The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 66, July 1962 - April, 1963 Page: 476
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Southwestern Historical Quarterly
fested great surprise and indignation of countenance, but remained
silent; casting his eyes over the officers that were assembled around
him, but no one spoke-all seemed to be dumb,18 and he finally
ordered the line to march forward. It was then about ten o'clock on
the 19th day of August, as hot as it ever gets, and the men were
marched in line ready for action at a moment, about four miles
through heavy post oak sand, without water drawing their six cannon,
their teams having been turned out on the previous night.
CONTENTS-The Battle-Route of the Mexicans-Fierce Contest-
Victory gained and lost-The Americans between two fires-Treach-
ery of the Mexican allies and their brutal conduct-Generosity of
Elisondo-Execution of 12o Mexicans.
On approaching a thick chapparal, skirting the next stream of
water, they were fired on from the thicket by two pieces of cannon.
They returned the fire from their artillery, but finding the enemy
protected by the timber, they charged, leaving their cannon, which
had broken down one third of the Americans dragging it through the
thicket, which prevented any correct estimate of their numbers.'"0
But on approaching an open post oak flat, they perceived, to their
surprise, a line of temporary breastworks, and the phantom they had
been pursuing clambering over it, and the next moment they were
saluted by the enemy's whole line of artillery, tearing off the brush
and limbs over their heads, scattering the fragments into their eyes
and faces. This sudden and unexpected attack by the enemy they
supposed they were driving before them, so alarmed the Mexican
Infantry that they had fled and hid in the chapparal, leaving the
Americans scattered in small detached parties-numbers of them
18According to Gaines, Menchaca and Kemper were the core of the resistance to
Toledo but Gaines agrees with McLane that Colonel Kemper did not rejoin the
American army until the day before the last battle. There is no indication that
Kemper had met Gutierrez after the latter had left San Antonio. Information from
Capt. Gaines, ibid., I, 283. Certainly Toledo showed a better appreciation of the
military situation than did Kemper or Menchaca. To crush the revolt, Arredondo
had to smash the republican army and retake San Antonio, therefore if the
republicans would wait, he would have to attack. History has proven time and
again that the defensive is the best plan for the employment of untrained or weak
forces. If the republicans had been content to await his attack, it is probable that
they would have cut Arredondo to pieces, as he did them.
a18This installment appears in the San Antonio Tri-Weekly Alamo Express, Feb-
ruary 2o, 1861.
"OThis retirement of the Spanish advance guard under pressure was part of
Arredondo's plan. Hatcher, "Arredondo's Report of the Battle of the Medina,"
Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, XI, r2s.
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Texas State Historical Association. The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 66, July 1962 - April, 1963, periodical, 1963; Austin, Texas. (texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth101196/m1/512/: accessed May 29, 2017), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Texas State Historical Association.