunk and jump into the water to face the Japanese.

Marcello: How long did this trip take you to go from the west coast of California?

Green: Two weeks, fourteen days.

Marcello: What did you do with your time while you were on board ship? Was it idle time, or were you busy in things constructive, or just exactly what took place?

Green: Every man was left on his own. There was no organization at all to it. I regret it. But I was a little officer. But there was absolutely no program planned for us. There was no recreation program, no reading program, no lecture program. We just sat and watched the waves.

Marcello: What were your thoughts about going to the Pacific? You mentioned awhile ago that, had you had your druthers, you'd have liked to have gone to Europe.

Green: I am a historian. I would love to have gone to a place that I knew something about. I had never studied anything at all about the Far East. I never will forget . . . all of my friends, by the way, had also

gone to Europe. I was impressed when I came up the back of that "Guinea," the island of New Guinea, to see the absolutely fantastic beauty of the jungles--the luxuriant plant growth, the white sands, the palm trees, and the red, ceramic tiled roofs of the dwellings occupied by the Westerners. All of the houses that I saw that were occupied by the natives were built of, I think, bamboo and thatched roofs and stuff like that. But it was very beautiful. It made a great impression on me. But as we got up into the Philippines, everyplace we went, I saw the same things, the same picture. The only major difference was on Leyte, Philippine Islands, where we later based--the 8th Army--the sands were charcoal rather than white. They were ashen gray. But it was beautiful. But it was really hot. It grew tiresome. Everyday at two o'clock it rained.

Marcello: In the rainy season it rained everyday. In the dry season it rained every other day, I suppose (chuckle).

Green: I'm sure that's what it was. But I was there on Leyte for several months. In fact, I was on Leyte until the war was over. See, I made the invasion. We went in on October 20, 1944, I believe it was. I

remember a kamikaze pilot was heading for our ship to destroy our ship when one of our gunners got him. He landed just about fifty feet off of our tail. That would be shortly after October 20, and I stayed there at Telegrafo--our unit stayed there, 8th Army stayed there--until the war was over.

Marcello: Well, let's just go back a minute here. You mentioned that you originally landed in Hollandia. That was your first stopping point. How long did you remain there?

Green: We left sometime in the summer--I can't recall that date for you right now--summer of '44. We made the trip to Hollandia in fourteen days, which is a record, if you realize how fast . . . evidently it was a fast ship. So we stayed there from I would say August until October 20. So I was there just about two months in Hollandia.

Marcello: What did you do during that period while you were at Hollandia?

Green: Because we were the 8th Army, we were a new army. It was our army's responsibility to make the forceful invasion of the Philippine Islands. The war was moving so fast that General Douglas MacArthur told the 8th

Army that we would not go in through Mindanao, the southern island, but that we would go into Leyte in the Visayan Islands. So during this period at Hollandia, it was to organize . . . an army is nothing but a headquarters. Then units are assigned to you-- divisions, corps. First it's corps, then divisions are assigned to the corps, and special forces on down. So as we were building up our strength to go into Leyte, Philippine Islands, we had to go out and inspect the combat efficiency of these units that were being assigned to us. So our job was . . . I would go out periodically, several times a week, to inspect the combat efficiency of the artillery units that were being assigned to us in our command.

I never will forget one, and I want to tell you about it. But first, because of the prevalence of malaria in the Philippine Islands, we had to take Atabrine. Now Atabrine is a dye. We were hot. We were in the jungles. We'd get sunburned, and then we'd get Atabrine-colored. So we would get yellow and brown mixed. A person whose skin was still white was held in contempt by the soldiers who were in the combat area because they had been fighting there so

long. It takes several weeks for you to get the combat color. So here old Green, as white as a lily, would go out to inspect the combat efficiency of these troops who had been in combat, some of them for two years, fighting the Japanese. I ran into one of them on the island of . . . oh, I forget the island . . . Biak. I walked into . . . the commanding officer, the colonel, took me and showed me a gun position. It was such a beautiful gun position! There wasn't a gum wrapper; there wasn't a cigarette wrapper; there wasn't a thing out of order. The unit was so wonderful, according to the book, that I asked the commanding officer, "This is one of the most wonderful gun positions I have ever seen. Are you using this for demonstration purposes for your soldiers?" He said, "Demonstration, hell! We're shooting at the Japanese from here (chuckle)." So you could see the contempt. Well, you could see the ignorance of the newcomers and the contempt that the oldsters had for us.

That's what we did. We did that until the administrative order came down to us that we were to prepare for the invasion of Leyte. I never will forget the evening before the morning that we left, the nighttime,

of going down and looking at the ships in the Hollandia Bay.

Marcello: I'm sure that must have been quite a sight. There were hundreds, I suppose perhaps even thousands, of ships.

Green: Thousands of ships of all kinds that were getting ready, that would steam out the next morning to go up there.

Marcello: What sort of feelings did you have about getting ready for this big invasion?

Green: It was one of thrill. We had been indoctrinated with the idea that we had a job to do, so let's do it, and let's get it over with. My ship was a . . . I think it was such a rattletrap. It was such an old ship that surely it must have been commandeered as one of the harbor ships. It was a boat, and we were to go up to Leyte on it. I never will forget that the band that played for the--this was the officers' ship--the band that played for us every night was the 112th Cavalry Band. The 112th Cavalry was in the Java campaign. They had all gone back home, but the band stayed there for us. It was a nice trip. You might call it just a pleasure trip until we got up into the fighting up in Leyte Bay, where all these . . . may I tell something here that "ain't" known?

Marcello: Go right ahead.

Green: While we were going up there to Leyte, the ships had arrived a day or two or three before us and our convoy, and we were listening to the Army radio and the Air Force radio on what was going on up ahead of us. I never will forget that the Japanese fleet was in the Leyte Bay area. After we went in, they began to go northward up toward Manila. They traveled very slowly. The admiral of the fleet that was in charge there thought that the Japanese fleet had been damaged, so he left us in Leyte Bay and went out to chase this wounded duck up there. As he was going up, he realized . . . well, in fact, one of the commanding officers back there said, "Sir, I'm sure that you . . ." Oh, I forget that admiral's name. He says, "I'm sure that you are protecting my right flank."

Marcello: I think it was Kinkaid, wasn't it?

Green: It started with an L, the name of the admiral who sent the message. So then the fellow, the admiral that was in charge of capturing the wounded fleet out there, so-called, sent some vessels back. But it left the Leyte Bay combat vessels . . . I mean, all of the Army combat vessels were gone. It left the Army transports

and escort carriers completely at the mercy of the Japanese.

Marcello: Yes, I think there was just little escort carriers.

Green: That's right. Then the Japanese Navy comes down the San Juanico Straits and comes into Leyte Gulf and destroys all of these little aircraft carriers so that the boys flying the planes could not land anyplace on it and bombarded the LST's that were discharging their soldiers and then turned around and went back up the San Juanico Straits before any combat units, these combat boats, could get back into it. It was a miracle that they didn't stay there and destroy everybody because they had it in their power to do it. It kind of made all of us mad who had been listening to this on the radio as you would a football game going on. I read in Time magazine that this was a remarkable naval feat, that we must give a medal to this fellow for falling for the lame-duck trap. The Japanese fleet had purposely led them to believe that they were wounded and that all they had to do was come to destroy them. What they were doing, they were luring them away from the Leyte Gulf in order that the other Japanese fleet could come down the San Juanico Straits.

I guess this is a part of oral history. I am a witness to what took place here, and let it be said that that was a mistake on the part of this great admiral. He just fell for a Japanese trap. It should not be to his credit that this was a terrific naval plan. When our boat got up to land, you could see the hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of planes that had no aircraft carrier to land on, that had tried to land on the beach and had crashed. So it was a tragedy, just very tragic.

Marcello: Up to this time, did you have any close contact with MacArthur himself?

Green: Not at this time, no. Only one time . . . with one exception. One time he came down to inspect the combat efficiency of some of the troops on Leyte. We had to stand guard . . . what do you call it . . . parade positions for him as he came down. He came by in a jeep, and he wasn't there but about two or three seconds.

Marcello: Incidentally, awhile ago you also mentioned that when you were going into Leyte Gulf, you did have a brush with a kamikaze plane. Would you describe this?

Green: We had a gun on our rear. A kamikaze plane is a plane in which the fighter is going to die. He's got a bomb in his little airplane, and he flies it at his target. He destroys himself and the target, too. So it's just a question of survival of the fittest, who gets whom first. This fellow, we saw him coming at us, and Lord bless our gunner, he got him first. He wounded him enough that he could not zero in on us. He came, I'm sure, within fifty feet of our . . . I was so frightened . . . but fifty feet. It was awful close as far as we were concerned.

Marcello: I'm sure this was a rather frightening experience to know that you were up against an enemy who really didn't care whether he lived or died, that dying in fact was considered a great honor.

Green: Oh, this was just a little bitty part. We had been taught in the school . . . and I had taught in the school . . . that we had four guns in each battery, and between the number one gun and the number four gun, it should be 100 yards. In combat we had a perimeter of 100 yards, and we had to put everybody within the perimeter. Then we would put barbed wire around us, and then we would put cans with rocks in

them. Then we would put up fires that would be unaimed, interlacing fires, so that whenever the Japanese would attack . . . they would drink sake, and they would be worked up. They would have a little Indian pow-wow, war dance, before the attack. Then they would attack us with their bodies as well as their guns to get to us. The instant that we suspected that there was--we'd hear in the rocks--somebody infiltrating with us, then all of the weapons would fire at once so that no one could be picked out. Then all of us would cease at once.

I never will forget one of these . . . by the way, the next morning . . . before the next morning, the Japanese would always come up and draw their dead bodies of their friends away. On one of these . . . by the way, we traveled in small groups in combat. On one particular one I was in . . . because the field artillery forward observer had suffered a shell attack, I had to go down and take his place. I was a liaison officer with the infantry regiment there. I went down to take his place. I had my radio operators, my wire operators, my other guards, about five or six of us together. We assigned one of us to try to go get

souvenirs. As we were fighting in combat, he would go pick up souvenirs, and then at the end of the day, we'd divide them. On one of these days, they found some sake. So at four o'clock, we'd have to stop and start digging our foxhole. We drank our sake, and it was very difficult for me to dig or any of us to dig our foxhole for that night (chuckle). So the sergeant and I decided that we would dig ours together. So we did and we got it down about, oh, eight inches, I guess, below the level. So we stopped. I lay down on my back and looked up at the stars. While you've been in combat and after the cannons firing, at nighttime there is not even an insect that will chirp. There's no bird that would sing. It's just absolutely the stillness of death. I looked up at the beautiful jungle sky through the palm trees. It was a beautiful sight. I took my .45 off and put it on the earth beside me so that in case of attack I could reach it very easily. Well, in the middle of the night, the Japanese attacked us. All of the fire then opened up around us, this interlacing fire, and then in about five minutes it ceased, and it was just the stillness of death again. I felt my trusty .45, and realized

that it was not cocked. Now I don't know whether you know anything about a .45 or not, but you have to pull the barrel mechanism back and then let it go, and it slams back into the cocked position battery. I did that. Well, I think coconuts must have fallen from the trees for a mile around, the noise was so crashing. The sergeant, master sergeant, who was sleeping beside me forgot that I was his superior officer, and he really dressed me down in four-letter words with inflections that I had never heard of (chuckle). I didn't do it anymore.

Marcello: Going back just a little bit, we were at the point where we'd been talking about the kamikaze attack on your ship. Did you have any other particular incidents of this nature when you landed? Were you in the initial landing force?

Green: I was in the initial landing force . . . I was with the group that was sent out with the initial landing force, but the flotillas are so long or so great that I went in about . . . the invasion was on October 20. I must have gone in within two or three days, four days, thereafter.

Marcello: In other words, the beachhead had already been established by the time you arrived.

Green: That's right. That's right. See, we were a noncombatant. We were just a bunch of officers. Just .45's was all we had. The infantry had to go in ahead of us to secure the beach for us.

Marcello: So what happened after you actually landed on the beach? What did your duties encompass from that point then?

Green: We got in a convoy of two and a half ton trucks with our equipment and our personnel. We landed just south of Samar at Tacloban, as I recall it, just south of Tacloban on the beaches there. Then we went several miles down to Telegrafo, which had been selected as the headquarters for the Visayan campaign for the 8th Army headquarters. When we got there, the enlisted men had put up our tents for us, these large squad tents that would house about, oh, twenty, I guess, of us officers. They built our latrines--they, the enlisted men--built the latrines. The latrines, the general had his own private home. But the colonels could only go into one latrine, and the field officers in another latrine, and the captains in another latrine, and the lieutenants in another one, and the enlisted men in the others. Oh, it was really a tightly segregated group (chuckle).

Marcello: There was a hierarchy of latrines.

Green: That's right. That amazed me.

Marcello: Well, what exactly did your duties encompass after you landed in Leyte and established your headquarters?

Green: We had to maintain connection with all of the combat units. So we had a lot of housekeeping work, paper-work, that we had to do at Telegrafo. But then we were formed out. I was formed out to the Zamboanga campaign, as I was describing to you awhile ago. We would go get our combat experience. We would go check their efficiency, their needs, and stuff like that. We would just keep checking to make sure that every unit had everything it needed and that we knew what the morale of the staff and the morale of the soldiers and stuff were. We were, I would say, traveling around the island of Leyte all the time. We were going up to . . . we secured Leyte first.

Marcello: Now at this time, you were really not a part of any combat unit as such.

Green: Well, I was in the headquarters of the enormous combat unit, which was the 8th Army headquarters.

Marcello: I see, but you had not yet been formed out to the Zamboanga campaign or anything of that nature yet?

Green: Oh, no. That is right. That's right. That came later. What I tried to do, I wanted to . . . I was the Army artillery intelligence officer. I wanted to form a target information center modeled after what had been going on in western Europe. Now a target information center is a clearinghouse for all bits of information that pertain to the enemy's method of operation--the targets and stuff like that that you're to pick. When we'd recognize a particular unit of Japanese in an area, like I think the 16th Division was on Leyte, we wanted to know exactly how many men there were, whether they were real, good, top fighting men, what kind of equipment they had, whether they were motor-drawn, horse-drawn, or man-drawn--stuff like that.

I went to my division artillery general and asked him would he staff me with the people to do it. He said, "No, we've never heard of it. We will not do it." So I went to General Jones. General Jones was the G-2 of the 8th Army. He says, "No, we're not going to do that. It never has been done, and we're not about to try it." So I went back to my group and talked to my lieutenants and enlisted men, and I said, "Are you game? Shall we do it ourselves?"

So we formed our own target information center. We would send different ones on different invasions to test the efficiency or the need as to whether it was workable on a target information center. The reports were that it was highly productive. So after the Visayan campaign was over, General Eichelberger went up to visit with MacArthur to plan the invasion of Japan. MacArthur turned to Eichelberger and said, "How is your target information center going?" Eichelberger turned to General McGinley and said, "How's your target information center going?" He says, "We have an officer back at Telegrafo that has put together a wonderful target information center. It's working very well." MacArthur complimented General Eichelberger and General McGinley for having that foresight to have a target information center. When he came back, he was so elated that I had disobeyed his orders that he promoted me to a major.

Marcello: You heard this story from General Eichelberger?

Green: It was by some friends of mine who were there. It was not Eichelberger.

Marcello: Well, how long were you in the Visayan campaign before you actually were assigned to the Zamboanga campaign?

Green: Well, no, no. See, Zamboanga is the tail end of a peninsula. When I was there, it was impossible for there to be a roadway with the machinery we had then. So Zamboanga actually was an island itself. We had to treat it, really, as a part of the Visayan campaign rather than . . . there was no other fighting on Mindanao. It was just a little island down there we had to get rid of. So I guess I was in the Visayan campaign . . . let's see. I was in Hollandia from October until the following August. I would say that I went to Zamboanga along in March or April, 1945. I believe that's right. It was before the victory in Europe.

Marcello: I assume that you were about to see your first actual combat, firsthand combat, in the campaign for Zamboanga.

Green: That is right. That's when every . . . we were seasick. We embarked from the island of Mindoro and sailed down to Zamboanga. I never will forget it. We jumped into the water in the face of the Japanese firing at us. Heck, it was up to my breast (chuckle). We waded on out. I was with the forward party, so I had to be with the infantry to control the batteries. Our guns were back in another ship, so I had to get

ashore and stay with the infantry. Do you want me to tell anymore on that?

Marcello: I'm kind of interested in that Zamboanga campaign and the landing and so on.

Green: Well, I was made the liaison . . . let me tell you. When I reported into the infantry commander of the invasion, the task force commander, the infantry colonel that was in charge of it, I was brand new. After about a day or two--I had been there a day or two--I was walking toward the pictures, motion pictures, in the nighttime during blackout. A little enlisted man who worked in the commander's office sidled up to me in the darkness, and I couldn't see who he was. He said, "Captain, sir, you have been assigned for the invasion, the most dangerous task of the entire business. You are to be an artillery liaison officer with the infantry." So that was very . . . it makes you feel very happy [sarcasm].

So when we landed, the second day of the landing, we were to kick off for the main effort . . . make the main effort the capture of the town of Zamboanga. The infantry asked the artillery to lay down its curtain of fire, oh, about 100 or 200 yards in front

of the infantry, and the infantry would walk toward our curtain of fire. Then it was expected that our curtain of fire would continue to move forward toward the Japanese at the same pace the infantrymen were moving.

Now the H-Hour came and went, and suddenly there came a message from the task force commander saying, "Captain Green, your fires are not moving. What's the matter?" So I went racing down to the forward observer and found that the forward observer was shell-shocked. So I had to release him and then take over his . . . take his place. I found out that he had not even set up the radio. He had not set up wire. He had no communication with our firing batteries at all, so I could not tell them to cease fire.

So I happened to notice that the Army had prepared for Plan B, Plan C, in case of something like that. They had little boats out in the Sulu Sea. So I saw one of these little boats come by, and I went running out into the water and waving my hands. He came up as close to me and I said, "Cease fire! Cease fire! Cease fire!" So he called, "Cease fire" on his radio back to our battery. Then he and I--he got out of his

boat--he and I treaded water there in the Sulu Sea and agreed upon a system of wig-wag whereby we would call for the fires, and then we'd mark the fires, we'd cease the fires, and stuff like that. I had to go down then on the sandy shore of the Sulu Sea with the Japanese firing toward the shore from the inland to wig-wag to the boat out there what to do.

Well, the cannons of the Japanese knew . . . they saw how sensitive it was. So they would shoot at the boat, and the boat'd have to kind of, like a little dog, put his tail in between his legs and run. Then they'd start shooting at me. I had a little enlisted man, Larry Silva, a little eighteen, nineteen year old boy, that I asked to guard me from the fires while I was out there. We went all the way through. We captured Zamboanga.

Let me give you one little incident along the way. At noontime, at twelve o'clock, with the Japanese shooting at us, we had the protection of a little bit of foliage. The beach was here (gesture), and then there was a little rise. The Japanese mortars could hit us, but their flat trajectory weapons could not get us. We were moving about twelve o'clock, and the

commander says, "Let's rest here for lunch." So I pulled out my combat rations and had no stomach for it. I took a drink of water, and suddenly something took hold of me and said, "Green, get out of here." I said, "Larry, let's go. Let's go. Let's go, Larry." We were the front lines, so the only place we could go was in front of the front lines. So I went about fifty or sixty feet beyond the front line, and a mortar hit right where we had been and killed and wounded every bit of our units, of soldiers, that were there, which was quite nerve-wracking.

Marcello: How long did this Zamboanga campaign last altogether?

Green: Looking back on it now, I'd say close to two weeks.

Marcello: Was this mainly close-in fighting and jungle fighting and this sort of thing?

Green: The answer is very definitely yes. But our method of fighting was to have the artillery curtain of fire in front of us. Well, back up a minute. The first thing was to get the Air Corps to neutralize the battlefield as much as it could. Secondly, to come in next would be the artillery with our curtain of fire. Then they would be followed by the infantry, and the infantry with their Garand rifles would go forward like you would water your garden with a hose.

Marcello: They would just spray the foliage in front of them with bullets.

Green: That's right, and they'd go forward with it. You passed up dead bodies of the Japanese. You marched right along with it. Sometimes we . . . I never did . . . I never would let . . . well, another incident. In the Zamboanga campaign I had gone in with the landing forces. The reserves had come up to relieve us after about a week, and they had put us back, oh, 200 or 300 yards behind the fighting in reserves there. When the forces that had relieved us had an objective to take, a hill to take, they were so mutilated that every officer was killed. So our officers, then, had to go back and take their place.

So when I reported in to combat, well, this commanding officer was lying in a foxhole, a full colonel. He'd been sent down from regiment to take a lieutenant colonel's place, but he had command. So he was trying to put his little team together. After they had talked--they didn't seem to know what they were talking about--I said, "Sir, may I suggest this." I gave the battle plan, and I told him what I thought should be done." He says, "Green, you're the senior officer present. You're in charge."

So I was in charge of the infantry, the artillery, the Marine planes, and the tanks. Normally you would send a . . . infantrymen would have sent what we call points. I mean, they send little kids out in front to draw the fire, which in my mind was too cruel. So I asked that the infantry line withdraw. I turned to my little radio operator, and I said, "We'll get in this foxhole, and we'll call down the curtain of fire within twenty-five yards of us." This was suicide because the Japs were so close to us. I mean, they were just right on us. So we brought it down. The wonderful little old Marines came through with their planes and dropped their bombs. Then we gave the signal for the artillery to go forward with this curtain of fire. Then we gave the command for the tankers to start their tanks going. Then we gave a command for the infantrymen to start following at the proper distance.

I didn't realize that my little radio operator had kept his radio open, on open channel, the whole time. We captured it. We got our hill, and we did not suffer a single wounded in action, whereas theretofore they had been repelled by the Japanese,

decimated. Here we didn't have a single wounded in action by following the book on it. When we went back to see my fellow officers in the rear, they said, "Johnny, you were like an announcer at a football game (chuckle). I never heard anyone as excited as you were, giving your orders and hollering, 'They've got them! Lou, don't do that'!"

Marcello: Incidentally, I know that in some of the landings on Mindanao, there was contact with the guerrillas in the hills, whether they be Filipinos or even some Americans who had been fighting in the hills. Did your particular unit or outfit ever come into any contact with any of the guerrillas?

Green: We were in constant contact with the guerrillas. They were our intelligence. They were primarily native Filipinos, but a bunch of American civilians who had been over there and had been caught went into the hills and helped form the guerrilla forces. I was in touch with some of them. Because I was an intelligence officer, I was in touch more with the Filipino guerrillas who helped us. Very definitely, yes.

Marcello: What sort of help did they give you in this particular campaign? Or maybe I should say, of how much value were they in this campaign?

Green: I'd like to go off the record (chuckle). They were helpful but a lot of the information was unreliable.

Marcello: But then again, I think as an intelligence officer, that's something you have to expect, do you not?

Green: That's right. That's right.

Marcello: You receive all sorts of intelligence, and how much of it is reliable?

Green: That's right. Actually, you receive the information, you evaluate the information, and it becomes intelligence. So that we should refer to the information that was given to us. A lot of the information . . . by gathering from several different sources, you could check the validity of it and act on it. I would say they intended to be and were very helpful. They were people that were not of the background of soldiers from the United States. They had not been trained. They just had not had the background. Though you loved them, they were not as emotionally stable as the American soldier was.

Marcello: I'm sure that their figures as to numbers and so on were continually inaccurate.

Green: That's right. That's right. There were more people there than what they . . . I mean, they said that

there were more people there. But it was terrific because we knew something was there. As an intelligence officer, we had to do a constant study of what was the strength of the Japanese units that were in front of you. We knew this before we went in, what was their strength. If it were like this . . . I referred to this one on the island of Leyte as the 16th Division, and that was one of their crack divisions. We knew what their weapons were. They were terrific soldiers. They were larger-bodied than the normal Japanese. So we studied. This was a part of our what I called target information center stuff. We studied the capabilities of each one of these, so once we spotted the unit in front of us, we knew what was there. What we really needed to know--and the guerrillas would give to us--was that a certain Japanese unit were there, and this meant a lot to us.

Marcello: You mentioned, of course, that you were an artillery officer, and now you've also mentioned that you were in intelligence as well. What is the connection between the two, and how does it work?

Green: Well, I'm an Army artillery intelligence officer. After this incident with MacArthur and Eichelberger

on the target information center, General MacArthur and General Eichelberger and General McGinley assigned, oh, many, many . . . several photo interpretation units so that the planes would fly over the Kanto Plain and would bring these pictures that they took back to these units that were under our target information center now. It was our job to pick all of the tactical targets for the Air Corps and for the Navy and for the artillery for the invasion of the Kanto Plain when we went into Tokyo. We were limited to artillery intelligence and not to infantry intelligence.

Marcello: Now when did you really get into the intelligence work intensively? Would this be after the Zamboanga campaign?

Green: No, no, no, no. I originally got into it at . . . I was assigned when the 8th Army was put together at Hollandia. See, we were at Hollandia only for a very short time, an organizational time, getting ready to go to Leyte. My job there was really more than intelligence; my job there was to check the Army . . . all of us, whoever we were, were to go out and check the combat efficiency of the troops that had been assigned to us. There'd been so many assigned to us that everybody had to go out and do it.

Marcello: Well, obviously, up until this time though, you really wouldn't have had too much of an opportunity to check over the results of that photo reconnaissance of the Tokyo area, would've you? Not if you were in combat and so on in Zamboanga.

Green: No, no, no, no. Zamboanga was just a little two-week affair. I was ostracized as the target information center until the Visayan campaign was completed and the Lingayan Gulf and all that was completed. Now we were getting ready to go into Tokyo.

Marcello: Okay, then I guess we need to pick up the story from here then. Where did you go from Zamboanga? What were your duties from that point on?

Green: I went back. After two weeks, I went back to Telegrafo on Leyte to my unit there.

Marcello: This is where the preparations then took place for "Operation Coronet?"

Green: That's right. That's right.

Marcello: You were involved in that plan at that time?

Green: That is right. That's what we were planning for. But see, we could not even get into "Operation Coronet" until the Visayan campaign had concluded, Mindanao taken care of and . . . what is the northern island called?

Marcello: Luzon.

Green: Luzon--and Luzon had been taken. Until all of this was taken, then we began to turn our attention to the "Coronet" operation. It was at this time that the target information center began to blossom. This would be, I'd say, in June or July of 1945. It blossomed then, and they began to take pictures and just send them to us. But then the surrender took place in the middle of August.

Marcello: Before we get up to the surrender--and we've almost reached that point at this time--there's one question I want to ask you with regard to some of your combat experience. Now you had been in combat for a certain amount of time. You had observed the Japanese fighting. You had observed them dying. At this time, did you have the impression that they were going to hold out to the last man? Had you seen evidence of their fanaticism? You had seen the kamikaze plane, of course. But among the actual soldiers themselves, what evidence did you see of this fanaticism? Maybe that's not a very good question.

Green: Oh, no! I mean, the answer overwhelms me. I could talk for weeks on it.

Marcello: I think it's important that we get this in the record because to some extent it's going to determine, I think, the plans that were taken a little bit later on when you actually went into Japan. Certainly it colored your attitude tremendously.

Green: Oh, yes, yes. Actually in combat, in contact with them, on their infiltration to us, they trained themselves, they disciplined themselves, and actually they had been taught that if they were to die for their country, they would be in the Japanese equivalent of heaven from there on after, but that anybody who surrendered, any Japanese soldier that surrendered, by his own people was considered dead and don't come home. You're gone. So they were fanatics in the sense that they would not let you get hold of them. We had to send our soldiers out to capture some of these people and not kill them. For their own self-protection, they'd rather kill them. But we needed to get as much information because once you caught a Japanese and brought him in and kept him alive, he would just talk. He was never taught to give only his name, rank and serial number. He was never taught that because he was not to be captured. So why train them?

Marcello: This is very interesting. He simply couldn't cope with being captured when in fact it had occurred.

Green: That's right. That's right. The Japanese could not train him to discipline himself the way we did our soldiers. According to the Geneva Convention, the way it was, we had to give only our name, rank, and serial number. They were not told that, so when once we could get them whole to us, get them healthy to us, they would just talk, tell us everything we wanted to know. Their information generally was terrifically accurate.

But we would send a kid out, one of the little United States boys, to get him, and at first they would strip them down to their G-string. They would bring them back, or try to bring them back, but while they were holding them and our boy would not be looking, the Japanese soldier would reach into the G-string and pull out a grenade and would destroy him and his captor at the same time. We Westerners were used to the . . . we did not want to see the sexual or private parts of a Japanese, so you wouldn't make them strip to the flesh, skin (chuckle). But we learned after we had to do this. We had to make them completely nude and then bring them up to us.

They were fanatics on killing themselves and killing you. For instance, they would come against our batteries, our field artillery batteries. They would infiltrate in through the infantry to get to our batteries in the nighttime. They would have a satchel charge of dynamite on their back. They would put their arms around the barrel of our howitzer and then pull the charge and destroy them and the howitzer at the same time. I don't see how more fanatical you could get to that. They would charge our inter-lacing fires wave upon wave, knowing that they were going to be killed. But they would kill enough of us, and in the early days of the war, by doing this, they could kill enough of us, and we'd run out of bullets and couldn't fire them fast enough, and they would overwhelm us. But as we got used to it, we set up our defenses in such a way that we could repel them with it. But I don't know. All I can say is that life to them or death to them does not, or did not, have the significance that it has to us of the Western world under the influence of the Christian religion.

Marcello: I wanted you to get this in the record for two reasons because I think it was going to in some way influence

the plans that you were making for the ultimate invasion of Japan. Secondly, from what you said, it was certainly going to influence your own thoughts as to what you were going to expect when you actually found the American prisoners-of-war in Japan. You mentioned awhile ago, for example, that a prisoner was . . . to be taken captive was equivalent to actually dying so far as they were concerned.

Green: Right.

Marcello: It was a disgrace, and so far as their families were concerned, they were dead. But I think it had to have influenced your thinking, both for the invasion and later on when you were in charge of the Recovery Personnel Section.

Green: The greatest influence it had on me . . . there was such a short time span between the time that the target information center was allowed to bloom and the time that the surrender took place that I had very little opportunity to even think about anything that affected the individual Japanese soldier and stuff like that. We were picking targets then. But when the Japanese threw in their towel, when the emperor threw in his towel, and it was decided . . . MacArthur

deliberated for a long time with the surrendering people on what protection would be assured us. He was just as conscious as Johnny Green was that when we went in there, what were we going to run into? We were all fearful that we were going to run into a trap, like the Japanese admiral had lured our men into. We thought possibly that we were going to run into a trap there.

Marcello: I think it was still perhaps part of the Pearl Harbor mentality, too.

Green: I'm sure of that, too. But MacArthur, for instance, decided on these things. He forced the Japanese to take off the propeller of every single airplane and stack them well removed from any airplane. He put a guard to make sure that no one would get hold of one of those propellers just in case a kamikaze-inclined fellow would attack our planes as we came in. He would not let anybody go in the initial force, landing force, who was under six feet. He made us paint all of our vehicles. He wanted to overwhelm the Japanese. MacArthur understood the Eastern people more than I guess any commander has ever understood their thinking. Their face is the biggest thing in the world, and a

show of force and stuff like that will help. The Japanese were so small in relationship to a six-footer that it was awesome.

I saw it; I was there. I remember one day I watched four Japanese lift a sack of cement, each Japanese getting hold of a corner in order to carry it. One of our boys was so amused with it that he went up to the four Japanese and pushed them away and took the sack of cement and threw it upon the truck by himself. Well, this awed the Japanese. MacArthur knew that this would do it, so he did it. He laid down as many stringent rules to protect us . . . I'm grateful to him that he did.

However, it turned out that the Japanese people had been trained to love their emperor and respect their emperor. If the emperor had said, "You will surrender," they did surrender. In my talks with them, the Japanese people thereafter, it was an unwanted war in Japan. But the shoguns or whatever you call them, the higher establishment or whatever you want to call them, said that you would have it, and they did it, and they had to go through with it. It was an absolute surrender. We also found out very

early that there was only 4,000 gallons of aviation fuel left in Honshu when we went in, so they were on their knees.

They were gone, and when they began to realize that . . . which brings up . . . but back to your question now. Very definitely, the haunting fear that was in the minds of everybody was, "What is going to be the reaction of the Japanese people?" MacArthur even ordered us, with the agreement on the part of the Japanese, that we would come into Yokohama. We landed at Atsugi Airfield. We would be brought into Yokohama, and we would stay in Yokohama until . . . and that would be phase one. Then a few miles farther out would be phase two, phase three, and on out, till you got into Tokyo. Because they knew . . . MacArthur had said, "You will make sure that there will be no hothead in phase one." This was an additional protection based upon the fear that you and I were talking about awhile ago.

Marcello: This is getting ahead of the story, but since you mentioned it, I'll bring up the point right now anyhow. Why did you decide to land at Yokohama rather than Tokyo? In other words, why were the initial landings

on Japan in Yokohama rather than Tokyo? Was there a reason? There must have been some sort of a reason for that.

Green: Now I didn't participate in that. I don't know.

Marcello: I was just wondering if you'd perhaps heard secondhand.

