

The
PHILOSOPHICAL
SOCIETY *of* TEXAS



P R O C E E D I N G S

2004

The
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SOCIETY *of* TEXAS

P R O C E E D I N G S

of the Annual Meeting at Denton
December 3-5, 2004

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF TEXAS

2004

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF TEXAS FOR THE COLLECTION AND DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE *was founded December 5, 1837, in the Capitol of the Republic of Texas at Houston by MIRABEAU B. LAMAR, ASHBEL SMITH, THOMAS J. RUSK, WILLIAM H. WHARTON, JOSEPH ROWE, ANGUS MCNEILL, AUGUSTUS C. ALLEN, GEORGE W. BONNELL, JOSEPH BAKER, PATRICK C. JACK, W. FAIRFAX GRAY, JOHN A. WHARTON, DAVID S. KAUFMAN, JAMES COLLINSWORTH, ANSON JONES, LITTLETON FOWLER, A. C. HORTON, I. W. BURTON, EDWARD T. BRANCH, HENRY SMITH, HUGH MCLEOD, THOMAS JEFFERSON CHAMBERS, SAM HOUSTON, R. A. IRION, DAVID G. BURNET, and JOHN BIRDSALL.*

The Society was incorporated as a non-profit, educational institution on January 18, 1936, by George Waverly Briggs, James Quayle Dealey, Herbert Pickens Gambrell, Samuel Wood Geiser, Lucius Mirabeau Lamar III, Umphrey Lee, Charles Shirley Potts, William Alexander Rhea, Ira Kendrick Stephens, and William Embrey Wrather. On December 5, 1936, formal reorganization was completed.

The office of the Society is located at The University of Texas, 1 University Station D0901, Austin, 78712.

Edited by Thistle Hill, Julie Pennington, and Terri Killen

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CONTENTS

Texas Military History

The Philosophical Society of Texas	5
WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	7
Alfred F. Hurley, President, Philosophical Society of Texas	
SPANISH TEXAS	
Ron Tyler <i>presiding</i> , Secretary, Philosophical Society of Texas	
<i>Defending a "Forgotten Frontier: Spanish Texas, 1716-1821"</i>	9
Donald E. Chipman and Richard McCaslin, University of North Texas	
<i>To the Last Drop of Our Blood: Defending King and Empire in San Antonio</i>	19
Jesus F. de la Teja, Texas State University	
THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE: BATTLE OF SAN JACINTO	
Diane Powell <i>presiding</i> , San Antonio	
<i>Calculated Victory: Sam Houston's Campaign to Rescue the Texas Revolution</i>	29
James E. Crisp, North Carolina State University	
<i>Turning Points in the San Jacinto Campaign: Mexican Army Perspective</i>	38
Gregg J. Dimmick, Wharton	
TEXANS IN THE CIVIL WAR	
Fran Vick <i>presiding</i> , Dallas	
<i>Who Fought for the Confederacy?: Harrison County as a Test Case</i>	52
Randolph "Mike" Campbell, University of North Texas	
<i>Who Fought for the Confederacy?: The Soldiers of Walker's Texas Division</i>	62
Richard G. Lowe, University of North Texas	

TEXANS IN WORLD WAR II AND THE KOREAN WAR

- Jane C. Monday *presiding*, Huntsville
Admiral Chester Nimitz: From Fredericksburg to Tokyo Bay 72
 Admiral Bob Inman, United States Navy (Ret.),
 The University of Texas-Austin
General Walton Walker: The Eighth Army's Fight for Pusan 78
 Adrian R. Lewis, University of North Texas

TEXANS IN THE AVIATION AGE

- Harris A. Kempner *presiding*, First Vice President,
 Philosophical Society of Texas
The Impact of Aviation on Texas: 92
The Military and NASA Example
 Hans M. Mark, The University of Texas-Austin

Memorials 103

Officers of the Society 118

Past Presidents 119

Meetings 121

Preamble 122

Members of the Society 123

In Memoriam 143

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF TEXAS

“Texas Military History” was the topic of the 167th anniversary meeting of the Philosophical Society of Texas, held in the vibrant North Texas area on December 3–5, 2004. The headquarters was Fort Worth’s Doral Tesoro Hotel. The site for most of the meetings, however, was The University of North Texas in Denton. A total of 180 members, spouses, and guests attended. President Alfred F. Hurley organized the program.

The meeting began on Friday with three optional tours: one by helicopter to view the burgeoning Alliance Airport development; the others by University of North Texas buses either to view buildings in Denton designed by O’Neill Ford; or the structure and activities of the University of North Texas Environmental Science Building. A reception and dinner were held at the Doral Tesoro Hotel, featuring musicians from the University of North Texas’s exceptional School of Music.

President Hurley announced the twenty-two new members of the Society and presented them with their certificates of membership. The new members are Phil Adams, Edward Glenn Biggs, John Walter Crain, Maceo Dailey, Ramona Davis, Patricia Lynn Denton, David Dewhurst, Cheryl Fleming, Michael Gillette, Judith Guthrie, Ray Keck, Richard Lowe, Larry McNeill, Patrick Cunningham Oxford, George Shipley, Steven Escar Smith, Rose Spector, Carol Keeton Strayhorn, Claudia Stuart, Lon Wood Taylor, Herman Lavon Totten, and Kathryn (Kay) Yeager.

Randolph B. Campbell was awarded the 2004 Philosophical Society of Texas Award of Merit for his book, *Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star State*, published in 2003 by Oxford University Press. The award is presented annually for a book on Texas, either fiction or nonfiction.

The annual business meeting was held on Sunday afternoon. The names of Society members who had died during the previous year were read: Rex Gavin Baker, Jr., Albert V. Casey, Gilbert Denman, James Hargrove, Amy Freeman Lee, John L. Margrave, James M. Moudy, William Seybold, and Jerome Supple.

Secretary Ron Tyler announced that Society membership stood at 200 active members, 80 associate members, and 43 emeritus members.

Officers elected for the coming year are as follows: Harris L. Kemp-

ner Jr., president; Roger Horchow, first vice-president; Isabel Brown Wilson, second vice-president; J. Chrys Dougherty III, treasurer; and Ron Tyler, secretary.

On Saturday evening a reception and dinner were held at the University of North Texas, followed by a President's Reception in the hotel's clubhouse.

After a business meeting for Society members and a lively discussion on the topic of Texas Military History on Sunday morning, President Hurley adjourned the meeting until December 2, 2005, in Galveston.

WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION

ALFRED F. HURLEY

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the University of North Texas campus and the opening session in our program on "Texas Military History."

Two important factors support our presenting this program. One factor is the long-standing advice of a founding father of this Society, Mirabeau B. Lamar, who identified military history as one of the subjects to be studied and discussed by our members. Another factor surfaced early in the last decade when I was immersed in the administration of this institution. My colleagues in our Department of History chose military history as one of their two major emphases; the other is Texas history.

Given my deep interest in military history, I was delighted when I heard about that action. Indeed, that decision helps explain why I took up my appointment in the department after stepping down from administrative work. You may be interested to know that the student interest in the subject is so keen that some six faculty members are teaching it here.

Another result was the encouragement the decision gave me to bring fully into the department an annual military history seminar series I had started in 1983 after I had become president. Last October 16, we staged the 22nd Annual Seminar, which attracted an audience larger than this one. Many of the seminar attendees are members of the business and professional communities of Texas; others include military veterans, military history buffs, and students.

The format of those seminars will appear in this meeting, where you will have a chance both to listen to and, then, question well-known scholars and practitioners. One of the scholars you will hear today, Dr. Adrian Lewis has been a practitioner as a career Army officer, in addition to being one of five of our History Department faculty members appearing in this program. Two other active practitioners, Admiral Bob Inman and Dr. Hans Mark, have served at the highest levels of military and/or governmental activity and continue to serve in advisory roles in Washington, D.C.

One different dimension to this program, compared to that of the seminar series, is the voluntary participation of five members of this Society as program session chairs. These chairs have been encouraged to keep the program moving along within very specific time limits intended to

provide time for you in this audience to ask the speakers questions and make comments.

My hope is that you'll find the environment of this meeting conducive to continuing your discussions of the issues raised during the formal program during your meals. Those discussions can be continued after dinner this evening when we shall follow the example set last year by Sam Moore in El Paso with a presidential reception at our headquarters hotel.

Now, I invite to this podium the Secretary of this Society since 1990, a very active teacher and scholar on the University of Texas-Austin's History Faculty and the chair of the first session, Dr. Ron Tyler.

DEFENDING A "FORGOTTEN" FRONTIER

Spanish Texas, 1716-1821

DONALD E. CHIPMAN & RICHARD B. MCCASLIN

Spaniards viewed the coast of Texas for the first time in 1519, and slightly more than three centuries would elapse before the flag of Castile and León was lowered for the final time at San Antonio in 1821. Uninterrupted Spanish occupation of Texas, however, lasted for only one-third of that period, the 105 years from 1716 to 1821. Spanish Texas (or Tejas, as it was called by its first European settlers) lay above the Nueces River to the east of the Medina River's headwaters and extended eastward into western Louisiana. This amounted to only a small portion of the present Lone Star State, but even then the area was large enough to offer daunting challenges to soldiers, explorers, and settlers.

Spanish Texas was first and foremost a military province. With only a few exceptions, every governor of the province was a commissioned officer in the Spanish army who held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel. These governors commanded soldiers stationed at presidios, the Spanish term for military garrisons, and were responsible for the security of Spanish civilians, missionaries, and partially Hispanicized Indians who were congregated in the religious establishments known as missions. Thus, to understand the military history of Spanish Texas, we must first examine how the Spanish came to depend on presidios and missions as an approach to dealing with the indigenous population of northern Mexico and the Spanish Southwest, which ultimately stretched from California to western Louisiana.

Spain's first experience in establishing its colonial or overseas empire came in the Canary Islands where most of the native population were sedentary farmers or fishermen. Next came Spanish colonization of the major islands of the Caribbean—Santo Domingo, Cuba, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico. Once again, Spaniards found an indigenous population that was settled and fairly easy to control—especially since islands have more finite geographical limitations. The primary agency in dealing with these sedentary people was a complex institution known as *encomienda*. Spaniards received grants of *encomienda*, which included a specified number of Indians who were to work as vassals for their Spanish overseer (*encomendero*) or pay tribute to him.

