The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 101, July 1997 - April, 1998 Page: 399
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1998 Book Reviews 399
leading the nation into a large-scale conflict? Would those reasons have justi-
fied the enormous costs of the war if there had been a reasonable chance for
victory? What were the consequences of Johnson's failure to disclose to the
American public the risks involved and to invite a congressional debate on
the issue of war or peace? How costly to the war effort was the absence of a
full-scale mobilization that might have followed such a debate? Did
Johnson's determination to salvage the Great Society justify his lack of open-
ness and honesty? Could any change in American strategy or tactics have won
the war, or was defeat unavoidable at the conventional level? Vandiver does
not avoid these questions, at least most of them; he simply fails to subject
them to systematic analysis. Yet these questions are critical to evaluating
Johnson's wartime leadership.
University of Texas at Arlington EVAN ANDERS
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Texas State Historical Association. The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 101, July 1997 - April, 1998, periodical, 1998; Austin, Texas. (texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth117155/m1/468/: accessed June 27, 2017), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Texas State Historical Association.