Green: No, no.

Marcello: Okay, let's go back then and talk about the preparations for the eventual invasion of Japan. I don't think surrender was being contemplated at that point yet, when you had terminated the Zamboanga campaign and were back at Telegrafo again.

Green: No.

Marcello: Why don't you describe next, then, the procedures or the operations in which you were involved getting ready for "Operation Coronet," which I think would be what you were working on at this time?

Green: I'm trying to figure it out now. I came back to Telegrafo from Zamboanga in the late spring of 1945. The Luzon campaign and the Visayan campaign for all intents and purposes were over along in, I would say, May or June, along in that point.

Marcello: Another question comes to mind here. I need to interrupt you. Did you have any experience in the

liberation of any American prisoners-of-war who were in the Philippines at this time yet?

Green: Well, I only did it on a personal basis. While I was in Telegrafo, some of the prisoners-of-war that would be liberated from these outlying islands would be funneled through us, especially during the Luzon campaign. Leyte was first, which began the Visayan. But we went on up into Luzon and kept on with the Visayan part, too, the last parts of it. I had had a friend, Alvin Scaff. Alvin Scaff was a Presbyterian minister. He was president of the University of Texas student YMCA, and I was vice-president of the student YMCA. I was known as a rank militarist.

Marcello: A hawk (chuckle)?

Green: A hawk. He, one day, as president of the YMCA, said that he would not fight under any circumstances, and it was emblazened on the headlines of the Daily Texan. I was ridiculed a great bit because I was vice-president, and I said I would fight, and he said he wouldn't fight under any circumstances. If his wife was being raped or child being killed, he would not fight under any circumstances. After he was ordained as a preacher--he went in the Southern Presbyterian

Church--he was sent as a missionary to the island of Negros, which is one of the Visayans, in the Philippine Islands. So anyway, I would take cigarettes, I would take candy, everytime a group of them would be flown in, brought in, and give them to them, and then ask the question, "Have you ever seen a friend of mine by the name of Alvin Scaff, a missionary?" Week after week after week went by, and, of course, it was a needle in a haystack. They said, "No," until one day a man said, "Yes, he was in charge of all the guerrillas on the island of Negros." I haven't talked to Alvin since that time, but it tickled me that evidently, when he was faced with the situation, he reacted the way you and I would.

Marcello: I gather then that you were in contact with some of these former prisoners-of-war through interrogation and this sort of thing as an intelligence officer in the Philippines?

Green: No, no, no, no.

Marcello: No?

Green: No. See, while I was in the Philippine Islands, I saw very few of the released prisoners-of-war, except, as I say, on a personal basis when I was talking with them.

Oh, we'd talk a little bit about what they did and stuff, but it was meager and unofficial.

Marcello: Well, here again, what I was leading up to is whether or not your informal talks with these former prisoners in any way influenced what you were about to do or what you had planned to do when you got to Japan.

Green: I would say no. I don't recall that it did. It added nothing or took away anything. I don't recall anything now, no.

Marcello: Okay, well, let's get back to Telegrafo and the ultimate invasion. What exactly were your functions, and what were your duties when you got back again?

Green: Now this is from Zamboanga?

Marcello: Right, right.

Green: Well, I had been with my target information center. Here I had come back working again with my intelligence section to try to help in any way possible with the remaining portion of the Philippine campaign. We did not do any work at all on "Coronet" until I'd say June or maybe the first of July before we actually got to do any work there. I'd say during this period of time, it was just as boring as could be. I went into the Army a non-drinking man. I think it was just

about in this period . . . the Zamboanga period shook me up and actually put me in the hospital. At the officers' club, I began to . . . I'd go up and ask for some Cebu rum.

By the way, I had been flying down to Zamboanga and had to land . . . our plane had to land--something was wrong with it--on one of the islands that was not secured. It was being held only by guerrillas. There was no American troops in there at all. We landed on a guerrilla airstrip, and the first person who met me on getting out of the plane was a little Filipino with a soda pop bottle full of whiskey that they had made over there (chuckle). I bought it and brought it back, but I never did drink it.

But here was the period of time, I guess, that I began to notice that of just sheer boredom. "Coronet" was too far behind us, mopping up behind us. Everything more or less had slowed down. There was nothing to do, so we just had . . . I guess just we played and swam in the ocean.

Marcello: How close to the actual surrender did you actually begin to work on "Coronet?"

Green: I would say that our unit began to work on it in June or July of 1945.

Marcello: What part was your unit to play in "Operation Coronet?"

Green: Well, in the 8th Army the artillery was just a section. Then within the artillery section, we had the S-1's, the S-2's, we had the S-3's and the S-4's. I was the S-2. I was the intelligence officer with that. There was very little that I could do to get ready for the Visayan campaign until my officers, my superiors, told us to get ready for it. As I recall, there was no activity, no real activity, until June or July of 1945 in the whole Army. So we weren't doing anything.

Marcello: Well, then when orders came down that you were to begin preparing for "Operation Coronet," what exactly did you do from that point then?

Green: This is when General Eichelberger began to attach to our unit these photo interpretation teams. The Air Corps would go make sweeps, photographic sweeps, over the Kanto Plain, and they would bring them back to the photo interpretation people for them to interpret and then bring them to us for us to pick the targets.

For instance, we found this going on. The Japanese would have a hill that they would want to put a gun position in or an ammunition storage place and all on it. If they were to begin to start digging from the

top, they knew our planes would come over and would photograph it and watch them developing it. Well, some of them we did this way. But they soon learned that they would tunnel in and they would brace, bolster up, the terrain so that we could measure the hill, see. This way they could hide underneath there, build fortifications and stuff for us. We knew this was their plan. So the photo interpretation people had been trained to watch for such targets as that.

Marcello: How well advanced was the aerial photography at this time?

Green: I think it was absolutely terrific. I think the photo interpretation teams were completely on top of it. Their intelligence was just fantastic. For instance, MacArthur had to turn the tide sometime from retreating. As I recall, before I got there, Eichelberger was in charge of the First Corps--I Corps, we called it--and MacArthur gave the command, "You will hold at Buna Gona," I believe it was. "You will hold. You will not retreat. This is your last-ditch stand." That is called, or was called when I was overseas, "Eichelberger's Cemetery" because there were so many kids that had been sick that had to get up and fight.

We suffered a lot of casualties, but we stopped the Japanese. Thereafter, the Japanese never made any farther advance. That was their turn-around in the war. Then we began to push forward up to Hollandia. Then that made it possible for us to come over there.

MacArthur was consumed with the idea that a soldier's life was sacred--he was a very religious-minded man--that a soldier's life was sacred. He would never go in . . . he said, "Never attack your enemy frontally. Never go in where he is massed. You pick the battlefield. You turn him out of his strong point." As I recall, even at Hollandia, he struck at _____, way up far beyond it, and got an airport. Always his first objective of any landing force was to prepare a landing strip that would accommodate certain planes and then prepare a harbor that would accommodate ships of a certain draft. All right, now his idea was to get in a very innocent place, just out in the country, where there were no soldiers. They would go in, prepare their strip and all, and then they would use their airplanes to isolate the battlefield. He would not let any supplies--food supplies, medical supplies, ammunition supplies--ever

go in, then, to the strongpoints. Then the airplanes would go over the enemy battlefield, over the battlefield where they were, everyday. We would count bodies, then, of the Japanese who were starving there because of the effectiveness of MacArthur's plans.

I will never forget that he wanted to go into Amite, China, that Chiang Kai-shek held, and it was 750 miles, or a 1,500 turn-around, from Tokyo. Chiang Kai-shek could let him come in here and not lose a single soldier's life and then use this as the airbase to go bomb Tokyo, and then come back here, and everything'd be all right.

But the Pacific Ocean area had not had any play. Tarawa, I guess, was the worst one and the most glamorous one from their standpoint. But Tarawa was an anathema to MacArthur. He did not want a bloody battlefield, so he pleaded with Washington to allow him to go into China. But he was outvoted, and the Navy then wanted to come into the play. So they chose to go in on Iwo Jima and then into Okinawa. Iwo Jima and Okinawa had about the same 1,500-mile turn-around. That's as far as a fighter pilot can have

enough gasoline to take care of a bomber going up to Tokyo. But MacArthur, after the Buna Gona incident, never went into a stronghold of the Japanese. He always went into their weak places, and he used the photo interpretation teams to help him in making sure what the strength of the enemy was. I'd say that they were first-class.

Marcello: I would assume it takes a little bit of experience to be able to read those aerial photographs and so on, to be able to pick out the camouflaged gun emplacements and other military targets.

Green: It took me, I'd say, two years. It took me two years, and I used to teach it at Fort Sill. I used to teach it. I never will forget one day . . . after this incident on Zamboanga that I was telling you about, everybody wants to go get souvenirs. So all of the "rear echelon commandos" come walking in and said, "Green, show us where we could get some souvenirs." So I knew my map reading so well--I know I just knew it so well--and I knew my photographs so well that I said, "Now, okay, let's go over here." I had on my one-piece suit which an officer at that time was supposed to have worn. I was a captain. I had my

bars on my helmet. I wore my .45 out on my belt, and this was not supposed to have been done. An officer was never to reveal himself as an officer to the Japanese because they killed the officers first, see. So I took these officer friends of mine that were properly dressed--and I wasn't--and I said, "Now there's a gun emplacement that we knocked out." I pointed it out on the map. They picked up souvenirs, and we went on back. Then I went up to my infantry commander and said, "Okay, what is our next objective?" He says, "Right there." That's the hill that I'd been on (chuckle). We attacked it and were repelled. We had to go into a perimeter that night (chuckle). Why the Japanese didn't shoot me and our group, I don't know. But I had misread my map. The answer is very definitely they are hard to read.

Marcello: Okay, this more or less brings us up, I think, to the actual Japanese surrender. Can you remember what you were doing and what your reactions were when you heard that the Japanese had surrendered?

Green: I will never forget it. We were at Telegrafo at nighttime. I was watching a motion picture in blackout.

For your information, the projection booth in blackout was completely covered so that no airplane flying over could see the light. Then the screen was put back in a little back-end of a tube or hole so that there would be no possibility of the silver screen being seen from up in the airplane. So we were here. As I recall, it was drizzling rain, showering rain. We had squad tents, and the squad tents would have their skirts way up so that the jungle air could circulate through them. Different people had radios, and they were listening to them. On my left--I can hear it today--I hear a rumble, then a roar, a rumbling, a rumbling, chattering, and talking, and suddenly it dawned what the chatter was, "The war's over! The war's over! The war's over!" Then it just like a wave went right on beyond us. Then soon the lights of the tents began to come on. Then the lights on the ships in the harbor began to come on. Then the soldier boys and the Naval kids began to shoot their tracers, bullets. They began to shoot their 90-millimeter guns. They began to shoot . . . well, the howitzers began to fire, and carbines began to fire. It was really the most gala Fourth of July celebration I've ever seen in

my life. Of course, everybody was swept off his feet. We got out a beer ration. It hadn't been given out to us, so we immediately headed for the supply to get our beer ration. So we drank beer until, oh, I guess about midnight, just all as happy as larks.

Suddenly it dawned on us then that the artillery section of the 8th Army was to carry the second mission. The first mission in our "Blacklist" was to make sure that there would be no opposition to our occupation. The second mission was to liberate and evacuate the prisoners-of-war. Well, at twelve o'clock that night, it dawned on us that "Buddy, we'd better get together and start making some plans for 'Blacklist'," because MacArthur would be sending the orders down to us soon to do it." So we stayed up another couple hours after having drunk all of that beer. I'm sure you don't drink, but alcohol has a very sedative effect on you (chuckle). We gave up about two o'clock and went to bed and got up the next day and began to make our plans for it.

The word came down, I guess, that next morning when we got up that there would be two people . . . yes, it was. This was on August 14, I think. That

night was August 14. The next morning, on August 15, word came down to us that there would be two officers selected from the artillery section to go in with the first group of people to occupy Japan, Tokyo. Because of my height, and because of Charles Allen-- Chuck Allen's--height, he and I were chosen. We were the two biggest men, I guess, in the artillery section.

Marcello: How tall are you, just for the record.

Green: Six foot three and a half barefoot or six foot four and a half with my shoes on.

Marcello: Your colleague Major Allen was about the same?

Green: He was about six foot two.

Marcello: I was going to ask you why they had chosen the two of you.

Green: Because of our size, I'm sure. Now Charles Allen, Major Allen, was a . . . by the way, he was promoted to be a major on the same special order, on the same order, that I was. That meant that our date of rank was identical, which became a crisis up at Yokohama in the liberation. But he was the fair-haired officer of General McGinley. General McGinley had his friends. I was not one of them. As you can tell, I bucked his orders. Really, I was insubordinate

all along in the Army. General Pennell, back in the States, had urged me to be disobedient. He said, "Captain Green, it's a great risk. But if you think you're right, you do what you ought to do, regardless of what your commanding officer tells you to do. You do what's right. I trust your judgment here." So I did it. I did it, and, of course, that made McGinley mad at me.

I might say this, that General Eichelberger sent word down to me that he wanted me to be his aide-de-camp. General McGinley began to coddle me then. He called me, and he said, "Johnny, you're going to be an aide to General Eichelberger." He said, "I want you to remember the artillery section when you're up there, and you" He would butter me up as much as he could. This happened during the period after I returned from . . . you asked awhile ago what I did when I got back from Zamboanga up to Telegrafo. I'd forgotten that I taught a school . . . we now had command of the air in the Philippines. The anti-aircraft battalions had a 90-millimeter, a straight trajectory weapon. They were lying idle. There was no need for them to . . . there was no mission for

them to accomplish anymore. So it was decided that Green would teach the officers from the antiaircraft battalion. They would all come from all over the islands up to Leyte and let me teach them fire direction center work, how to coordinate, how to mass their fires. So I was teaching it, and all the officers from over the islands were my pupils there.

So when I was asked to become the aide to Eichelberger, I asked General McGinley what officer was to take my place in teaching. Major Allen, as I say, was his fair-haired boy. So he said, "Major Allen will take it over." I knew that Major Allen didn't know what to do. So I went to Major Allen, and he said, "My gosh, I don't know a thing in the world about that." So I said, "Well, you come up and tell General McGinley that." He did. As a result of the fact that he couldn't find anybody to teach it, I did not get to be the aide de camp to Eichelberger. I'd like for you to even block that out. I might hurt the major.

Marcello: But anyhow, so you and Captain Allen, who was to become Major Allen or . . .

Green: Well, see, this was now in the days when we were . . . I think we were majors then.

Marcello: You were majors at the time that you were appointed.

Green: That's right. See, when they came back from Luzon, and the target information center was blessed by MacArthur, we were both promoted on the . . . he had nothing to do with it, but he . . .

Marcello: I see. I assumed that you had been promoted upon your appointment to the Recovery Personnel Section of the 8th Army. You were majors at the time that you were appointed.

Green: That's right.

Marcello: Okay, and this organization was known as the Recovery Personnel Section.

Green: Recovery personnel unit. See, now a recovery personnel unit . . . the artillery sections of each one of the combat units were to be the governing civil administration group of every island or every place where they were, so that this was Colonel Rice's job. So he would create recovery units. Now Major Allen and I were really not a member of a recovery unit. We were the bosses. That was beneath us (chuckle).

Marcello: Okay, I wanted to get that clear for the record. So anyhow, you were appointed to this Recovery Personnel Section. What plans or what preparations did you

make at this point so far as getting those prisoners out of the camps, getting them processed, taking care of them again? Obviously, you didn't make too many plans because you weren't there too long before you took off for Okinawa.

Green: We took off for Okinawa, I believe, on August 15.

Marcello: So in other words, you were appointed, and you had no time whatsoever to make any plans while you were in the Philippines, virtually none.

Green: As I recall, we scampered around and got as much information and asked that Colonel Rice get information as fast as he could and to send it to us at Okinawa because we knew that we were going to have a two-week layover in Okinawa to get everything ready. So Colonel Rice would, as I recall . . . I'm sure that the artillery section would send stuff up to Major Allen and me on Okinawa. Major Allen and I went to the commanding officer, the American commanding officer, of Okinawa and asked them if we could use the airstrip at Okinawa for a . . . we would go up and get the prisoners . . . he, the Okinawa airstrip commander, would funnel the troops that would land in the Atsugi Airfield up there, and when they would turn around,

instead of coming back empty to Okinawa, we asked him if we could put the former prisoners-of-war on that plane and then let them come back to his strip. Then he'd make sure that they were shipped back down. The next stopping place was Luzon. There they would be processed and then sent home. Chuck and I made these arrangements while we were on Okinawa. The artillery section under Colonel Rice in Telegrafo ordered the air droppings and supervised the air droppings from back yonder because we had this map. But at that time, as I recall, he did it himself back yonder. We could not do it. I don't think Chuck and I did any of that at Okinawa. I don't recall.

Marcello: Well, let's go back just a minute before we actually get you to Okinawa. So you were appointed to this Recovery Personnel Section, and without making any preparations whatsoever for getting these prisoners out, you were on the first wave, you might say, or with the first group that entered Japan actually.

Green: We started out in these great, big, beautiful planes. We had been in little C-47's. By the way, the C-47 was a heaven to look at. In combat when we saw a C-47, we knew we were winning the war because a C-47

has no protection. When you see P-38's, when you see others, you know that we're still fighting. But once you see that little old C-47 coming in, it was a lift to us. We knew that everything was going all right. We were used to that kind of plane. It had been stripped down because they didn't want paint on it. They didn't want too much paint and too much baggage, luxuries, because that took the place of supplies that could be sent. So when we got in this beautiful--was it a C-54 or whatever it was--thing, it was like walking into a king's palace.

But it was on midnight of August . . . as I recall, the order was that we were to begin to take off from the Okinawa airfield at midnight, August 30, 1945. The airplanes took off . . . the order was that every two seconds a plane would take off. My plane took off at 0202. That would be 2:02 a.m. So you could count the number of planes that had gone off down to me. But I was there at midnight waiting for our plane.

Marcello: But again, going back a minute, so you got to Okinawa, and you were there for about two weeks. It was here that you made some of your initial preparations for

how you were going to handle this prisoner-of-war situation when you got to Japan.

Green: That is right. But they were general preparations. The preparation for the airfield, for the command of the airfield, was one. Next one was that it was determined that I would be the liberator. I would go out and get the prisoners-of-war, and Major Allen would process them and evacuate them back to Okinawa and back to Luzon. Beyond that, we just cooled our heels here.

Marcello: What sort of a working relationship was ultimately to develop between Major Allen and yourself?

Green: He and I got at cross-purposes. This was actually after we got into full-scale operation up there. I was liberating more than he could . . . wanted to process. He was a very methodical person, very thorough, very intelligent person. But he says that 250, I think, was all that he would process . . . 200-250 was all he wanted to process for one day. Well, I was getting in 500 or more. In fact, anybody that I could find, I would get them to Yokohama as fast as I could.

My theory was that these kids have been in these flea-bitten camps for so long that if they stayed there, they would either crack up, or they were going to get in trouble with the Japanese people, or something was going to happen. But I felt that even if they were walking home that their morale would be good.

It came to an impasse one day. General Fitch, with Douglas MacArthur's headquarters, who was assigned to work with us, kept asking Major Allen, "Do you need typewriters? Do you need enlisted men? Do you need officers? Tell me what you want because we think Major Green is right. We've got to get them out. We're going to have a problem if we don't get them out." Major Allen kept putting rocks in his way and was uncooperative with him.

General Fitch turned to me and said, "Major Green, you're in charge of the full operation now. You go forward." I said, "Yes, sir." Chuck then had to fade into the background. He helped me with the processing.

We worked out a plan that I think we worked out in conjunction with the surgeons or the doctors, with the supply people and all, on getting a big warehouse in Yokohama. Every soldier that would come in . . .

outside the door, before he walked into the warehouse, he was stripped completely, and we would throw his clothes away. Then he would step in the nude inside the warehouse. Then he would go to a bath, a shower bath. Then when he got out of the shower bath, he would go by the doctors, the physicians, to get examined. Some they would just look at. They could tell that they were all right. Very few of them, though, were singled out that needed more thorough physical examinations. After they passed the doctors, they went then to the supply section, and they gave them their underwear and gave them their outerwear and gave them everything else so that when they got through the line, they were completely dressed.

Then they stepped out into a . . . we felt like they needed to . . . see, these people had just come in. We felt like they needed to get a communication back to their wife, parents, whatever it is. So we put four tables together, and we put a couple of men in the middle of it. Then we'd seat soldiers, or former prisoners-of-war, around the perimeter of it. They'd give them the forms that they had to fill in the information for their Red Cross reports, for all

kinds of reports. We would talk everyone through: "You go to line A, line B. Answer this. Do this on it." One of the things said, "Now write out a telegram to whomever you want to send it. Write it out right here. You put the address on it. We'll collect them, and we'll send them at our cost to your loved one." Then they would get up from there, and they'd go to a battery of typewriters where the clerks behind the typewriters would take their names, ranks, and serial numbers for call on the next airplane that would be available. They would call their name out to get on the airplane. They called them airplane manifests, is what they called them then.

This was just a system that Major Allen and other people working with us worked out. As I look back on it, I wouldn't improve on it because it worked so well. We also realized that there needed to be some sort of emotion. There needed to be some sort of "thank you," some sort of something, to these prisoners-of-war who had been captured at Corregidor, Bataan, Java, Wake Island, various places like that.

The evacuation primarily was by . . . I'd say it was three-fourths was by railroad. They would come

in at the Yokohama Central Station. We would always have a band playing--the American band, the IX Corps band. Different bands that would be playing here. We would have an honor guard for them. Then we would ask the brass to come down. We always asked General MacArthur, but I don't think he ever came down. But Mrs. MacArthur was there all the time. But just great, big, terrifically high people would be coming down there to watch these people come in.

We were scared. We had nurses there. We had litter bearers there, thinking that there might be some who were weak. We didn't know what their conditions were. But I don't recall a single nonambulatory prisoner-of-war that came off any of those trains. Everyone of them were able to walk. They were in high spirits.

Marcello: Now had most of these details or had some of these details been worked out on Okinawa before you went into Yokohama? Or did most of these details that you just described to me really take place after you got into Japan proper itself?

Green: I would say the majority of the ones I have just mentioned came after we got up there. We did not

know what was going to be available up there once we got there. We did not know what we were going to run into. We did not know what the reception was going to be. There were so many unknowns that we didn't . . . I'm sure we did not do it because it was impossible for us to be that smart, to look forward that far in advance.

Marcello: Okay, so you were on Okinawa for two weeks. Then, of course, you were going to be in one of the first groups to actually go into Japan proper itself, that is, to Yokohama. What were your thoughts when you found out that you were to be with that first group that was going into Japan?

Green: I was thrilled. I wanted to go in. I was thrilled. I wanted to. I think when Chuck and I were discussing with each other which one would be the liberator, which one would be the evacuator. I chose . . . I wanted to be the liberator, if necessary, to go out into the hinterlands and find these prisoner-of-war camps.

Marcello: Were you apprehensive about it at the same time as you were thrilled?

- Green: You bet your life I was apprehensive! I was scared to death!
- Marcello: You say you were both thrilled and scared. I assume this was at least in part due to some of the experiences that you had had in the Philippines with the fanaticism of the Japanese that we talked about before, plus what you probably had read and had been told by other people in Intelligence and this sort of thing.
- Green: That is right. I had been briefed while I was in the States, before I went overseas, as to the type of combat soldier that the Japanese soldier was, that he was a fanatical person that would rather die than surrender.
- Marcello: How about the civilians? Had you heard the same sort of information about the civilians?
- Green: No, no.
- Marcello: I guess you just didn't know what to expect from the civilians.
- Green: That is right. This is another thing that scared us on our trip from the Atsugi Airfield into the New Grand Hotel.

Marcello: Something else just comes to mind here, and I'll ask if you thought about this. Now these Japanese people had been under very, very intensive air attacks for some time, especially those who lived in the cities, and you'd be working primarily out of the cities. Did this perhaps give you cause for apprehension? I mean, after all, I don't see how they would have particularly liked Americans after having been under those very, very intensive air attacks.

Green: That is right. As we flew in . . . see, it was dawn, it was daylight, when we got to Yokohama. As we flew over Honshu, we could see beautiful highways that would lead to a blackened spot, which means that the buildings that were capable of being burned were completely burned out. The only things that were left standing were the brick, tile, concrete buildings that had been designed by American architects and had been built so that they were fireproof. Now those buildings were well-protected. I found out later that it was for this reason that they fire-bombed the cities of Japan rather than block-bust the cities as was done in Western Europe, and it worked very effectively. You can rest assured this did weigh

heavily on me, knowing that there would be so many people that had lost loved ones in the fires.

Marcello: What sort of precautions did the 8th Army or MacArthur in particular take to protect these initial troops that were going in? Let's say at Yokohama. I guess we could probably start with Yokohama or maybe even back in Okinawa?

Green: Well, it started in the Atsugi Airfield. As I told you awhile ago about the airplanes, they made all of the airplanes all over the nation have their propellers taken off of them so that no one could fly from anyplace. We saw the stacks of propellers. We saw the soldiers standing guard over the propellers so that no one would go out and do it. The armistice contract called for the Japanese government to furnish us with trucks, with vehicles, motor vehicles, that would carry us from the airfield into Yokohama. In the first truck, for instance, would be--all of them would be charcoal burners--in the first truck we were loaded with the infantrymen with their Garand rifles. I can see it now. They were standing with their guns in their arms, pointing outward, so that the truck itself looked like a porcupine with his quills.

Marcello: Now these were American infantrymen?

Green: These were American infantrymen.

Marcello: Were these American soldiers that had been guarding the propellers?

Green: No, no. They were Japanese.

Marcello: They were Japanese soldiers?

Green: Those were Japanese soldiers.

Marcello: That might have told you something, perhaps, about the sort of reception that you were going to receive. I don't know if that was a clue or not, that they were going to be rather obedient.

Green: No, it didn't. I was too scared to think of that. The next vehicle would be non-combat soldiers like myself. They had no rifles. Then the next vehicle would be one of these porcupines again. We got all in line, and we started into the New Grand Hotel from Yokohama, from Atsugi Airfield. We went down what I would call in the United States an alley, but it was the main road between Atsugi and Yokohama. As the convoy would proceed, at every street intersection there would be a Japanese policeman with a rifle in his hand. As we approached him--and I was in the next vehicle after the first vehicle--as we approached

him, the policeman would be facing the street, standing at attention. But as our vehicle reached him, he would do an about-face and turn his back to us. This gave us basis for fear. We thought they were treating us with contempt as they did this.

There were absolutely no civilians or any other persons on the street between the airfield and Yokohama. We could see people peeking out from behind curtains in their windows. As I've told you, I remember particularly one little girl, Japanese girl, a little doll. She couldn't have been over four or five years old, and she was giving the Churchill victory sign with her fingers, which was comforting to us. When we got to the New Grand Hotel, they sat us down in the restaurant. The New Grand Hotel was completely free from any fire or any demolition. It was in perfect working order. Having come out of the jungles, it was one of the most beautiful things you could lay your eyes on.

Marcello: Now were you the first American personnel who arrived at the New Grand Hotel, or were there some Americans who had been there before you to make certain arrangements?

Green: If they had been there before us . . . someone had made arrangements. But we were the first ones there. Now there were no other Americans there when we got there. But arrangements were made. The Japanese had a meal prepared for us if we wanted, had their Japanese beer for us if we wanted it. They wanted to serve us what looked to me like raw fish and beer and some things. None of us Americans . . . I don't think there was anyone who ate anything. We drank their beer, but we wouldn't eat the raw fish.

Marcello: What was the attitude of the Japanese waiters and personnel in the hotel?

Green: Complete humility. It began to dawn on us that possibly that they meant business, that they had thrown in the sponge, and they were going to do nothing but cooperate with us. Do you want me to keep on?

Marcello: Keep going, yes.

Green: That was the first day that we reached there. That must have been August 31, 1945. Word was sent to us the next day that Johnny Green and Major Allen were to prepare a plan for the liberation and for the evacuation.

Marcello: Now I assume you did nothing on August 31 when you got there, other than get into your quarters and this sort of thing at the New Grand Hotel. You perhaps got there late in the day, maybe.

Green: No, it was that morning.

Marcello: While I'm thinking about that, what did the city of Yokohama look like--the city when you came in, from what you could see of it?

Green: The city of Yokohama, most of it, the downtown part, was masonry--brick, stone--and was very nice-looking, clean and all.

Marcello: And was it still intact?

Green: Still intact. Oh, without a doubt, still intact. But the fringes outside had been burned, or parts of it had been burned. But it was not as devastated as Tokyo. Now that probably was the reason why . . . you asked me before why we went into Yokohama rather than into Tokyo. It occurs to me now that Tokyo was more burned out than Yokohama. I see possibly this is the reason we went into Yokohama.

Let me think a second. Now either it was that afternoon or the next morning, one or the other, that Lloyd Price, who was then a war correspondent for the

Dallas Morning News, and a war correspondent for the Fort Worth Star Telegram came to me, knowing that I was there to try to locate . . . that it was my job to locate the prisoners-of-war. He came to me and says, "What are you doing?" I wanted to tell him I was waiting for instructions, but I didn't dare tell him that. So he says, "Aren't you interested?" He said, "Isn't it your job to go out and get and locate the prisoners-of-war?" I said, "Yes." He says, "Well, when are you going to start?" I said, "Well, I've got to wait until we get some people in here." He said, "Why don't you start now?" So I said, "All right, let's go." So the two war correspondents and I . . . I don't know who else . . . there was just a very few of us, and we decided that we would commandeer a Japanese vehicle and go to the Omori prisoner-of-war camp, which I knew was in the near area.

Marcello: You knew about the Omori prison camp from the photo reconnaissance, the intelligence. That was one of those that was definitely located, was it not?

Green: Yes, yes. I knew it because we had planned back in Telegrafo, back in Leyte. We had planned for air droppings for the locations on the map. We had plotted

on a map the locations of the known prisoner-of-war camps and the possible prisoner-of-war camps that our information had led us to believe. So I had one of those with me. The one I did know, that stuck out in my memory, was the Omori prisoner-of-war camp.

Marcello: If I may interject here, a former prisoner-of-war who was at Omori told me that he believed that that was the only place that was left standing in Tokyo (chuckle). So far as he was concerned, there wasn't too much of Tokyo that was left standing except that prisoner-of-war camp.

Green: Well, now that would be easily explained because the coordinates of the prisoner-of-war camps were known, and I feel reasonably sure that the pilots of the bombers were briefed that these were prisoner-of-war camps. I noticed on your photograph of the Omori camp that it had "PW" painted on one of the roofs.

Marcello: But I think that "PW" sign wasn't put on there until after the surrender. I don't think the Japanese marked those camps in any way, as I recall.

Green: Now until I saw your picture, my memory was that there was no "PW" when I was there.

Marcello: I think the instructions were--and maybe you know more about this than I--I think the instructions to those prisoners were that they were to in some way or another paint or whitewash "PW" on the roofs of those buildings so that when the air drops and so on came over, the pilots knew where to drop the material and what have you.

Green: This could be. I don't know. Colonel Rice was in charge of that back at Leyte.

Marcello: I'm almost positive that those buildings were not marked before the surrender because I know some of the prisoners were worried, especially those that were working in steel mills in metropolitan areas, and there was always the danger of getting bombed, especially if those prisoner-of-war camps were located next door to those steel mills.

Green: Well, I feel reasonably sure that the location of these camps was given to the pilots of the fighter-bombers or the bombers to make sure that they would not be dropped where these coordinates were. That possibly would explain it.

Back on this Lloyd Price deal. We had been given instructions that when we arrived in Yokohama

that there would be a Japanese civilian being paid to be an interpreter for us and to help us in the occupation. Lloyd Price and I saw such a Japanese with a red band around his arm. We went over and asked him would he commandeer a truck for us, and then he did commandeer a bus. This was an alcohol-burning bus instead of a charcoal-burning bus.

Marcello: Well, were the alcohol-burning and the charcoal-burning vehicles a result of a lack of gasoline or fuel?

Green: That is right.

Marcello: You mentioned awhile ago that there apparently was very, very little aviation fuel, for example, on the entire mainland.

Green: Four thousand gallons. I'm sure that they were conserving fuel. This evidently had been going on for some time, and they had been conserving their gasoline or petroleum and using alcohol. Anyway, all I saw was charcoal-burners and alcohol-burners. The truck driver told us that he didn't have enough alcohol to get us into Tokyo, so he knew where he could get some in the back yard of a private citizen. He drove the truck, which looked like one of our old

World War I dump trucks, is what it looked like. It was not very glamorous. It was painted, oh, I call it GI color, that brown, greenish-brown color--very ugly. We drove into the back yard. The Japanese civilian and the interpreter talked with each other and ended up by pouring some alcohol into the tank. Then we started on our way to the Omori prisoner-of-war camp in Tokyo.

Marcello: Incidentally, you had mentioned earlier, I think, that there had been perimeters established around these American-occupied areas, and American personnel, I think, were ordered to stay within those perimeters. I gather this was because one didn't know what reception one was going to receive outside the perimeters from the Japanese civilians. Obviously, your perimeter, I don't think, would have extended all the way from Yokohama to Tokyo, would it?