Then came the conquest of mainland Mexico from 1519-1521, following which essentially all of the sedentary Indians of Central Mexico

who survived the conquest were assigned to Spanish *encomenderos*. The process of conquering outlying areas such as the Gulf Coast, western Mexico, and Yucatán and placing these Indians in *encomienda* then occupied Spain for the next twenty years.

By 1540 the effective line of Spanish settlement in Mexico ran from Culiacán on the west coast southeastward to Lake Chapala, east to Querétaro just north of Mexico City, and then northeastward to present-day Tampico on the Gulf Coast. With few exceptions, (notably in the Yucatán where Lacandón Maya Indians resisted the Spanish conquest for the next two hundred years), all of the Indians south of this line had been conquered. They, too, as a generalization were sedentary Indians who had been placed under an *encomendero*. Once again, these settled Indians worked for the Spanish overseer or paid tribute to him. As for the *encomendero*, he was responsible for bringing the Christian message to his vassals, Hispanicizing them, and protecting them—an obligation few *encomenderos* took seriously.

Everything Spain had experienced in the Canary Islands, in the Caribbean Islands, and in Central Mexico had been pretty much the same—sedentary Indians (not all of them peaceful to be sure, the Aztecs and Mayas come to mind here) had fallen under Spanish control. Then a “whole new dimension” in Spanish-Indian relations came about in the 1540s and lasted until the 1790s in Spanish Texas.

North of the previously mentioned line of Spanish settlement, were non-sedentary Indians collectively known as Chichimecs. These Indians, which included a great variety of nations and languages, were decentralized and masters of the bow and arrow. They were so tough that even the Aztecs, the most powerful Indians in North America, did not attempt a conquest of Chichimec lands. The Aztecs labeled the Chichimecs as barbarians, or with the pejorative terms “uncivilized dirty dogs.” (As an interesting sidelight, Aztec nobles could dine on human flesh, but they rationalized their inability to conquer the Chichimecs by claiming that “they did not taste good!”)

Spaniards by the early 1540s had little reason to venture into Chichimec lands. The reports of Coronado, whose army had traveled along the west coast away from hostile Indians, as well as accounts from survivors of the De Soto expedition, were not favorable about the North Country. To this discouraging news add the known hostility of the Chichimec nations, all of which made northern Mexico an unattractive and dangerous place for Spaniards.

All of this changed, starting in 1546. In that year a Spanish captain, a few Franciscan friars, and some Indian allies ventured to the present-day site of Zacatecas. At Zacatecas they discovered what turned out to be a mountain of rich silver ore, still worked to this day. This discovery of silver touched off a mad rush of people into the Zacatecas area, and by 1550 (just four years later), the town of Zacatecas had turned into a classic boom town with more than thirty mining companies operating in the

area. Zacatecas had attracted so many Spaniards that the town itself was safe from Indian attacks. The problem lay with roads and supply lines that ran into the area from Guadalajara and Mexico City.

Mule trains loaded with silver and headed south for Spanish counting houses in Mexico City or Veracruz were of little interest to the Chichimecs. What really interested the Indians was all manner of goods—food, supplies, and weapons—being sent north to the mining frontier. In 1550 Chichimecs attacked a supply train and wiped it out, killing everyone. This incident was the start of the Great Chichimec Wars that lasted for half a century.

The Spanish response to these wars is crucial to understanding what would go on for about 250 years and eventually influence the military history of early Texas. To secure supply lines into and out of the silver frontier, Spaniards built strong houses and fortified towns located at the end of a day's journey. These were Spain's first presidios or military garrisons.

As an aside, we historians used to think that Spaniards were the most litigious people on earth. Americans, however, now rival them in every regard! But over time, Spaniards drafted a myriad of laws to cover seemingly every possible contingency—right down to where people could sit in church or march in a parade. Some 400,000 laws had been drafted for the New World by the mid-1600s. Laws governing these new military outposts stated they must be stocked with enough goods “to accommodate one hundred nude and hungry guests” at the end of their day's journey!

Despite these military outposts, wars with the Chichimecs lasted for the better part of fifty years. Why? Keep in mind that Spaniards had defeated both the powerful Aztecs and Incas in record short times, but they had great difficulty in subduing the Chichimecs. There were several reasons for this: (1) The lands of northern Mexico were huge, Northern Mexico is about twice the size of Texas! (Mexico as a whole, 756,198 square miles; Texas today, 267,339 square miles) Much of the terrain was desert, but also included rough country containing mountains, hills, and valleys. This provided good cover for Indians who knew these lands far better than Spaniards. (2) Chichimecs were fierce nomadic warriors whose food supply could not be cut off—a powerful lever that had worked well in controlling sedentary people. (3) Spain was seriously over-committed both in Europe and America. This made it difficult to concentrate on any one theater of military operation. (4) Spaniards initially underestimated the seriousness of the situation. Having defeated powerful Indians in Mexico and Peru, Spaniards were supremely confident of their military prowess—to the point of being overconfident. As it turned out, Chichimecs won the early battles and this gave *them* confidence. (5) Chichimec languages were so difficult that they hindered efforts to communicate directly with them. (6) And Chichimecs were often on the attack; Spaniards were on the defensive. In their attacks, the Indians could fire four or five arrows in the time it took for Spaniards to load a musket or crank a crossbow.

This is not one of the important points but an interesting one. Chichimec warriors wore no clothing other than a breechcloth. Often when attacking Spaniards, they would take off their loin cloths "for the effect" and attack in the nude. There is something about clothing that makes men going into combat feel more secure. Spaniards were absolutely astonished by the appearance of the Chichimec attackers.

Finally, let's give the Chichimecs a lot of credit. Spaniards themselves who knew something about fighting—having carried out nearly 800 years of warfare against the Moors in Spain—were often, to use modern terminology, in "shock and awe" at Chichimec proficiency with the bow and arrow. As one observer put it, "In the opinion of men experienced in foreign lands, the [Chichimecs] are the best archers in the world." And, "They kill hares, which, even though running they pierce with arrows; also deer, birds, and even little animals of the land, not even overlooking rats. They fish with the bow and arrow." Children were taught the use of the bow from the time they could walk, "and they practice shooting at insects." The Chichimec arrow was so deadly it could easily penetrate Spanish plate armor and chain mail. This forced the Spanish to use several layers of cotton quilting as armor (much like the modern flack jacket) that did prove effective against Chichimec arrows. By the way, Spaniards learned about cotton quilted armor from the Aztecs, who did not know how to forge metal.

For thirty-five years the Spanish answer to Chichimec attacks was increased military pressure and vicious reprisals for loss of lives. In the final analysis, what the Spanish called "Fire and Blood" policy failed and failed miserably.

Around the middle of the 1580s, Spain gave up on "Fire and Blood" tactics and adopted what historians have called "Peace by Purchase." This new policy, urged on by the Spanish clergy and accepted by army commanders, was out carried for fifteen years (1585-1600) and it worked because: (1) Peaceful sedentary Indians, especially Aztecs and Tlaxcalans, were brought to the frontier to serve as models of good conduct. The transplanting of sedentary Indians to the frontier was used as far north as New Mexico. This was considered for Spanish Texas but was never used. (2) Wives and children of Chichimecs were captured and held as hostages to insure the good conduct of their warrior husbands and fathers. (3) Gifts of clothing, food, and supplies were given as rewards to pacified Indians. (4) And by this time the missionary clergy had begun to learn the Indian languages and could serve as agents of persuasion and pacification.

By 1600 the Chichimec wars in northern Mexico had largely come to an end. During these wars and for the first time in its history, Spain used missions and presidios to deal with decentralized and largely nomadic Indians. (You can readily see that *encomienda* could not possibly have worked in dealing with these indigenous people). From this point on, Spain would use a combination of force and persuasion on its northern frontier, including Texas. The presidios represented force, and the missions were another aspect of "Peace by Purchase."

As the frontier of northern Mexico expanded in the second half of the 1500s, the overall strategy of how missions and presidios were intended to work in pacifying nomadic natives took form. In theory, it worked along these lines: (1) The settled and relatively secure areas on the frontier included mines, ranches, and missions, and of course the line of settlement moved northward toward Texas—a movement that continued throughout the 1600s. (2) A new mission and presidio would advance into the unsettled region, perhaps as many as fifty miles beyond the settled frontier. (3) The new mission was supported and defended by a nearby presidio staffed with soldiers. (4) The missionary clergy were usually members of the Franciscan Order—that is, regular or order clergy. These regular clergy were temporarily assigned to the mission. They were to serve a maximum of ten years, and then move on to a new mission beyond the settled frontier and start the process all over again. (5) And the overall goal of the regular clergy was to Christianize and Hispanicize their Indian charges and make them tax-paying citizens. Once the regular clergy left a mission, they were replaced by secular or non-order clergy.

On January 1, 1700, the first mission of lasting importance to Spanish Texas was founded on the south bank of the Río Grande, a short distance from present-day Piedras Negras and Eagle Pass. The Río Grande mission, San Juan Bautista, was soon joined by two more missions and a presidio in 1703, also named San Juan Bautista. This locale was at a ford in the Río Grande and was the main avenue into and out of Texas.

Now, at this juncture, Spanish Texas as we have defined it was not occupied by Spaniards. But they had explored parts of Texas in the 1680s and occupied an East Texas mission in the early 1690s.

Briefly, the French, led by René Robert Sieur de La Salle, had set up an ill-fated colony near Matagorda Bay in the mid-1680s. Spaniards learned of the colony's existence soon after its founding but did not know where it was located. In the late 1680s, Spain sent out five sea expeditions and six by land before finding the remains of the French colony in April 1689—by then Indians had already destroyed the colony and killed all the adults.