Green: It did not extend to Tokyo. It extended just beyond, really, the barriers of . . . we came to the first perimeter in about a mile. We had driven down the road about a mile when we came to a bridge. There were in both directions, at ninety degrees from us in both directions--ninety degrees to the road--there

was just rows and rows and rows of barbed wire. There was barbed wire across the approach to this bridge into what was Kawasaki. Green was first faced with, "Now do I back up and go home, or do I violate General Douglas MacArthur's instructions that I will not go beyond this?"

Marcello: Here's another one of those citizen-soldiers not going by the book, huh?

Green: That is right. You expressed it very right. I felt like it would have been cowardly on my part to back down. I did turn to Lloyd Price and the Fort Worth man and said, "Do you want to go forward now with it?" They said, "Yes, let's go."

Marcello: I imagine Price and the Fort Worth correspondent were very much interested in the Texas prisoners-of-war, and probably more particularly the "Lost Battalion." Is this perhaps correct?

Green: No, I think they were taking advantage of me because I was a Dallasite (chuckle). They knew that they could localize a story that would make the war personal to Dallas and to Fort Worth. I got the impression, either from their telling me that or not, but I got the impression that they were pressuring me because I was a Texan, and I was their newspaperman.

So anyway, we decided we'd go forward. The interpreter talked with the soldier that was in charge of the barbed wire and the approach. As a result, they moved the barbed wire and let our truck go through. As we went on, I don't recall seeing any Japanese civilian at all on the street. I don't recall. There may have been.

But I do remember one thing very vividly, and that's our little interpreter. Two or three times from the time that we started out on our trip to Tokyo--at least two or three times--he had to stop to urinate. He would stop on what would be Main Street in downtown Dallas and would go up, walk across the concrete sidewalk to the brick building, and there he would urinate against the building much like a child or an animal would do. He did it, as I say, several times and we all giggled at his kidney trouble or his lack of . . .

Marcello: Control over his bladder (chuckle)?

Green: Control or something. Now let me think here. That was the only barbed wire fence that we had to cross that I can remember until we got to the prisoner-of-war camp. As we approached the Omori prisoner-of-war

camp, we crossed either a little bridge or a peninsula or something to go out onto the island of the prisoner-of-war camp.

Marcello: Omori was kind of located in Tokyo Bay?

Green: That is right. We saw some American soldiers on the shore just walking along casually and not paying any attention to us. It worried us that if they're prisoners-of-war, they were very nonchalant about their liberators coming up to get them, that they would not even pay any attention to us.

Marcello: Did they look like prisoners-of-war, that is, from their physical appearance or their clothing?

Green: They did not look like prisoners-of-war from their appearance, clothing, or anything else. They were American soldiers. But they were so nonchalant. They were well-fed, well-clothed, and all. But it worried the living . . . it worried us that, "What in the world are you doing there?" Well, we pulled in the gate of the prisoner-of-war camp and were taken into the commanding officer of that camp. There we learned from him that Commander Harold E. Stassen had been there within, I would say, the last twelve hours. Because most of the people in the Omori camp, according

to Harold Stassen, were Navy people, and he had liberated them by ship.

Marcello: Now for our record, this is the Harold Stassen, who was the perennial Republican presidential candidate in later years.

Green: That is he, Harold E. Stassen.

Marcello: Former governor of Minnesota, I think, wasn't he?

Green: Pennsylvania or Minnesota, one. He was a former governor. Yes, that was he. He was working as a Navy staff officer on the staff of Commodore Simpson.

Now we went inside the commanding officer's office of the camp. He didn't shake hands with me. I was introduced through the interpreter. He kept seated. I told him who I was and what my mission was. My mission was to get these boys who were prisoners-of-war in his camp. That's when he informed me that Harold Stassen had already gotten them out. I says, "All right. Now he did not take your records. I want all of the records regarding these prisoners-of-war that you have."

Marcello: Now incidentally, at this point you had really no overall plan yet, is that correct? This was kind of a spur-of-the-moment thing, and you'd more or less

been . . . I don't want to say you were talked into this by Price and the Fort Worth correspondent. But there was nothing really official about this.

Green: Let's face it, I was prodded. It was terrifically unofficial, illegal, and I would not have done it had I not been prodded to do so by Lloyd Price and his crew.

Marcello: In other words, at this stage had you been able to liberate all those prisoners, there'd been no arrangements made to get those prisoners back to Yokohama or any other place to be processed.

Green: You're absolutely right.

Marcello: What was the attitude of this Japanese commander as best you could tell? Commandant, I suppose we should call him.

Green: He was in uniform, well-dressed, and terrifically belligerent. He did not want to have anything to do with me. I could tell there was nothing but hatred that was peering out of his eyes at me. I think, as I look back on it now, it was possibly that he was just frightened and that he was just as fearful of me as I was fearful of him.

Marcello: Do you think perhaps he may have had some sort of a

bad aftertaste because of something that Stassen had done? Had you ever queried Stassen about this?

Green: No, no, no. We had ample opportunity, but I never did. For one thing, I was kind of upset with him that he did it. That was my job, not his job. It was the Army's job to get the prisoners-of-war out, not his job to get the prisoners-of-war out.

Marcello: Well, maybe Stassen was already looking ahead to some sort of a political career when he got back home.

Green: Well, you have to know Stassen.

Marcello: That surely wouldn't have hurt one's political career any.

Green: Well . . .

Marcello: Maybe this is conjectured on my part, or maybe it would be on your part, too.

Green: I have met Stassen. I met Stassen a year or two after the war when he was the candidate then. He was the contender for the candidacy for the presidency of the United States. He came to Dallas. That's another story. But he and I got along wonderfully well together.

But with this belligerent fellow, he said that he would not give me his records, and I said that he would give me his records. I said it in the regular Army

way of a command. He finally says, "If you'll give me a receipt, I'll give you the records." So I wrote him out a receipt.

Marcello: I thought maybe you had straightened up to your full six feet three inches and simply had hovered over him or something.

Green: Well, he was still sitting down, and I was still standing up. I was trying to take advantage of all of my six foot three and a half. But anyway, it was successful, and he did let me have them. We put them in the truck and brought them on back to the New Grand Hotel. But before we went back, I asked if could we go . . . one of the primary reasons I'd gone out there was really to see what was the condition of the prisoners-of-war and the condition of the camp itself. The prisoners-of-war were gone, so I wanted to inspect the camp to see the type of living conditions that the POW's had been under while they were there.

Marcello: Well, this would have given you some sort of an idea as to how to prepare for them when they were liberated, too, I would assume.

Green: That is right. So I asked to see the kitchen. He showed us the kitchen. The kitchen was an old-fashioned,

a hundred-years-ago-type of kitchen that we would use in the deep South. They had these iron wash pots that we used to wash clothes with in the South a hundred years ago on top of brick kilns. There were about six or eight, about eight. There were two rows of four each in which they cooked their rice and other stuff. I was told then that the prisoners-of-war would come here to pick up their food. Designated people from the barracks would come with buckets and stuff to pick up the food from this kitchen and carry it to their barracks.

Marcello: Did he seem rather cooperative in showing you around the camp?

Green: Yes. After I gave him the receipt, he changed from belligerence to one of cooperation with me. He had some underlings with him that went along with us that were able to talk English with us. So we went from the kitchen into one of the barracks. The barracks were--it looked like to me--very temporary structures. I'd say they were about twelve feet tall. They were rectangular, about eighteen feet wide and about twenty-five or thirty feet long. You entered through the door that faced onto the compound. On the hallway

from the front where you entered to the rear was dirt. But on either side were little platforms. On top of each platform, every three feet, was a straw mat. I was told that this is where they lived, that they came in on the dirt floor, that they took off their shoes, lie down and sleep on these straw mats. As you continued on down to the corridor, down this little aisle here to the far end, there was a toilet. On one side was the supply room, and on the other side was a dry toilet. In the jungles we had dry toilets. In Japan the prisoners-of-war had dry toilets. I don't know whether you're familiar with a dry toilet that's used or over-used, but it is not the most pleasant-smelling thing that you ever saw. It had an obnoxious odor. We inspected it, and then we left and came back out into the compound.

Marcello: What were your general impressions of this barracks so far as a place to live for three and a half years?

Green: It would be one of horror to me. I think the greatest torture or the greatest torment . . . one of the greatest torments, one of the greatest tortures that the prisoners-of-war had . . . now you've interviewed more than I have, but the ones that I have interviewed

said it was the compelling of an American citizen to live on the standard of a wartime Japanese. The Japanese just didn't have anything.

For instance now, this driver of our charcoal-burning bus from Atsugi, he had his lunch with him, and it was nothing more than croutons that you put in soup here--little pieces of dried, light bread and stuff like that. That was his whole lunch. He had nothing. He just had a little paper sack of croutons to eat. This is how poor they were.

Their standard of living was so bad that though there were some . . . in the Omori camp, for instance . . . no, it was not in the Omori camp. It was one of the Osaka camps. In the Osaka camps, the prisoners-of-war would put a crossbar over their shoulders and a bucket on each end. They were compelled to go into the dry toilets and take shovels and take this stuff out of the dry toilets and put it in what they called the "honey bucket" and carry them and put them in another dry toilet someplace else. This was done just so the Japanese could humiliate these large Americans to show how much superior the Japanese were to the Americans.

The worst torture that I can recall--Travis J. Smith told me--was that some of the people in his camp had tried to escape and that they were to be killed on August 15, I think it was, and the surrender took place on the fourteenth. In other words, one day before they were killed, the word came down that the surrender was to take place.

There was a lot of slappings. There was a lot of corporal punishment. There was a lot of things. But I think that the worst--they could endure that for a time--but just to have to live day in and day out in these camps was horrible.

For instance now, in this particular camp at Omori, as I got out in the compound--now don't forget that the prisoners-of-war had only left twelve hours or so before--when I got out into the compound . . .

Marcello: When you got out into the compound from the barracks?

Green: When I left the barracks and got out into the compound, I felt something crawling on my leg. So I pulled up my pants, and my legs were brown with fleas. So I promptly disrobed completely to the skin to get rid of the fleas. I brushed them off of me. I shook my clothes out. Others seemingly were not as

covered as I. They brushed theirs off without having to go to the extremes that I went to. It was a source of amusement to the Japanese that were around that fleas would be a bother to me. Evidently they were just a part of life with them. I was told that no attempt had been made to get rid of the fleas in the camp and that these prisoners-of-war had been living there with these fleas.

Marcello: Well, again, that gave you some sort of an idea, I suppose, as to what you could expect when you have begun to liberate these prisoners in earnest.

Green: That's right. I knew the type of living conditions that these prisoners-of-war were under and how they needed to get out of them, not stay with the fleas.

Marcello: I think you were beginning to get some sort of an idea as to what to expect. This idea, I think, goes all the way back to the Philippines with the fanatical resistance of the Japanese soldiers, the kamikaze plane that you'd seen, the condition of the barracks, the lack of food that the Japanese civilians had, and now this incident with the fleas in the barracks. It seems to me that at this point, all these things would have added up, perhaps, to tell you that you

perhaps might find some pretty horrible conditions when you'd actually begun to liberate those prisoners.

Green: We anticipated the worst.

Marcello: That's the exact word I was going to use.

Green: We suspected the worst, that we were going to find them in bad physical condition and all.

Marcello: I think this is important because pretty soon you're going to have to be writing up that plan or drawing up that plan of liberation which you'd been assigned to draw up.

Green: That's right.

Marcello: I'm sure these things must have weighed on you or figured into your planning at least.

Green: That is right.

Marcello: Incidentally, when you disrobed to get rid of these fleas, what was the attitude of the Japanese when you'd done this?

Green: They laughed at me. They laughed at me. I'm sure . . . well, I don't know. But I got the idea that they thought this was a part of life, to have to undergo fleas and stuff like that. We inspected the rest of the camp. I'm looking at this picture that you showed me today. As I recall, we walked all the

way up here to this point right here (gesture) and then turned around and came back.

Marcello: In other words, you virtually walked from one end of the compound to the other.

Green: That is right. We went to this building here (gesture). We went to the kitchen. Then we went to the barracks. Then we went up here (gesture), turned around, and came back. Once you've seen one barracks, they told me you had seen them all. Just like if you'd seen one coconut tree, you'd seen them all. We got the records and came on back. Behind the general, though, there was a jeweled sword, a jeweled samurai sword. I would have given anything in the world had I asked him for it. I found out later that I should have done it, that all the rest of them asked for it, and it was given to them. However, I got one, but with no jewels in it.

Marcello: Up to this time, had you had a chance to examine the camp records?

Green: No. I didn't try to.

Marcello: In terms of bulk, were they very extensive?

Green: No. They were in boxes, and the boxes would be about sixteen or eighteen inches by sixteen or eighteen inches by about three feet.

Marcello: In other words, the Japanese apparently had not kept the most extensive records in the world concerning the prisoners-of-war.

Green: That is right!

Marcello: This was another rather discouraging sign that I'm sure influenced you in drawing up your plan for the liberation of these prisoners.

Green: That is right. Now we came on back to the headquarters, to the New Grand Hotel. This could have been August 31 that this thing took place because it took a long time. Then we were excited about that afternoon on the preparations for the celebration, the signing of the armistice that was to take place on September 2, I believe it was, 1945. The ship that it was going to be on was out in the harbor. But General Fitch called a meeting of . . . would you like their names? I got the names here of the ones that were meeting.

Marcello: Why don't we just mention them offhand?

Green: Well, I have them here. We met with General Fitch to devise a plan for the liberation and evacuation. Those present were Commander Harold E. Stassen, General Hiroshi Tamura of the Japanese Army, General Fitch of MacArthur's headquarters, Colonel A. E.

Schanze, G-1 of the 8th Army, Major Charles Allen, Artillery Section, 8th Army. There was a member of the Japanese foreign office, a representative of the Far Eastern Air Force, and Dr. M. Junod with the International Red Cross. There were representatives of the 5th Fleet, 6th Army, and 10th Army there with us. There was quite a roomful of people. General Fitch called the meeting to order, stated its purpose, and he said that Major Green would give the plan for the liberation and evacuation of all the live prisoners-of-war from Japan. I stood and I gave my plan.

Marcello: When had you drawn up that plan? Now after all, on August 31, you'd been involved in this business at Omori. Did you draw up the plan between the time you got back to Yokohama from Omori and the morning of September 1?

Green: From the time I got back from Omori prisoner-of-war camp until the time we delivered it, yes. That was it.

Marcello: I would assume that that was the only time that you had to do so.

Green: We used the map that I'm showing you here. I exhibited that to them. This was of the Tokyo area. I exhibited a larger map that brought in the islands of Hokkaido

and far south as Kyushu. I told where the prisoners-of-war were and in what strength our intelligence showed that they were in each one. I gave a report as to what we thought the conditions of these prisoners-of-war personally were, and we suspected that they would be in bad condition.

Marcello: What sort of contributions did General Tamura make? Who was representing the Japanese Army?

Green: He was there not to make . . . he was there to listen, and we were to work through him. See, if we needed anything with the Japanese Army, then he would see that it was done.

Marcello: Okay, he was your liaison with the Japanese Army.

Green: With the army. We had a representative of the foreign service who was a civilian and who despised the army. The foreign service despised the army. We also, by the way, had a representative at this table from the Japanese railway system, so that if we needed the railways in our planning, all we needed to do is to speak to him, and he would make sure that the trains would be there whenever we needed them.

Marcello: Were the Japanese cooperative, at least so far as their attitudes were concerned? Did they seem to be cooperative?

Green: Yes. It became obvious to me, I would say, as a result of my trip to the Omori prisoner-of-war camp, as a result of my experience with the generals and other people that were beginning to come onto the sidewalks and talk, that the civilians welcomed the armistice. They were overjoyed with the armistice. Later on the Japanese with whom I worked said, "We're grateful to you." One said, "I'm a graduate of Yale." He says, "I love the United States. I did not want to fight, but it would be suicide if we said no. So we welcome you." They were so cooperative that I made the bet--but never did carry it out--that if you were to face a Japanese toward the Tokyo Bay and give him the command, "Forward, march!" he would walk right in there to his death if need be.

Now it is Johnny Green's opinion that one of the main reasons why the Japanese were so cooperative is because the emperor had gone on the radio and had told them to be cooperative and that he wanted them to be. It would be to their best interest and in the best interest of the emperor if they would give the utmost cooperation to us. They had been taught to worship the emperor, and the emperor had spoken.

We had been told this was going to happen. I'd say it became evident by September 2 that it was going to be true and that they were going to be obedient and helpful to us.

Now when this happened . . . this feeling of security surfaced, I would say, on September 1, September 2, right along in this period of time because it was here along in this period that we realized that the primary mission of our going into Japan was to secure the Allies in the occupation of Japan. That was the first primary objective. The second objective was the liberation and evacuation of prisoners-of-war.

So when we felt like we had the security, the primary motive then became the liberation and evacuation of prisoners-of-war. This is when General Fitch came to us at this meeting and told Major Allen and me that all of the forces of the Army and of the Navy and of the Air Force and of the Japanese Army and of the foreign service were at our command to get these out.

Now there were just two of us majors there with no other officer and with no enlisted man and no

equipment. All of our enlisted men and all of our officers were coming from the Philippine Islands by ship and were not to arrive in Yokohama until two weeks after. It would be about September 14 or 15. Now we were faced with "Do we do something now, or do we wait until our people get here?" General Fitch said, "You will not wait till the people get here." He says, "I will give you all of the equipment. I will give you all the people that you need. You just tell me what you want, and let's get these liberated and evacuated."

Marcello: Now was it in this atmosphere that you presented your plan?

Green: That is right, yes.

Marcello: How much time did you spend working up this plan? Then we can go in and start talking about what sort of a plan you presented to the people at that meeting. Can you discuss your preparations in writing up the plan a little bit?

Green: (chuckle). Chuck and I discussed it in general terms. There had been coming . . . there had been building up in the two weeks that we were in Okinawa certain things that needed to be done. Once you looked at the

prisoner-of-war camps all over the four islands, once we identified them, where they were, one of the first things we did when we got there was to ask General Tamura to furnish us with a list of all the prisoners-of-war who were in every camp in all of the main islands. That was a stack of stuff, oh, so high (gesture) that he brought to us.

Marcello: About a foot high almost?

Green: Yes. About a foot high. I have some of them here that I've shown you that I brought home with me so I could remember this stuff here. But this is what they brought to us. But actually, the plan evolved out of what was there, what needed to be done. In my mind it was elementary.

Marcello: I think a lot of these things had probably been circulating in your mind for some time. It was simply a matter of formalizing them and organizing them and presenting them to this meeting on September 1.

Green: That's right. We suggested, for instance, that we would take one camp, and we would organize a recovery personnel team. We had to create them now. Our recovery personnel teams were now back in the Philippine Islands on the ship coming up to us.

Marcello: Okay, here we have at the top the Recovery Personnel Section of the 8th Army.

Green: Well, we were not a section of the recovery. A recovery personnel unit was a different thing. We were the bosses who put together the unit, see. We were just in charge, just like you could . . . well, anyway, do I make myself clear? Chuck and I had to have several people to do certain things in a recovery personnel unit. He and I were not equipped to do it. We could create them, but we were not one of them. So we knew that we had to have one officer in charge of a recovery personnel unit. We knew that he had to have certain housekeeping personnel, had to have a second-in-command, had to have certain personnel to go along with him, particularly someone who was from a medical unit if they were available who could go along with them. So we would make up a personnel recovery team or unit. We would assign that unit to a prisoner-of-war camp.

Marcello: About how many people were in one of these units altogether?

Green: I would say five. It would be about five or six. So I suggested that we do this. We'd just create a

personnel team, and as soon as we could get a personnel recovery team together, we would assign them to one of the prisoner-of-war camps. We had made a study of which prisoner-of-war camps lay on the railway system. We could evacuate these by railroad because the Japanese railways were running on time far more efficiently than the railroads in the United States. We found that in Hokkaido, for instance, we could not. There was no transportation. We would have to evacuate them by air or by water. That's the northernmost island of Japan. Then we proposed that air drops continue until we could reach these camps, that we would continue to do it. We would try to get in communication with them and let them know that we were coming up there. In general, this was the plan.

Marcello: Now at this time, how long did you envision this whole process to take? How long do you think it would take to get all of these prisoners liberated? We're talking about 32,000 prisoners.

Green: That's right.

Marcello: Of all nationalities.

Green: That's right.

Marcello: How long did you estimate it would take to complete

the process of liberating them, processing them, getting them back home again.

Green: "Operation Blacklist" called for around twelve or more months for it to be done.

Marcello: Before you had talked to the Japanese general, Tamura, did you have a rough estimate as to how many prisoners there were in there?

Green: Let me go back here. Let me show you. Major Allen wanted to abide by the directions included in the "Operation Blacklist" on the evacuation of them. He wanted only 200 to 250 a day. If there were 200 a day, that would take approximately three to four months, so you can see how long it would have taken. I was just explaining to you how, had we followed "Operation Blacklist," how long it would have taken.

Marcello: Well, two questions come to mind at this point. First of all, why did "Operation Blacklist" envision this process taking so long?

Green: I had no part in the formulation of "Operation Blacklist." I don't know.

Marcello: My second question was, before you talked to the Japanese general and had gotten all of his information, did you at that time have some sort of an idea, a rough

idea, as to how many prisoners were in these Japanese camps?

Green: Yes. There were not as many as we had thought.

Marcello: Was this principally because some had died or because they actually were located in camps in other localities in Asia?

Green: There had been some shifting around of them. There had been some shipments over to China.

Marcello: I knew that they had moved the prisoners around quite a bit to wherever they needed labor. I'm sure you'd have had a great deal of trouble in getting anywhere near an exact accounting of how many prisoners were in Japan.

Green: I'm sure that's right.

Marcello: Incidentally, from what you've said, I gather that this meeting was almost completely the Army's show.

Green: It was completely the Army's show.

Marcello: You mentioned that General Fitch more or less chaired the meeting, and you in turn presented the plan for liberation, speaking for yourself and Major Allen. I gather from what you've said that it was an Army show.

Green: It was General Douglas MacArthur's show. The government, the War Department--which was called the War Department at the time--had put him in charge. It became cumbersome. I was originally to report to MacArthur, and MacArthur in turn would report to the War Department. It was cumbersome, so MacArthur said, "You just become an unofficial member of my staff, and you will direct all of your reports to the War Department, and leave me out in the interest of time."

Marcello: How many of these prisoner-of-war camps were there altogether? Do you have any idea? Could you estimate?

Green: I'd say there were a couple of dozen. There may be even more than that. Here's one, two, three, four, five, six, seven . . . oh, listen, from the report that they gave to us, there would be several dozen. I'm looking at the report here. There's several dozen. Here's the list.

Marcello: In other words, it was going to take quite a few of these recovery personnel units.

Green: I would say from the . . . there are four pages with about twenty on a page . . . five pages with about fifteen or twenty on a page. So from what the Japanese . . .

Marcello: We're talking about seventy-five, eighty, ninety camps altogether.

Green: That is right. I'm looking at it from the list that General Tamura gave us. Some of these, however, had been abandoned, I later found out, and some of them had been moved, so there would be much less than that.

Marcello: What was the reaction of the other people to your plan? I'm speaking now of the other people at this meeting.

Green: The plan was adopted. It was adopted as we gave it. It was implemented. For instance, we needed to have a line of communication between MacArthur's headquarters and the Navy. Harold Stassen gave us the name of a captain of his ship that was anchored there in the harbor, and we were to telephone to his headquarters. Then his headquarters would broadcast over the Navy radio for Stassen to do something.

By the way, it's rather humorous here. Following the established procedures at this particular meeting, we needed Harold Stassen to be at a meeting the next day or so. So we called down there and left word for Stassen to be at our Yokohama headquarters at a certain time and place. We had no response from Stassen, but we got a hot cablegram from Admiral "Bull" Halsey,

jumping on Major Green for being so stupid as to jump the channels, that any man in his reasonable mind would know that I would have to contact MacArthur, MacArthur would have to contact "Bull" Halsey, and "Bull" Halsey would have to contact Commodore Simpson, and Commodore Simpson would have to contact Harold Stassen to get it done. I still have that radiogram.

Marcello: From the records that you received from the Japanese Army, where did most of the prisoners seem to be located?

Green: There were the ones that the International Red Cross, Dr. Junod, said, "You must get to Hokkaido as soon as possible. They are in the worst condition working in the coal camps up there. You must get up there as soon as possible."

Marcello: Incidentally, I can confirm this because the ones I've spoken to who were imprisoned on Hokkaido told me that they couldn't have held out that winter.

Green: In other words, had we followed "Operation Blacklist" we would never have reached them.

Marcello: That's correct, especially if you had waited through the winter to get those people out.

Green: Well, don't forget this is September.

Marcello: That's what I mean. Winter was fast approaching.
In ninety days it would have been winter. It gets cold in Japan in the wintertime.

Green: Yes.

Marcello: On Hokkaido I'm sure it gets the coldest because that's getting pretty close to Siberia actually.

Green: That means that Major Devereux, who was on Hokkaido and who was liberated, would possibly not have survived. I hadn't realized that.

Marcello: Generally speaking, most of the prisoners on Hokkaido were Wake Island Marines or North China Marines. Almost to the man they have told me that they could not have held out another winter.

Green: Well, I'm glad we reached them. I'm glad we reached them. So we had to set up a line of communications. We had to establish how we would transport them out. There were certain places that the Navy could get to better, of course, because of the unavailability of railroads to them. We gave the duty or the authority to the Navy to get out those particular prisoners. They were to be evacuated by ship under the command of Commodore Simpson, with Harold Stassen really doing the work.

As soon as we could put together an officer and a recovery team, we would assign or give them a prisoner-of-war camp. Or sometimes there would be three or four or five camps in an area that we'd assign to them and ask them to go get them and bring them in.

Now on about the third or fourth of September, there walked into our headquarters at the New Grand Hotel Travis J. Smith, a second lieutenant, field artillery, who was in the "Lost Battalion" at Java and who was in the prisoner-of-war camp at Osaka. There was an American civilian internee that was a sympathizer with the Americans when the war broke out. They put him in solitary confinement and then later sent him to Osaka. Then there was an Air Corps officer that walked in. We were delighted to see them. I was delighted to see Travis J. Smith from Texas, from Wichita Falls, fine young fellow. We fed them. They got there in the early morning. We took them to the officer's mess, fed them the chow there, which was scrambled eggs from dried eggs. None of us officers had eaten any of it. We had eaten the bacon and the other stuff, but we hadn't eaten any of these dried eggs. But the three former prisoners-of-war not only

were delighted to have them, but they went back for seconds, and some of them went back for thirds because they thought they were so wonderful.

I told Travis after we had finished breakfast and after we'd been talking about his experiences down there in Osaka and Kobe, "Now we could put you back right now, this afternoon, on a plane going back to Okinawa, and then on back to the Philippine Islands to be processed and sent back to the United States. He and his two cohorts were even insulted that we would even think about treating them like this or thinking that they were that selfish that they would want to go back. They said that they had been sent from the Osaka Camp to find out when we were going to reach them, and they wanted to stay there. So I seized on this opportunity then. I carried him to my map of the islands and told him that if he would have about seventy-five of the prisoners-of-war in the Osaka prisoner-of-war camp to volunteer for housekeeping duties only . . .

Marcello: When you talk about housekeeping duties, what are you referring to?

Green: Guard, mess, maintenance, clerical--stuff like that. I said, "If you'll get these seventy-five together, we'll send you nurses, we'll send you doctors, and we'll let you operate what we call in the Army a regulating station." Because if you'll look at the map, you'll see that Osaka and Kobe are right at the narrow waistline of the island of Honshu. We told Travis that there were, in our opinion, about 10,000 prisoners-of-war in the southern part of Honshu and in Shikoku, which was the island just to the east of the main island of Honshu. He said that he would have no trouble at all getting the volunteers. So I said, "Now be sure you let them volunteer. Make sure you don't coerce anyone to stay there. We want to get them home as soon as we can."

So he said, "Now what evidence of authority are you going to give me that I can give to the Imperial Japanese Army to let them work with me and with the railways and other stuff that we're going to need. We're going to need food down there. We're going to need shelter down there. We're going to need all kinds of stuff. What authority are you going to give me, a former prisoner-of-war, to do this?" So I wrote

out a letter--typed it myself--to the Imperial Japanese Army: "This will introduce to you Lieutenant Travis J. Smith, United States Army. You will grant to Lieutenant Smith any order that he makes of you, by command of General MacArthur."

He took it and went down to Osaka and requisitioned the New Osaka Hotel, which was about as good over there as the Fairmont Hotel is in Dallas today, the Sheraton in Dallas, or the Statler-Hilton Hotel. It was wonderful. I went down there and saw it. It was untouched by fire damage or anything else. There were beautiful carpets on the floor, and what was the thing that amazed us more than anything else was that it had hot and cold running water and water toilets. They were through with those dry toilets. He had given a private room with bath to each one of the seventy-five people who'd volunteer to stay there. Then we sent the nurses down there.

Whenever I wanted to communicate with . . . Major Mitchell was one of the officers down there. He was in charge, as I recall. I'll have to get you his full name. Major Mitchell was in charge. I would get on the telephone at Yokohama, New Grand Hotel. When

the operator would answer, I would say, "New Osaka Hotel, Major Mitchell." There was nothing but just jabber, jabber, jabber, and I'd say, "New Osaka Hotel, Major Mitchell." And jabber, jabber, jabber. I'd repeat it about six times, and a few minutes on the line comes Major Mitchell from the Osaka Hotel down there, and we would talk this way. I went down to inspect them. I have pictures that I want to give you copies of these heroes standing honor guard for Johnny Green.

Marcello: In other words, the prisoners-of-war themselves had established an honor guard.

Green: That's right, for Johnny Green. I mean, it was humbling.

Marcello: This Lieutenant Smith must have been a rather unusual fellow to have done and to have arranged all this.

Green: Yes, he was. But Dr. Marcello, I would say that just about every one of them were unusual.

Marcello: When we first started talking about Lieutenant Smith and his two cohorts who came to see you in Yokohama, you had promised him, or you had indicated to him, that if he were able to organize the housekeeping team, that there was a good possibility that you could have those prisoners out of those camps near Osaka in a very, very short amount of time.

Green: That's right.

Marcello: How did things work out?

Green: He accepted the challenge. He got his seventy-five volunteers. He got all of the people, all of the prisoners-of-war, out of Shikoku and from southern Honshu--and there were at least 10,000 of them--and he got them out in less than a week.

Marcello: How many prisoners are we talking about altogether?

Green: There was over 10,000 that he got out in less than a week. The last train that came up had a trainload of--what is it--Suntory whiskey. There were just thousands of cases of this Suntory whiskey that he sent on the train to John Plath Green.

Marcello: Now I've never heard of Suntory whiskey.

Green: It's the most delicious whiskey you ever put in your mouth.

Marcello: Is it Japanese?

Green: It is Japanese, and if you buy it in the States, you will pay more than you will for Scotch whiskey. It is imported into this country now. I have drunk it in the last thirty days, and I think I paid \$12 for a fifth. Though it's a whiskey, it tastes like excellent Scotch. They mix it or cut it over there with Tansan,

which is like mountain dew water from Arkansas and stuff like that--Ozark water or something. But it was absolutely delicious. Now he sent this to me. I could have sold it to these whiskey-hungry soldiers and been a millionaire and could have retired. But I felt an extreme loyalty. I would have felt selfish. I had had so many people, so many . . . look at these recovery personnel people. They could have done stuff, too. Instead, I just gave it all to them. I kept one bottle--one or two bottles, I think--and brought one home.

Marcello: Awhile ago, I asked you where most of the prisoners were located. You had indicated that there were a great many on Hokkaido.

Green: No, no, no, no, I don't mean a whole lot. They were located on Hokkaido, but I would say that there wasn't 1,000 on Hokkaido.

Marcello: Right. Then I interrupted you, and you never did finish as to where the bulk of the prisoners were located.

Green: The bulk of the prisoners were all either located in the Tokyo area and southern Honshu. Really, on the island of Honshu were the very large bulk of them. So we could reach them by railroad and by using this regulating station down with Travis Smith.

Marcello: At this stage, let me ask you some general questions. I'll try to limit most of these questions to the actual liberation of the POW's, since that was the facet of the whole operation that you were most familiar with. First of all, how would you evaluate the effectiveness of the recovery personnel teams that you organized?

Green: They were the whole foundation program of the liberation of the prisoners-of-war. We could not possibly have operated without them. As I look back on it now, I don't see how I could improve upon the plan of getting these wonderful officers and men together and sending them out on railroads and organize, let them . . . see, they would go out into the prisoner-of-war camps. They would evaluate their health and conditions and stuff like that. They would work with the Japanese railroad official that was on our committee and line it up. Then they would report--Mitchell, Churchill, whoever it was--the head of the recovery teams would then wire me or write me by airmail--now not the United States airmail. They'd just put it on a regular Army plane and bring it up to us--the train schedule, when a certain train would be in Yokohama Central Station at

a certain day, time, with so many prisoners-of-war on board, and whether or not there would be any nonambulatory prisoners-of-war that would be on it. This is the way we could meet the train. It was because of this--we had such magnificent recovery teams that were just like with missionary zeal going out and getting these kids--that we were bringing them in at 1,000 to 2,000 a day. See, we got all the prisoners-of-war out in much less than two weeks. What the "Operation Blacklist" had contemplated, we got them out in less than two weeks. There wasn't a single major accident that occurred. There were twelve Australian nurses that we recovered, and two or three of them died of tuberculosis. But they were in such a . . . the mechanical operation did not cause that. I mean, they would have died had they stayed there. But those were the only casualties that we had. The rest of them we got out. Have I told you about how Fitch put me into the . . . the altercation that we had on this?