To secure East Texas, Spain established its first mission, San Francisco de los Tejas in 1690 (probably near modern Augusta in northeast Houston County). There was no presidio to defend it. At this juncture, it is important to note that the Franciscan clergy believed the sedentary Caddo Indians so peacefully inclined (especially when compared with the Chichimecs of northern Mexico) that they did not need or want a military presence. The military commander, General Alonso de León, wanted to leave fifty soldiers in East Texas; the clergy would accept only five.

Within three years, the Franciscans had to abandon this first mission and burn it before fleeing southward to Mexico. The failure of this mission may be attributed to floods, epidemic diseases among the Indians, and opposition by the Caddos who threatened rebellion. Bottom line—Texas was abandoned from 1693 to 1716; and at no time in the future

were missions established anywhere in Texas without the eventual support and security provided by military garrisons.

In abandoning Texas for about twenty-five years, the Spanish failed to take into account France's goal of establishing a colony near the mouth of the Mississippi and the threat this would eventually pose for East Texas. Starting in 1699, the French established a foothold near present-day Ocean Springs, Mississippi, and began the settlement of the lower Mississippi Valley. In July 1714 Louis Juchereau de St. Denis, a Canadian-born French adventurer, crossed East Texas and arrived at Presidio San Juan Bautista, which alerted Spain to the dangers of an unoccupied Texas.

The Spanish response was not long in coming. In 1716 and 1717, six new missions and a presidio were set up in East Texas and western Louisiana. This was the very locale where Mission San Francisco de los Tejas had failed in 1693, but now there was a military garrison in the region. Then in the following year, 1718, a mission, presidio, and civil settlement were established on the San Antonio River.

As mentioned in the conference's introductory remarks, by the late 1600s, wars in Europe began to spill over into the Americas; this continued through the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), which actually began in the Americas in 1754 and then spread to Europe. The point here is that a relatively obscure war in Europe began in early 1719—pitting a Quadruple Alliance of England, France, Holland, and Austria against Spain. Six months passed before the Spanish in East Texas knew that the mother country was at war with France.

The Spanish first learned of this far-off conflict when half a dozen French soldiers from Natchitoches descended on the most eastern of the six new missions in East Texas. The French quickly subdued one half-naked and unarmed Spanish soldier, as well as the local priest. They then turned their attention to the mission's chicken house, caught a few hens, tied their legs together, and slung the birds over the back of the French captain's horse. The chickens flapped their wings in protest, which caused the horse to shy and spill the captain in the dirt. In the confusion, the priest fled into the woods and escaped. He reached the presidio with news of the attack and panic set in—a version of Chicken Little's "The Sky is Falling" lament. Soon rumor spread that one hundred French soldiers were on their way to East Texas. Overreacting, Spaniards abandoned all six missions and the presidio and began a long retreat to San Antonio. This war is derisively called the "Chicken War" by the Spanish, but it had important results. Once again, East Texas was unoccupied by Spaniards.

The war in Europe lasted for just more than a year. But in Mexico, where there was a substantial time lag in news from the Continent, plans went forward for the reoccupation of East Texas—by force of arms if necessary. Five hundred armed men and cannon crossed the Río Grande in late 1719, but by then there was word that the Quadruple Alliance and Spain were negotiating a truce that would end the war in Europe.

This Spanish expedition, led by the Marqués de Aguayo did reoccupy East Texas in the summer of 1721. And Aguayo did much to ensure that Texas would be Spanish, not French: (1) He refounded the six missions in East Texas. (2) He built two presidios in East Texas to protect the missions and defend against the French. (3) He marched to the site of the old French colony near Matagorda Bay, where he founded a presidio and mission. (4) Aguayo had brought six hundred mule loads of merchandise, plus literally hundreds of horses, cattle, sheep, and mules into Texas. His expedition was the first big “Cattle Drive” in Texas history. In many respects, Aguayo brought Spanish livestock to Texas. (5) And a second mission in San Antonio, San José de San Miguel de Aguayo, had been founded and named in his honor.

Because of the theme of this conference, it might interest you to know that Aguayo had apparently studied the works of Louis XIV’s great military engineer, Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban on siege craft and fortifications, which existed only in manuscript form until its publication in 1740. Many have long argued that Aguayo never built anything very elaborate in Texas. But recent excavations at the French fort near Matagorda Bay have discovered the footings for his star-shaped Presidio Nuestra Señora de Loreto. I think we can assume that his plans for all Texas presidios were actually carried out.

Aguayo had increased the strength of the military guard in Texas from 60 or 70 to 268. But his work was soon undone. In the 1720s France and Spain, both under Bourbon dynasties, began the long process of becoming allies in the eighteenth century. Spain first began its retrenchment in East Texas. By 1730 Spain closed the western most presidio in East Texas, and the three nearby missions were left without military support. By 1731 these missions had been moved to San Antonio, bringing the total number of religious establishments there to five.

The weakening of military defense in Spanish Texas, primarily because the French were no longer considered a serious threat, led almost immediately to problems with the Indians—especially the Lipan Apaches, who were being driven toward San Antonio by their archenemies, the Comanches. By the 1750s the Lipans were in serious trouble, squeezed as they were between Comanches in the north and Spaniards in the south.

At that time, the Apaches agreed to be peaceful if the Spanish would build a mission for them in their lands to the northwest of Austin. The Spanish agreed and in 1757 built the San Sabá mission and presidio located in Central Texas at present-day Menard. Although the Apaches had promised to live in the mission, they refused to do so. What happened instead is a good example of Apache guile. They would stop by the mission on their way north, pick up things that were clearly Spanish—like shoes and clothes—then carry out attacks on the Comanches, always leaving behind articles of European manufacture and lending the impression that Spaniards had supported their attacks.

The Comanches were understandably furious. By March 1758, they

had recruited hundreds of Indian allies, especially Taovayas (Wichitas), and descended on the mission—located about four miles east of the presidio. The Indians killed two priests, eight Spaniards, and burned the mission. In their fury they even killed the mission cats and oxen. By the way, the San Sabá mission was the only mission in Spanish Texas destroyed by outright Indian attack.

The Spanish responded to the destruction of their mission and loss of life by sending a message to the Comanches and their allies, that “even in their most remote haunts they would not be secure from the long arm of Spanish vengeance.” With a force of more than five hundred men, Colonel Diego Ortiz Parrilla left San Sabá and marched to the Red River near Nocona. In early October 1759, Ortiz Parrilla entered a clearing where he could see the north bank of the Red. To his astonishment there was a palisaded fort within which he spied the French Fleur de Lis (some reports say that the Spanish heard the sound of fife and drum within the fort). In a pitched battle with Indians that lasted for several hours, Ortiz Parrilla suffered losses but inflicted even greater ones on the enemy. Nevertheless, the Spanish commander was obliged to leave behind two cannon, but the artillery pieces were retrieved about ten years later by Athanase de Mézières.

Following a series of skirmishes with powerful Plains Indians in the 1770s and early 1780s, the Spanish signed a peace treaty with the Comanches in 1785 that essentially lasted throughout the remainder of the colonial era. But by the mid-1780s, the only viable missions left in Texas were at Goliad and San Antonio, and even they were in serious decline. Beginning in the 1790s, Texas missions were secularized. This meant turning over operation of the missions to the secular, or non-order clergy. As mentioned earlier, Texas missions were to be run by the regular clergy, such as Franciscans or Dominicans, for a maximum of ten years; but the Texas Indians were not considered Hispanicized and Christianized enough to do this for several decades.

The failure of the mission system essentially meant that a military solution was now the main course of action in dealing with Texas Indians. This was especially true of Karankawas along the Texas Coast.

The 1790s was also the decade in which American adventurers, mostly notable Philip Nolan, began making forays into Texas in search of wild mustangs for sale in Louisiana. Spaniards came to view Nolan as a spy or an advance agent of American expansion. On his fourth expedition in 1801, Nolan and his followers were surrounded by Spanish forces near Waco. Early in the fighting, Nolan was shot in the head and killed. Nine of his followers were captured and taken to Ciudad Chihuahua. These nine had to cast dice on a barrel head, and the one with the lowest number would be hanged for firing on the king's soldier. Ephraim Blackburn's “four” sealed his fate.

By 1810-1811, Spanish Texas was caught up in Mexico's struggle for independence from Spain. For a brief time in early 1811, insurgents over-

threw the Spanish government in San Antonio. But royalists regained control after only thirty-nine days. Nevertheless, it was clear that Spanish control over Texas was shaky.

Importantly, a Mexican insurgent named Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara traveled to Washington D.C., and arrived there in late 1811. Gutiérrez met with U.S. officials in War and State, as well as with President James Madison. Clearly, what Gutiérrez wanted was American aid for Mexican independence. There is no evidence that Gutiérrez received any encouragement or promise of assistance whatsoever from the United States, despite claims to the contrary.

Gutiérrez did get passage on a U.S. ship from Philadelphia to New Orleans. From there he traveled to Natchitoches, where the Mexican insurgent found no shortage of volunteers and adventurers who were willing to attack royalists in Texas. One of his recruits was Augustus William Magee, a West Point graduate and artillery officer who had left the U.S. Army.

Gutiérrez and Magee operated under the self-chosen name of the "Republican Army of the North," and soon had recruited about 130 followers. In 1812 this ragtag army descended on Nacogdoches and captured it without firing a shot, whereupon its numbers swelled to around 300.

The invaders then headed for Goliad and captured the presidio there, where they captured two or three cannon. Spaniards from San Antonio, headed by the governor and Lieutenant Colonel Simón de Herrera marched on Goliad and placed the presidio under siege. But the siege failed, and the Spaniards had to retire to San Antonio. During the engagement Augustus Magee died, leaving command of the rebel army solely in the hands of Gutiérrez.

The so-called Republicans then marched on San Antonio, won a major battle outside the city, and arrested Governor Manuel de Salcedo, Simón de Herrera, and fifteen Spanish officers and sergeants. These seventeen men were sentenced to death but given hope that they would be exiled to American Louisiana. Instead, they were taken outside San Antonio and murdered.

Spain, however, would not tolerate an independent Texas and the murder of its governor. It appointed a no-nonsense military officer in Mexico, Commandant General Joaquín de Arredondo who would alter the course of Texas history. Arredondo assembled more the 1,800 infantry and cavalry troops and marched on Texas. One of his second lieutenants was a young officer names Antonio López de Santa Anna, who got his first taste of battle in Texas and came away with a dim view of the fighting qualities of Anglo Americans.

Opposing Arredondo was the "Republican Army of the North" with about 1,400 former royalists, American adventurers, and a few Indian allies. This collection of men left San Antonio and marched about twenty-five miles south to the Medina River where it engaged Arredondo's forces on August 18, 1813. The Republicans fought well for about three hours,

and then they broke ranks and fled, making themselves easy targets for Spanish cavalry units armed with sabers and lances.

The Battle of Medina is the bloodiest battle in Texas history. An estimated thirteen hundred of the Republican army died in this battle or were later executed as pirates. Arredondo lost fewer than sixty men. Bear in mind the cost of this battle. Thirteen of every fourteen members of the Republican army either died in this battle or were soon executed.

San Antonio was then undefended and Joaquín "the Butcher" de Arredondo would soon demonstrate his "tender mercies" on its inhabitants. For fifty-four days Arredondo meted out executions to "those deserving death." Anyone suspected of supporting or sympathizing with the rebels was summarily shot without trial.

The military history of Spanish Texas essentially ends with the Battle of the Medina and reprisals of Arredondo in San Antonio. Texas got a decent Spanish governor in 1817, a man named Antonio Martínez who presided over a ruined province until 1821. There was no fighting when Spanish rule ended on July 19, 1821. By then Nacogdoches, which once had a population of more than 500 people, was a ghost town. In the words of Texas's last Spanish governor, Arredondo and the king's soldiers had "drained the resources of the country and laid their hands on everything that could sustain life." Again in Governor Martínez's words, Texas had "advanced at an amazing rate toward ruin and destruction."

One last observation: Spanish Texas reported 3,103 people in its first census of 1777. The estimated non-Indian population of Texas in 1821 was slightly more than 2,000. You can readily see how few people were in Texas and how open it was to Anglo-American immigration. Even Arredondo knew that "to govern is to populate," and signed off on an agreement with Moses Austin allowing Anglo-Americans, whom he disliked and distrusted, to enter Texas. Clearly the ethnic population of Texas was about to change.

CONCLUSIONS

The military history of Spanish Texas may be characterized as periodic clashes with Indians, especially Taovayas, Comanches, and Lipan Apaches. When a mission was established for the Lipans at San Sabá in the late 1750s, it brought down the wrath of the Comanches and Taovayas who later stood off a Spanish army at Red River in 1759, forcing the temporary abandonment of two cannons. Peace with the Comanches in 1785 foreshadowed problems with American adventurers such as Philip Nolan in the 1790s and early 1800s. When the Mexican revolution of 1810 spilled over into Texas, it unleashed rebels within Texas and outside of it in Louisiana. This ultimately led to the punitive expedition of Joaquín de Arredondo in 1813 and the destruction of Texas's population to the point that Arredondo himself favored the immigration of Anglo Americans by the time Mexican Texas began in 1821.

“TO THE LAST DROP OF OUR BLOOD”

Defending King and Empire in San Antonio

JESÚS F. DE LA TEJA
TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY-SAN MARCOS

On 8 May 1791 the citizens of San Fernando de Béxar, as the chartered town we now call San Antonio was then known, addressed a petition to the Commandant General of the Interior Provinces, the military-political jurisdiction of which Texas was a unit. Governor Manuel Muñoz had issued an order calling for the removal of the civilians' horses from the company herd. Not only was this a break in tradition, but it exposed the impoverished citizenry to great hardship. They asked to be relieved of the burden of guarding their horse herd, except for those times when the company went on campaigns, scouting expeditions, and other royal business. The reasons they gave for their request were familiar to every governor and other royal officials who had had the misfortune of dealing with Bexareños for over a half century. They were a miserable lot of wretched unfortunates, who had little on which to maintain themselves other than their limited plantings and personal labor, the result of the many years “that the enemy Indians have pursued and harassed us, for which reason we have not been able to raise our heads above water.” The request did not mean, however, that they were not willing undertake other services “to the last drop of our blood.” The commandant general, sympathetic to their plight, granted them their request and ordered Governor Muñoz to allow the integration of the civilian herd, including tame mares, into the military *caballada* (horse herd).

Ten years earlier, in his monthly military report, then-governor Domingo Cabello, wrote an account of an event—one of many over the decades—that supported the truthfulness of the citizens' petition noted above. The lone survivor of a Comanche ambush of a patrol out of the Fuerte del Cíbolo, a post on the road between San Antonio and La Bahía, led a rescue party to the site of the skirmish. There, according to Cabello, they found the troop “leaning against trees, their scalps missing and their fingers and noses cut off. But they must have put up a good fight, for fifty spent cartridges were found and the lips and teeth of the soldiers were black with powder, and from the evidence it seems they must have

killed some Indians." Shortly after, Cabello received a summons for help from Ensign Valdez who, while out on patrol from the Cíbolo post, felt threatened by a superior force of Indians. Retired Ensign Baltasar de los Reyes Pérez offered to lead the rescue party, which consisted of 37 soldiers and 45 citizens. They set out at 11 p.m. and managed to join up with Valdez early the next morning, but could not catch the Indians. On the way back they found the bodies of José Flores and Melchor Ximénez, who had stayed behind hunting for a cow when Valdez left Cíbolo.

The Cíbolo post had been established ten years earlier, in March 1771, as a result of increased hostilities in the countryside. A temporary respite from Comanche, Apache, and Norteño raiding in the late 1760s had led to the reoccupation of a number of civilian ranches in the valleys of the San Antonio and its tributaries east of town. Renewed hostilities as far as La Bahía had brought the rancheros to request of Governor Barón de Ripperdá that he provide a guard so that the ranchers could plant their fields. The result was the construction of a stockade at the site of Vicente Alvarez Travieso's Rancho Las Mulas, where, "because of the great danger, only one horse per man should be taken." The arrangement was to last until it was once again safe for each ranchero to return to his lands and fields.

A decade before that, in June 1762 the townspeople of San Antonio joined the missionary at Espíritu Santo in complaining about Apache depredations to the new governor, Angel Martos y Navarrete. "The Apaches are stealing our horses and slaughtering our cattle and oxen in the vicinity of the presidio and town with such audacity that they almost take no precautions. If a group from the town goes to the *rancherías* (Indian villages) and spots livestock with known brands, not only do the Indians not return them, but they laugh at us since our forces are so weak."

The correlation between Indians and presidio, and the survival of San Antonio had been made clear yet another ten years earlier, in June 1750, during an investigation on the desirability of moving the presidio to a site on the Pedernales River in support of a new mission for the Apaches. Although Fray Mariano Francisco de los Dolores of Mission Valero agreed that the transfer would result in the ability of the citizenry to move into the countryside to farm and raise cattle, conditions in town did not permit the move. The citizenry was poor, lazy, and dependent on the supplies provided to the presidio for their sustenance. Béxar's town council agreed, stating that the town counted no more than fifty or sixty vecinos (citizens), not all of them armed. "If the presidio were moved, not one-half the citizenry would remain, because of all who would follow it, because it is the only commerce this country has."

Talk of bringing the Apaches to the light of salvation and civilization had been going around among missionaries for over a decade by the time the Pedernales plan was proposed. In fact, much of the debate centered on whether Béxar's settlers were not making things tough on themselves because of their treatment of the Indians. Lipan attacks in the late 1730s

finally drove Captain Joseph Urrutia to organize the first of three campaigns into Apache territory in the winter of 1739. The expedition was roundly condemned by Fray Benito Fernández de Santa Ana, who claimed that the time of year and the lack of discipline among the soldiery only served to increase the hostility of the Indians. Moreover, "it is ridiculous that these same persons should claim certificates as servants of the King our Lord, when they were interested in what I have stated, and had greater hopes of a considerable prize of horses, hides, and Indian men and women to serve them."

Horses, settlers, and soldiers—they had been part of the mix from the very beginning of San Fernando, a decade before Urrutia's campaign. Having taken stock of the Canary Islanders who had just arrived in Béxar after more than a year-long journey from their homeland, Captain Juan Antonio Pérez de Almazán could only scratch his head in wonderment. He provided lodgings for the settlers in the most comfortable dwellings available in the presidio, despite the hardship caused to the soldiers' families. Then, signaling his disapproval of the whole affair, and "considering the exhausted condition of the settlers, their inexperience with the weapons used against the Indians, and their lack of horsemanship to hinder their usefulness on the watch, I therefore placed the horses of the settlers with those of the company." Thus were presidio and town joined, a tradition started, and San Antonio's career as a military town cemented.

One last decade-long step back in time brings us to the beginning of our story in the earliest days of San Antonio, when it was a fledgling community not yet completely settled into its permanent site. In 1721 the Marqués de San Miguel de Aguayo was in the midst of his reorganization of the province, making sure that it was sufficiently strong to hold off further French incursions from Louisiana and Indian depredations from the interior. A year earlier, the first documented Apache attack on the settlement had taken place—the killing of two men out searching for missing horses. Aguayo felt the Lipan Apache menace so strong that he increased the garrison by over twenty enlisted men, bringing troop strength to 54 officers and men.

It was the failure of the 1690-1693 religious occupation of Texas, which had been based on the Franciscans' exaggerated hopes of converting the Hasinai into loyal Christian Spanish subjects, which served as a good lesson for the 1716-1718 permanent settlement of the province. Texas would no doubt be a religious province, but it would also be a military district. The mission and the presidio would work hand in hand, just as they had come to do throughout the colonial Mexican far north. It was from that religious-military tradition that San Antonio was born. It was the tradition on which the occupation of California would take place fifty years later.