Marcello: No.

Green: When it became evident from these recovery teams, when Churchill and when Mitchell from the regulating station . . . he was the real commanding officer.

Travis Smith worked under him. Major Mitchell was the one in charge of it. When he would say, "Green, there's going to be so many people from southern Honshu in Yokohama at a certain time" All these--Price, Major Price--different ones would wire in that they were going to be here at a certain time, to be ready for them, they would be coming in sometimes 2,500, 3,000 people a day. I was bringing them in as fast as I could.

Major Allen one day sat down on his fanny and said, "You can't get any more in. I will not let any more be processed here than 200-250 men a day." I appealed to General Fitch. General Fitch came down and talked to the two of us and asked what the problem was. I stated what the problem was. He turned to Major Allen, and he said, "Major Allen, what is your problem?" He said, "I don't have enough personnel." "Tell me how many you want and what you need, the MOS [military occupation specialty], whatever they are. Tell me what you want, and I'll get them for you." He said, "Well, we don't have enough typewriters." "Tell me how many you want, and I'll get you your typewriters." He had one excuse right after the other,

and he never told the general that even if the general were to furnish them that he would do it.

So in disgust General Fitch turned to me and says in the presence of Major Allen, "Major Green, you're in charge of the complete operation. Now you go ahead and carry out your directions the way that you think fit because these people have to get out of the prisoner-of-war camps as soon as possible."

Marcello: You mentioned earlier that you and Allen were promoted to major at approximately the same time or at exactly the same time.

Green: It was on the same . . . promotions came out on what we call special orders. On this mimeographed special order he and I came out promoted to major on the same day. So I couldn't pull my rank on him, and he couldn't pull his rank on me.

Marcello: This is what you were referring to earlier when you said that the fact that you were of equal rank was going to cause problems later on. This is where it came in.

Green: That's right.

Marcello: Or at least one of the places where it came in.

Green: See, to speak more precisely, major is a grade. Now each hour that you are in the grade of major is your rank so that two majors will have different ranks. But in our peculiar instance we had the same date of rank.

Marcello: So I gather then that from this time on, you were more or less the commanding officer in charge of the entire operation.

Green: That is right.

Marcello: Now Allen perhaps was still handling the processing, but he was, in effect, taking orders from you.

Green: That is right. General MacArthur gave me the Legion of Merit for my work--for heading, for being the officer in charge, of the liberation. He did not give one to Major Allen.

Marcello: Getting back to these recovery teams again, what sort of orientation program did you establish for them before they moved out into the field? What sort of instructions and directions did you give them? Here again, I assume it wasn't simply gathering an officer and a couple of men together and saying, "Okay, you're a recovery team. Go to it."

Green: We would say to Churchill, Price, Mitchell, or whatever his name was, "Now get a group together. We need to get these people out. We think the best ones are these. Are these all right?" He would choose the camps that he could go to. If it was five, six, seven or eight, he would say, "I want this many," or "I want so few." He could tell from the information that was reaching us whether or not there was some special deal, like the Hokkaido stuff. He would pick his own people to help him. We would make the assignment to him. We would send him out there to organize the group, put them in physical condition to get on the train, make arrangements with the railroad, wire us any special instructions before they get here for care and whatever it might be. But in any event he was to wire us, get information to us on when to welcome them or when to receive them here at the station.

Marcello: You mentioned awhile ago getting them into physical condition. I assume you mean in terms of equipment and things of that nature.

Green: That's right, their personal belongings and stuff like that.

Marcello: How many men approximately would make up one of these teams?

Green: I would say five. But if Major Mitchell or some . . . now Major Mitchell would have more than that because he was running a regulating station, too. But I would say normally it would be about five people.

Marcello: This would include a commanding officer . . .

Green: . . . of the unit, an assistant . . .

Marcello: An assistant who would also be an officer?

Green: Yes, second in command.

Marcello: What other sort of personnel would usually be included?

Green: Three or four enlisted men, sergeants or privates, that would carry out the . . . you're evidently not acquainted with . . . the officer doesn't do the work. The enlisted men do the work (chuckle).

Marcello: Sure.

Green: They needed the enlisted men to help them do the work.

Marcello: Would these enlisted men have had any sort of skills? In other words, might there be a medic among these enlisted men or a radio operator or something of this nature?

Green: We wished that we had them. We did not have them. Don't forget now that people were flying in here to do one thing. It turns around, and we do another

something. So we had to adjust ourselves immediately, and we just took advantage of whoever was willing to help us do it.

Marcello: In other words, what you're referring to is the fact that people were flying in in order to carry out the first priority, which was to peacefully occupy the islands.

Green: That's right.

Marcello: Then all of a sudden, when it became clear that the Japanese weren't going to resist, then the second priority actually became the first priority. The second priority, which became the first priority, was the speedy liberation of those prisoners.

Green: That's right. You read me loud and clear. Don't forget that all of our bosses and all of our helpers were on a ship between the Philippine Islands and Yokohama.

Marcello: You were utilizing personnel who had come to Japan to carry out the original first priority.

Green: That's right. I was putting my hands on anybody that would volunteer to help me.

Marcello: Was there any dearth of volunteers?

Green: No.

Marcello: I assume that there was a great deal of esprit de corps

then, that everybody knew the importance of getting these prisoners out as soon as possible.

Green: I think the answer is yes. I think that everyone that I can recall took it as a thrill, a joy. For one thing, if they stayed in Yokohama, they would have been bored stiff, and this way they could get out and see part of the islands (chuckle).

Marcello: Let's move on to another general question at this point, Mr. Green. Let's talk a little bit about the Japanese cooperation in this operation. Now we've talked in some specific terms about the general who served as the liaison officer, General Tamura. In general, how would you evaluate the Japanese cooperation throughout this entire operation of liberating and processing these prisoners?

Green: They were fantastically cooperative. The only thing I had to do was to put the civilian from the foreign service on one side of the table and put General Tamura on the other side of the table. They would not speak or look at each other.

I don't know whether I've mentioned this to you before, but if I have, let me do it again. MacArthur understood the minds of the Japanese people so much that

he wanted to work through Hirohito, the emperor, because he knew if he worked through the emperor, he saved the face of the emperor even in defeat. The emperor was still the boss of his people. So he did this. President Truman, President Truman's staff, tried to encourage--they tried to get MacArthur--to treat Hirohito as a war criminal. MacArthur says, "You call it disobedience or whatever you want to, but I will not treat Hirohito as a war criminal. The emperor is the key to our peaceful occupation of Japan and the rapid restoration of Japan to a place among the family of nations." He said, "Leave him in here." He said, "If you want to bring peace to the East over here, if you want to bring peace, don't send me soldiers, send me missionaries." Now this stuff is not written anyplace. I was that close to his staff. I was really on his staff at the tail end. I saw the Communists come in. They wanted to have a big hand in the occupation of Japan.

Marcello: These would be the Russians?

Green: These were the Russians, and they were at this point our allies, remember. Don't forget that. MacArthur would listen as long as the Communists wanted to talk,

but he would never follow their directions unless they happened to be the same thing that MacArthur wanted to do. In other words, he was the boss, and he let the Communists know that he was the boss, and he would not tolerate anybody trying to fight him. As a consequence, the Japanese idolize General Douglas MacArthur. I think that had the Western world worked similarly through the leaders of the people, we would have had peace, I think, far faster.

Marcello: Then you would say that on the whole that the Japanese did cooperate virtually 100 per cent, and a great deal of this was due to the decisions of MacArthur.

Green: That's right. There is no doubt about that. The emperor would have lost face, and I'm sure he would have had to . . . well, I don't know. The people would not have known where their leader was. MacArthur was not their leader. There would have been no Japanese around whom they could rally other than the emperor. I think history has proved that he was absolutely right.

Marcello: How would you evaluate the Navy's role in this whole process of liberating and processing the prisoners-of-war? Let's say from the standpoint of cooperation,

from the standpoint of efficiency, and any other factors.

Green: So far as the work of Harold Stassen is concerned, with the exception of the Omori incident, Stassen's work and Commodore Simpson's work was one of utmost cooperation with us. Now there I stop. The Navy, the Pacific Ocean area, unnecessarily took Iwo Jima and unnecessarily took Okinawa. Had they let the Army stay in command, instead of the Navy--and it was the Army that knew more than the Navy ever thought about about land warfare--had they let MacArthur go into Chiang Kai-shek's bailiwick over there, he could have gotten closer approaches to Tokyo than Iwo Jima or Okinawa. I think that the war would have ended sooner, and there would have been far less bloodshed. What I am saying is, it is my opinion that the Navy--I'm saying this for posterity, and they may hate me now--but having been on the higher echelon, that is, in an Army headquarters, and watched the development of the operation and the whole Pacific area, it is my opinion that MacArthur had a dirty job to do, and he wanted to get it done with the least loss of human life.

To the contrary, the Pacific Ocean area wanted the glamor of the war. You'll notice that every fight that they had was a glamor war. Tarawa was a glamor war. It was a bloody war, a horrible thing. Iwo Jima was a glamor war, a glamor battle. Okinawa was a glamor place, though it was the least of the three.

Had the Navy realized that their job was a supply arm primarily to the Army, and where necessary, to protect us in vulnerable spots and where we needed fire power after the Air Force lifted their bombs . . . the Air Force cannot bomb with precision. The rifles of the battleships can fire accurately, but they have a flat trajectory. So they would come in after the Air Force would leave. This was very good. One of the arguments that was advanced to the 8th Army by the Navy, or that reached us, was that they said that unless they took Tarawa and Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the supply routes, the route of supply to China, to MacArthur, would have been too long and tenuous for them. I say tommyrot!

Marcello: When the Navy did liberate the prisoners, as they did at some places in Hokkaido and perhaps some other places on Honshu, did they transport these prisoners to Yokohama?

Green: Now look, don't forget, it was the Far Eastern Air Force that was . . . the officer, the personnel recovery unit in charge of Hokkaido--and I've got his name here--he was to operate with FEAF, with the Far Eastern Air Force, to go in and get it. The Navy was to play a secondary position in that, and it was the Navy that took Devereux away from the Army in order to glamorize, I guess, more of what they were doing.

Marcello: In other words, all the prisoners eventually were funneled through Yokohama.

Green: Ninety-nine and forty-four one-hundredths per cent were, yes.

Marcello: Well, whether they were liberated by the Air Force or the Army or the Navy, most of them, as you point out, did go to Yokohama.

Green: That's right. Now with this one exception: in those prisoner-of-war camps that were predominantly Navy people, permission was given to Stassen and Commodore Simpson that they could evacuate them without having to go through Okinawa and Luzon. They could do those. But those were very few. Those were your Wake Island people, some of them. The rest of them were predominantly ground forces and air forces.

Marcello: This is a question that we haven't talked about yet, and I'm not sure if you've even given much thought to it. But did you ever encounter any sort of, what I might call, political interference in carrying out your duties? In other words, the liberation of prisoners-of-war and being in on the liberation of prisoners-of-war could have been of some benefit to some ambitious politician. Did you ever receive any civilian political interference in the carrying out of your duties?

Green: I did not. Only MacArthur from Truman.

Marcello: Yes. In other words, I was wondering if any of your operations were ever investigated or visited by any congressmen or senators from Washington who wanted to get their pictures taken with you or anybody else in the liberation of the prisoners?

Green: Dr. Marcello, don't forget now that all of the prisoners-of-war were out of Japan before the newsmen--except for Price and some of them--got there. There were no cameramen to take pictures of these historical events. There were no newsmen to report the events. Something happened to Lloyd Price and his Fort Worth Star Telegram friend after our trip to Omori. They disappeared.

We never saw them anymore, so that for the time of the major operation, that is, those fourteen days, that there were no newscasts. There were no cameramen to take the picture of any politicians who might come over there. I'd give anything in the world if we did have some records, pictures and stuff, of what took place. But there was none. The answer is we had none because there was no one there.

Marcello: In other words, the rapidity with which those prisoners were liberated and processed made it impossible for even the press to be there, let alone any politicians to fly over from Washington or some other place.

Green: When the bulk of them arrived--I'd say the ship with Colonel Rice arrived about--I haven't checked it--September 12, 13 or 14, along in there--that was the tag end. My notes show that September 16 was when the last prisoner-of-war group went out. About that time, the press did come in when Colonel Rice got there, and we did have press coverage at that time.

Marcello: Now Colonel Rice was the man who was in charge of the overall operation.

Green: That's right.

Marcello: What is his full name?

Green: Donald J. Rice, full colonel. See, I was on Eichelberger's staff. But Eichelberger wasn't there, and no one was there from Eichelberger's staff except Chuck and me, to my knowledge. It was all MacArthur's staff. So we had to work as a part of MacArthur's staff to get it done. So when you say that he was in charge, he was in charge by name, but he didn't get there because "Blacklist" didn't contemplate the expedition of the liberation of the prisoners-of-war. So that's all I can say.

Oral History Collection

John Plath Green

Interviewer: Dr. Ronald E. Marcello

Place of Interview: Denton, Texas

Date: March 1, 1974

Dr. Marcello: This is Ron Marcello interviewing John Plath Green for the North Texas State University Oral History Collection. The interview is taking place on March 1, 1974, in Denton, Texas. I'm interviewing Mr. Green in order to get his experiences and reminiscences and impressions while he was the commanding officer of the American units that were responsible for the liberation of Allied prisoners-of-war on the four home islands of Japan following the conclusion of World War II. This is the second in a series of interviews with Mr. Green.

Now when we stopped the last time, we were talking primarily about the role that some of the other branches of the service played. I think at this point we ought to talk just a little bit about what roles some of the foreign contingents played because, after all, there were British and Australian and Dutch prisoners-of-war in Japan as well. So what sort of

cooperation or relationship existed between the American teams and the teams from the other Allies?

Green: Dr. Marcello, you will recall that it was MacArthur's forces that were placed in charge of the security of the Allied forces in Japan, and it was MacArthur's forces, American forces, that were in charge of the liberation. As the 8th Army under MacArthur had no British, Dutch, or Australian or other nations on its staff or under his command, the only people that went in were just the American boys. For that reason, there was no British, Dutch, Australian, Swiss, or other people that were there. Now after the evacuation, the liberation, the evacuation was well under way--in fact, it had almost been completed--then the British legates came in. I only saw one Dutchman, I guess. I only saw one. I saw no Australians. Dr. Junod, who was with the International Red Cross, came in later in order to check for any atrocities that the American forces, occupying forces, might commit upon the captured Japanese. But they came in later. As I told you awhile ago, about the only participation that the British had was through their legate there, giving a dinner in the evening at the British embassy

in Tokyo in honor of the officers who had been in charge of the liberation and evacuation of the prisoners-of-war.

Marcello: Who was liberating the British, Dutch and Australian prisoners? Were the American teams doing it as well, or what were you doing in this case?

Green: We were liberating all of the . . . we had no United Nations then. But we were liberating all of our Allied prisoners-of-war. There was only one category that we were not liberating, and those were the Chinese, the Chinese prisoners-of-war. For some reason or other, our command from MacArthur's headquarters was that we would not liberate the Chinese prisoners-of-war. They would be taken care of by someone else.

Marcello: Was there any reason for this?

Green: "Mine was not to reason why, mine was but to do or die (chuckle)."

Marcello: Okay, well put. Well answered. How about Korean civilians? This is a question that just comes to my mind because I know that on the island of Hokkaido, working very closely with the prisoners-of-war up there in the coal mines, there were Korean laborers.

I'm sure that these people had been conscripted and had been sent over to Hokkaido. Was anything done about these people to your knowledge?

Green: To my knowledge there was nothing done with them because everybody that was liberated was liberated to Yokohama except those that were Navy personnel, that were liberated under Stassen's jurisdiction. So I went down to welcome almost every prisoner-of-war who came in, and I do not recall seeing any Koreans.

Marcello: Well, again, actually these would not have been prisoners-of-war. They would have been simply civilian conscripts. Forced labor, I suppose, would be a good term to use for them.

Green: You're right. The only civilian internee was an American civilian internee that I mentioned before that was with Travis J. Smith.

Marcello: You also mentioned in the last interview that eventually, due to certain command difficulties and what have you, that you eventually more or less oversaw the entire operation, so far as liberating the prisoners was concerned.

Green: That is right.

Marcello: Now eventually then, within this particular scope,

you would have to make arrangements so far as food, clothing, bedding, medical needs, and all this sort of thing.

Green: That is right.

Marcello: Now why don't you talk just a little bit about this and perhaps describe the procedures that you had to follow to arrange these things.

Green: Well, did I not do this at our first interview?
I think I did.

Marcello: I think you did to some extent, yes.

Green: Now you stop me when you want to.

Marcello: Yes, sure.

Green: It was foreseen that we were going to have to have the hospital cases put on the Marigold and other hospital ships. These were our plans before we went in. It was contemplated that we would use the Japanese close-in prisoner-of-war camps, clean them up, and use them if we could. MacArthur had set aside for us certain buildings, certain apartments and things, that would be for our use.

This story has never been told, I am sure, but I would like to tell it here. It was the practice of the Japanese with their army to bring along Japanese

girls to service the boys that were in the army. You know what I mean by service. The Japanese government made available to MacArthur and all of his enlisted and officer personnel one of the most beautiful apartment houses I ever saw. It was a high-rise. Oh, it was twelve stories or more, totally undamaged by the fire bombs. MacArthur says, "We do not practice such things. You will not make that available to us." It was not available to us. But it was contemplated that the Japanese would help us house these prisoners-of-war.

But all of this was changed with the speed of the operation. We had no housekeeping personnel to billet them even if we had need to billet them. It seemed to Johnny Green stupid to let these great, big airplanes come up from Okinawa to Yokohama bringing in the soldiers and turning around going back to Yokohama empty. So we hit upon the idea of processing them in such a way that we would never have to billet a single boy on the island, on Yokohama, and that they would be sent on back. So there was no need for bedding or billeting.

Now so far as food was concerned, on August 14 or 15, whenever the emperor threw in the sponge, it became our responsibility to air drop supplies to all the prisoner-of-war camps that we had been able to identify. This we ordered to be done, and it was done--medical supplies, bedding, clothing, food. I think I told you before that in the combat rations, when we would go into combat, we would have these rations that we would carry, and it was expected that we would lose a pound or two a day by the use of these rations. We dropped those on the prisoners-of-war, and the prisoners-of-war gained one to two pounds a day. They were the most bloated-looking people you ever saw, some of them were, when they came out. I think maybe I told you, but if I haven't, these boys that had been trained to kill, these boys that had been trained to be subjected to all kinds of indignities, and who could have . . . and you remember, the Japanese soldiers that were guarding the prisoners-of-war gave their swords, their guns, their armament to the leaders of the prisoners-of-war when the emperor threw in the sponge and said, "We're leaving. You're going to have to feed yourself, clothe yourself, take

care of yourself." It was at that point that the boys, I think, could have turned on their former captors and have hurt them. But instead, they gave them food. They gave them clothing. They gave them medicine. They gave them the stuff that we were air-dropping to them, which I think was a great tribute to the American boy.

Now as to the clothing, as each person came in for processing, you will recall we made him strip himself naked, take a shower. While he was naked, the doctors would look at them. Those that were physically able would go on down the line. Those that were in need, the doctor thought, of further examination would be taken out and would be given whatever care that they needed. Those that went on would start then with the clothing issuance from their underwear right on till they got to the end of the line. They were completely dressed at that time. They had, I think, one complete set of clothing that we gave them. We burned or got rid of their old clothing.

Marcello: Now by this time I would gather that you may have had a rough time fitting these prisoners-of-war with uniforms because I assume they were still constantly gaining weight, were they not (chuckle)?

Green: Well, they may have, but it was never called to our attention. They just selected the ones that fitted them.

Marcello: How about funds for the prisoners-of-war? I think at the Yokohama reception station there were also funds provided for the prisoners-of-war, isn't that correct?

Green: The International Red Cross, under the direction of Dr. Junod, had had free drinks--that's soft drinks--free sandwiches, candies, and things like that--jukebox-- I don't know whether there was a jukebox. Anyway, they had music available to them in these little areas after they had completed their processing and were just waiting to be transported out to the airplane. The American Red Cross took care of them there.

Marcello: They were also allowed to make a telephone call home at this time or send a telegram at this time, were they not?

Green: Well, they were allowed to send a telegram. I think it's on the other tape, but you'll recall that we put them, we put four tables in a square. So I don't need to go into that.

Marcello: Right, yes. We talked about that before. Okay, let's move on now and talk a little bit about some of the other responsibilities of the Army headquarters. Some of these things we didn't mention before. How about the supervision of the provision of the subordinate units for the care of the POW's? How was this carried out?

Green: Until the recovery personnel teams reached them, the prisoner-of-war camp leadership was charged with the responsibility of care of the prisoners-of-war within that particular camp. They could call us at Yokohama for help, either medical help, food, clothing, or anything else after we got in. Of course, before we got in, as I said awhile ago, we air-dropped it. After we got in, Dr. Junod also, when he got there, had his people evidently to come in, too. I don't know how they got there. He just reported to me one day they were ready. He would send reports to us on who needed what, where and how much. We would follow his advice and have it sent out to them. But until they got on board the train or the boat, their care and maintenance was in complete charge of the senior officer at the prisoner-of-war camp. When he got to

us, of course, he was within our charge. But we processed him so quickly that there was no unit as such needed.

Marcello: How did you communicate with these senior officers in these various prisoner-of-war camps?

Green: We would get on the telephone. The telephone operator would come on and begin to speak in Japanese, and we would just say, "Major Mitchell at Osaka, please." You would hear a lot of chatter, and we'd say, "New Osaka Hotel, please." Lot of chatter, and a few minutes here would come Major Mitchell at Osaka on the phone. So evidently someone could understand English there, and we would then just talk. So we would do that wherever we were. We'd call the senior officer and just say we wanted to talk, and the Japanese would make a connection with us.

Marcello: Had we mentioned Major Mitchell's role before? I can't recall.

Green: Major Mitchell was in charge of the railhead at Osaka. Travis J. Smith came in, and this civilian internee came in. We sent them back down with Major Mitchell in charge, with a bunch of nurses and medical personnel, to staff that rail collecting point,

whatever you want to call it, to get all of the prisoners-of-war from Shikoku and lower Honshu up into Yokohama. Major Mitchell was the one that was in charge of that particular recovery.

Marcello: His headquarters were in Osaka?

Green: The New Osaka Hotel, Osaka, Honshu, Japan.

Marcello: I see. Okay, now another question comes up at this time. I think it's important to get into the record. I'm sure that all of these prisoners-of-war or internees had to be registered, or some sort of registration had to be compiled to find out which ones were dead and which ones were alive. Do you recall how this was done?

Green: As the prisoners-of-war came in, we finished their processing before they went to the battery of typewriters to make the manifest to get on the airplane. At the same time that we were giving them the opportunity to write out a message for transmission back to their next-of-kin, these little table units would prepare a list of their name, rank, serial number of every one of the prisoners-of-war who was liberated. At the end of each day, we would send that list first to MacArthur. Then MacArthur put

us on his staff rather than on the staff of . . . in order to eliminate an additional headquarters, he put a whole group on his staff in order that we would send this wire, this message, directly to the War Department in Washington, D.C., so that the War Department daily got a list of the names, ranks and serial numbers of every recovered, liberated, evacuated prisoner-of-war and would take whatever steps that was necessary, to notify their next-of-kin as to what was going to happen. Don't forget that while we were on two weeks at Okinawa, Major Allen and I talked with the commanding officer there to make sure that that could be a collecting point for the prisoners-of-war that we would have in Japan.

Marcello: Now when you went into Japan, I assume that you had a list, or you were soon about to get a list, of all the Americans who were assumed to have been captured, is that correct? Then, in other words, I assume that you had to have a list of this nature in order to compare it with the list that the Japanese were providing you.

Green: Dr. Marcello, we did not. We were not furnished those. It was impossible for . . . when I say impossible, we

did not have them. As to why, I don't know. We did not have them. But after I got in, I could see that there was not a complete change-over in camp-to-camp, the closing of camps, the moving of people, of prisoners-of-war, from one camp to another. I think that it would have been physically impossible for us to get. It was just not available. But one of the first orders that we gave to General Tamura, one of the first orders we gave to him--and we said it must be done in a hurry--is to get the name of every person in all of the prisoner-of-war camps. He was to identify and locate for us where these prison camps were. I told you last time he was very obedient, gave them to us, and I showed you a copy that I brought home of the type that they gave to us.

Marcello: How did you go about determining which prisoners had died at some point during their captivity? In other words, who was keeping records of those who died somewhere along the way?

Green: This was not our mission. My heart goes out to those, especially the loved ones of those who had died, but our job was to liberate and evacuate the live ones, whether they be well or whether they be sick, whatever

it was. So this was not our mission. I know nothing about it.

Marcello: I do know that from time to time, the senior officers in the actual prisoner-of-war camps did try and keep some sort of a record whenever possible of those prisoners who did die. I think they also tried to keep some of the personal effects of these prisoners, perhaps their wallets and some of their identification material and things of this nature--the dog tags and what have you, if at all possible. Again, I was wondering if the recovery personnel teams entered into this in any way. But I can see that your main responsibility certainly was to get these prisoners out as quickly as possible.

Green: That's right, to take care of the living.

Marcello: Okay, now also there was a transportation clearing-house established by your headquarters, was there not?

Green: That's right.

Marcello: Describe how this was arranged. What process took place here?

Green: In the treaty or arrangement that was made between General MacArthur and the emperor, it was felt that Yokohama would be the safest place for the headquarters

of the beginning part of the liberation to be. So the New Grand Hotel in Yokohama was requisitioned with the concurrence of the emperor. The New Grand Hotel was made the focal point for the administration, including the transportation. We found that the trains in Japan on all of the islands--I can speak with complete authority of Shikoku and Honshu--were running more on time than the trains in the United States were running when we left. Realizing that this was a fact, we negotiated with the civilian who was a part of the team furnished us by the emperor. We worked with him, and he put on our staff the man in charge of the railroads of Japan. Working with this fellow, we found out what trains could be available at what hours at the various prisoner-of-war camps. We notified each one of these prisoner-of-war camps through the recovery personnel teams to make available that the train would be here at a certain time. They could have the prisoners-of-war there, and they would come up to the Yokohama Central Station. So I would say that 90 per cent of those persons who were on Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu came through the railroads. Now Hokkaido was liberated almost completely by ship by

Commander Stassen. He was supposed to have brought by ship the Army personnel back to Yokohama, back to the New Grand Hotel, to be processed and to go back out to Okinawa. He was given the permission, if he wanted to do so, to take care of any Naval personnel and send them back to the States directly by ship.

Marcello: This is where he managed to pull out Devereux before your group got there.

Green: Yes, that is right. Stassen felt that there was a morale factor involved, that the Navy did not want to be liberated by the Army. They would rather be liberated by the Navy and taken care of by the Navy. That made no difference to us, as long as we got them out, and I have no regrets for just getting them out.

Marcello: Now we've talked about this next question just a little bit. But somewhere along the line, the living conditions in those prisoner-of-war camps had to be observed. In other words, you had to find out what sort of living conditions existed in those camps before you would know what the needs of those camps were. How'd you go about finding this out? How were they inspected?

Green: Dr. Junod would do that. The recovery personnel team would go out. We did not want to send someone out to a prisoner-of-war camp from the Army headquarters just to inspect and look. We would much rather send a recovery personnel team out there to get them ready to come home. If we just sent a person out there to make a reconnaissance and come back to us, officially from our liberation and evacuation team, I personally felt like we might cause some trouble. We wanted to get them out. So we'd much rather see them and get them out instead of tantalizing them by sending someone out there. So we depended upon any prisoner-of-war camp that was in distress, the Red Cross would report to us, and we'd take care of it. Otherwise, we'd send a recovery personnel team out there. Don't forget now, we just send mass . . . we didn't use any planned method. As soon as we could put together a recovery personnel team, we sent them out just as fast as we could send them out.

Marcello: Did we ever talk about how many recovery personnel teams there were altogether? I'm sure you could only estimate this.

Green: Oh, I would say that there were ten or twelve different ones, and each one of them was charged with, oh, four,

five, six, seven prisoner-of-war camps to reach in the Honshu-Kyushu area. Of course, we sent them by air to Hokkaido. We sent them by rail to Kyushu and all others. Of course, part of the Navy went to . . . we sent, as I recall, the Far Eastern Air Force into Hokkaido, and the ships went on up after the recovery teams got there. I have in my notes here from precious original reports made by the head of the recovery team. You need to have these in your possession, how they knocked on doors in the middle of the night and stuff. It's real good.

Marcello: Thank you. I think it would be quite appropo to have that as an appendix on the record here.

Green: I've got them here someplace. I've got them.

Marcello: We'll have them as an appendix. Now with regard to my next question, I think you've in part answered it. I was going to ask you what sort of liaison or cooperation existed between your outfit and either the State Department or the International Red Cross. I think you've answered it in part, at least so far as Dr. Junod is concerned. I'm not sure what else we could add to that. Let me just ask this: were relations harmonious between the Red Cross and your unit?

Green: Very definitely. Very definitely. Dr. Junod was very complimentary of the speed and the manner in which we took care of them. But now there began to come in from Okinawa different . . . I know the Swiss legation, as I recall, was there. The Swedish legation was there. The British legate was there. All these people began to pour in to find out where were their prisoners-of-war. Of course, when they got up there, they found out that we had been sending them back to Manila, Philippine Islands, for their . . . we wanted to get them back to an area that was competent to take care of them. The real processing would be done back in Manila. But I think I told you before about we could not play "The Star-Spangled Banner" when these little boys started rolling in because we were liberating the Britishers and the Aussies and different ones.

Marcello: In other words, what you're referring to are the ceremonies at the Yokohama railroad station when the prisoners reached there. As you mentioned, you usually tried to have a band there.

Green: We always did have a band there. We had an honor guard there. We had the brass there. Mrs. Douglas MacArthur to my knowledge attended every single

train she was to receive there. The colonels, the big colonels, the big admirals, the big people, would be down and watch them come in. It was the most . . . in fact, this was the . . . I would call it the climax of the whole four years of war because MacArthur said, "I shall return." He returned, and he got them.

Marcello: You mentioned awhile ago that the International Red Cross was somewhat worried over the fact that the newly freed prisoners might take out revenge or what have you on their former captors. Was there ever very much evidence of this sort of thing taking place?

Green: Dr. Junod was fearful that these kids that had been trained to kill the Japanese on sight might turn on them, might commit atrocities, rape, or anything else to exact revenge. He and I had many, many conversations on this. He wanted to make sure. There were only a few times, only a few times, that reports came in from the Japanese that atrocities had been committed. I immediately called Dr. Junod and gave him the report. I said, "Would you please make an investigation." In every instance, Dr. Junod came back and reported to me that there was no basis for any such report. I think that's a credit. I think that should be on

record. The International Red Cross did make the investigations and did report back that there were none.

Marcello: From my own research and in previous interviews, I think what I have found out would probably corroborate what you've said. Most of the prisoners told me that they were simply so happy about being liberated that they couldn't have cared less what happened to those Japanese guards and so on.

Green: We were the victors!

Marcello: Sure.

Green: The Japanese were the vanquished. Why try to kick that fellow when he's obedient to you? As I told you last time, the Japanese were the most cooperative people that I ever saw. They were seemingly proud to be the . . . they were so delighted to get rid of the war; they were so delighted to be free again. They had been evidently under the subjugation of the Japanese military.

Marcello: There's another question that I want to ask you with regard to the various Allied contingents of prisoners-of-war. Did you ever notice from your own observations any differences in the physical condition of the various

POW's? In other words, did the British seem to be more emaciated than the Dutch, or the Dutch than the Americans, or were the conditions virtually all about the same?

Green: I would say that from what I saw, they were about the same.

Marcello: The reason I asked this is because I do know that in some camps, the British, for example, seem to have suffered more than some of the other groups so far as casualties were concerned and deaths. Some of my American prisoners-of-war have attributed this to the lack of personal hygiene on the part of the British. I was wondering if they perhaps looked in any worse shape than some of the others.

Green: You would have more knowledge of that than I. My knowledge is that there was no difference. Now I worked in the 8th Army headquarters during the war with a group of British officers. In fact, one of them slept right beside me. I would say his personal hygiene was the same as all the rest of us.

Marcello: What were the responsibilities of the corps and the divisions that were sent in here at this time, so far as recovery of these prisoners-of-war were concerned?