The upper reaches of the San Antonio River held a number of natural advantages as a site for a missionary-military complex to serve as a way-station between presidios San Juan Bautista del Río Grande and Nuestra

Señora del Pilar de Los Adaes. To a greater degree than other Texas streams, the San Antonio River was fit for irrigation. The area held plentiful supplies of timber and rock for construction and nearby prairies offered an abundance of grazing land. During a 1709 exploration Fray Isidro Espinosa was effusive in his praise for the area; returning to the site in 1716 as part of the expedition headed for the occupation of east Texas, he sounded even more like a real estate agent in his description of the locale's potential, praising the abundance of useful plants, animals, and fish. A veteran of northern Mexico's arid environment, he was laudatory of the aquatic resources: "its copious waters . . . are clear, crystal, and sweet."

Finding a location for the military-religious complex was the easy part. It would prove much more difficult to turn the post into a flourishing settlement. Governor Martín de Alarcón founded Mission San Antonio de Valero and Villa de Béxar at the beginning of May 1718, but the *villa*, or town, never developed. Working alongside mission Indians and the few retirees who stayed on after fulfilling their enlistments, soldiers cleared fields, dug *acequias* (irrigation canals), and erected homes and other buildings. Some of the younger men married from among the daughters of the older soldiers, or found spouses among the presidio families at Los Adaes or La Bahía, but others had to go in search of their wives outside the province. Although the thirty or so soldier-settlers of the Alarcón expedition were joined by those recruited by Aguayo, and later in the 1720s by a few more, it soon became clear that Texas offered no incentives to civilian colonization.

When Inspector General Pedro de Rivera inspected the company late in 1727 he was generally satisfied with the military community: the garrison was well armed and disciplined, although the prices charged by the commander to his men were high; the Apaches, he believed, had been chastised to the point of submission. The soldiers may well have boasted to him of the successful 1723 campaign in which they had killed over thirty braves and captured many horses along with women and children. With the appearance of the regulations of 1729, based on Rivera's recommendations for cost savings, Presidio de Béxar experienced a reduction in troop strength by ten billets, ironically producing the first substantial boost in the settlement's civilian population.

Two other Rivera recommendations conspired to turn San Antonio into the center of Spanish activity in Texas. One had to do with the largely moribund missions of east Texas, which soaked up scarce financial resources. Rivera recommended reducing their number because the Hainais were peaceful Indians who seemed willing to deal with the Spaniards without the intervention of missionaries. After a few months' stay at what is now Barton Springs in Austin, three missions found a permanent location along the San Antonio River south of the existing communities. In early March 1731 missions Concepción, San Juan Capistrano, and San Francisco de la Espada joined the original San Antonio mission, Valero

(now the Alamo), and another founded in 1722, San José y San Miguel de Aguayo, to form the Alamo chain of missions.

Rivera's second recommendation echoed one that had been made by the Marqués de Aguayo upon his return to Coahuila: to foster the civilian settlement of the province, families from Spain or the Canary Islands should be encouraged to migrate. The king eventually approved the plan for the transfer of four hundred families, but of these, only fifteen eventually reached San Antonio. Seeing what he had to work with, Captain Almazán thought unworkable the order that the Canary Islanders be settled in their own separate community. Instead, as stated earlier, he housed the new arrivals among the presidio families while he prepared the area immediately east of the presidio as the site of San Fernando de Béxar.

The small garrison had its hands full. The garrison provided each mission with a guard of about three men. The community's horse herd, as we have seen, itself required a substantial guard. Escort service—of the mail, of visitors entering or leaving the province, of civilians going to cut timber or to hunt—also reduced the number of troopers available at the garrison itself. When not otherwise occupied, the soldiers performed construction work around the presidio. Of the forty-three men in the company, the commander could rarely count on more than a handful to be on hand, and these were usually the infirm or injured. Not surprisingly, Béxar's commanders came to rely on civilians and mission Indians to supplement presidio troops. In the summer of 1745, following Captain Toribio de Urrutia's campaign against the Apaches, the Indians mounted one of their most determined attacks on the settlement, which was saved only through the timely arrival of a militia composed of Mission Valero Indians.

A temporary peace with the Apaches was reached in 1749, following another campaign by Captain Urrutia the main purpose of which was to take captives for negotiation. In one of the most spectacular events to have taken place in the frontier community to that time, Apaches and Spanish colonials gathered around a large pit dug in the center of the military plaza, where the symbols of war—a horse, hatchet, lance, and arrows—were buried while settlers, Indians, and dignitaries danced to seal the peace.

The years of relative peace that followed led royal officials to repeat the mistake that General Rivera had made in 1727, the erroneous assumption that peace with the Indians was at hand and that the garrison could be reduced. Always short of funds, royal officials decided to populate the garrison being created to protect a new mission for the Apaches in part with twenty-two men from the Béxar company. The reduction of the garrison to twenty-one effectives, not counting the captain, not only posed a setback to the community's growth, it forced the civilian population to take on a greater share of the defensive burden. It is during this time that an organized militia emerged, although, as might be expected, the citizenry always played down its ability to contribute to the community's defense in order to restore the company's fighting strength.

In the punitive expedition that followed the Comanche-Norteño attack on Mission San Sabá in 1758, a few soldiers and numerous civilians and mission Indians from San Antonio participated. The expedition proved a miserable failure and only served to make Béxar the target of the Apaches' enemies, who now considered San Antonio's population allies of their Apache enemy. The result was an increasing level of violence that required the posting of temporary detachments from other presidios at Béxar to help manage the situation. The twenty-two men that Béxar had provided for the San Sabá presidio returned in 1769 when the viceroy approved their temporary posting. By 1773 San Antonio's garrison could count on a permanent troop strength of eighty men, led by none other than the provincial governor, whose capital the viceroy officially moved to Béxar that year.

What happened? From its beginnings until the late 1760s the presidio had been a virtual fiefdom. Presidio commanders had almost complete autonomy in running their companies. They recruited their own men for enlistments of ten years, controlled the payrolls, faced only infrequent inspections, and meted out justice as *justicia mayor* in the jurisdiction—in San Antonio this last prerogative became a major bone of contention between the commander and the town council, which claimed that the king had granted its civilian authorities jurisdictional autonomy. In sum, the presidio system had evolved as an ad-hoc response to local circumstances in New Spain, and was neither part of the regular army nor a distinct unified command. Presidios came in all shapes and sizes, and while some were under the direct jurisdiction of the viceroy, others were under the authority of the provincial governor.

In Béxar's case command had actually become a family legacy. After the terms of the first two commanders, Juan Pérez de Almazán and Nicolás Flores de Abrego, the captaincy had passed to Joseph de Urrutia, an old frontier hand with personal knowledge of Texas's Indians going back to the early 1690s. Following his death his son Toribio took command, and upon his retirement Luis Antonio Menchaca, Toribio's nephew, assumed the post. It was Toribio who had built what is now called the Governor's Palace, a building that served as both home and general store for the town until an independent civilian commercial sector developed in the 1770s. Because they controlled the payrolls, and because the payroll was converted into goods for issuance at elevated prices, the captains were the wealthiest men in town and ran stores that supplied the rest of the community. This state of affairs was so normal that when Toribio de Urrutia asked for retirement at full pay after thirty years of service, the viceroy's advisor replied that although the law did not allow it without the king's permission, he and his successor could split the salary since, "the advantages of the post will surely make someone take it up even under these conditions."

The 1760s marked a turning point in San Antonio's military history.

Increased hostilities from Comanches and the Nations of the North created a need to address its long-term survivability. Viceregal authorities and the governor attempted to deal with the growing crisis by shuffling available resources around, with detachments from as far away as Nuevo Santander and Coahuila stationed at San Antonio for limited periods of time, but that was no solution. In 1766 Captain Menchaca found an opportunity to press the case for reinforcing San Antonio when Governor Navarrete instructed him to supply ten soldiers and thirty-five mission Indians to an exploratory expedition to the coast. Menchaca refused to supply the soldiers and was unable to convince the missionaries to do likewise. His reasons reveal the state of defenses at Béxar in the face of growing Indian hostilities. He was not responsible for the missionaries' unwillingness to supply Indians—they argued that the Indians made their living from doing daily manual work and should be compensated for being drawn away from their labor for such a mission—he went on to state that he had only six men on hand, three of whom were on guard duty over the horse herd, and the other three on watch over the artillery. Although the company was composed of twenty-one men, with three stationed at each mission, and with no instructions to remove them, he could not see how he could carry out the order. Furthermore, the presidio, town, and missions were subject to constant Indian attack about which he could do nothing. The solution lay in increasing the garrison and having soldiers from La Bahía and Los Adaes temporarily stationed at San Antonio. The worst was yet to come, he warned, as Indians had stolen about one thousand animals, and although the detachments he had sent out to track them down had failed, a group of mission Indians from San Jose had met up with four Comanches, whom they managed to kill. "So it is certain that the war with the Comanche will only grow worse."

From the king on down there was a growing realization that the entire frontier defense structure needed a serious overhaul, especially Texas, which had been the border province with French Louisiana, but the strategic importance of which had changed now that Spain had acquired the territory west of the Mississippi River. The man charged with evaluating New Spain's northern frontier defenses was the Marqués de Rubí, a Spanish officer trained in the latest military techniques. His inspection took him from the Gulf of California to the Gulf of Mexico over a two-year span, at the end of which he presented a bold plan that had major consequences for Texas, particularly San Antonio. Although he recommended that a presidio line be established at 30° north latitude, with all territory above that line be abandoned to the Indians, he also recommended that because of their importance Santa Fe and San Antonio be allowed to remain. Béxar came in for special attention, as Rubí recommended an increase in the size of the garrison, something that townspeople and commanders had been lobbying for since the removal of half the command in 1757. The additional troops would come from closure of

east Texas presidios Los Adaes and Orcoquisac. The expanded garrison would be commanded by the provincial governor, who would now have his capital at San Antonio.