Green: I do not recall of my own knowledge any corps unit, any corps, that was sent in. The 24th Division, to my knowledge, was attached to 8th Army headquarters, and the 8th Army headquarters worked directly with the 24th Division. The 24th Division was sent in by prior plan, prior to the time that we thought that the Japanese were . . . at the time when we went in, we thought that the Japanese might resist us. So we wanted some Army personnel to secure us. So the 24th Division was chosen to be that division that would give the security to the American occupying forces. They were sent in by plane. This was their sole function period. It was from them, it was from MacArthur's headquarters, it was from the 8th Army that had been sent in, that these recovery personnel teams were formed. The 24th Division, to my knowledge, never operated as a unit in the liberation of the prisoners-of-war. They were a part of the security and housekeeping forces.

Marcello: Now awhile ago we talked about the role of the Red Cross. I gather that also in the whole process of liberating the prisoners-of-war, the Swedish and the Swiss legations played a part.

Green: They came in later--that is right--and helped us in . . . the British legate or the Swedish legate . . . that legate I was telling you about who gave us the dinner, I think possibly that was a Swedish legate that did that. The Swedish legate was the most cooperative one with us. He stayed with us more, I guess, than anyone else.

Marcello: Did they use these groups because they represented neutral countries and operated very closely with the Red Cross also?

Green: Now that decision was made higher up, from a higher authority than me.

Marcello: I was just wondering because, of course, both Switzerland and Sweden remained neutral throughout World War II. I was wondering if that was perhaps one of the reasons why they were used.

Green: That I would speculate, but I do not know of my own knowledge.

Marcello: In my notes here, I also have reference to a Task Group 30.6. What was the role of this particular task group, or what was it? Can you identify it first of all?

Green: You're going to have to let me turn through my notes to see where you got that. I do have a recollection of that. After a break I'll come back on and give you the results of my investigation. But my memory today is that that was Stassen's idea. Stassen wanted a Navy group to do it. We assigned him to furnish the boats to pick up the people at Hokkaido. He was asked, as I recall, to pick up the prisoners-of-war at Aomori. Instead of Omori down in Tokyo, there's Aomori up there. Some of those on the far tip of Honshu he was to pick up because he felt that as the ship went up and back, he might as well pick up some of them on the way in. I'll bet you that's what that task group was.

Marcello: Now that you mention it, I'm sure it was a Naval unit, probably the one under Stassen.

Green: That's right.

Marcello: What I want to do next is talk a little bit about some of the personal experiences that you observed as these prisoners-of-war were being liberated. As we've discussed previously, rather than have you repeat what is already a part of the actual written documents, we'll simply add those documents as an appendix to this interview because, as you yourself mentioned,

they probably more vividly describe some of these personal experiences than anything you could possibly tell us on tape. But there is one that does stand out in my mind, and I want you to talk about it quite briefly. This was a comment that was made by one of the prisoners-of-war at the time of his liberation. I think you could probably pick up the incident from there.

Green: This was on one of my trips down to welcome the prisoners-of-war at the Yokohama Central Station. As the prisoners-of-war were filed by the honor guard and by the brass that was there, I overheard this statement: "I told you that they would come and get us." It made chills run up and down my spine when I heard it, so I immediately went out and trailed the boy down to find out why he had made that statement. He told me that there in his particular prisoner-of-war camp, there had been some Britishers, Canadians, Aussies, Dutch, and other prisoners-of-war and that in their discussions during the days, I guess, of . . . remember, they had been there almost four years. These people had been the heroes of Bataan, the death march of Bataan, Corregidor. They had been, I guess,

the longest in the prisoner-of-war camps of Japan. He said that all of the prisoners-of-war . . . there had been a lot of feeling among the persons who were not American prisoners-of-war--that is, the Britishers, Canadians, Aussies and so forth--that there was a doubt in their mind as to whether or not their government would have the guts to come in and get them. The United States prisoners-of-war never . . . they told me that they knew their country would never let them down. So he was just having the last word.

Marcello: This is, I think, a general feeling among most of the American prisoners-of-war that I've interviewed. They never gave up hope, and, of course, that's one of the things that made it possible for them to survive. They knew that sooner or later they were going to be rescued, if at all possible.

Green: You know, if you'll permit me a philosophical comment on that, it is my personal opinion that the American prisoners-of-war held this high morale because it had been the history of the United States government that they would never let their soldiers and sailors down when they got in a bind. I think it paid dividends for us here, whereas other nations evidently had not

been so careful to rescue their own. I hope and pray that the United States will never sink so low as to forget its boys and girls in combat.

Marcello: Let me ask you this question. Did you ever notice any resentment on the part of any prisoners at the time of the liberation? In other words, was there ever the sort of remark, "Well, what the hell took you so long to come get us?" or something of this nature? Did you ever see any resentment? Did anybody ever have any chips on their shoulder or anything of this nature?

Green: Absolutely not! No, they were so grateful that we got them. The only thing that I think would have caused us trouble and that they would have jumped on us for was that once we got into Japan and found that there was no opposition to us, had we let them continue to rot in the prisoner-of-war camps, I think they would have had a justifiable complaint against us. Some of these reports from the International Red Cross that I showed you will show that we had to move in in a hurry. I have no complaint that has come to my knowledge, even that we delayed or dilly-dallied once we got on

Yokohama, once we got on Japanese ground. We got to them as fast as we could.

Marcello: As you look back on this whole experience in the liberation of these prisoners-of-war, what do you see as perhaps being the most important accomplishment? I think we've talked about this several times. But I'm just trying to draw some things together here. What do you see as the crowning achievement, so far as you were concerned, in this whole process?

Green: Well, to me the crowning achievement was that we got all of these prisoners-of-war out in such a short period of time. We got them out without any major accident taking place once we got them within our control. Now as these records will show, there were a lot of accidents that were caused--and a lot of injuries, killings . . . when I say killings, I mean people who were killed accidentally by their not being able to recognize the weight of air drops that were coming in.

Marcello: Air-dropped supplies?

Green: But once we got them in our control, that is, put them on the railroad train and coming back on the ship, there was not reported to me any major accident that

took place. There were some, I think, British nurses that in their camp they had had . . . they died of tuberculosis which they had contracted while they were in the camp. I don't think you can attribute that to us. Now to me, that was our mission. We accomplished our mission, and it was for this that MacArthur gave me the Legion of Merit. If you've never seen the Legion of Merit, I'll have my son take a picture, a colored picture of it. It's a beautiful medal which would be, I guess, official testimony to the fact that MacArthur put me in charge of the liberation and evacuation. But my greatest observation, rather than having witnessed as to what took place is that the prisoners-of-war and the American soldiers who were the occupying forces in Japan had been conditioned to hate and to kill, that the instant that the emperor threw in the sponge and we went in, we do not find, as I said to you awhile ago, any atrocity, any vengeance, that was committed on any of these Japanese. I think that this is a terrific tribute to the background that lay deeper than the training that the military put on us. This was the background from the American home, the American

community, the products of the Sunday school classes,
your Boy Scouts, YMCA's and other groups that taught
us to have a great respect for human personality.

A P P E N D I X

Copy of Red Cross
8063 GT SAPPORO 2173 117/2108

D INTERCROSS TOKYO

FOUR THANKS YOURS TWO STOP YOURS ONE RECEIVED STOP
MINE TWENTYFIFTH ASAMUSHI NUMBER ONE TWENTYSEVENTH SAPPORO
NUMBER TWO TWENTYNINTH BIBAI NUMBER THREE STOP COMPLETED
VISITS SIX POW CAMPS HOKKAIDO THIRTYFIRST TOTAL 1596
POW READY PROCEED HAKODATE FOR EMBARCATION PLEASE ADVISE
EARLIEST FULL DETAILS WHEN SHIPS ARRIVE HAKODATE STOP
BRITISH AC 1 HALLIWELL WITH SPINAL INJURY FROM ACCIDENT
JULY TWENTYEIGHTH 1945 AND SERGEANT ROBINSON LEFT THIGHBONE
FRANCTURE TWENTYEIGHTH AUG BOTH BIDAI MINE HOSPITAL
REQUIRE URGENT TREATMENT IN GENERAL HOSPITAL PLEASE
ARRANGE AMBULANCE PLANE PICK THEM UP SAPPORO SAME TIME
EVACUATION BOATS ARRIVE HAKODATE STOP VISITING CICAPP
OTARU TODAY STOP GREATLY INDEBTED NORTHERN HQ AND
SAPPORO AUTHORITIES FOR MOST COURTEOUS RECEPTION AND
HELP BEST REGARDS PESTALOZZI

Public Relations Office

6 September 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: Major DANIEL A. JENKINS, Public Relations Officer,
Headquarters, Eighth Army

1. Clarification of policy concerning release of information on Allied Prisoners of War has been requested of the GHQ Public Relations Office.

2. GHQ PRO policy on this matter at present is as follows:

a. Any information concerning released POW's may be given immediately to war correspondents.

b. GHQ press censors are responsible for seeing that no story mentioning the name of a POW is passed for publication until 24 hours after notification has been sent to next of kin from Manila.

c. The AG ruling on this release time applies to release of story FOR PUBLICATION, and not to the release of information to the writer.

d. At present all such stories are being cleared through Manila, where press censorship and Recovered Personnel sections are in close liaison. When rosters showing notification of next of kin arrive at our forward headquarters clearance may be made from here.

3. To facilitate proper news coverage it is important that the correspondents be permitted access to POW information wherever possible. Your cooperation is requested.

RICHARD P. POWELL
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Executive Officer

International Red Cross

Swiss / D.^r M. JUNOD Chief delegate of Int. Red Cross Japan
Miss M. STRAEHLER Delegate "

Swiss Legation

D.^r E. BERNATH, Secretary of Legation

Swedish Legation

M.^r N. ERICSON, Consul of Legation

M.^r GAWEL, Secretary of Legation

Major Greene AUS

Major G. Sinykin

atal-5-28-42--40M.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

No.

U. S. S GAMBLE
MINECRAFT, BATTLE FORCE

HEADING:-

DATE

TBS 048728 (APD 39 V CTU 30 6.7)

My medical and processing team
on Mangold will not be transported
to Rongerik Island. Please inform
Commander who has all
information regarding this situation.

METHOD		PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEF'D	ORIG.	RELEASE
4. Carter	William				101	
5. 7					110	2754

Capt.	Exec.	Eng.	Gun.	1st Lt.	Mine	OOD	Comm.	C'Sary	Sup.	Q.M.	F. Yeo	S. Yeo	H.C.
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Many thanks

Walter Gunn

C. Leroy Cookingham

Artiller Section

22 Sep 45

attention

~~272~~
142

Capt Krough-

At your leisure (?) would you look up the following POW's for me. What physical condition, where recovered, etc:

1. Sgt Joe Graham Tender No
2. George Edward Messer yes Fair, Ohashi
3. Aubrey Lee Hooten No
4. Carter Williamson No
5. Joy Garrison No

Many thanks.

Major Green

6. Leroy Cookingham No

EIGHTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS
SIGNAL CENTER

REFER TO:

MST CEN NO. Q2135

ACTION GI

MI ANS MSGR

INFO TO

CITE NIL

CS/S

FROM CTG 30.6

TO CG 8TH ARMY

INFO COM 3RD FLT

PRICE TO GREEN. Commodore Simpson and I with representative Swedish Leagation have procured signed statements from Local Authorities Kamaishi that they have investigated and that there are no POWS, Civilian or elsewhere in thsœ areas. Commodore Simpson had air recon made. Found no camps so returning Yokohama eta Prior noon 17th. Total take at Kamaishi from camps 4 and 5 were 598 POWS and internees and 167 Chinese Nationals. Impossible neogtiate Chinese without interpreter so sending them to Yokohama on LSM with noon 17th. Have 32 cases American and Dutch Ashes and approximately 50 cases Chinese ashes. This completes mission with total 3239 persons recovered.

TOO: 160400/

TOR: 170930/1

THI: 171030/1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE
IS FORBIDDEN SEE par 40 and 41, AR 380-5

Completed

Richard

8th. ARMY RECOVERY HEADQUARTERS
NEW OSAKA HOTEL
OSAKA, JAPAN

12th., September, 1945.

SUBJECT: Lists of personnel who have assisted 8th. Army Recovery Headquarters,
at New Osaka Hotel Osaka.

TO: G - 1 8th. Army.

1. List of Officer personnel.
2. List of Enlisted personnel
3. List of personnel who were evacuated from the New Osaka Hotel
on 11th., September, 1945, in consequence of which their full particulars
could not be obtained.

LISTS ON ATTACHED PAGES NUMBERED CONSECUTIVELY
FROM (-1-) ONWARDS.

J. E. Mitchell
Major L. E. MITCHELL,
Commanding Officer,
8th. Army Recovery Personnel,
Osaka, JAPAN

LISTS ON ATTACHED PAGES NUMBERED CONSECUTIVELY
FROM (-1-) ONWARDS.

L. E. Mitchell

Major L. E. MITCHELL,
Commanding Officer,
Stn., Army Recovery Personnel,
Osaka, JAPAN

Travis J. Smith

TRAVIS J. SMITH,
2nd Lt., U.S. Army,

1. List of Officer Personnel.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>AGE</u>
OLSON, J. C. (American) <u>CAPTURED: BATAAN</u>	Captain U.S. Army		0-22125	27
		HOLLEY SPRINGS, MISS		
RILEY, John C. (American) <u>Captured: Bataan</u>	Captain Prov. Tank Co.	194th. Tank. Bn.	0-396950	29
		<u>Home Address:</u> 2502, 8th. 2nd. St., St. Joseph, Mo.		
NASCH, Lassiter A. (American) <u>Captured: Bataan</u>	Captain Sig. Off. F.E.A.F.		0-19060	30
		<u>Home Address:</u> Jacksonville, Florida, U.S.A.		
HOCHMAN, David (American) <u>Captured: Bataan</u>	1st. Lieut. Gen. Hosp # 2	Bataan P.I.	0-420069	33
		<u>Home Address:</u> 5614 - 15th. Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.		
SMITH, Travis J. (American) <u>Captured: Java</u>	2nd. Lieut. Field Art.		CX42727K 0-403578	27
		<u>Home Address:</u> Wichita Falls, Texas, U.S.A.		
DILLARD, Samuel H. III (American) <u>Captured: Bataan</u>	2nd. Lieut. A.C.		CX40357E 0-481737	30
		<u>Home Address:</u> Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A.		
JENKINS, Robert F. Jr. (American) <u>Captured: Bataan</u>	1st. Lieut. U.S.M.C.	4TH MARINES	Unknown	29
		<u>Home Address:</u> 2346 N. Broad St., Philadelphia, Pa.		
HALL, Robert (British) <u>Captured: Singapore</u>	Captain Royal Artillery		100470	32
		<u>Home Address:</u> "Braemount" 1, Kirkgate, Liberton, Edinburgh, SCOTLAND.		
SEABY, John (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Warrant Off. R.N.V.R.		None	37
		<u>Home Address:</u> 41, Byrne Drive, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, ENGLAND		
GULP, James Daniel (American) <u>Captured: Corregidor</u>	Gunner	U.S.N.	371-90-39	23
		<u>Home Address:</u> 1057, 26th. St., San Bernardino, Calif.		
BROWN, Robert Miller (British) <u>Captured: 5th. Atlantic by Germans.</u>	3rd. Officer B.M.N.		None	23
		<u>Home Address:</u> 17, Lockharton Gdns., Edinburgh 11, SCOTLAND.		
LENDAY, David (British)	2nd. Radio Off. B.M.N.		None	26

(American)
Captured: Bataan

MASCH, Lassiter A.
(American)
Captured: Bataan

HOOHMAN, David
(American)
Captured: Bataan

SMITH, Travis J.
(American)
Captured: Java

DE LARD, Samuel H. III
(American)
Captured: Bataan

JENKINS, Robert F. Jr.
(American)
Captured: Bataan

HALL, Robert
(British)
Captured: Singapore

SEADY, John
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong

GULP, James Daniel
(American)
Captured: Corregidor

BROWN, Robert Millar
(British)
Captured: Sth. Atlantic
by Germans.

LINDSAY, David
British
Captured: Sth. Atlantic
by Germans

194th, Tank. Bn.

Home Address: 2502, 3th. 2nd. St., St. Joseph, Mo.

Captain Sig. Off. P.E.A.F. O-19060 36

Home Address: Jacksonville, Florida, U.S.A.

1st. Lieut. Gen. Hosp # 2 O-420069 33
Bataan P.I.

Home Address: 5614 - 15th. Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

2nd. Lieut. Field Art. ~~XXXXXX~~ 27
O-403878

Home Address: Whitchita Falls, Texas, U.S.A.

2nd. Lieut. A.C. ~~XXXXXX~~ 30
O-421737

Home Address: Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A.

1st. Lieut. U.S.M.C. Unknown 29
4TH MARINES

Home Address: 2346 N. Broad St., Philadelphia, Pa.

Captain Royal Artillery 100470 32

Home Address: "Braemount" 1, Kirkgate, Liberton,
Edinburgh, SCOTLAND.

Warrant Off. R.N.V.R. None 37

Home Address: 41, Byrne Drive, Southend-on-Sea,
Essex, ENGLAND

Gunner U.S.M. 371-90-39 23

Home Address: 1057, 26th. St., San Bernardino, Calif.

3rd. Officer B.M.N. None 23

Home Address: 17, Lockharton Gdns., Edinburgh 11,
SCOTLAND.

2nd. Radio Off. B.M.N. None 26

Home Address: 108, Wedderlea Drive, Glasgow SW 2,
SCOTLAND

2. List of Enlisted Personnel

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>AGE</u>
3 SPIRIT, Robert (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	P.O.	Royal Navy	P/JX 131484	34
	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, London.			
4 IRVINE, George Robert (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	P.O.	Royal Navy	G/JX 132780	33
	<u>Home Address:</u> 14, Green Lane, New Malden, Surrey, ENGLAND.			
5 BROWN, George Frederick (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Sto.	Royal Navy	G/KX 109342	28
	<u>Home Address:</u> 20, New Quay House, Kennington, Lambeth, London SE 11, ENGLAND.			
6 ENDRES, Francis Walter B. (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	A.B.	Royal Navy	P/JX 152255	28
	<u>Home Address:</u> 223, Hales Lane, Smethwick, Staffs., ENGLAND.			
7 BENNETT, George (British) Sth. Atlantic <u>Captured: HONGKONG</u> by Germans.	A.B.	Royal Navy	G/JX 313898	33
	<u>Home Address:</u> 99 Waller Road, New Cross, London SE 1 ENGLAND.			
8 LLOYD, John (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Ldg. Sea.	Royal Navy	D/SEX 15748	29
	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, London.			
9 GODDARD, Alfred Cruncell (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	A.B.	Royal Navy	P/JX 130147	23
	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, London.			
10 ANDRE, Edward Ernest (British) <u>Captured: Sth. Atlantic</u> by Germans.	A.B.	Royal Navy	G/JX 313895	41
	<u>Home Address:</u> XXXXXXXXXXXX 88, Daubensy Rd., Clapton Park, London E. 5, ENGLAND.			
11 HUGHES, Kenneth, Wynford (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	A.B.	Royal Navy	D/JX 167284	27
	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, London.			
12 GREEN, Jack (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	A.B.	Royal Navy	P/JX 130147	26
	<u>Home Address:</u> 14, Hettleton Ave., Hixfield, Yorks. ENGLAND.			
13 HAINES, Stanley John (British)	Ldg. Sea.	Royal Navy	G/JX 126907	35
	<u>Home Address:</u> 1, H... ..			

- 15 **BROWN, George Frederick** .
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong
Sto. Royal Navy
C/EX 109342 24
Home Address: 20, New Quay House, Kennington,
Lambeth, London SE 11, ENGLAND.
- 16 **ENDREZ, Francis Walter B.**
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong
A.B. Royal Navy
P/JX 153255 29
Home Address: 223, Hales Lane, Smethwick, Staffs.
ENGLAND.
- 17 **BENNETT, George**
(British) Sth. Atlantic
Captured: HONG KONG
by Germans.
A.B. Royal Navy
O/JX 313893 39
Home Address: 99 Waller Road, New Cross, London SE
ENGLAND.
- 18 **LLOYD, John**
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong
Ldg. Sea. Royal Navy
D/93X 15743 29
Home Address: C/O Records, Admiralty, London.
- 19 **GODDARD, Alfred Gruncell**
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong
A.B. Royal Navy
P/JX 130147 23
Home Address: C/O Records, Admiralty, London.
- 20 **ANSIE, Edward Ernest**
(British)
Captured: Sth. Atlantic
by Germans.
A.B. Royal Navy
O/JX 313893 41
Home Address: ~~21, ...~~ 83, Daubeney Rd., Clapton Park
London E.5, ENGLAND.
- 21 **HUGHES, Kenneth, Wynford**
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong
A.B. Royal Navy
D/JX 167234 27
Home Address: C/O Records, Admiralty, London.
- 22 **GREEN, Jack**
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong
A.B. Royal Navy
P/JX 130147 26
Home Address: 14, Hattleton Ave., Mirfield, Yorks.
ENGLAND.
- 23 **HAINES, Stanley John**
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong
Ldg. Sea. Royal Navy
O/JX 126907 35
Home Address: 1, Harbour Terr., Gorleston,
St. Yarmouth, Norfolk, ENGLAND.
- 24 **KENTON, Herbert**
(British)
Captured: Sth. Atlantic
By Germans
Ldg. Sea. Royal Navy
D/JX 267054 36
Home Address: 13, Buttermere Gdns., St. Crosby,
Liverpool 25, ENGLAND.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>AGE</u>
LAVER, Ronald (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Mne.	Royal Marines	Mly X 990	26
	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, LONDON.			
KEWTON, Thomas Edward L. (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	A.P.	Royal Navy	D/JX 134895	31
	<u>Home Address:</u> 9, Store Terr., Warrington Lane, Co. Durham, ENGLAND.			
SEWELL, Albert (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Cor.	Royal Artillery	4639383	27
	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Ministry, London			
JONES, Leslie (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	S/Lt.	Royal Engineers	5738487	36
	<u>Home Address:</u> 27, Sidney Rd., Gillingham, Kent ENGLAND.			
FAYHAM, Alan George (BRITISH) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	R.R.A.	Royal Navy	D/MX 528510	30
	<u>Home Address:</u> Talbot, Launceston Rd., Bodmin, Cornwall, ENGLAND.			
MURPHY WILSON, Hill (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	S/Lt.	Royal Artillery	842274	28
	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office London.			
LAMPARD, Victor George (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	M.M.(P.O.)	Royal Navy	P/MX 68632	31
	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, LONDON.			
TAYLOR, William (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Sgt.	Royal Artillery	860933	25
	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON			
SUMMONS, Eric (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	M/PL.	Royal Corps of Signals	2323357	27
	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.			
BIGGS, Maximald Ernest (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	S/Pl.	Royal Corps of Signals	2330252	29
	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.			
JURGEN, Frank Ernest (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	M/Pl.	Royal Corps of Signals	2321437	26
	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON			
W. George Victor (British)	Sigs. Sgt.	Royal Navy V.R.	None	27

<p>SMITH, Thomas Edward L. (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong</p>	<p>A.S. Royal Navy D/JX 134895 31 <u>Home address:</u> 9, Store Terr., Dartington Lane, Co. Durham, ENGLAND.</p>
<p>SEWELL, Albert (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong</p>	<p>Gar. Royal Artillery 4609583 27 <u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Ministry, London</p>
<p>JONES, Leslie (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong</p>	<p>2/Lt. Royal Engineers 5738487 36 <u>Home Address:</u> 27, Sidney Rd., Gillingham, Kent ENGLAND.</p>
<p>BAYRAM, Alan George (BRITISH) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong</p>	<p>R.R.A. Royal Navy D/MX 528510 30 <u>Home Address:</u> Talbar, Launceston Rd., Bodmin, Cornwall, ENGLAND.</p>
<p>XIXXX WILSON, Hill (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong</p>	<p>Lt. Royal Artillery 842274 28 <u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office London.</p>
<p>LAMPARD, Victor George (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong</p>	<p>M.N. (P.O.) Royal Navy P/MX 68682 31 <u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, LONDON.</p>
<p>TAYLOR, William (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong</p>	<p>Lt. Royal Artillery 860933 28 <u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.</p>
<p>RUFORD, Eric (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong</p>	<p>L/CPL. Royal Corps of Signals 2323357 27 <u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.</p>
<p>BIGGS, Wagnald Ernest (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong</p>	<p>L/Cpl. Royal Corps of Signals 2330252 29 <u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.</p>
<p>JOHNSON, Frank Ernest (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong</p>	<p>L/Cpl. Royal Corps of Signals 2321647 26 <u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.</p>
<p>XIM, George Victor (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong</p>	<p>Ldg. Sig. Royal Navy V.R. None 27 <u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, LONDON.</p>
<p>RIX, John Arthur (New Zealander) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong</p>	<p>Lt. Royal New Zealand Navy NZPO 7426 26 <u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, LONDON.</p>
<p>FULLER, William Alfred (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong</p>	<p>Sig. Royal Corps of Signals 2323302 27 <u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.</p>
<p>JACKSON, Albert (British) <u>Captured:</u> Atlantic by Germans</p>	<p>Ldg. Sec. Royal Navy P/JX 167285 26 <u>Home Address:</u> 25, Dunston Ave., Greenpace, Durham, ENGLAND.</p>

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>AGE</u>
HAYWOOD, George Arthur (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong	Cnr.	Royal Artillery	2042864	25
		<u>Home Address:</u> 4, Willow Terr., Pilsley, Chesterfield, England.		
BEVAN, William Thomas E. (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong	Sig.	Royal Corps of Signals	2325210	27
		<u>Home Address:</u> 114, Penhurst Rdo., Thornton Heath, Surrey, ENGLAND.		
MCCANN, James (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong	Sig.	Royal Corps of Signals	³²⁴³⁴⁸¹ 2325210	28
		<u>Home Address:</u> 3/O Records, War Office, London. 10 RICHMOND PLAC RUTHERGLEN, GLASGOW, SCOTLAND		
RAINBOROUGH, George (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong	Ldg. Str.	Royal Navy	D/MX 53724	27
		<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, London.		
GRIFFITH, Robert Alexander (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong	Sgt.	Royal Marines	Ply X 634	29
		<u>Home Address:</u> 32, Halftown, Lower Mass, Hillboro N. Ireland. Co. Down.		
URE, William Bloomfield (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong	C.S.M.	Middlesex Regt.	6199252	31
		<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Mrs. M. Terwit, 29 Terwit Rd., Gallowlands, Glasgow, SCOTLAND.		
TAYLOR, William Alfred (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong	L/Cpl.	Royal Corps of Signals	233665	29
		<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, London.		
LAYCLAY, Cecil Alexander (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong	Sgt.	Royal Corps of Signals	2314216	35
		<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.		
GANNON, Frank Kekewich (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong	Sea. Cnr.	R.N.V.R.	None	45
		<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, LONDON.		
COOK, William James (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong	Sig.	Royal Corps of Signals	2350354	29
		<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.		
ARNOLD, Charles Arnold (British) <u>Captured:</u> Hong Kong	M.M.(P.O.)	Royal Navy	P/MX 67932	30
		<u>Home Address:</u> North Rd., Retford, Motts.		

3	BAINBOROUGH, George (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Ldg. Str. Royal Navy	D/MX 53724	27	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, London.
4	GRIFFITH, Robert Alexander (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Sgt. Royal Marines	Ply X 694	29	<u>Home Address:</u> 32, Halftown, Lower Mass, Hills N. Ireland. Co. Down.
5	URE, William Bloomfield (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	C.S.M. Middlesex Regt.	6199252	31	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Mrs. M. Tervit, 29 Tervit Rd., Gawlands, Glasgow, SCOTLAND.
6	TAYLOR, William Alfred (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	L/Cpl. Royal Corps of Signals	233565	29	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, London.
7	LANGLEY, Cecil Alexander (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Sgt. Royal Corps of Signals	2314216	35	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.
8	GANTON, Frank Kekewich (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Sea. Gun. R.N.V.R.	None	45	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, LONDON.
9	COOK, William James (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Sig. Royal Corps of Signals	2350354	29	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.
10	RULE, Charles Arnold (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	M.M.(P.C.) Royal Navy	P/MX 67932	30	<u>Home Address:</u> North Rd., Retford, Notts., ENGLAND
11	WHITTINGHAM, Harold (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	S.A. Royal Navy	C/MX 69410	27	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, Admiralty, LONDON.
12	MCMURTRY, Harry (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	W.O.II Royal Artillery	1058692	35	<u>Home Address:</u> C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.
13	ROBINSON, Walter G. (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Cpl. Royal Army Medical Corps	7268750	23	<u>Home Address:</u> 293, Aulford Rd., Yorks, Yorks, ENGLAND.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>AGE.</u>
4 ARCHER, Norman (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Gnr.	Royal Artillery	872437	24
	<u>Home Address:</u> 45, Tynemouth Rd. E., Howden, Newcastle-on-Tyne, ENGLAND.			
5 LIVESAY, Ellis Norman (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Ldg. Sea.	Royal Navy	P/93X 17109	27
	<u>Home Address:</u> 407, Ashton Old Rd., Openshaw, Manchester, ENGLAND.			
6 HUGHESON, Jack J. (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Tel.	Royal Navy	P/BRX 456	28
	<u>Home Address:</u> G/O Records, Admiralty, LONDON.			
7 McNULTY, Robert (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Bar.	Royal Artillery	798254	33
	<u>Home Address:</u> 39, Holbeck St., Burnley, Lancs., ENGLAND.			
8 SHIBBY, John (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Gnr.	Royal Artillery	872647	24
	<u>Home Address:</u> 7, Lysways St., Walsall, Staffs. ENGLAND.			
9 HART, William Henry Edward (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Gnr.	Royal Artillery	6202039	28
	<u>Home Address:</u> G/O Records, War Office, London.			
10 ROBERTSON, Ernest Henderson (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Gnr.	Royal Artillery	850033	23
	<u>Home Address:</u> "Orms Cottage" Citadel, Inverness SCOTLAND.			
11 REDFORD, Ernest (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Gnr.	Royal Artillery	843597	29
	<u>Home Address:</u> 16, S. Back Ave., South Bank, York, Yorks., ENGLAND.			
12 JORDAN, Charles Rivers (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Gnr.	Royal Artillery	860109	23
	<u>Home Address:</u> G/O Records, War Office, LONDON.			
13 ROGERS, Arthur (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Gnr.	Royal Artillery	843587	27
	<u>Home Address:</u> G/O Records, War Office, LONDON.			
14 GATON, Albert Victor (British) <u>Captured: Hong Kong</u>	Gnr.	Royal Artillery	872442	27
	<u>Home Address:</u> G/O Records, War Office, LONDON.			

Captured: Hong Kong

Home Address: C/O Records, Admiralty, LONDON.

57 McNULTY, Robert
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong

Bdr. Royal Artillery 798254 33

Home Address: 39, Holbeck St., Burnley, Lancs.
ENGLAND.

58 SILBET, John
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong

Gnr. Royal Artillery 872647 24

Home Address: 7, Lysways St., Walsall, Staffs.
ENGLAND.

59 HART, William Henry Edward
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong

Gnr. Royal Artillery 6202039 28

Home Address: C/O Records, War Office, London.

60 ROBERTSON, Ernest Henderson
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong

Gnr. Royal Artillery 860033 23

Home Address: "Orms Cottage" Citadel, Inverness
SCOTLAND.

61 BEDFORD, Ernest
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong

Gnr. Royal Artillery 843597 29

Home Address: 16, S. Bank Ave., South Bank,
York, Yorks., ENGLAND.

62 JORDAN, Charles Rivers
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong

Gnr. Royal Artillery 860109 28

Home Address: C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.

63 ROGERS, Arthur
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong

Gnr. Royal Artillery 843587 27

Home Address: C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.

64 CATON, Albert Victor
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong

Gnr. Royal Artillery 872442 27

Home Address: C/O Records, War Office, LONDON.

5 SILVERTHORPE, Thomas G.
(British)
Captured: Hong Kong

P.O. Tel Royal Navy C/JX 135001 30

Home Address: 4, Churchill Rd., Edgware, Middx.
ENGLAND.