The changes officially took effect in 1773. Governor Juan María, Barón de Ripperdá oversaw the permanent expansion of the company to eighty men, and the establishment of the Cíbolo post. Rubí's recommendations, incorporated into the *Reglamento* of 1772 and other decrees, for the first time addressed the presidios of New Spain as a system rather than as an ad hoc collection of semi-autonomous posts. The *Reglamento* called for each company to have a quartermaster, elected from among the officers of the company by the entire garrison. That officer would hold fiduciary responsibility for handling the payroll of the garrison, from which provisions and supplies were to be bought. By taking the payroll and supply functions away from the company commander, higher officials sought to end the rampant corruption and inefficiencies that ill-served royal interests. Each soldier was to receive part of his pay (which was reduced under the logic that given the reforms less would be more) in cash in an effort to boost the local economy and to encourage him to keep his uniform, equipment, and mounts, which in the past had often been sold to cover personal expenses. The regulations also called for regular drilling, including target practice, and inspections. On the bureaucratic side, company commanders were to make monthly reports of all military activities within their jurisdiction and maintain a monthly muster book stating the detail to which each member of the unit was assigned.

The reordering of the presidios was followed up by the creation of a new administrative unit for the frontier that would make communications and decision making more efficient. The Comandancia General de las Provincias Internas, although never the fix-all that the king's ministers thought it would be, at least created a chain of command at the top of which sat an individual with intimate knowledge of frontier conditions and a zeal for the royal service. In the first decade of its existence, the comandante general's most important actions were to plan a new strategy for dealing with the various autonomous tribes, particularly the multiple bands of Apaches that carried out depredations from the Sonora-Arizona border region to San Antonio and La Bahía.

For Presidio de Béxar the changes were profound. Although Ripperdá's successor, Colonel Domingo Cabello, abolished the Cíbolo post, the challenges he faced in his administration, between 1778 and 1786, contributed to the further expansion of the presidio company. By 1781 the garrison had increased to 100 men and had been divided into two companies, one light cavalry and one heavy cavalry. The citizens' militia was reorganized and supplied with standard weapons. And San Antonio became the center of negotiations with the various Comanche and Norteño bands. Campaigns from San Antonio and Santa Fe against the Apaches brought most of these bands under general control by the end of the decade.

The last decade of the eighteenth century was one of relative stability on San Antonio's Indian frontier. Still, the presidio represented the settlement's most important institution. Most members of the garrison were locals, some of them third or fourth generation soldiers of the company. Thus, the presidio was the B exar's most important employer, as it was the most important market. While in the early years the captain's store, stocked from the profits the commander gained from managing the company payrolls, served the rest of the community, by late decades a number of full-time shopkeepers and artisans had the garrison and its dependents for regular customers. Recruits had always seen the presidio as an opportunity to escape the general poverty of Texas; enlistment protected soldiers and families from the instability of the local agricultural economy and most presidio work called for skills that young men already possessed—horseback riding, herding, reading Indian signs, construction. With a little luck and moderate habits, a soldier could stay relatively out of debt, yet know that in case of need the company served as an economic safety net.

The early nineteenth century takes us into a complicated set of political and military transformations that would require an additional paper to explain. The Louisiana Purchase reestablished Texas as a border province with an acquisitive neighbor willing to work through area Indians to undermine Spanish authority. United States claims of Texas as part of Louisiana required a massive reinforcement of the province that brought hundreds of troops from throughout northeastern Mexico to Texas. In the midst of this, the Mexican War of Independence erupted and Texas's military establishment blew with the winds of change, fighting both against and for royalist interests. By the time of Mexican independence in 1821, the progress that had been made in creating a sustainable society based on a relatively well-equipped military force and strategic consideration of Indian interests was in shambles. Independent Mexico was never equipped to properly restore the presidio system to its required strength and vitality and its feeble attempts to do so in the early 1830s made up one of the contributing factors leading to the struggle for Texas independence.

NOTES

1. Representaci n hecha por el vecindario de esta villa solicitando la reuni n de sus caballer as al situado de la tropa, A o de 1791, May 8, 1791, Bexar Archives, Center for American History, the University of Texas at Austin (hereafter cited as BA).

2. Estado de la fuerza efectiva. Feb. 28, 1781, BA.

3. Auto of Gov. Ripperd a, Feb. 24, 1771, BA.

4. Petition of Fr. Pedro Ram rez, June 6, 1762, BA.

5. Testimonio de los autos fechos sobre la reducci n de los indios gentiles de la naci n Apache a las misiones de los r os de San Xavier de la provincia de Texas.

Nov. 29, 1749, Audiencia de Mexico 92-6-22, Archivo General de la Nación de México, in *Spanish Materials from Various Sources*, vol. 90, Center for American History, the University of Texas at Austin (hereafter cited as SM).

6. Carlos E. Castañeda, *Our Catholic Heritage in Texas* 7 vols. (reprint; New York: Arno, 1976) 3:47.

7. Auto en que se da razón de haber hospedado a los isleños y otras providencias. Mar. 10, 1731, Provincias Internas vol. 32, pt. 2, SM vol. 727.

8. Unless otherwise cited, this paper is based on Jesús F. de la Teja, *San Antonio de Béxar: A Community on New Spain's Northern Frontier* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995).

9. Jesús F. de la Teja, "A Fine Country with Broad Plains—the Most Beautiful in New Spain": Colonial Views of Land and Nature," in Char Miller, ed., *On the Border: An Environmental History of San Antonio* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 48.

10. Spanish jurisdictional nomenclature is rather confusing, which no doubt contributed to modern names of city and country. The district to which the city, presidio, missions, and outlying ranches belonged was called San Antonio de Béxar, as was the presidio. The chartered town, named in honor of the heir to the Spanish throne and the medieval saint-king, was San Fernando de Béxar. Each mission had its individual names, as did each ranch. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the settlement as Béxar or San Antonio, identifying the specific entity—town, presidio—when necessary.

11. On the history of the presidio system see Max L. Moorhead, *The Presidio: Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975).

12. El virrey de Na. España da cuenta con Testimonio de haver concedido reforma a D. Toribio Urrutia Capitán del Presidio de Béjar y nombrado a D. Luis Menchaca. Aug. 11, 1763, Audiencia de Guadalajara 104-6-13, Archivo General de Indias, SM vol. 42.

13. Diligencias que en virtud de no haber contribuido don Luis Menchaca los diez hombres y 35 indios que se le pidieron para el reconocimiento de las islas blancas que se cometió al coronel Parrilla, tubo a bien de practicar el gobernador de Texas con lo demás que en ellas se expresa. June 30, 1766, BA.

14. For the Texas War of Independence period see Jesús F. de la Teja, "Rebellion on the Frontier," in Gerald E. Poyo, ed., *Tejano Journey, 1770-1850* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 15-30; for Mexican-period San Antonio see Jesús F. de la Teja and John Wheat, "Béxar: Profile of a Tejano Community," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 89, 1 (1985): 7-34.

CALCULATED VICTORY

Sam Houston's Campaign to Rescue the Texas Revolution

JAMES E. CRISP

In order to better appreciate the place of Sam Houston's cautious "San Jacinto" campaign in the larger story of the Texas Revolution, it is useful to understand the difficulties faced by General Houston in shifting the Texan war effort away from an overtly offensive posture during the winter of 1835-1836.

To be sure, the offensive actions of the Texans during the first phase of the war had served them well. The Mexican force sent out from San Antonio de Béxar to recover the now-famous Gonzales cannon was forced to return, bloodied and empty-handed, after the Texan volunteers crossed the Guadalupe in the early morning of October 2nd and enthusiastically engaged the enemy. The taunt of the rebels' flag notwithstanding, they did *not* wait for the government dragoons to "Come and Take" their precious ordnance. Most of the settlers who rushed to protect the Gonzales cannon had apparently left their homes eager for a fight, and their audacity was rewarded when the Mexicans withdrew from the field.

From Gonzales the rebels continued to take the fight to the enemy as they marched toward San Antonio under the titular command of the Anglo-Texan patriarch, Stephen F. Austin. The empresario turned general found that "titular" was a much more significant word than "commander" in the Texan "Army of the People," as most of the orders he gave over the few weeks of his generalship were either disputed or disobeyed by his headstrong soldiers and subordinates. This pattern did not end when Austin gave up his command in late November to seek aid for the rebel government in the United States. On the contrary, the tendency toward insubordination became one of the most common, and most costly, characteristics of the Texan war effort.

In the meantime, however, the offensive operations of the rebels continued to pay dividends. Even before Austin's motley crew reached their goal and laid siege to Béxar, other Texans seized the Goliad presidio on October 10th from the token garrison that had been left to defend that place by General Martín Perfecto de Cos as he marched to San Antonio following his September landing at Cópano Bay. The Mexican post at Lipantitlan on the Nueces was also successfully attacked and dismantled. Now Cos's only remaining line of supply and communication stretched all the way from San Antonio to the Río Grande.

Though he had been sent to Texas to prevent a rebellion, Cos did not have enough "boots on the ground" to defend both Goliad and San Antonio from an even partially aroused Texan population. Before the end of the year, thanks to key defections from his besieged army and the timely arrival in the Texan ranks of fresh volunteers from the United States, it became clear that Cos could not even hold on to San Antonio itself.

In early December, just as the Texans were about to give up their lengthy and uncomfortable siege of Béxar, a Mexican lieutenant sympathetic to the Federalist cause slipped out of town and urged the departing rebels not to move east into winter quarters without a fight. The Centralist forces under Cos, he said, were weak and the city could be taken. A Federalist-leaning cavalry unit had already mutinied and headed south. Emboldened by this news, the remaining rebel forces stormed San Antonio and after five days of fierce house-to-house combat, received Cos's capitulation. His subsequent withdrawal across the Río Grande meant that by mid-December no Centralist forces remained in Texas.

The introduction of the terms "Federalist" and "Centralist" into this description of the conflict reflects the political definition of the revolt adopted by Texan delegates to a "Consultation" which met in San Felipe de Austin while San Antonio was under siege. By a vote of 33 to 14, the members of the Consultation voted to declare their struggle as one in defense of the "republican principles of the Federal Constitution of Mexico, of 1824." For most Texans, these principles were: states' rights, limited government, *unlimited* immigration, low taxes, free trade, and no meaningful interference with slavery. It was under a Mexican tricolor with the year 1824 emblazoned on its central white band that the rebels, assisted by more than a hundred local *tejanos*, fought their way into San Antonio and defeated the representatives of President Santa Anna's Centralist regime.