6 SELBY, Lial Joseph
(Australian)
Captured: Hong Kong

Police Const. R.N.D.Y.P. H.K. Hong 33

Home Address: 115, Blair Street, N. Bondi, Sydney
AUSTRALIA.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>AGE</u>
7) HARPER, William Charles (AMERICAN) (American) <u>Captured:</u> Wake Island.	Civilian	Wake Island Contractors		23
		<u>Home Address:</u> 9/0 Wake Island Contractors, U.S.A.		
8 STEVENS, Clifford Vait (AMERICAN) <u>Captured:</u> Wake Island	Civilian	Wake Island Contractors		27
		<u>Home Address:</u> 9/0 Wake Island Contractors, U.S.A.		
9 LAVIA, Emilio A. (AMERICAN) <u>Captured:</u> Corregidor	QM 1/c.	U.S.N.	321-01-13	30
		<u>Home Address:</u> 1802, 6th. Ave., Des Moines, Iowa, U.S.A.		
0 HUBBELL, William Allen (AMERICAN) <u>Captured:</u> Corregidor	SF 1/c	U.S.N.	390-96-36	30
		<u>Home Address:</u> 523 - W. 8th. St., Pueblo, Colorado		
11 ALDERMAN, Chester J. (AMERICAN) <u>Captured:</u> Corregidor	Cpl.	U.S.M.C.	267223	25
		<u>Home Address:</u> 513, W. 5th. St., Flora, Ill., U.S.		
12 GALLINER, Cornelius G. (AMERICAN) <u>Captured:</u> Griveles, P.I.	Sgt. (AM 1/c.)	U.S. Army	6277101	27
		<u>Home Address:</u> Route No. 2, Box 716, Pueblo, Col.		
13 MUCCIACCIANO, John (AMERICAN) <u>Captured:</u> Guam	Pfc.	U.S.M.C.	Unknown	23
		<u>Home Address:</u> Clear Lake, Wisconsin, U.S.A.		
14 STEEL, JOHN HOWARD (AMERICAN) <u>Captured:</u> P. I. CORREGIDOR	RM 1/c.	U.S.N.	UNKNOWN	
		<u>Home Address:</u> 3/0 Navy Dept. Washington, U.S.A. 844 1/2 WEST 65th ST LOS ANGELES, CALIF		
15 GRAY, HARRY THOMAS (AMERICAN) <u>Captured:</u> P. I.	RM 3/c	U.S.N.	UNKNOWN	
		<u>Home Address:</u> 3/0 Navy Dept. Washington, U.S.A. 1533 WRIGHT 5th BORO ROAD AUGUSTA, GA.		
16 ROSENBERG, Harry (AMERICAN) <u>Captured:</u> Corregidor	Cpl.	U.S.M.C.	270309	27
		<u>Home Address:</u> 16949, Shea Ave., Hazelcrest, Ill.		
17 NICHOLSON, John Thomas (AMERICAN) <u>Captured:</u> Corregidor	CMA.	U.S.N.	267-70-08	41
		<u>Home Address:</u> 33, Durland Rd., Lynbrook, N.Y.		
18 ELIUS, Richard (AMERICAN) <u>Captured:</u> Corregidor	Y 2/c.	U.S.N.	311-44-41	24
		<u>Home Address:</u> 719, Village St., Falmouth, Mass		
19 COP... ..	Cpl.	U.S.M.C.	Unknown	25

<u>Captured:</u>	<u>Corregidor</u>	<u>Home Address:</u>		
20	HUBBARD, William Allen (American) <u>Captured:</u> Corregidor	Home Address: 1802, 6th. Ave., Des Moines, Iowa U.S.A.	SF 1/c U.S.N.	390-96-36 25
71	ALDERMAN, Chester C. (American) <u>Captured:</u> Corregidor	Home Address: 523 - W. 8th. St., Pueblo, Colorado	Cpl. U.S.M.C.	267223 25
72	GALLAGHER, Cornelius G. (American) <u>Captured:</u> Mariveles, P.I.	Home Address: 513, W. 5th. St., Flora, Ill., U.S.	Sgt. (AM 1/c.) U.S. Army	6277101 27
73	MUCCIACCIANO, John (American) <u>Captured:</u> Guam	Home Address: Route No. 2, Box 716, Pueblo, Col.	Pfc. U.S.M.C.	Unknown 23
4	STILL, JOHN HOWARD (American) <u>Captured:</u> P. I. CORREGIDOR	Home Address: Clear Lake, Wisconsin, U.S.A.	RM 1/c. U.S.N.	UNKNOWN
5	GRAY, HARRY THOMAS (American) <u>Captured:</u> P. I.	Home Address: 610 Navy Dept., Washington, U.S.A. 844 1/2 WEST 65th ST LOS ANGELES, CALIF	RM 3/c U.S.N.	UNKNOWN
6	RODENBERG, Harry (American) <u>Captured:</u> Corregidor	Home Address: 610 Navy Dept., Washington, U.S.A. 1533 WRIGHT 150 BORO ROAD AUGUSTA, GA.	Cpl. U.S.M.C.	270309 27
7	NICHOLSON, John Thomas (American) <u>Captured:</u> Corregidor	Home Address: 16949, Shea Ave., Hazelcrest, Ill.	CML. U.S.N.	267-70-08 41
8	ELISS, Richard (American) <u>Captured:</u> Corregidor	Home Address: 33, Durland Rd., Lynbrook, N.Y.	Y 2/c. U.S.N.	311-44-41 24
9	COPPELAND, Frank E. (American) <u>Captured:</u> Guam	Home Address: 719, Village St., Falamazoo, Mich.	Cpl. U.S.M.C.	Unknown 23
10	JAMES, Walter J. Jr. (American) <u>Captured:</u> Corregidor	Home Address: 2575, Chase St., Denver 11, Colorado	Pfc. U.S.M.C.	285382 25
	MAURER, Charles Eugene (American) <u>Captured:</u> P. I.	Home Address: 7218, Dittman St., Philadelphia, Pa.	Sgt. U.S.M.C.	289960 26
		Home Address: Coleman, Alberta, CANADA.		

3.

3. LIST OF PERSONNEL who were evacuated from the New Osaka Hotel on 11th., September, 1945, in consequence of which their full particulars could not be obtained:-

AUSTRALIAN OFFICERS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SER. NO.</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
CAMPBELL, Ronald A.	Major	VX 27472	2/40 Bn. A.I.F.
FULLER, John G.	Lieut.	HX 34375	2/18 Bn. A.I.F.
THOMBLE, Keith	Lieut.	VX 42632	8 Div. Sigs. A.I.F.
LUSH, J. F. D.	Lieut.	VX 41317	8 Div. Sigs. A.I.F.

AUSTRALIAN ENLISTED MEN

CHEAL, L. C. R.	W.O.II	HX 55371	2/18 Bn. A.I.F.
BROWN, W.G.	Pte.	HX 52052	2/20 Bn. A.I.F.

AMERICAN UNLISTED MEN

LECUTKO, A. J.	Pvt.	-----	U.S. Army
POWERS, R. C.	SF 1/0	-----	U.S.M.
DAYTON, E.	Pvt.	-----	U.S. Army
MCWILSON, M. W.	Pfc.	-----	U.S. Army
FINK, W. H.	Cpb.	-----	U.S.M.C.
SMITH, J. W.	Cpl.	-----	U.S.M.C.

BRITISH UNLISTED MEN

CARTER, John Douglas H.	A.B.	C/SSK 16249	Royal Navy
HELMAN, Albert Frank	Sto.	P/XX 125726	" "
FACER, William James	Tel.	C/S 45222	" "
ALEXANDER, John	A.B.	P/S 23722	" "
LEVI, Charles Henry	A.B.	C/SK 253059	" "
CORLEY, Frederick Charles	Cnr.	2353351	Royal Artillery
FRENCH, Stanley James	C.E.R.A.	P/XX 47314	Royal Navy
TRUSCOTT, Montague H.E.	Cpl.	6748347	R. Corps of Signals
HEDGECOCK, George Melvin Phillip	Cnr.	272633	Royal Artillery
MCNEWMICK, William Thomas	Sig.	2324111	R. Corps of Signals
SKINNER, Maynard A.	Sig.	2547217	R. Corps of Signals
BLONDEL, Victor	Sig.	2325157	R. Corps of Signals
HOCKLEY, Ernest John	Sig.	2570400	R. Corps of Signals
MCNABE, James	Cnr.	255703	Royal Artillery
WREN, William	Cnr.	272553	Royal Artillery
BYERS, John	Cnr.	273367	Royal Artillery
BROWN, James	Cnr.	272731	Royal Artillery
BARBER, Edward	Sig.	2120145	R. Corps of Signals

FULLER, John G.	Lieut.	VX 21978	2/40 Bn. A.I.F.
TRUMBLE, Keith	Lieut.	VX 42632	8 Div. Sigs. A.I.F.
LUCAS, J. P. D.	Lieut.	VX 41917	8 Div. Sigs. A.I.F.

AUSTRALIAN ENLISTED MEN

CHEAL, L. C. E.	W.O.II	HX 55371	2/18 Bn. A.I.F.
BROWN, W.G.	Pte.	HX 52053	2/20 Bn. A.I.F.

AMERICAN ENLISTED MEN

LEGUTKO, A. J.	Pvt.	-----	U.S. Army
POHNS, R. C.	SF 1/c	-----	U.S.N.
DAYTON, E.	Pvt.	-----	U.S. Army
McMILLAN, H. W.	Pfc.	-----	U.S. Army
PINKIN, W. H.	Cpb.	-----	U.S.M.C.
SMITH, J. W.	Cpl.	-----	U.S.M.C.

BRITISH ENLISTED MEN

CARTER, John Douglas H.	A.B.	C/SSX 16249	Royal Navy
HELMAN, Albert Frank	Sto.	P/KX 125726	" "
FACER, William James	Tel.	C/J 48822	" "
ALEXANDER, John	A.B.	P/S 53722	" "
LEVI, Charles Henry	A.B.	G/JK 233059	" "
COMLEY, Frederick Charles	Gar.	3350354	Royal Artillery
FRENCH, Stanley James	C.E.R.A.	P/MX 47314	Royal Navy
TRUSCOTT, Montague E.E.	Cpl.	6748357	R. Corps of Signals
HEDGES, George Melvin Phillip	Gar.	372633	Royal Artillery
McCONNICK, William Thomas	Sig.	2324111	R. Corps of Signals
SWINER, Maynard	Sig.	2547217	R. Corps of Signals
BLEIGHT, Victor	Sig.	2325157	R. Corps of Signals
HOCKEN, Ernest John	Sig.	2370460	R. Corps of Signals
McHALE, James	Gar.	853703	Royal Artillery
WREY, William	Gar.	872523	Royal Artillery
BIERS, John	Gar.	878367	Royal Artillery
BROWN, James	Gar.	678701	Royal Artillery
LANDER, Edward	Sig.	2322446	R. Corps of Signals
LUCAS, Herbert Daniel	Gar.	8322314	Royal Artillery
DARSON, John	Sig.	P/JX 225516	Royal Navy

HOLLAND ENLISTED MEN

KWISLAND, Aric Francois	Olieman	5799/D	Royal Dutch Navy
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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY
Public Relations Section
APO 343

13 September 1945

MEMO:

TO : Major Greene

Following is tentative schedule for arrival of 75 PWs from
Osaka ~~18~~ September:

20

- 0930: Arrive Yokohama Station, greeted by General Eichelberger, General Hall, General Byers, General Barrows, Brigadier Anderson and others. Military band present. General Eichelberger to meet Lt. Smith, Lt. Jenkins and Mr. *BONAVARÉ*.
- 0950: Through station to trucks. Band present.
- 1015: Arrive warehouse, dispose of excess baggage.
- 1020: Seated in mess hall. Brief address by General Eichelberger, winding up with praise for British. Band follows with "God Save the King."
- 1030: Mess. Eighth Army dance band to play.
- 1100: Correspondents to be given half hour for individual interviews.
- 1130: Normal processing procedure begins. Individual letters from General Eichelberger to be delivered to men during processing.

D. A. Jenkins
DANIEL A. JENKINS
Major, Infantry
Public Relations Officer

OSAKA

<u>Camp</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Reported Strength</u>	<u>Evacuated</u>	<u>By Whom</u>
1	Osaka	443		HQ - OSAKA
2	Kobe	488		
3	Kyoto	633		
4	Ikun a	440		
5	Kuk Fukui	399		
6	Hyogo	296		
7	Hukim Fukui	198		
8	Shiga	196		
9	Shiga	301		
10	Shiga	199		
11	Fukui	361		
12	Hyogo	302		

OSAKA

Major Green:

There will be four (4) correspondents ready to accompany you or your recovery personnel to Kobe tomorrow at 7:45 A.M. One from United Press, one from Associated Press, one from Stars & Stripes and one from the Pacifican. They are prepared to stay with you until you come back.

I thank you,

Lt. Larkin

Major John Green
Recovered personnel section
G 1 - G HQ

The mail sack which
I left at your desk
contains the forms
of the released POW's
Remainder of forms are on the
way. Please notify G HQ.

Maj. Green
HQ 8 U.S. Army


Please confirm following
matters:

- 1) Tokyo Branch 7 & 8, Sendai
Branch 1 & 2 camps will be
evacuated by R.R.
- 2) No task force of U.S. Navy,
consequently, will anchor at
the port of Onahama.

P.O.W. Information Bureau

Delegate International Red Cross Committee

Approved



Chief Delegate

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE TO 8TH ARMY HEADQUARTERS

AFD 500
15 September 1945

MEMORANDUM At the time of embarkation of Sendai POW Camp 11 on the 13th September at Shiogama Pier into Hospital ship "Rescue" (Commodore Simpson), the POW were not allowed to take more than 25 lbs. of their personal belongings on board.

1. Lt. T. Foley (Commanding Officer of Camp 11) asked me to take care of his and the other POW of his Camp's luggage. I therefore stored about 2 truckloads of cases, bundles and packages of this luggage in a storehouse near the pier under control of Police Chief Mr. Koizumi of Shiogama City.

Lt. T. Foley wishes to have this luggage, i.e. those pieces properly marked, forwarded to his address:

Lt. T. Foley

No. 155-15-35th Ave.


Flushing, N.Y.

from where he will attend to the redistribution to the respective owners.

A. O. Keller
A. O. Keller

Delegate International Red Cross Committee

Agreed.



Chief delegate

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

APO 500
15 September 1945

MEMORANDUM:


TO : Commanding General, 8th Army, APO 343
(Attention: Major Green, G-1).

1. The British Embassy has requested the return to Yokohama the following British Naval personnel now on duty at Osaka assisting in the processing of recovered personnel:

Sub-Lieutenant Harris
Warrant Officer Holmes -
2 British Navy enlisted men (names unknown).

2. On your next communication to Major Mitchell, desire you inform him that the personnel named above should be returned to Yokohama not later than 1200 19 September 1945.

By Command of General MacARTHUR


F. N. CRANDALL
Major AGD
Asst Adjutant General

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

APO 500
15 September 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Commanding General, 8th Army, APO 343
(Attention: Major Green, G-1).

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Warrant Officer Holmes
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By Command of General MacARTHUR

F. N. CRANDALL
Major AGD
Asst Adjutant General

318th Troop Carrier Squadron
is on Taisho (F 3) 3:30
via M. S. Yabuhama.

May 1944

Major Green:

Capt Jones has had a call from Maj Mitchell, Osaka, who requests that 1st Lt Cary R. Alburn Jr, 0402496, 318th Troop Carrier Squadron, 3rd Air Command Group, be assigned on ~~the~~ D/S to Major Mitchell and that he return to Osaka with either a C 46 or a C 47, as soon as he reports at Atsugi.

Major Green

Major Green:

Capt Jones has had a call from Maj Mitchell, Osaka, who requests that 1st Lt Cary R. Alburn Jr, 0402496, 318th Troop Carr¹er Squa¹tron, 3rd A¹r Command Group, be assⁱgned on ~~the~~ D/S to Major Mitchell and that he return to Osaka with either a C 46 or a C 47, *as soon as he reports at Atsugi.*

Maj. J. Holmes Delivered.

\$ 180 - 2000 per

Date of return

Call Again ?

Call Mitchell
that Col Marcus &
party of five will be
at HANCHON FIELD
tomorrow (14 SEP 45) at about
noon. Have car at field.

Acting Sgt

Green

May Mitchell

PRO Dope
Silk

Trains

Navy at Wakayama

4 Sep 45

- ✓ 1. See Col Marcus
- ✓ a. ~~Re Plan 6th Army Area Evacuation~~
- ✓ b. ~~Supply of Forms 23, 44, 112.~~
- ✓ 2. ~~Get~~ ~~order~~ ~~transferring~~ following AFPAC
Recovery Teams from XI Corps & 8th Div
- ✓ a. 55TH
- ✓ b. 51st
- ✓ c. 53d
- ✓ 3. Get 4 AFPAC Teams from 1st Cav
- ✓ 4. Work on Plan for Gen Ditch. Contact
Air Corps for info re airstrips
near camps.
- ✓ 5. Check on Niigata Evacuation, Details of
Receiving
- ✓ 6. Check on Toyama Evacuation
- ✓ 7. Check on evacuation of civilian
camp near Tokyo.
- ✓ 8. ~~Get copy of Jan Plan to Maj. Price.~~
- ✓ 9. ~~Put officer in charge of forms.~~
- ✓ 10. See that Navy Processing Forms are sent
to Manila.
- ✓ 11. See Col Shea regarding transportation.
- ✓ 12. Mr. Mr. Tajistaki; Japanese
Foreign Office.

\$ Sep 45 (contd)

~~Tell Dr Junod to see Col Marcus~~
~~regarding photos.~~

Have 1174 AB to send for their
Red Cross representative
immediately.

~~Wing Allen: call Col~~

~~Sturdivant FEAF AB re~~

~~dropping 500 lbs. (Quito or more)~~

~~Capt Clayberg. Supervise unloading &
storing of litter & supplies at
8th air, Quator Pool. Necessary
to send truck this afternoon in
evacuation.~~

YAMARITA CAMP #1 (KITA ASHIGARA
MURA) ~~U~~ UCHIYAMA) rations for

two days will dropped within
48 hrs of 4 Sep 45. Camp ready

for evacuation on 8 SEP 45.
Send Recovery Team as soon
as possible.

Send for Recovery forms. Wing
Crandall, Customs Bldg, G.H.Q.

4 Sept 45

- ✓ See Maj. Price at 1400.
- ✓ See Gen Rice regarding the hospital
- ✓ cases (49 - 25 TB) at KOBE,
- ✓ needing immediate attention.
- ✓ Tell Krough to make manifest
- ✓ for 22 persons per plane -
- ✓ 5 copies of manifest.
- ✓ Send radio to Navy (Corp Sumner
- ✓ before to Command of 3rd Fleet) re
- ✓ Maj. Price. INT. RED - CROSS
- ✓ Mr. Junod N MARCEL JUNOD
- ✓ KOJIMACHI - KU
- ✓ MAROUNOUCHI 2 CHOME n. 8
- ✓ Tel: 3341-(42)
- ✓ Have transportation for British Consul General
- ✓ (HARBIN, MANCHURIA) (Military Representative Maj. General)
- ✓ at ~~Sheny~~ SHUZIENJI at 0800,
- ✓ 7 Sep 45. Truck & automobile to
- ✓ report to Grand Hotel at 0800, 7 Sep 45.
- ✓ (Mr. Arche, & wife & 2 children.)
- ✓ Evacuate Consul General to ship
- ✓ designate by British Consul, ^{Foreign Office Representative} Yokohama
- ✓ British Representative (Mr. Mac Dermot)

4 Sep 45

- ✓ Make instruction list for Maj. Mitchell.
- ✓ Ship 120 K Rations to ATSUGI for
- ✓ delivery to TOYAMA Camps. Get
- ✓ transportation for Capt Clayburgh.
- ✓ Find out from what dock the
- ✓ 7 o'clock trucks are leaving.
- ✓ British Vice Consul GARNER & WIFE
- ✓ interned at FUKUSHIMA. Send wire
- ✓ requests info when liberated.
- ✓ 200 suits of ~~that~~ fatigues needed at the
- ✓ processing room. Manifold now.
- ✓ Send Jones to AFAC; Rosters to Col
- ✓ Marcus.

5 Sep 45

- ✓ 1000 - Conference with 3rd Fleet, 5TH
- ✓ Fleet, 6TH Army, 10TH Army, FEAF
- ✓ with Gen'l Fitch at G H Q.
- ✓ Mr Butler - Members of 7th Bomb
- ✓ Command are located in Shanghai
- ✓ Unit, Yokohama.
- ✓ Maj Allen - ~~Does~~ Have any msgs
- ✓ been recd or sent to Ascom I
- ✓ at Okinawa re their facilities?
- ✓ See Maj Mitchell regarding graphs
- ✓ of strength of camps.
- ✓ Arrange transportation for British
- ✓ Consul General.
- ✓ Send wire to OC TU 30.6 to advise
- ✓ when British Vice Consul GARNER
- ✓ is liberated from FUKUSHIMA.
- ✓ Make distribution list for JANFU Plan.
- ✓ Release letters to Marigold
- ✓ Get American Consul to Yokohama.
- ✓ Arrange evacuation from TAKATA to
- ✓ Sendai.

5 Sept 45

- ✓ Write evacuation plan to 30 Meet.
- ✓ Check with OKINAWA re strength (POW) daily
- ✓ Be in Col Gideon's office at 1330.
- ✓ 5 Sept 45 895 at ~~Yam~~ ^{HIAMMUMATSU}
- ✓ Total 3495.
- ✓ 450 needed for air transport.
- ✓ See Col Gideon re air evacuation today.
- ✓ See about ten FO, ten Teams,
- ✓ 10 med.
- ✓ See about one FO to KYUSHU
~~Where to go~~
- ✓ Names of British evacuees & destination desired by Col Marcus.
- ✓ KOBE TRAIN consists of 2 sleeping cars (capacity 25 each) & second class car, 9 third class cars.
- ✓ See Comdr Stasney's two wires
- ✓ Lt Travis J. Smith ^{Det} (Wichita Falls, Tex)
- ✓ Sgt. Robert F. Jenkins, Jr. ^{Corporal} Okla. Pa
- ✓ Mr. Michael J. Vannevar, ^{Solitary Confinement} ^{Prospective Interpreter}
- ✓ Get OSAKA Camps lined up.

5 Sep 45

- ✓ Notify Japanese G. HQ of necessity
- ✓ for safety of planes at OSAKA
- ✓ airfield. & OZUKI airfield &
- ✓ near SHIMONOSEKI. (HIROSHIMA).

6 Sept 45

- Comdr Stassen: Otaru is the best
port for evacuation of AOKHAI DO.
- ✓ Comdr Stassen: Data on evacuation of
 - ✓ Nagoya Camps: Name of camp &
 - ✓ location. When will others be
evacuated.
 - ✓ In O with ~~#~~ VI Corps: How many
RP Teams can you let us have?
 - ✓ Comdr Stassen: Can jeep be loaded on
 - ✓ ship for Price's TF?
 - ✓ Comdr Stassen: Can we use 'AKA's
to supplement air evacuation?
 - ✓ Bund Hotel at 1930 tonight for Press
 - ✓ conference. Bring representative from
 - ✓ VI Corps Processing Teams. (Capt Goyer)
 - ✓ Toyama Camps ^{Expts 2, 3 & 5} have been evacuated.
 - ✓ Chuck: Tell Capt Goyer to be a
 - ✓ Bund
 - ✓ Tell Major Mitchell to get Nagoya 4.
 - ✓ Unable to drop rations. Notify if
 - ✓ needed.
 - ✓ Check with Col Gideon re Air Evac OSAKA.

6TH Sept 45

- ✓ Arrange transportation for British
- ✓ Consul General fax in the morning.
- ✓ Make distribution list JANFU Plan
- ✓ Arrange evacuation SAKATA & SENDAI.
- ✓ Complete arrangements for OSAKA
- ✓ evacuation.
- ✓ Get names of ten FO's, ten RPT teams,
- ✓ 10 medical teams.
- ✓ Notify Japanese G HQ of necessity for safety
- ✓ of planes at OSAKA airfield &
- ✓ OZUKI Airfields near SHIMONOSEKI
- ✓ (HIROSHIMA).
- ✓ Notify Col Marcus of number of Britishers
- ✓ repatriated direct.
- ✓ Toyama ^{air} evac stops today. Get radio to
- ✓ Simpson re rail evacuation.
- ✓ Maj. Kline B O Office AF5051,
- ✓ Image B O or Capt Endicott Air Evac
- Meeting Col Marcus Office (Room 30, Customs
- Bldg) with Admiral Poinsey & Comdr
- ✓ Stassen & Gen Tomura.
- ✓ See Maj Barber & get list of British
- ✓ Evacuees.

6 Sep 45

- ✓ Major Mitchell: Investigate area
- ✓ Wakayama for processing Bldg
- ✓ - for medical especially.

7TH Sep 45

- ✓ Evacuated British Consul General.
- ✓ Truck & auto leave Grand
- ✓ Hotel at 0800.
- ✓ 0900: Conference Swedish + Swiss +
- ✓ Red Cross.
- ✓ Check with Col Gideon on OSAKA +
- ✓ HOKKAIDO evacuations.
- ✓ Get officers for teams to OSAKA.
- ✓ Make distribution ^{via} JANFU plan.
- ✓ See Holvoogin regarding contact with
- ✓ Stassen.
- ✓ Arrange civilian evacuation of
- ✓ Yamikita.
- ✓ Check on 2 hospital cases ^{to} evacuate
- ✓ from 8 miles N of Nagoya.
- ✓ Kamaishi Camp evacuated to ^{Yokohama}
- ✓ HOKKAIDO evac 1300 today ^{Yokohama}
- ✓ Answer CINCPAC Radio re Wakamuro.
- ✓ Evacuation.

8th Sept 45

- ✓ ✓ Evacuate Yamakita Camp #1
- ✓ Send British Consul to see Ft Campbell.
- ✓ Tell Mitchell about GUAM civilian
- ✓ internment Camp at KOBE.
- ✓ Get train schedule to Eschelberger
- ✓ daily.
- ✓ @ 1400: Conference with Dutch Officers
- ✓ regarding evacuation of Hiroshima Camp.
- ✓ arrange air drop at MIYOSHI.
- ✓ Arms for the officers.
- ✓ 1600: See Col Gideon FEAF A-3
- ✓ re air evacuation of HOKKAIDO.
- ✓ 1445: Conference with Col Griffin, G-2
- ✓ Sixth Army re evacuation of
- ✓ Southern Honshu. Tell the Colonel
- ✓ about conference with Red Cross at
- ✓ 0900, 10 Sep at OSAKA HOTEL,
- ✓ Get ^{air} transportation for Gen Rice ^(+ Green) to OSAKA
- ✓ Get breakdown of OSAKA personnel. Pass
- ✓ to CTU 30.6.9. & when arrival.
- ✓ Make sure info gets to Monitor.

9 Sep 45

sig sec

- ✓ Ft Mercer, Octago 56, ^{DAY} ~~will~~ on channels 6535 & 3644, ^{NITE} can
- ✓ contacts Maj. Price. Have him
- ✓ to call me direct when Price
- ✓ gets a msg to him.
- ✓ Air Evac Office, ATSU GI (half-way down E side) Col Johnson at field.
- ✓ R 507 0545 at ATSU GI.
- ✓ Send party to ATSU GI at 0730
- ✓ 10 SEP. Same contact. Col Johnson.
- ✓ Gen Kenny interested in POW on Shikoku. Maj. Frank Deverly, Aussie, Eighth Div. Camp. Zentagi. Wants to know about condition. Col J.A. Johnson, FEAF.
- ✓ Send msg to Navy. Com for Pac ~~canceling~~ trip
- ✓ Get 1500 medical forms for Mitchell.
- ✓ Get 2000 military forms for Mitchell.

9 SEP 45

- ✓ Call Maj. Harvey at II Corps
- ✓ re 3 officers.
- ✓ Get 2000 Military processing forms
- ✓ to Maj. Mitchell at OSAKA.
- ✓ Lt Fisher, Marigold, 420 Gen Hosp,
- ✓ left OSAKA with Mitchell's forms
- ✓ last night.
- ✓ Call II Corps re processing of
- ✓ persons from OSAKA. Maj.
- ✓ Mitchell has already processed
- ✓ them.
- ✓ Get one large flag & four small
- ✓ American flags to Mitchell
- ✓ by plane tomorrow. Small
- ✓ flags to be used on autos.

9 Sep 45

- 0900: Jone FEAF (Col Johnson) re
- air evacuation of HOKKAIDO.
- Check with Jap Gov't on rail facilities
- & billeting near CHITOSE airfield
- on HOKKAIDO.
- ~~Get~~
- FEAF: Air transportation to OSAKA.
- Monday 10 SEP - Gen Rice.
- Notify Chuch re msg to OYINAWA
- See QM re remains of dead
- evacuated in POW camps. Must
- have on certificate.
- Get three officers from VI Corps to
- go to OSAKA.
- Get msg to SCAP & AFPAC on Camps
- evacuated & location by
- coordinates.
- Get additional Officer & Man help
- from our rear echelon in the
- bay.
- Get msg to AFPAC daily listing
- Name, Serial No., male, female, civilian
- and Camp, & physical condition.

Mitchell - OSAKA

- ✓ Check with Mitchell on completeness
- ✓ of his cadre list. ^{Mitchell} Bonavar 32
- ✓ is omitted. Are any others
- ✓ omitted? KIOBE.
- ✓ Report on availability of C-47.
- ✓ C-47 will be at TAISHO airfield
- ✓ at 0830 in the morning to pick
- ✓ up Col Marcus.
- ✓ Return British Naval Personnel to
- ✓ Yokohama.
- ✓ Have Mitchell submit lists of
- ✓ cargo (description, cubage, weight, etc.
- ✓ & destination. For use in obtaining
- ✓ his C-47.

APA 84 - docks at North Pier -
96

11 Sept 45

- ✓ Get shipping list on the Ozark to
- ✓ Col Marcus immediately;
- ✓ Get names of air evacuees to Guam
- ✓ to Col Marcus immediately.
- ✓ Get buckslip to Dan Jenkin regarding
- ✓ publicity on the OSAKA cadre.
- Get info on Besson to Gen Besson
- Look up names of Mom's letter.
- ✓ Meet 0748 train in the morning.
- ✓ (To get St Smith's supplies.)
- ✓ Get Smith at OSAKA to give me the
- ✓ names & home addresses & place
- ✓ ^{& date} of capture of all persons helping
- ✓ him at OSAKA.
- ✓ Find out why ~~OSAKA~~ OZARK shipped
- ✓ civilians, Britishers, & army personnel
- ✓ to GUAM. ~~It~~
- ✓ Get passenger list on OZARK.
- ✓ Check with FEAF regarding airplanes
- ✓ leaving here for HOKKAIDO.
- ✓ Capt^{EO} Roeder, 246 FA Bn, Americal.
- Maple White
- Transmit Section, Col George. on my. aller.

12 Sep 45

- ✓ Notify AFPAC, SCAP, REPL COMMAND
- ✓ at Manila of ~~the~~ ETA of ships
- ✓ leaving Yokohama carrying POW's
- ✓ Get passenger lists of every ship.
- ✓ Notify ^{Marine} ~~the~~ Corps that no ship is to
- ✓ leave Yokohama without special
- ✓ permission.
- When will 3 APA's on turnaround
- ✓ from 43rd Div be available for
- ✓ evac of POW's?
- ✓ Check with Ralph on notification
- ✓ OKINAWA of 35 air evacuees today.
- Team #45 will be ready at
- 1200 today for transportation to
- KYUSHU. N Vaughan in charge.
- Send radio to XI Corps relieving
- ✓ the team from atchul that HQ,
- ✓ Get decisions from Col. Marcus on Chinese
- ✓ & Italians & woman who married a
- ✓ German citizen.
- | Mr. K. NEGISHI, Foreign Office Representative
- | Atchd to LHO in Prefecture Hldy.

13 Sep 45

- ✓ When will 43rd Div's APA's be available
- ✓ for evacuees on turnaround?
- ✓ Notify AFPAC, SCAP, REPL COMD of ETA of ships leaving Yokohama.

15 Sep 45

- ✓ Get C-47 to Major Mitchell.
- ✓ Request Gen Rice to write BNLO
- ✓ at British Consulate that
- ✓ Hospital Ship Vasna is not
- ✓ needed by the Army.
- ✓ Prepare ~~list~~ Radio for transmission
- ✓ to AFPAC, Manila, listing the
- ✓ POW's serving in Mitchell's
- ✓ cadre.
- ||| Maj. Sheldon, 245 F.A. Bn, Americal
Maple Red

Mrs. H. H. H.

16 Sep 45

- Titcheliner is sailing about
- three o'clock this afternoon
- straight to Australia - with
- about 440 British patients
- (including 60-80 fit)
- Sgt David Adams 3984 4480, 6TH
- In Team (Capt. Hopton) ⁶⁹ (37 in In)

advised Surgeon's office
he means about it -

fs 1
1730
16 Sept -

19 Sep 45

- ✓ 1400: Call Mitchell
- ✓ 1500: Go with Mr David to
North Docks.
- ✓ Call Col Eldridge re trip
- ✓ to N Docks.
- ✓ Tell Col Eldridge will need six
extra Trunks Thursday.
- ✓ Call Col Eldridge re his request
for billets.

17 Sep 45

- ✓ 1000: call Mitchell at OSAKA.
- ✓ Have Krogh check the ~~the~~ OSAKA list for clearance with Manila & the War Dept.
- ✓ Check with Col Brockert on HEYWOOD & MONITOR APA's.
- ✓ Check with Major Brown FEAF on C-47 for Mitchell.
- ✓ 461 due from HOKKAIDO today.
- Look up Sgt Joe Graham Tenders for Mrs Brewer
- Look up George Edward Messer for Mrs Barber.
- Look up Cpl Aubrey Lee Hooten for N.B. Cook.
- Look up Carter Williamson for Ina.
- ✓ Have weather report to Lt Alburn, 318 TCS at OSAKA.

18 Sep 45

Get trucks (2) for Mr. David to
report to 8th Army Dispatches by
0900, 20 Sep 45.

Get 3 trucks for us to Appohann
Central Station 0900, 20 Sep 45.

Get 30' extension cord for Mr
David.

Remind

Get interpreter for Col Eldridge.

19 Sep 45

Get 30' extension cord from Utilities.
Talk with VI Corps re
Band at the Station
Tell them about change in time
Deliver Eichelberger's letters

Arrange for five 2½ ton trucks for
in the morning: two at the
dispatches office by 0830 +
three at the Yokohama Central
Station 0830.

See Dan about formally inviting
Commodore Simpson.

by all persons will be on wheels
tomorrow night.

横浜市鶴見区仲通三丁目

東京

宮城

OKI

Okimasami

Masami Oki

American
United States
Pearl Harbor

11/20
15
55

23

22

16

36

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

This plan is based upon the following information which appears to be all that is available at this time:

1. That the location and size of camps is as shown on the attached map.
2. That the number of internees in each camp may vary from 100 to 5,000.
3. That British, Dutch, American and other nationals will be interned in these camps.

PLAN FOR THE CARE AND EVACUATION OF
LIBERATED ALLIED INTERNEES

4. That their physical condition will be poor at the best, that a large percentage will require hospitalization, that there has been a shortage of food and medical attention over a long period of time, and that all personnel will have varying degrees of malnutrition.
5. That the camps will vary from the standpoint of being suitable living quarters and that some of them will require immediate evacuation in order to preserve the health of the inhabitants.
6. That the inhabitants' immediate needs will be for medical attention, food, clothing and bedding.

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T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

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Inclosure 2 to

Annex 1

Adm Order _____

Basic Plan, Care and
Evacuation of Allied
Prisoners of War and
Civilian Internees.

This plan is based upon the following information which appears to be all that is available at this time:

1. That the location and size of camps is as shown on the attached map.
2. That the number of internees in each camp may vary from 100 to 4,000.
3. That British, Dutch, American and other nationals will be intermixed in these camps.
4. That men, women and children of all ages will be present, some as families and others as split families.
5. That their physical condition will be poor at the best, that a large percentage will require hospitalization, that there has been a shortage of drugs and medical attention over a long period of time, and that all personnel will have varying degrees of malnutrition.
6. That the camps will vary from the standpoint of being suitable living quarters and that some of them will require immediate evacuation in order to preserve the health of the inhabitants.
7. That the inhabitants' immediate needs will be for medical attention, food, clothing and bedding.

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8. That the initial immediate wishes will be the ability to communicate with relatives and friends in the United States, telling of their condition.
9. That some persons will desire to leave for their homes as soon as practicable, that some may have no homes to go to and may desire to remain in Japan, and that many will not be in condition to travel until they have recovered their health.
10. That all personnel will be without funds.

The satisfaction of the needs of these internees, their rehabilitation, care, contentment, and return to their homes, is the prime mission of this army and its subordinate units after accomplishment of its combat mission.

RESPONSIBILITIES:

AFPAC

AFPAC has assumed the following responsibilities:

1. Exact from the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command such assistance in handling Allied prisoners of war and internees as may be appropriate.
2. Be responsible for the organization and training of necessary liaison, recovery and final processing teams.
 - a. Liaison Teams: One group of 3 officers and 3 enlisted men (1 each U.S., British and Dutch) attached to each army (3) and each corps (9).
 - b. One recovery team for each 700 POWs (approximately 50 teams).

Composition:

Officers - 1 U.S., 1 British, 1 Dutch.
 Enlisted - 3 U.S., 1 British, 1 Dutch.

- c. Final processing teams: One group of 9 officers and 20 enlisted men (to include 1 officer and enlisted man each from the British, Australian, Canadian and Dutch) attached to each recoveree disposition center operated by AFWESPAC in Japan and Korea (approximately 4).

ARMY

1. This headquarters will supervise the provision of subordinate units for the care of these individuals.

2. It will establish an information clearing house providing for the centralization of registration of all internees, together with information of those reported dead from local sources, pending the assumption of this function by AFPAC.

3. That this headquarters will establish a transportation clearing office for this personnel and arrange for their transportation to the United States or to their homes, pending the assumption of this function by AFWESPAC.

4. Inspect the living conditions of the prisoners and maintain a report on the condition of the respective camps and the treatment accorded therein by the Japanese, and the Japanese officers in charge of the camp.

5. Act as liaison with the State Department, the Red Cross, and other agencies assisting in the accomplishment of this mission.

6. Provide a message center for the forwarding of messages to friends and relatives of the internees.

7. Assign sufficient hospitals to the corps to care for estimated number of hospital cases in their sector.

8. Allocate supplies and equipment to the corps for this mission.

CORPS

1. Will assign zones of responsibility to divisions.

2. Will allocate supplies and equipment to divisions.

3. Forward requests for extra transportation to army headquarters.

4. Will establish suitable hospitals in the most advantageous locations to give the most efficient care to internees.

5. Consolidate records from divisions and forward to army headquarters.

6. Assign AFPAC recovery teams to divisions as needed, on basis of one (1) team per seven hundred (700) internees.

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DIVISIONS

1. a. Locate, care for and safeguard all allied recovered personnel until such time as they can be evacuated to AFWESPAC disposition centers.

b. Care shall include billets, food, clothing, comforts and medical care.

2. Will conduct a preliminary reconnaissance of their area to determine the following:

a. Location of camps.

b. Number of internees.

c. Percent of men, women and children.

d. General health conditions, including number of internees who need immediate hospitalization.

e. Conditions of camp, with regards to its continued use.

f. Availability of other housing facilities in the area which may be suitable for use.

g. Location for headquarters of the local unit which is to care for the internees in that sector.

3. Based on 2 above, will complete and execute their final plans for the care of the internees to include:

a. Establish a provisional unit, or designate an existing organization to care for the internees in one camp, a series of camps, or an area, depending upon the plan. The initial strength of this unit should be on the basis of approximately five workers to seven internees, and as needed thereafter.

b. Evacuate, to the nearest internee hospital, all those needing immediate hospitalization.

c. Evacuate internees from unsuitable camps to either commandeered billets or to a tent camp.

- d. Establish proper messing facilities for internees.
 - e. Issue clothing and supplies.
4. Collect all existing records and forward through corps to army headquarters.
 5. Obtain as much detailed data as possible regarding internees, both living and dead, and forward to army headquarters through corps.
 6. Make fullest use of organizational transportation and equipment.
 7. Existing organizations, rather than provisional units, will be used wherever practicable, where use of such will not interfere with any combat mission.
 8. Furnish safe storage space, and forwarding facilities for personal belongings which internees cannot carry with them when evacuated.
 9. Evacuation of internees to AFWESPAC recoveree disposition centers when established.
 10. Cooperate with the Red Cross in all phases of their work.
 - a. Care and equipping of children.
 - b. Messages home.
 - c. Morale of internees.
 11. The time element is very essential in this mission, and every effort will be made to furnish the necessities and comforts to the internees at the earliest possible time.
 12. Fill out Form #1 shown in Appendix #4, in duplicate, for all internees, living and dead. Forward the original to this headquarters by fastest means. In same manner, Form #2 will be executed for deceased internees.

SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

See Logistic Plan, Appendix #3.

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- APPENDIX:
1. Definition of POW and Internees.
 2. Detailed information on POW Camps, with attached map.
 3. Logistic Plan.
 4. Personnel Data Forms.

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Appendix 1 to
Inclosure 2 to
Annex 1
Adm Order _____

Basic Plan, Care and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.

DEFINITION: UNITED NATIONS PRISONERS OF WAR

1. The term, "United Nations prisoners of war," as used herein includes all personnel held in Japanese custody:

a. Who are or have been members of, or persons accompanying or serving with, the armed forces of any of the United Nations, or

b. Who as members of the armed forces of countries occupied by Japan have been captured by the Japanese while engaged in serving the cause of the United Nations and who, under the rules and customs of war, should be treated as prisoners of war even though not recognized as such by Japan, or

c. Who are or have been members of or serving with the merchant marine of any of the United Nations.

2. Such term does not include personnel who, although formerly held in Japanese custody as prisoners of war, have accepted release from the status in exchange for employment in or by Japan. Persons in this category, after appropriate identification, will be dealt with as displaced persons.

DEFINITION: CIVILIAN INTERNEE

A civilian internee is a person without a military status, detained by the enemy, who is not a national of the Japanese Empire as constituted on 10 July 1937.

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Appendix 2 to
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Basic Plan, Care and
Evacuation of Allied
Prisoners of War and
Civilian Internees.

PRISONER OF WAR ENCAMPMENTS

JAPAN - HOKKAIDO

Name : ABASHIRI
Coordinates : 44°01'N., 144°16'E.
Name : ASAHIGAWA
Coordinates : 43°46'N., 142°22'E. (AMS L764)
Name : HAKODATE MAIN CAMP
41.
Coordinates : 41°46'N., 140°42'E.
Number : 400-336
Nationality : U.S., British, Canadian, Dutch, Estonian,
Australian
Name : HAKODATE
Coordinates : 41°46'N., 140°42'E.
Number : 200
Nationality : U.S.

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Name: HAKODATE DIVISIONAL CAMP

Coordinates: Northeast of city in a wooded valley -
faces south in pine-covered hills.

Number: 400-500

Nationality: American and British Imperial

Name: KAMISO Detachment Camp No. 1 - HAKODATE
Extension Camp No. 1.

Coordinates: 41°50'N., 140°40'E.

Number: 170

Nationality: British, U.S.

Name: KUSHIRO

Coordinates: 42°58'N., 144°23'E. (AMS L764)

Name: MOURORAN, Secondary Camp No. 1 -
HAKODATE Sub Camp No. 1.

Coordinates: 42°19'N., 141°00'E.

Number: 428

Nationality: U.S., British, Dutch.

Name: OTARU

Coordinates: 43°12'N., 141°00'E.
Reported possibly closed

Name: RAIBA

Coordinates: 42°38'N., 140°26'E. (AMS L764)
Believed closed.

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Name: SAPPORO
Coordinates: 43°03'N., 141°20'E. (AMS L764)
Nationality: One RAF
Name: TOMAKOMAI
Coordinates: 42°37'N., 141°31'E. (AMS L764)
Number: 200
Nationality: 40 women reported moved here from ZENTSUJI

NORTHERN HONSHU

Name: AKITA
Coordinates: 37°46'N., 140°29'E. (AMS L773)
Number: 141
Name: FUKUSHIMA No. 222
Coordinates: 37°46'N., 140°29'E. (AMS L773)
Number: 141
Nationality: Civilian internment
Name: FURUMAKI STATION
Coordinates: 40°40'N., 141°21'E. (AMS L773)
Number: 900-1000
Name: IWAKE Coal Mine, or YUWAKI
Coordinates: Approx. 37°02'N., 140°50'E. (AMS L773)
Number: 1000
Name: KAMAISHI
Coordinates: 39°16'N., 141°53'E. (AMS L773)

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Name: KANAZAWA
Coordinates: 36°33'50"N., 136°39'30"E. (AMS L774)

Name: KATSUYAMA
Coordinates: 36°04'N., 136°30'E.

Name: KOMATSU NAVAL AIRFIELD
Coordinates: 36°22'N., 136°23'E.

Number: 200

Name: MATSUMOTO
Coordinates: 36°13'N., 137°58'E.

Name: MURAKAMI
Coordinates: 38°11'N., 139°29'E. (AMS L773)

Name: NAOETSU, NIIGATA KEN
Coordinates: 37°10'N., 138°15'E. (AMS L773)

Number: 50-300

Nationality: Australian

Name: NIIGATA Sub Camp No. 5
Coordinates: 37°55'N., 139°03'E. (AMS L773)

Number: 350-900

Name: OHASHI
Coordinates: 39°16'N., 141°44'E. (AMS L773)

Number: 600

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Name: SENDAI
Coordinates: 38°15' N., 140°53' E.
Number: 27 Civilian internees
Nationality: U.S., Canadians.

JAPAN - TOKYO BAY AREA

Name: AKASAKA WARD
Coordinates: 35°40' N., 139°44' E. (AMS L774)
Name: DENEM CHOFU MONASTARY
Coordinates: 35°35' N., 139°42' E. (AMS L774)
Number: 12
Nationality: Civilian internment camp. Reported closed.
Name: FUKAGAWA WARD
Coordinates: 35°40' N., 139°50' E. (AMS L774)
Name: KAWASAKI SUB CAMP No. 2
Coordinates: 35°38' N., 139°40' E. (AMS L774)
Number: 308. Another source, 241.
Nationality: British, Dutch, American.
Name: NARASHINO
Coordinates: 35°42' N., 139°59' E. (AMS L774)

Formerly reported at an airfield which is now a drill ground. Camp unlocated in this area.

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Name: OMORI No. 8 TOKYO CAMP, ORORI-KU IRRIARAI KILA
Coordinates: 35°35' N., 139°44' 30"E. (AMS L774)
Number: 611
Nationality: British, American, Australian, Others
Name: SHIBA PARK
Coordinates: 35°39' N., 139°45' E. (AMS L774)
Name: SHIBAURA DOCKS
Coordinates: 35°38' 30"N., 139°45' 30"E. (AMS L774)
Number: 100-600
Name: SHINAGAWA No. 1
Coordinates: 35°36' 30"N., 139°45' E. (AMS L774)
Number: 60-250
Nationality: 68 U.S. Civilians
Name: SHINJUKU CAMP
Coordinates: 35°41' N., 139°43' E. (AMS L774)
Number: 200
Nationality: U.S.
Name: *SUMIREJO (SUMIRE GAKUAN)
Coordinates: Information insufficient for pin-pointing
Nationality: One source stated camp closed. Civilians and POWs.

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Name: TAKATANOBABA
Coordinates: 35°42' N., 139°42' E. (AMS L774)
Number: 3300
Nationality: 1108 U.S.

Name: *TOKYO SECTIONAL CAMP
Coordinates: (See HIRAOKA Camp No. 3 in area 3, Misc.)

Name: UENO PARK
Coordinates: 35°42' 40"N., 139°46' 40"E. (AMS L774)

Name: ACHI YAMAKITA
Coordinates: 35°26' N., 139°39' E. (AMS L774)
Nationality: Civilian internees

Name: KANAGAWA CAMP
Coordinates: 35°25' 50"N., 139°40' 18"E. (AMS L774)
Number: 540-1500
Nationality: U.S., U.K., Dutch.

Name: *KAWASAKI CAMP
Coordinates: Reported on outskirts of town, 2 to 3 kilometers from NISSAN Auto Factory,
Number: Several thousand reported.

Name: KAWASAKI BUNSHO No. 1
Coordinates: 35°31' N., 139°42' E. (AMS L774)
Number: 400
Nationality: 21 U.S.

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Name: KAWASAKI DETACHMENT CAMP No. 5
Coordinates: 35°30'N., 139°28'E. (AMS L774)
Number: 400
Nationality: 22 Civilians from WAKE. 256 U.S. One source reports 265 Americans.

Name: NEGISHI RACE COURSE
Coordinates: 35°25'N., 139°38'30"E. (AMS L774)
Number: 11
Nationality: Mostly civilians, but there may be a few POWs.

Name: NOGEYAMA PARK
Coordinates: 35°26'30"N., 139°37'30"E.
Number: 2000

Name: OLD CITY HALL, YOKOHAMA
Coordinates: 35°26'30"N., 139°37'30"E. (AMS L774)
Number: 100

Name: *TAKAZAI
Coordinates: KANAGAWA SECTION - unlocated. No coordinates.

Name: TOKYO CAMP No. 3
Coordinates: 35°27'N., 139°28'E. (AMS L774)

Name: TOKYO CAMP No. 5
Coordinates: 35°28'N., 139°38'E. (AMS L774)

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Name: *TSURUMA
 Coordinates: (See KAWASAKI BUNSHO Detachment Camp No. 5
 or KAWASAKI Branch No. 1)

Name: TOTSUKA
 Coordinates: 35°24'N., 139°32'E. (AMS L774)
 Nationality: Civilian internment.

Name: YOKOHAMA No. 5
 Coordinates: 35°26'N., 139°28'E. (AMS L774)
 Number: 1000
 Nationality: 96 U.S.

Name: YOKOHAMA YACHT CLUB BOATHOUSE
 Coordinates: 35°26'N., 139°40'E., (AMS L774)
 Number: 16 women, 4 Australian army nurses.
 Nationality: Civilian internment.

There is a reported POW camp adjacent to Target 52. AOF 90.17 which consists of two-storied barracks buildings 50 x 100 meters, housing 200 - 250 men. A Japanese prisoner of war reports that many factories in this area have special prisoner of war stockades attached to them, some containing as many as 2000 men. No definite locations except that near Target 52 have been reported.

Name: ATAMI
 Coordinates: 35°06'N., 139°04'E. (AMS L774)
 Nationality: Officers camp

Name: CHIBA
 Coordinates: 35°35'N., 140°07'E. (AMS L774)
 Number: 100

Name: FUJI
 Coordinates: 35°08'N., 138°29'E. (AMS L774)

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Name: FURASHI
 Coordinates: 35°10' N., 138°57' E.
 Nationality: Undetermined.

Name: HAKONE
 Coordinates: 35°17' N., 139°02' E. (AMS L774)
 Number: 200

Name: KIRAOKA CAMP NO. 3 (Tokyo Sectional Camp)
 Coordinates: 35°48' N., 140°43' E.
 Number: 224. One source states 757 U.S. POWS here.
 Nationality: U.S. and British

Name: KITA COTYGARA MURA
 Coordinates: 35°06' N., 140°12' E.
 Nationality: Civilian internees

Name: KOMINATO
 Coordinates: 35°07' N., 140°13' E.

Name: OFUNA
 Coordinates: 35°20' N., 139°33' E.

Name: URAGA
 Coordinates: 35°14' N., 139°43' E. (AMS L774)

Name: URAWA (SAITAMA)
 Coordinates: 35°51' N., 139°39' E. (AMS L774)
 Number: 56
 Nationality: Civilian Internees, 3 U.S.

Name: YAMASHITA (YAMAKITA) No. 1
 Coordinates: 35°22' N., 139°05' E. (AMS L774)
 Number: 48
 Nationality: 7 U.S.

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Name: YOKOSUKA
Coordinates: 35°18'N., 139°38'E. (AMS L774)
Number: 200
Name: ZENTSUJI CAMP No. 61
Coordinates: 34°14'N., 133°46'E. (AMS L775)
Number: 800-4000. One source as of 1945, reports 468 total.

Nationality: U.S.
Name: ZENTSUJI SUB CAMP No. 3
Coordinates: Reclaimed ground near seashore. Wood and mud huts.

Number: 333
Nationality: Dutch

3. The following minimum essential items are needed initially:

	For women	For men	For children
* - Not plotted.			
2 Bath towels	2 Waists	2 Pants; Denim	available
1 Meat can, fork,	2 Skirts	or Khaki	Red Cross
knife, spoon	2 Slips	2 Jackets - Denim	Supplies
1 Canteen and canteen	2 Panties	or Shirts	
cap	1 Shoes	2 Shorts	
1 Duffle bag	2 Stockings	2 Undershirts	
2 Blankets	12 Sanitary	2 Sox	
1 Cot	napkins	1 Shoes	
1 Toothbrush		1 Cap	
1 Comb		1 Waist belt	
1 Barber kit/100		1 Razor	
1 Sewing kit/50		30 Blades	
30 days rations			
300 Vitamin tablets			

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Appendix 3 to
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Annex 1
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Basic Plan, Care and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.

LOGISTICS PLAN

1. Estimated Allied Internees.

- a. XI Corps zone 25,000
- b. XIV Corps zone 4,300
- c. IX Corps zone 1,900

Of these internees, it is estimated that 75% are men, 15% women and 10% children.

2. All necessary food, clothing and equipment for adults, and food and equipment for children shall be furnished from army supplies.

Children's clothing must be furnished from outside sources, such as Red Cross supplies, relief supplies, clothing on hand, or confiscated Japanese clothing.

3. The following minimum essential items are needed initially:

<u>For all internees</u>	<u>For women</u>	<u>For men</u>	<u>For children</u>
2 Bath Towels	2 Waists	2 Pants, Denim	Available
1 Meat can, fork, knife, spoon	2 Skirts	or Khaki	Red Cross
1 Canteen and canteen cup	2 Slips	2 Jackets - Denim	Supplies
1 Duffle bag	2 Panties	or Shirts	
2 Blankets	1 Shoes	2 Shorts	
1 Cot	2 Stockings	2 Undershirts	
1 Toothbrush	12 Sanitary napkins	2 Sox	
1 Comb		1 Shoes	
1 Barber kit/100		1 Cap	
1 Sewing kit/50		1 Waist belt	
30 days rations		1 Razor	
300 Vitamin tablets		30 Blades	

Form #1
12 August 45

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Appendix 4 to
Inclosure 2 to
Annex 1
Adm Order _____

Basic Plan, Care and
Evacuation of Allied
Prisoners of War and
Civilian Internees.

RECORD OF INTERNEES

Prisoner of War ()

Civilian Internee ()

(Last Name) (First Name) (Middle Initial) (Rank) (ASN) (Age)

(Nationality) (Sex) (Physical Condition)

(Former Unit or Civilian Occupation)

(Place of Recovery) (Date of Recovery)

(Emergency Address - Include Street & Number, City, State, Province)

(In case of Child or Married Woman enter Name of Husband or
Father of Child)

(Disposition)

REMARKS:

(Address of Nearest Relative, or Persons to be Notified)

REMARKS:

Form #1
12 August 45

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Appendix 4 to
Inclosure 2 to
Annex 1
Adm Order _____

Basic Plan, Care and
Evacuation of Allied
Prisoners of War and
Civilian Internees.

REPORT OF DEATH OF INTERNEE

Prisoner of War ()

Civilian Internee ()

(Last Name) (First Name)(Middle Initial) (Rank) (ASN) (Age)

(Nationality) (Sex) (Date of Death)

(Former Unit or Civilian Occupation)

(Cause of Death) (Place of Burial)

(Pertinent Facts)

(Witnesses)

(Address of Nearest Relative, or Persons to be Notified)

REMARKS:

Form #2
12 August 45

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY
United States Army
Office of the Commanding General
APO 343

AG 383.6 (D)

3 September 1945

SUBJECT: Liberation and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War
and Civilian Internees in Japan.

TO : All Eighth Army Units Concerned.

1. GENERAL. By direction of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, the Eighth United States Army, utilizing units of the Third Fleet under the command of Commander Task Group 30.6, and assisted by representatives of the International Red Cross and of the Swedish and Swiss Legations, will liberate and evacuate Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in accordance with the plan contained herein. Certain camps designated herein are located on the coast of Japan at points readily accessible to the Navy. Other camps are located within the interior, necessitating land transportation to the coast at points selected by the Commanders of the Task Force Units hereinafter described. The Japanese Government has been directed by the Supreme Commander Allied Powers to provide timely and adequate transportation from such inland camps to points accessible from the sea. (See letter to Japanese Government from SCAP, attached hereto as Annex 1.)

2. PLAN. The camps have been divided into four groups, as follows: East, West, and North Honshu, and the island of Hokkaido. The specific camps comprising each of these groups are listed and attached as Annex 2.

a. One Task Force Unit of Task Group 30.6 will be assigned to liberate and evacuate all personnel of the camps within each group to the Tokyo Bay area and there await orders of the Commanding General, 8th Army.

b. All recovered personnel will be processed aboard ship as soon as practicable. The attached forms (Annex 3) will be completed on all recovered personnel. The original of 8th Army IR Form No. 1 will be forwarded immediately to Headquarters 8th Army, G-1 Section (Recovered Personnel) by the fastest available means.

c. Liaison officers of the Eighth Army (G-1 Section and Surgeon Section) and representatives of the International Red Cross, Swedish and Swiss Legations, will be aboard the Flagship of the Commander of each of the four Task Units. One Japanese Army officer of field rank will accompany each Task Unit.

Ltr, Hq 8th A, subject "Liberation and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees in Japan," file AG 383.6 (D), dd 3 Sep 45.

d. Eighth Army Medical teams will be aboard the hospital or evacuation ships of each unit to medically screen all evacuated personnel and to furnish medical care and treatment enroute. Evacuees requiring hospital care will be off-loaded at Yokohama and transferred to the U.S.A. Hospital Ship Marigold for additional hospitalization and appropriate disposition.

e. Ambulatory patients desiring air transportation and not requiring hospital care will be off-loaded at Yokohama and transferred to Atsugi Airfield by Eighth Army. Those not desiring air transportation will remain aboard ship awaiting orders of the Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army.

f. The Japanese Government will furnish transportation from the camps to the designated evacuation points on the coast, under the direction and supervision of officers of the U. S. Army and Navy, in accordance with instructions contained in Annex 1. Limited motor transport will be loaded in an amphibious ship of each Task Unit to assist in the operation.

g. Air protection and reconnaissance will be provided by the Commander, Third Fleet, during the operation.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

[Signature]
C. E. BYERS,
Major General, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

LIST OF ANNEXES:

- Annex No. 1 - Ltr to Japanese Govt .
 from SCAP, 1 Sep 45.
- Annex No. 2 - Camp Groups on Central &
 Northern Honshu and Island
 of Hokkaido.
- Annex No. 3 - Forms for Processing Personnel..

Info copies to:

- OC, Third Fleet
- OC, Task Group 30.6

OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

2 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH: Central Liaison Office Number 1.

FROM : The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

1. The Japanese Government is ordered to alert the Japanese authorities in each of the Allied Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee Camps indicated on the attached sheet, for evacuation of all personnel therein on or about 3 September 1945.

2. On such date or soon thereafter the Japanese camp commander at each of the camps listed will be contacted by a representative of the United States Army. The local representative of the Japanese Government will act under the orders of the United States Army representative and will furnish transportation for all personnel from the camps to the evacuation point or points designated by the United States Army representative.

3. Camp commanders will make an estimate of the transportation required at each camp and will hold such transportation available until contacted by the representative of the United States Army.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

HAROLD FAIR,
Lt. Colonel, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl - List of POW and
Civ Internee Camps

ANNEX 1

LIST OF ALLIED PRISONER OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEE CAMPS

Sendai No. 1
Sendai No. 2
Sendai No. 3
Sendai No. 4
Sendai No. 6
Sendai No. 7
Sendai No. 8
Sendai No. 9
Sendai No. 10
Sendai No. 11

Tokyo No. 3
Tokyo No. 3 B
Tokyo No. 4
Tokyo No. 5
Tokyo No. 7
Tokyo No. 8
Tokyo No. 13
Tokyo No. 15
Tokyo No. 16

Nagoya No. 1
Nagoya No. 3
Nagoya No. 6
Nagoya No. 7
Nagoya No. 8
Nagoya No. 9
Nagoya No. 10
Nagoya No. 11

Hokkaido Main Camp
Hokkaido No. 1
Hokkaido No. 2
Hokkaido No. 3
Hokkaido No. 4

Inclosure to ANNEX 1

CAMP GROUPS ON CENTRAL AND NORTHERN HONSHU
AND THE ISLAND OF HOKKAIDO

1. East Coast Group, Honshu:

READILY ACCESSIBLE TO COAST

<u>Official Name of Camp</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Number of Persons</u>	<u>Suggested Port of Evacuation</u>
Tokyo No. 7	HITACHI	349	KAWARAKO or KAWARASHI
Tokyo No. 8	HITACHI	290	KAWARAKO or KAWARASHI
	Sub-total	639	

NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE TO COAST

Sendai No. 1	YUMOTO	559	KAWARAKO or KAWARASHI
Sendai No. 2	KAMIHAZA (YOSHIMA)	246	KAWARAKO or KAWARASHI
Sendai No. 3	UGUISUZAWA	284	SENDAI
Sendai No. 4	OHASHI (KAMAISHI)	778	KAMAISHI
Sendai No. 10	WAKASEN	300	SENDAI
Fukushima Camp (men, women, Children)		139	SENDAI
Sendai (Miyaga Camp) 4 Km SW of (civilians)	SENDAI	35	SENDAI
	Sub-total	2351	
	Total	2390	

2. West Coast Group, Honshu:

READILY ACCESSIBLE TO COAST

Tokyo No. 4	NAOETSU	699	NAOETSU
Tokyo No. 5	NIIGATA	685	NAOETSU
Tokyo No. 13	AOMI	544	NAOETSU
Tokyo No. 15	NIIGATA	317	NAOETSU
Sendai No. 9	SAKATA	273	SAKATA
	Sub-total	2518	

West Coast Group (continued)

NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE TO COAST

<u>Official Name of Camp</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Number of Persons</u>	<u>Suggested Port of Evacuation</u>
Tokyo No. 3	NAGAOKA	199	NAOETSU
Tokyo No. 3 B	NAGAOKA	101	NAOETSU
Tokyo No. 16	KANOSE	288	NAOETSU
Nagoya No. 1	KAMIOKA	606	IWASE
Nagoya No. 3	KAMIOKA	346	IWASE
Nagoya No. 6	TAKAOKA	293	IWASE
Nagoya No. 7	TOYAMA	152	IWASE
Nagoya No. 8	TOYAMA	300	IWASE
Nagoya No. 9	TOYAMA	350	IWASE
Nagoya No. 10	TAKAOKA	300	IWASE
Nagoya No. 11	TOYAMA	<u>150</u>	IWASE
	Sub-total	3085	
	Total	<u>5603</u>	

3. North Coast Group, Honshu

NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE TO COAST

Sendai No. 6	OSARUZAWA	546	AOMORI
Sendai No. 7	HANAOKA	292	AOMORI
Sendai No. 8	KOSAKA	344	AOMORI
Sendai No. 11	KAMIKITA	196	AOMORI
Italian Embassy	Same as Sendai No. 8	<u>42</u>	AOMORI
	Total	<u>1420</u>	

4. Hokkaido Group.

NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE TO COAST

<u>Official Name of Camp</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Number of Personnel</u>	<u>Suggested Port of Evacuation</u>
Hakodate Main Camp	BIBAI	393	OTARU
Hakodate No. 1	ASHIBETSU	509	OTARU
Hakodate No. 2	AKAHIRA	281	OTARU
Hakodate No. 3	UTASHINAI	310	OTARU
Hakodate No. 4	ASHIBETSU	83	OTARU
Hokkaido (Civilians)	OTARU	<u>24</u>	OTARU
		Total 1600	
			<u>GRAND TOTAL 11,613</u>

RECORD OF INTERNEE

NAME

CLASSIFICATION

(Check proper description)

(Last) (First) (MI)

- Prisoner of War _____
- Family of Prisoner of War _____
- Civilian Internee _____
- Family of Civilian Internee ... _____

SEX: Male ___ Female ___ Age ___

Nationality of Internee _____

Next of Kin, or Emergency Addressee:

In case child or wife, indicate name of father or husband below:

Name: _____
 Relationship: _____
 Address: _____

HISTORY OF INTERNMENT

Former Unit, or Civilian Employer _____

Rank or title _____ ASN _____

Last Legal Residence _____ Country _____

Place of Capture or Internment _____

Date of Capture or Internment _____

Place of Recovery _____ Date of Recovery _____

Physical Condition _____ In need of medical attention _____
 In need of hospitalization _____

Interviewed or Checked by _____ Rank _____ Date _____

(Use reverse side for remarks - such as, list of other members of family who are interned and their last known location)

FOR MACHINE RECORDS USE ONLY

Grade	Sex	Unit-Emp	Age	Camp	Date Recovered	Phy	Cls	Nat'l	Alpha
					:				
					:				

IR Form No. 1, Hq 8th Army,
 18 August 1945

Annex # 3

Reporting Unit -----

----- 194 -----

REPORT OF RECOVERY OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Name ----- (male - female) citizen of

Country ----- recovered from enemy occupied

territory on ----- 194 ----- at -----

Emergency addressee: Name -----

Address -----

Physical Condition ----- Age -----

Request following message (not to exceed ten (10) words) be transmitted to the above emergency addressee:

To be filled out by civilian employees of War Department.

I was employed by ----- Department located at

On ----- 194 ----- I was paid at the rate of -----

per (year) (month) (day) (hour)

With grade (Civil Service) ----- I served at such employment

to ----- 194 ----- when I ceased employment because of

(Signature)

Processing Unit _____

Affidavit No. _____

1945

AFFIDAVIT OF RECOVERED CIVILIAN
(DESIRING REPATRIATION) (NOT DESIRING REPATRIATION)
(Cross Out One Not Applicable)

I, _____, _____ years
of age, after having been duly sworn according to law depose and say that the following information is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge and belief:

1. _____
(Last name) (First name) (Middle name)

2. _____
(Name at birth)

3. _____
(Birthplace) (Day) (Month) (Year)

4. Nationality at Birth _____

5. Present Nationality _____
(If not same as at birth, state how acquired)

6. _____
(Passport No.) (Date and Place of Issuance)

7. If no passport, list documents in possession evidencing nationality.

8. _____
(Height) (Weight) (Color eyes) (Color hair) (Complexion)

9. _____
(Identification marks)

10. _____
(Name of Father) (Nationality)

(Present address in full)

11. _____
(Name of Mother) (Nationality)

(Present address in full)

12. I was last married on _____ to _____ (Name)

who is a citizen of _____

13. The following children have been born to me:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Sex</u>	<u>Place of Birth</u>	<u>Date of Birth</u>	<u>Nationality</u>
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

14. Places lived in and dates since 1939 _____

15. Military Service (List all service) _____

16. Govt. or Public Service—(National or local government, agencies by which employed, position, exact dates of employment) _____

17. Occupation prior to 7 December 1941: If employee of War Dept., show branch) (Give names of employers) _____

18. Fully report all activities engaged in from 7 Dec 1941 to date of internment. (If never interned, report fully activities to date of recovery) (Use additional page if necessary)

19. I (was) interned by Japanese forces on _____, 19____ at _____
(Location) and (was released) (escaped) on _____

19. _____ at _____ If released, state under what circumstances and conditions

20. Activities while interned: (Fill out only in case of internees)

21. Upon (release) (escape) I engaged in the following activities or occupations: (give dates, places, duties, authorities, and names) (Fill out only in case of internees)

22. Present physical condition: _____

23. Employment by Japanese in any capacity, (location, dates, by whom employed, other pertinent data): _____

24. Vital statistics regarding individuals of U. S. or Allied Nations; (Give here all information possible—full names, rank, place, and date. State of health. If dead, give cause, and where buried if known. Was the grave marked? State source of information. If additional space is needed another page may be appended hereto.)