This did not mean, however, that most of the delegates at San Felipe nor most of the soldiers who stormed San Antonio actually opposed the idea of Texan independence from Mexico. But such an outright declaration was seen by cautious men such as Austin and Houston as the kind of political candor which they could not yet afford. When war came bubbling up in 1835 from the cauldron of strife between contending Mexican factions in the interior—with the Centralist President Santa Anna dismissing state legislatures and shattering Federalist militias in Zacatecas and Coahuila—there did not exist in Texas the kind of unity or preparedness that could guarantee the success of an open war of secession against Mexico. The war had started before the most serious revolutionists were fully ready for it.

Most of the Texan revolt's leaders believed that their immediate fortunes depended on cooperation with Mexican Federalists who might well turn against them and embrace Santa Anna if the territorial integrity of the Mexican nation were threatened. But if such cooperation could succeed even temporarily, it might keep the war out of Texas and allow immi-

gration from the United States to continue unabated. Even before the Mexican civil war had reached Texas, Stephen F. Austin had concluded that “the violent political convulsions of Mexico” would soon shake Texas from Mexico “like a ripe peach.” All that is wanted, he confided to his cousin in August of 1835, is a “great immigration” in the coming fall and winter—“especially from the western states” with “each man [carrying] his rifle or musket.” Then, Austin predicted, “the peach will be ripe.” In the meantime, however, some calculated subterfuge was in order.

Sam Houston (who had wanted to deliver Texas to the United States from the moment he splashed across the Red River into Mexico in 1832) agreed with this assessment, and backed Austin’s cautious advice to the November Consultation to avoid an outright declaration of independence. But by the end of the year, Houston had come to fear that the logic of cooperation with Mexican Federalists was pushing Texas prematurely toward a much more dangerous offensive than any yet attempted: an expedition to Matamoros, far to the south and deep in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas.

Less than a week after the fall of Béxar, several members of the General Council—a body created by the Consultation to exercise authority over revolutionary Texas in an unsteady tandem with Governor Henry Smith—suggested a Matamoros expedition in a letter to General Edward Burleson, who had succeeded Stephen Austin as commander of the volunteer army of Texas. After the ignominious departure of General Cos for Laredo, many of the restless volunteers from the United States were ready for more action, and perhaps a little plunder, as well. Matamoros, the reputedly rich Mexican port city just across the Río Grande, beckoned to them like a jewel. Others saw Matamoros as the logical place to link up with supporters of General José Antonio Mexía. This exiled Federalist leader had departed New Orleans on November 6th with a boatload of volunteers bound (as it turned out) for Tampico, the next major port down the Mexican Gulf coast from Matamoros.

In addition to a governor and council, the Consultation had created, at least on paper, a “regular” Texan army, with Sam Houston as the commanding Major General. The catch was that Houston was given no authority over the volunteers already in the field. Houston was soon to discover a second limit to his authority. So great was the prejudice against “entering into the regular service” among those who were willing to fight for Texas that at no time during the revolution did the Regular Army attract more than a hundred enlisted men, despite the government’s elaborate plans for thousands of recruits!

Houston, the “titular commander” of a virtually non-existent army, got wind of the Matamoros plans almost as soon as they were hatched. On December 17th, the day after the letter from the Council was sent to San Antonio, Houston turned to Governor Smith and asked for orders “directing the adoption of such measures as might be deemed best for the protection of the frontier and the reduction of Matamoros.” On the very

same day, Houston in turn gave complete command of the Matamoros expedition to James Bowie, a man who, the Major General knew, could be very popular with the volunteers.

Houston's written orders made it crystal clear that Bowie was to carry out such an ambitious campaign only if he could obtain "a sufficient number of men for the purpose," and that if he deemed the expedition too risky, he should instead take up a position on the southern frontier that would, at all costs, protect the Texan port of C6pano. "*You* will conduct the campaign," wrote Houston to Bowie, adding that "much is referred to your discretion." "Great caution," Houston warned in the final words of his orders to Bowie, "is necessary in the country of an enemy."

But Bowie never received these orders, and the Matamoros Expedition soon fell into other hands—*many* other hands. Colonel Francis W. Johnson had emerged from the fight for San Antonio as the elected "Commander in Chief of the Volunteer Army of Texas." Frank Johnson, as he was known, claimed that Edward Burleson "lost entirely the confidence of this army in consequence of his having opposed offensive measures against the enemy." Johnson opened the letter sent from the Council to Burleson, and saw the chance to lead a much greater offensive than the storming of B6xar. He promptly ordered an expedition against Matamoros, and while his second-in-command led 530 volunteers out of San Antonio toward the southeast on December 30th, Johnson hurried to San Felipe to let the councilors know just what they had wrought.

As it turned out, the Council was dissatisfied with Johnson's proposed list of officers for the expedition, and refused them commissions. Johnson resigned in a huff, and then on second thought told the Council the next day (January 7th) that he was going on with the expedition anyway, even if the denial of commissions to his officers "drives them to the necessity of seeking authority from some liberal [that is, Mexican Federalist] General in the interior and should Matamoros be taken deprives Texas of the benefits." (The Matamoros customs revenues were expected to be quite lucrative.)

While Johnson had wavered, however, the Council had handed over responsibility for the Matamoros Expedition to a young Texan officer (and West Point dropout) by the name of James W. Fannin. But when Johnson changed his mind and claimed the command after all, the Council explicitly revoked neither man's commission! For his part, Fannin headed to the coast to find recruits for the venture.

Governor Smith vetoed Fannin's appointment, but the Council overruled him, and then impeached the governor for good measure. Smith refused to give up his office, and attempted instead to disband the Council. Neither side backed down, and soon there was no effective government in San Felipe. Yet meanwhile both Fannin and Johnson were busily preparing to carry their war beyond the boundaries of this completely dysfunctional "provisional state" of Texas.

It gets worse. When Johnson's "second-in-command," a charismatic

Scottish physician by the name of James Grant, led the expedition's volunteers out of Béxar, they took with them most of the supplies and provisions – even the clothing – intended for the San Antonio garrison at the Alamo. When the marchers reached the Goliad presidio, Grant seized the horses belonging to the Goliad garrison for his own troops, and further demanded that the soldiers at Goliad pull down the unauthorized flag of Texan independence that had been raised at the presidio a few weeks before.

The Scotsman, who had large landholdings south of the Río Grande, had been one of the leaders of the Federalist forces in Coahuila in 1835 before the arrival of Santa Anna's troops forced him to flee to Texas. Grant was adamantly opposed to an independent Texas, despite the fact that calls for a complete separation from Mexico were becoming more and more frequent among both old settlers and new arrivals in Texas.

Frank Johnson was also adamant in his adherence to Federalism. He even claimed that the volunteers from the United States who were arriving in San Antonio in December “all declare that if we pretend to independence they will immediately quit us, as they consider the War in that case interminable.” On January 10th, four days after his hasty “resignation,” the self-styled commander-in-chief issued a proclamation in San Felipe in the name of the “The Federal Volunteer Army of Texas” to the effect that his army marched under the flag of 1824, and had “for their object the restoration of the principles of the constitution, and the extermination of the last vestige of despotism from the Mexican soil.” Texas, said Johnson, “yet hears the groans of her oppressed Mexican friends, and their call for assistance.”

Governor Henry Smith, who had favored an outright Texan declaration of independence even at the time of the Consultation, had a very different attitude toward cooperation with Mexicans. He even opposed allowing *tejanos* to vote for delegates to the convention which had been called to meet on the 1st of March (1836), to take up once again the issue of independence. Many historians have cited their contrasting attitudes toward Mexicans as a key factor in the split between the Governor and the Council, and some have argued that Sam Houston shared with Smith a “racial antagonism” towards Mexicans. Others have argued that Houston opposed a Matamoros Expedition led by Johnson or Fannin simply because egocentric Major General wanted to lead the campaign across the Río Grande himself.

A closer examination of Houston's words and deeds as he faced the twin crises of “Matamoros fever” and the breakup of the Texan provisional government will show that his motives were much more pragmatic than they were racist or egotistical. It will also show that the contours of the San Jacinto campaign of March and April were shaped in great part by the events in Texas in December and January. It may also be useful to take a look at one of the least studied and most often misunderstood phases of the Texas Revolution—especially since it has attracted the attention of some of the most interesting and challenging new scholarship

in the field, including Edward L. Miller's *New Orleans and the Texas Revolution* and Thomas Ricks Lindley's *Alamo Traces*.

Sam Houston did not spend the winter of 1835–36 planning the San Jacinto campaign. Much of December was devoted to commissioning recruiting agents and ordering the establishment of a line of posts from C6pano Bay to San Antonio to defend the frontier and to house the recruits that Houston hoped to receive in time for a renewed conflict in the spring, which, he warned, could begin as early as February 20th to March 1st. As late as December 30th, he was advising all new recruits to head for the port of C6pano. He told Governor Smith that before he could join the troops on the frontier, however, he would have to go to east Texas “to hold an Indian talk, and arrange matters for safety in the rear of the army.” When that was done, he told the governor, he would be ready to proceed to either C6pano or Matamoros, depending on Smith's orders. The spring could bring either offensive or defensive war for the Texans, depending on the circumstances that they might face.

However, Houston received news on January 6th that made him postpone his visit with the Cherokees. The San Antonio garrison, reported its commander J. C. Neill, had been left depleted and nearly destitute by the departure of all but a hundred men with Dr. James Grant. This “deplorable anarchy,” exclaimed Houston in response, caused an “anguish” in his soul that no language could express. He told Governor Smith that he would leave his headquarters at Washington-on-the-Brazos “within thirty hours” to try to intercept the volunteer army on its march to the south. By the time that he departed on January 8th, Houston had discovered to his mortification that the Council, without his knowledge, had in effect commissioned both Johnson and Fannin to proceed to Matamoros, and that none other than Stephen F. Austin was reputedly lending support to a plan proposed by James Grant to the troops that he led from San Antonio—a plan “to march to the R6o Grande, and unite with the Federalists . . . and form a new Confederacy of the Northern Mexican States & Texas.”