25. I (do) (do not) desire repatriation to _____ If alien requests repatriation to U.S., state name, relationship, present address of American citizen family member (he) (she) intends accompanying or joining.

26. If proceeding to U.S., give names of 2 sponsors or relatives in U.S.

1. _____ (Name) _____ (Full Address)

2. _____ (Name) _____ (Full Address)

27. Means of self-support providing individual does not desire repatriation. If unemployable, state reasons:

28. _____ (Last Residence)

29. _____ (Permanent legal home address)

30. _____ (Proposed new address)

31. I desire that my minor children as follows accompany me (to be filled out only in case of repatriates):

Name

(Signature)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 194 _____ at _____

Reporting Unit -----

----- 194 -----

REPORT OF RECOVERY OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Name ----- (male - female) citizen of

Country ----- recovered from enemy occupied

territory on ----- 194 ----- at -----

Emergency addressee: Name -----

Address -----

Physical Condition ----- Age -----

Request following message (not to exceed ten (10) words) be transmitted to the above emergency addressee:

Maria Jean B-1 866
Army
de

To be filled out by civilian employees of War Department.

I was employed by ----- Department located at -----

On ----- 194 ----- I was paid at the rate of -----

per (year) (month) (day) (hour)

With grade (Civil Service) ----- I served at such employment

to ----- 194 ----- when I ceased employment because of -----

(Signature)

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER GENERAL
AND STAFF

1945

REPORT OF THE COMMANDER GENERAL

AS OF 0001, 14 SEP

There are currently 4,835 internees remaining in the Eighth Army zone, located as follows:

1009 at Yokohama
720 at Yokohama
720 at Yokohama
591 will arrive Yokohama from Sendai by boat on 15 September.
746 will arrive Yokohama from Northern Honshu on 17 September.
430 in Hokkaido are being evacuated by air through Aomori.

Maj Gen Green B-1 JTB
Army Staff
JTB

Report of disposition of hospital cases:

Total cases: 1858

Evacuated by air to Guam	370
Evacuated by air to Okinawa	170
Evacuated by air to Iwojima	210
Total evacuated by air	750

Evacuated by water to Kure	96
Total evacuated	846

Abokai hospital ships at Yokohama 1009

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY
United States Army
Office of the Commanding General
APO 343

R E P O R T

RECOVERED PERSONNEL SECTION

as of 0001, 14 Sep

10,483
4,717

15,200

16,929
15,200

1,729

To date Eighth Army has liberated 16,929 internees, and has evacuated a total of 15,200: 10,483 by air and 4,717 by water.

There are approximately 4,835 internees remaining in the Eighth Army zone. These are located as follows:

- 1009 on hospital ships at Yokohama.
- 720 at Yokohama who will be evacuated by air on 14 September.
- 790 arriving Yokohama from Sendai by boat on 14 September. ~~Will be evacuated by water.~~
- 591 will arrive Yokohama from Sendai by boat on 15 September. ~~Will be evacuated by water.~~
- 746 will arrive Yokohama from Northern Honshu on 17 September. ~~Will be evacuated by water.~~
- 979 in Hokkaido are being evacuated by air through Atsugi Airfield to Okinawa at the rate of approximately 400 per day. These should all be evacuated by 16 September.

Report of disposition of hospital cases:

Total Cases: 1868

Evacuated by air to Guam	330
Evacuated by air to Saipan	179
Evacuated by air to Okinawa	254
Total evacuated by air	<hr/> 763
Evacuated by water to Marianas	96
Total evacuated	<hr/> 859
Aboard hospital ships at Yokohama	1009
	<hr/> <hr/> 1868

Report of recoverees by nationality:

American:			
Army	4972		
Navy	861		
Marines	607		
Civilians	558		
		Total:	6998
British:			
Military	5350		
Civilians	147		
		Total:	5497
Dutch:			
Military	2187		
Civilians	93		
		Total:	2280
Australian:			
Military	611		
Civilians	6		
		Total:	617
Canadian:			
Military	671		
Civilians	55		
		Total:	726
Russian:			
Civilians	2		
		Total:	2
Chinese:			
Military	1		
Civilians	28		
		Total:	29
Others:			
Not yet recorded:	720		

to Navy
~~861~~
~~607~~
subtract civilians as OZARK

~~60~~ - *21 corps here - 20 non-patriotables - cannot be evacuated.*

16,149
280

16,929

D. J. RICE
 Lt Col, FA
 Recovered Personnel O.

2-533

OCCUPATIONAL MILITARY REQUISITION
for
CIVILIAN-OWNED PROPERTY

1. Name of civilian or privately owned business from which supplies were received: Japanese Government.

2. Address: MEIJI INNER SHRINE *Wow!*

3. Articles received:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ARTICLE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION*</u>
1	Horse Paddock	30 by 80 yds.

4. Unit or officer receiving property 1st Cavalry Division

5. Purpose for which supplies were requisitioned: Motor Park

6. Signature of civilian or authorized representative of privately owned business

NAME CAPACITY

7. Signature of commissioned officer receiving supplies:

<i>Charles H. ...</i>	<i>Plt</i>	<i>Hq 1st Cav Div</i>
NAME	GRADE	UNIT

8. Date transaction completed: 10 Sept. 45.

*Detailed description giving present condition and any other factors which will enable proper disbursing authorities to determine fair value.

TOKYO

*J.C. Johnson, D-1110029
1st Lt. C.E.
XI Corps Area & Facilities Office*

PROCUREMENT OF JAPANESE CIVILIAN OR GOVERNMENT EQUIPMENT
AND PROPERTY

1. PRIVATE JAPANESE PROPERTY.

a. Private property which does not consist of war material serviceable for military operations may not be seized. If any property such as buildings, supplies and equipment are needed for the occupying forces, the same should be acquired through an Occupational Military Requisition (OMR).

b. Army, Corps and Division commanders will designate commissioned officers within their commands to effect requisitioning of these necessary supplies and equipment. The delegation of such requisitioning authority is a command responsibility. Commanders are responsible that the property and equipment requisitioned under this authority are essential to the mission of their command.

c. All requisitioning transactions will be effected by the use of the form "Occupational Military Requisition for Civilian Owned Property", (OMR), attached hereto as Incl #1. Forms will be made in quadruplicate and completed at the time the transaction is made. Distribution of completed form will be as follows:

- (1) Original and duplicate to this headquarters.
- (2) One copy to be retained by civilian or privately owned firm with which the transaction is made.
- (3) One copy to be retained by the headquarters effecting the requisition.

d. The owner will be advised that he will be paid the fair value of the property requisitioned as may be determined by the proper military authorities. When possible, the requisitioning officer will indicate on all copies except that delivered to the owner, the reasonable value of the article requisitioned.

2. JAPANESE PUBLIC PROPERTY.

a. Occupying forces are entitled to seize and take possession of money and funds belonging to the Japanese government, munitions of war, depots of arms, stores and supplies; also, the rolling stock of public railways, motor cars and other means of transport, telephones, telegraph and all types of public

utilities, and everything and anything which is essential for military operations; likewise, any of the above war material even though private property, may be seized and made use of for military purposes. However, the occupying force takes all such property with the right only to use it to extinction by normal wear and tear, and with the understanding that at the end of the occupation, such property will be returned to the Government or its rightful owner without payment for use, but with payment for damage through neglect or carelessness. So far as necessitates of occupation demand, use in like manner may also be made of Japanese public buildings.

b. Authority for seizure is vested in Corps and Division commanders.

c. Report of all utilities and Japanese government or military equipment seized will be made to this headquarters by letter, in quadruplicate, and will include the following information:

- (1) Utilities or equipment seized.
- (2) Owner of utilities or equipment.
- (3) Place where seized.
- (4) Date of seizure.
- (5) Use being made of utilities or equipment seized.

1 Incl:
Occupational Military Requisition Form.

OCCUPATIONAL MILITARY REQUISITION
for
CIVILIAN-OWNED PROPERTY

1. Name of civilian or privately owned business from which
supplies were received: _____

2. Address: _____

3. Articles received:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ARTICLE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION*</u>
-----------------	----------------	---------------------

4. Unit or officer receiving property: _____

5. Purpose for which supplies were requisitioned: _____

6. Signature of civilian or authorized representative of
privately owned business:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>CAPACITY</u>
-------------	-----------------

7. Signature of commissioned officer receiving supplies:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
-------------	--------------	-------------

8. Date transaction completed: _____

* Detailed description giving present condition and any other
factors which will enable proper disbursing authorities to
determine fair value.

Incl #1

OCCUPATIONAL MILITARY REQUISITION
for
CIVILIAN-OWNED PROPERTY

1. Name of civilian or privately owned business from which supplies were received: _____

2. Address: _____

3. Articles received:

QUANTITY

ARTICLE

DESCRIPTION*

4. Unit or officer receiving property: _____

5. Purpose for which supplies were requisitioned: _____

6. Signature of civilian or authorized representative of privately owned business:

NAME

CAPACITY

7. Signature of commissioned officer receiving supplies:

NAME

GRADE

UNIT

8. Date transaction completed: _____

* Detailed description giving present condition and any other factors which will enable proper disbursing authorities to determine fair value.

Incl #1

OCCUPATIONAL MILITARY REQUISITION
for
CIVILIAN-OWNED PROPERTY

1. Name of civilian or privately owned business from which
supplies were received: _____

2. Address: _____

3. Articles received:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ARTICLE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION*</u>
-----------------	----------------	---------------------

4. Unit or officer receiving property: _____

5. Purpose for which supplies were requisitioned: _____

6. Signature of civilian or authorized representative of
privately owned business:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>CAPACITY</u>
-------------	-----------------

7. Signature of commissioned officer receiving supplies:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
-------------	--------------	-------------

8. Date transaction completed: _____

* Detailed description giving present condition and any other
factors which will enable proper disbursing authorities to
determine fair value.

Incl #1

OCCUPATIONAL MILITARY REQUISITION
for
CIVILIAN-OWNED PROPERTY

1. Name of civilian or privately owned business from which supplies were received: _____

2. Address: _____

3. Articles received:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ARTICLE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION*</u>
-----------------	----------------	---------------------

4. Unit or officer receiving property: _____

5. Purpose for which supplies were requisitioned: _____

6. Signature of civilian or authorized representative of privately owned business:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>CAPACITY</u>
-------------	-----------------

7. Signature of commissioned officer receiving supplies:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
-------------	--------------	-------------

8. Date transaction completed: _____

* Detailed description giving present condition and any other factors which will enable proper disbursing authorities to determine fair value.

Incl #1

NAGOYA

Kamicho Camp #1 sub camp

Funatsu Camp #3 sub camp

To Maj. Green

Recovered Personnel Det.

Arrived at these two camps

2230. 4 Sept. stayed all night
at #3.

Sending hospital cases, total
29. out this morning by truck
to the air strip at Toyama
to be flown back to Gasegi today.

Proposed plan for evacuation
of other P.O.W. by rail, leaving
Camps #1 and #3 6 Sept. There
are 859 allied prisoners in the
two camps, which forces us to
send them on two (2) trains
nine (9) hrs apart. These camps

are so situated that it is almost
an impossibility to remove them
by trucks to the air strip

With your OK we would
like for you to make plans to
receive them.

The first train will leave
at 1200 and arrive ~~24~~ 19 hrs

later at Yokohama, the second
train 5 hrs later. rations will
be issued for ~~one~~ ^{two} (2) meals on train.

Can you make arrangements for one (1)
more meal enroute, and one (1) on
arrival at the pier, any questions
refer to Parpart, I have briefed him
on things I have omitted.

486 1st train
373 2nd train

Lt. W. E. Churchill

TOYAMA

To Major Greene
Recovered Personnel Div.
Hq, 8th Army

Sept. 4, 1945

*10 cases
ration
urgent.*

Camp No. 6 - Total 283	134 Americans 2 Evacuated 149 British
Camp No. 7 - Total 195	195 Americans 4 Evacuated
Camp No. 8 - Total 298	235 British 7 Evacuated
Camp No. 9 - Total 346	226 Americans 100 British 19 Aussies 1 Dutch
Camp No. 10 - Total 294	164 Americans 1 Evacuated 27 Aussies 47 Dutch
Camp No. 11 - Total 148	48 Americans 75 Dutch - 6 Evacuated 25 British
Camp No. 5) Camp No. 12)	No information available as yet.
Chomori Camp - 362 Total	
*Funatsu Camp - Total 322	118 Americans 200 British

*This camp is about a six hour train ride situated on top of a mountain. Will proceed to this camp this afternoon and secure more definite information.

We have been informed that many of the men are hospital cases Also there have been riots between the guards and POW's.

*20 men sent out
back 1045 4 Sept*

NORMAN E. CHURCHILL
2nd Lt., Inf.
Recovery Team No. 53

N.E. Churchill

NAGOYA

ADVANCE ECHELON
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Civil Censorship Detachment
APO 500

Date: 6 September 1945.

JA/TOK- 1

From: Lt. Col. Guy H. Stubbs, Commanding Officer, Toyama POW Camp No. 7, Toyama, Nippon.	To: Commanding Officer, USS Bellau Wood.
Date of letter (or postmark): 31 August 1945	Language: English
Comment by: A. Lezak	Disposition: Passed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Held Deleted <input type="checkbox"/> Condemned Returned <input type="checkbox"/> Photographed

Advance Ech.
Distribution

COMMENT

- C/S
- G-1
- G-2
- G-4
- AG
- Ch. Eng.
- Ch. Sig. Off.
- Ch. Surg.
- JAG
- Nav. Lia.
- PWB
- PRO
- MGS
- Fin. Off.
- Pub. Hlth.
- CCCIO
- CIC
- CIS-ops
- 8th Army
- 6th Army
- CCD
- ASF

PRISONERS OF WAR: Accident of Relief Supplies Aircraft

Writer states:

"On August 29, U. S. Navy fighter ships flew over the Toyama prison camps dropping bread, newspapers, etc. At about 10:00 AM Navy No. 53457, P-88, flying very low - approximately 100 feet - attempted to avoid a tall, thin flagpole which the pilot had not probably originally observed. The plane's wing flaps and wheels were down and the pilot pulled the ship to the left. The plane then nosed over on the left wing and crashed. The pilot was killed and two men injured.

Dead - Paul Herbert Henderson, 403082, Pilot
USNR - T-4/43, Age 21

Injured - Robert Franklin Sutton, 657-99-68, GM 3cl
USN - T-10/43
Contusion of the scalp, shock

Injured - James Smith Ferebee, 131709, Lt. Commander
Compound fracture left humerus, lower 1/3,
Puncture left buttock, contusion left eye,
Concussion, shock

"Personal effects of deceased: Pocket knife, little finger ring, dog tags, and 1 issue wrist watch.

"X-ray shows Lt. Commander Ferebee's arm so badly shattered as to require an operation. No facilities are available for this and no experienced surgeon at hand. I therefore signalled one of your planes that we needed a doctor in reply to his question. Ferebee will be recovered from shock sufficiently to justify moving him by Sept. 1, and movement

CCD
Distribution

NAGOYA

ADVANCE ECHELON
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Civil Censorship Detachment
APO 500

6 September 1945

JA/TOK- 2

From: Lt. Col. G. H. Stubbs, Hq, USAFFB, P.O.W. Section, Manila, P. I.	To: Mrs. A. H. Stubbs, Peach Bottom, Penn., U.S.A.
Date of letter (or postmark): 31 Aug 1945	Language: English
Comment by: A. Lozak	Disposition: Passed Held Deleted Condemned Returned Photographed

Advance Ech.
Distribution

- C/S
- G-1
- G-2
- G-4
- AG
- Ch. Eng.
- Ch. Sig. Off.
- Ch. Surg.
- JAG
- Nav. Lia.
- FWB
- PRO
- MGS
- Fin. Off.
- Pub. Hlth.
- OCCTO
- CIC
- CIS-ops
- 8th Army
- 6th Army
- CCD
- ASF

CCD
Distribution

COMMENT

PRISONERS OF WAR: Accident of Relief Supplies Aircraft

Writer states:

"Navy planes flew over the several Prisoner of War Camps near Toyama yesterday dropping us magazines, cigarettes, medicines, and food. This was the first direct contact with the outside world since December 8, 1941 and was appreciated beyond words by all ex-prisoners. Many men who have been hardened by unspeakable torture to themselves and friends cried like babies. Veterans of Bataan had seen three out of every four die by torture, starvation, lack of medicine and execution but now American food, tobacco, and news. It was indeed a great day for all of us but ----

"One plane crashed. Two of the crew were injured, one instantly killed. Ensign Paul Herbert Henderson paid for our joy with his life. Our grief is beyond expression. The irony of this disaster, after peace, to a man bringing happiness to us strikes to the core of men who have shown no emotion for years.

"The crash took place between this American camp and a camp occupied by three hundred British from Hong Kong. This morning a military funeral was held by the British and Americans. American flags had been prepared locally by both camps, Americans and British shared as escort pallbearers and during the ceremony planes of Henderson's squadron arrived and flew overhead. Wreaths of flowers, prepared by prisoners from the few flowers available, appeared as by magic. Private J. L. Seabrandt, a theological student, conducted the services. Cremation was necessarily agreed upon. The international escort carried the casket to the

"crematorium where Gunner Leroy Hoyt, as senior American Navy representative present, officiated at the final ceremony.

"The ashes, personal belongings, and the makeshift flags are being forwarded to you.

"Please accept the heartfelt but humble condolence of every one of the four hundred ninety-five of us who saw this tragedy."

PRISONERS OF WAR: Report on ex-prisoners of War of Camp #7, Nagoya District, Toyama, Nippon.

- "1. Inclosed is a roster of the ex-Prisoners of War now at this camp, numbering one hundred ninety-five (195), all Americans.
- "2. One hundred fifty of us came here from Yokkaichi, twenty-five kilometers southeast of Nagoya, on June 1, 1945, while forty-six men arrived here August 3, 1945, from several other camps as transients enroute to an oilfield camp. One man, Private Clifton S. Uckerman, 19011248, Salt Lake City, Utah, died here June 25, 1945.
- "3. Our treatment here has been far better than in any of the other six Prisoner of War Camps, and three Concentration Areas, in which I have been confined. Hours of work have been long but our treatment and rations have improved here when supplies of all kinds were getting scarce. The Japanese Commandant cooperates in everything and makes apparently sincere efforts to meet my every request for supplies, etc., but supplies of all sorts are hard to obtain due to the burning of Toyama August 2, 1945.
- "4. My men have been well behaved throughout with few exceptions. All of us are now trying to realize that we are again free.
- "5. One bomb was dropped so near this camp on July 20, 1945, that our fence and part of the barracks collapsed. Twelve Americans were injured, none seriously. The town and area surrounding the camp were bombed and burned beginning about 1:00 A.M., August 2, 1945. Seven incendiary bombs dropped inside the camp, together with hundreds of fragments, but fires were quickly extinguished, and no prisoners injured. Several metal sheets from the sides of the bomb-clusters were used in patching our roof. A large percentage of the incendiary 4 pound bombs were duds, fortunately for us.

- "6. Navy planes of VP - 83 circled this camp August 27, 1945, but indicated no message pick-up service and dropped no food. I will give this report to the neutral official now scheduled to inspect this camp today.
- "7. At noon, August 15, 1945, the Nipponese Camp Staff and Guard were assembled within our view to receive a radio message. This was unusual and coupled with the dejected attitude of some of them after the message had been received led us to hope that the long anticipated capitulation was at hand. A holiday for all workers was promptly announced for the afternoon of August 15th and no Americans have worked since that time except internal police, etc.
- "8. The morning of August 22nd I was informed by 2nd Lieutenant Shoichi Hagishi, Nipponese Commandant, that (1) the war was over, (2) that all Americans would remain in protective custody of the Nipponese Army until delivered to a port of embarkation, (3) that his guard would thereafter patrol only outside of our fence, (4) that all internal discipline would be turned over to me, (5) that the ration of rice and beans would be increased directly, and (6) that he would make every effort to secure meat, fish, and vegetables for our use. The above message was delivered in part on the evening of August 21, but complete delivery was delayed due to the lack of an interpreter. I at once informed all men of the above and warned them to avoid friction and unpleasant incidents of all kinds. There has been no trouble of any kind here.
- "9. I am now conducting short close order drills and am permitting the men to swim in a nearby river and to take short exercise walks within one-half mile of camp, accompanied by an unarmed Nipponese guard. The Nipponese Commandant is very cautious and fears friction with local civilians. I have informed him that I will permit no liberty contrary to his judgment, in order that he remain responsible for the safety of all Americans. All of the more radical Americans have apparently forgotten their omity to a great degree however and local Nipponese are very friendly.
- "10. All men are now receiving all the rice, beans, and vegetable soup they can eat. One pig, weighing 210 pounds, and five quarters of beef were delivered August 25 to 28 inclusive, together with a small issue of sugar, flour, sake, and bean curd, the first received in ages. Our sick rate has been very low here due to the gradual increase in food served. We have received cigarettes in advance to September 11 at the old issue rate of two cigarettes per man per day, an unusual concession; but the shortage of tobacco is keenly felt. We have received more tobacco than Nipponese civilians.

- "11. The Nipponese Commandant has turned over his Headquarters building and quarters to me and my staff so that all officers and warrant officers are now removed from barracks to more suitable accommodations.
- "12. The lack of news and tobacco are now our chief complaints. All newspapers, magazines, etc., and all verbal news of any kind have been denied us since October 1943. A few men have learned to read Nipponese to some degree and we have kept ourselves sketchily informed through stolen papers. The Nipponese staff will talk freely now but news magazines from December 1941 would be greatly appreciated.
- "13. The Nipponese Commandant has completely disarmed his guard although I requested him in writing to retain the guard rifles in the guardhouse for use in case of mob action which he fears.
- "14. The health of the men here is remarkably good considering the long hours of heavy work required of them on deficient rations during the last three and a half years, the shortage of medicines and clothing, the crowded housing conditions coupled with poor sanitary conditions. I enclose a health report of Captain Howard W. Friedman, Dental Corps, who has been acting as Medical Officer here."

PRISONERS OF WAR: Health Report

- "1. The original group of one hundred forty-nine (149) men interned in this prison camp are in comparatively good health. Forty-six additional men who arrived August 3, 1945 are not as fortunate. Of this new group, a good many suffer from hypoproteinemia and anaciation.
- "2. Generally speaking the most common complaints are: hypoproteinemia and beri-beri---twenty-five severe cases and approximately twenty-five mild cases. There are approximately twenty cases of malnutrition and anaciation. The most general complaint suffered occasionally by all men and continually by about twenty-five men is gastro-enteritis and diarrhea, due not so much to digestive tract affections, but to the quality of the prisoners' diet.
- "3. Although the majority of the men have suffered from malaria in the Philippines, only two demonstrate occasional malarial symptoms at the present time.
- "4. There are undoubtedly present a few cases of incipient tuberculosis but none definitely demonstrate without x-ray, and approximately four cases of either tuberculosis or acid burned lungs.

- "5. One man is temporarily crippled from a factory injury, sustaining multiple fractures and contusions of the right foot.
- "6. There are also from seven to ten men with visual impairment of the retina due to Vitamin A deficiencies during the past three years.
- "7. RECAPITULATION: Of the 195 men in this camp, one man is unable to walk and from 7 to 10 unable to walk but a short distance."

2 September, 1945

CAMP REPORT OF TAMANO POW CAMP III
(Hiroshima Sector)

1. Date of visit: 1 September, 1945.
2. Location: The camp is located on a peninsula four miles west of UNO (ferry service to Takamatsu) within the compound of the MITSUI Copper Refining Factory, on the seashore.
3. Camp Commander: 1stLt. NAKAJIMA, Japanese Army
4. Camp Representative: Warrant Officer Thomas John Davies, British
5. Strength and Composition: 200 British NCO's and privates.
6. Place of Capture: Hongkong (40%), Singapore, Malay (60%).
7. Transfers: These POW's have been transferred several times - last from the AMAGAZAKI Sub-camp of the OSAKA POW Main Camp, two months ago.
8. Camp Opening: 1st June, 1945.
9. Camp Buildings: One large wooden shed. Space, sufficient. Latrines, satisfactory. Told Camp Representative to keep WC's cleaner.
10. Work: The Camp Representative reports strenuous work, such as smelting, and handling of gaseous residues. There were no safety devices for the Prisoners of War. They had to walk on hot metal bare-footed. The servicing of blast furnaces without goggles, which they had requested repeatedly, caused several minor eye injuries. Some men complained about the gases.
11. Medical: The Camp Representative reports that until the 15th of August there was no medical inspection. However, since then a Japanese Doctor has been in attendance. Medical Supplies through IRCC were enough.
12. Relief: The Prisoners of War seem to be rather bitter about the lack of relief supplies by the IRCC. The necessary explanations were given by the Delegate (AWA Maru case, refusal of Japanese Authorities for camp visits, etc.). According to the Camp Representative, the following food parcels were distributed:- one parcel in the third week of November, one parcel just before Xmas, 1/2 parcel in January, and the balance in small portions later. This distribution took place at the AMAGAZAKI Camp.
13. Messages: During their stay at this camp POW's were not permitted to write letters.
14. Transportation for evacuees: (a) POW's can be brought by a lighter to the pier at UNO and from there board the train at the railway station.
(b) Sick POW's who cannot be transported in the above manner could be conveniently taken directly from the camp on to a hospital seaplane.

15. Sick: In the Infirmary of the camp, which is not separated from the regular living spaces of the POW's, there are at present twelve light cases, mostly beri-beri. Two TB cases appeared to the Delegate most serious and will have to be investigated. Apart from these light cases, there are six hospital cases, five of which were caused by the air-drop accident of August 28th. One patient has advanced beri-beri.
16. Air-Drop Accident: At 1430 on August 28th, three planes dropped relief goods and injured five prisoners of war. Three of them sustained minor injuries on the legs and two are seriously hurt. The accident happened because one of the planes flew low and the parachute did not ~~fall~~ and in another instance the relief goods were detached from the chute when some cases containing tins crashed on the ground they exploded ~~at~~ like bombs and ~~injured~~ the nearby POW's.

2 September, 1945

Camp report of Tamano POW Camp III (Hiroshima Sector) -- sheet two.

Pte. E. L. Knowles, 5776956, 5 Norfolk Regiment:- Air-drop accident. Compound fracture both bones left leg, between knee and ankle. The Japanese Doctor intended to amputate immediately, but the Camp Representative objected, and from the latest doctor's report obtained on the date of the Delegate's visit, the leg may be saved. This injured POW, if no infection sets in, can be put into casts within a week and transported in lying position after ten days. (Recommend seaplane).

Pte. T. L. Whitley, 5933142, Cambridgeshire Regiment. Sustained internal injuries, probably of the intestines. An operation was necessary to let the gas out, which otherwise may have pressed on the heart with fatal consequences. This patient is not yet out of danger and cannot be considered as transportable for the time being.

The Camp Representative had sent an urgent message to the Delegate on the 29th at 0400, which at the time of writing this report has not reached the Delegate's Headquarters. An investigation will be made as to the cause of this delay. The Camp Representative requested the urgent despatch of an Allied, or POW, Medical Doctor to assist the Japanese Doctors at the UNO hospital. He also wishes to place on record the speed with which the Japanese authorities brought these cases to the hospital and the careful and constant attendance of the two Japanese Doctors, who seem to be very competent.

17. Requests: The Camp Representative wishes the Delegate to report that on the occasion of the Air Drop, practically all the milk supply was smashed and the sugar destroyed. He would also like to have some shirts, underwear and stockings. As they are short of gauze and bandages, and due to the accident, the Delegate has made arrangements that these supplies will be immediately forwarded from the main POW camp.

18. GENERAL: The Camp Representative related that the most dreadful experiences were during the one and one-half years captivity in Thailand where they were compelled to build a railway through the jungles into Burma. Thousands of Prisoners of War succumbed during this period. Furthermore, the transfer to Japan was another terrible experience, when they were practically starved on the HAKUSAN MARU, which took them three months for the trip.

19. IMPRESSION: The Delegate's impression of these prisoners of war was, not generally, favorable. Their health and condition showed distinct signs of undernourishment, and the constant factory surroundings without any green must have had a depressing effect on their morale.

The Camp Representative stated that our first announcer came just in time, as the prisoners of war were getting practically out of control due to the lack of information. However, there are now every indication that this camp can be evacuated without incident.

NAGOYA

Cable 9 -- Nagoya -- Kindly send ambulance or transport
plane to Komaki airfield 10 kilo. north of Nagoya
Railway Station preferably on Sept 8th. Purpose
is to take out 2 seriously ill POW 2 attendants.
Some extra space on board for Doctors and new cases
as may occur. Confirm Nagoya.

Troedsson

Swedish Legation

0 meters
unway

NMFMX

NAGOYA

<u>Camp</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Reported Strength</u>	<u>Evacuated</u>	<u>By Whom</u>
1	Ginm Kamioka	594	6 X Sep	Hq Churchill
2	Aichi	273	/	"
3	Ginm Funatsu	318	6 X Sep	Hq Churchill
4	Mie	284		
5	Mie	296		
6	Toyama	286		
7	Toyama	195		"
8	Toyama	300		
9	Toyama	350		"
10	Toyama	294		
11	Toyama	148	12 Sep	

E 9

HIROSHIMA

Item

- 1 Train schedule for the evacuation of ~~xxx~~ all the
Camps in this area
- 2 Report of the International Red Cross of the
condition of the Camps in the area

HIROSHIMA

Jap In Office
167

Tm Schedule

Tm 1
9020

422

lv OYAMICHI 1200 12 SEP

MUKOJIMA (193) II

MITSunosHO (185) V

MYOSHI (44) 34° 45' N, 139° 58' E

ar OSAKA 1930

ar Yokohama 1000 13 SEP

Tm 2

Camp NIHHAMA II 643

ZENTSUJI I 109

TAMANO III 200

952

1030 Wakanoura

0846 Sep 14

0953 - 972

昭和 年 月 19日發行

日郵、近郵、南海、朝郵

區分 等級	大 人									小 兒			摘 要
	切符番號	人數	稅 額	切符番號	人數	稅 額	切符番號	人數	稅 額	切符番號	人數	稅 額	
三〇〇 三 等 以上													
五〇〇 三 等 以上	一等 (1.80)	5674 5676	1 1	1.80 1.80	2								} 3 ¥3.90
	二等 (.90)												
	三等 (.30)	7024	1	.30	1								
八	一等 (2.40)	5675	1	2.40	1								} 15 ¥2.80
	二等 (1.20)	7529 7172 7173 7174 7175	1 1 1 1 1	.40 .40 .40 .40 .40	13					7177	1	.20	
													¥2.20

1400. - Call Mitchell at 054110

41.75

~~41.75~~

TN 3

Arr Wakayama 1655 14 SEP

ONODA - ~~300-400~~
Hiroshima #8 - 482

TN 4

Arr Wakayama 2236 14 SEP

OMINE -
Hiroshima #6 - 472

TN 5


Arr Wakayama 0400 15 SEP

UBE -
Hiroshima #7 - 293

TN 6

Arr Wakayama 0806 15 SEP

ONODA -
Hiroshima #9 - 390



This schedule clears and the
When in Gen Beson an OSAKA.
1400 - Call Mitchell at OSAKA.

HIROSHIMA

<u>Camp</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Reported Strength</u>	<u>Evacuated</u>	<u>By ^Whom</u>
1	Kagawa ZENT SUJI	110	14 Sep	HQ Osaka
2	Niihama	644	14 Sep	HQ Osaka
3	Okayama TAMANO	200	14 Sep	HQ Osaka
4	Hiroshima MUKOJIMA	194	12 Sep	HQ Asaka
5	Hiroshima MITSUNOSHO	185	12 Sep	HQ Asaka
6	Yamaguchi OMINE	283 472	14 Sep	HQ Osaka
7	Yamaguchi UBE	283	15 Sep	HQ Asaka
8	Yamaguchi ONODA	482	14 Sep	HQ Osaka
9	Yamaguchi ONODA	390	15 Sep	HQ Osaka

arm }
All except 4 & 5 were joint
Army - Navy - Evacuation through
Wakayama