Was it racism, or egotism, that sent Sam Houston hurrying to South Texas to try to stop this movement in its tracks? It is true that he distrusted James Grant's assurances of assistance from Federalists who were reputedly waiting for him near Matamoros. Similar promises made to (and by) Jos6 Antonio Mex6a had proven illusory at Tampico in November and December. The Mexican Federalist general barely escaped from Tampico with his life, and those of his New Orleans recruits who were left behind as captives (most of whom claimed that they thought they were sailing to Texas, not Tampico) were executed by the Mexicans as pirates. By Christmas, the New Orleans papers were carrying the doomed men's last words as they faced the firing squad.

On Christmas Day Mex6a was at the mouth of the Brazos, having deep discussions with Stephen F. Austin about making Texas a part of a new north Mexican Republic that would encompass all of that country above

a line drawn from Tampico due west to the Pacific! Mexía also apparently persuaded Austin that General Cos's capitulation at Béxar had been some sort of political gesture designed to promote such a confederacy. Just before he left for New Orleans the day after Christmas—in the company of Mexía, on a ship bearing the Mexican Federalist flag—Austin was writing letters to the Texan government in opposition to Texan independence, arguing that the upcoming March Convention should declare Texas explicitly to be a separate *Mexican* state, and even suggesting that new volunteers coming to Texas from the United States be gathered at Goliad and then “offered to the federal party” should it need an army in north Mexico. Austin was also in conference at Velasco and Quintana, where new volunteers were landing daily, with that *other* potential Matamoros Expedition commander, James W. Fannin,

By end of the first week in January (just as Stephen Austin, ironically, was undergoing a radical change of mind in New Orleans and coming out forthright for Texan independence), Sam Houston was hearing Austin's December opinions in the form of swirling rumors. “I hope you will send me an Extract of Austin's letter about the New Confederacy,” he begged Governor Smith, “and what he says about the ‘Capitulations’ of Bexar.” An hour after writing to Smith, Houston was on his way south.

As he approached the Texan volunteer camp between Goliad and Refugio on the 17th of January, Houston wrote to Governor Smith that he was going to attempt to dissuade the rank and file from acting on James Grant's “hope or belief that the Mexicans will cooperate with us. I have no confidence in them,” Houston declared, “and the disaster at Tampico should teach us a lesson to be noted in our future operations.”

For years, historians believed that Houston's distrust was not limited to the Mexicans south of the Nueces and the Río Grande. But the bitterly racist speech to the Texan troops that is recorded in *The Writings of Sam Houston* and *The Papers of the Texas Revolution*—a speech which denounces most *tejanos* as traitors and claims that Mexicans and “the descendants of the sturdy north” can never live together in peace—has been shown to have been written instead by Herman Ehrenberg, ironically one of those volunteer soldiers whom James Grant had lured out of San Antonio with dreams of Matamoros. (Ehrenberg's colorful memoir of the Texas Revolution, written in Germany in 1842, frequently puts his own words and ideas into the mouths of others.)

Houston, even when explaining his efforts to stop the expedition to Governor Smith, did not rely on racist reasoning, but instead called attention to the insanity of sending against “a city containing twelve thousand souls . . . a handful of men who have marched twenty-two days without . . . necessary supplies for an army.” He also accused Fannin of having promised to pay his recruits for the expedition “out of the first spoils to be taken from the enemy.” Houston declared that “in war, when spoil is the object, friends and enemies share one common destiny. This rule will govern the citizens of Matamoros in their conclusions, and render their

resistance desperate." He added that those citizens had probably already heard of James Grant's tendency to seize the property of others.

However, Houston feared disaster not only from a failed Matamoros expedition, but also from a successful one, if that success should produce a north Mexican Confederacy. Sam Houston did not get involved in a revolution in Texas in order to create a north Mexican Confederacy. In an emotional letter to John Forbes written on January 7th, when "Events Hurry themselves upon us," Houston said that he regarded such a union

as worse, than our present, or even our former situation. Their wars would be our wars, and their revolutions our revolutions: While our revenues, our lands, and our lives would be expended to maintain their cause, and we could expect nothing in return; but prejudice, and if we relied on them disappointment. Let Texas now Declare her Independence, and it will cost her less blood, and treasure to maintain it; than it would cost her to maintain her integral interest in such a confederacy as has been projected. Were she to unite in such a confederacy; the preponderance, would be so decidedly against her, that she would, have less influence if possible, than she has heretofore enjoyed in the Congress of Coahuila and Texas.

This is not the outright racism that Herman Ehrenberg reported, but Houston undoubtedly did give a speech to the men at Refugio on January 17th urging them not to attack Matamoros. His oratory was only partially successful. Most of his listeners continued to favor the expedition, but they agreed after listening to Houston to wait for Fannin's arrival by sea with the additional troops and supplies that could make their campaign a success.

When Fannin finally did arrive in early February, rumors of a large Mexican invasion force heading north from Matamoros persuaded him to withdraw those men who would follow him to the Goliad presidio, where he set them to work strengthening its defenses. But Johnson and Grant would have none of these defensive measures. With a splinter group of followers, they headed south. Separated from each other and with their forces fatally split, each of these would-be commanders was quickly surprised and defeated by advancing Mexican troops under General José Urrea. Johnson and only four of his men managed to escape from San Patricio on February 27th to bring word of their disaster to Fannin. Grant was surrounded at Agua Dulce and killed along with over half of his men on the 2nd of March, the same day that the newly-elected Convention at Washington-on-the-Brazos issued the Texan Declaration of Independence that the fiery Scotsman had so opposed and that Houston had so longed for.

And what was Sam Houston doing in the meantime? That's not easy to say, because neither Houston's plans nor his actions during the spring of 1836 are entirely clear—nor did he want them to be.

As he rode south toward Refugio, Houston was already rethinking the defense of Texas. In the same letter of January 17th in which he told Smith that he was planning to speak to the troops in person in order to quell the “Matamoros rage,” he informed the governor that the Alamo garrison was in such deplorable condition that he was sending James Bowie with orders to destroy the fortifications of the city of San Antonio, and that with Smith’s permission, Houston would “remove all the cannon and other munitions of war to Gonzales and Cópago, blow up the Alamo and abandon the place, as it will be impossible to keep up the Station with volunteers[;] the sooner I can be authorized the better it will be for the country.”

Of course we know that Smith disagreed with this advice, and instead sent William Barret Travis to San Antonio to join Bowie in the Alamo and in immortality. But again, what of Houston?

Unable either to command the obedience of the volunteers gathering on the extreme southern border or to recruit enough men into the regular army to provide an adequate defense for the rest of Texas, Houston requested at the end of January a furlough from his duties as commander-in-chief. He went to East Texas, where he negotiated a treaty with his Cherokee friends and their allies. If Texas was to face the Mexican army on the southwest, the friendship (or at least the neutrality) of the Indians of North and East Texas was essential.

But this is undoubtedly not all that Houston was doing while he was close to the Louisiana line. Recent research by Tom Lindley has shown that even before Houston left Refugio and Goliad in January, he was sending couriers to the United States Army post at Fort Jesup. Houston would have many opportunities while he was in Nacogdoches throughout February for clandestine conferences with people who could help him to “arrange matters for safety in the rear of the army.”

James Haley and Stephen L. Hardin, who disagree about so much with regard to Sam Houston, concur that there is considerable evidence that he was prepared to lure Santa Anna, if necessary, into an East Texas trap. Andrew Jackson himself had authorized (on the excuse of the Mexicans’ use of Indian auxiliaries) the United States Army to proceed into Texas as far as Nacogdoches—a move which could snap that trap shut.

Houston returned from the Redlands to Washington-on-the-Brazos just in time for the Convention, determined to put a stop to the military anarchy he left behind him in January. Tom Lindley has criticized Houston for staying at the Convention and playing politician when he should have been rushing to relieve the Alamo. But nothing Houston did during the revolution was more important militarily than his persuading those other politicians to give him, finally, full command over *all* Texan forces.

There is still a great debate as to whether Sam Houston rescued the Texas Revolution in March and April. If he did, it wouldn’t be the first time.

TURNING POINTS OF THE SAN JACINTO CAMPAIGN

Mexican Army Perspective

GREGG J. DIMMICK

In examining the San Jacinto campaign from the Mexican army's perspective the campaign will be defined as March, 6, 1836 to May, 9, 1836. If one examines the five turning points that have been selected as having the greatest effect on the outcome, three common themes arise—politics, power and profit. The following turning points show why the actions of the Mexican army were a great part in Houston's ultimate success in this campaign.

For the Mexican army in Texas, participating in the Federalist-Centralist civil war, the San Jacinto campaign began at the storming of the Alamo on March 6, 1836. With the fall of the Alamo, Antonio López de Santa Anna was, essentially unopposed by any organized Texan army. His coastal division under the command of General José Cosme Urrea was yet to deal with the Texans at Goliad under Col. William Fannin but this force posed no particular threat to Santa Anna. On February 29, General Ramírez y Sesma had been sent toward Gonzales with pickets of the Jiménez Btn. and the Dolores Regiment to meet the Texans that were rumored to be marching to the relief of the Alamo. Finding no evidence of a Texan column he returned to Béjar on March 1st. This assured Santa Anna that Fannin was not marching on Béjar. Even if Fannin had managed to do so, General Santa Anna and his force of several thousand seasoned Mexican troops would have been anxious for the chance to confront him.

The first turning point in the campaign by the Mexican army is the fact that Santa Anna abandoned the military campaign at this point and decided to play politics in San Antonio until the end of March. This delay shows that Santa Anna may have been as concerned with his enemies in Mexico City as he was with those to his front.

The subsequent lull in the campaign, on the part of the Mexican forces under Santa Anna, was likely a huge blunder on the part of the Mexican Commander. By March 11, 1836, the remainder of the first infantry brigade, the second brigade and the cavalry brigade had arrived in Béjar. At that time there were 5106 *soldados* (5417 listed by Filisola—*Memo-*

ries for the History of the War in Texas pg. 149–152, less the 311 listed by Andrade as killed at wounded at the Alamo; *Memories* pg. 178) and 20 pieces of artillery (plus what was captured at the Alamo) available to Santa Anna.

Sam Houston, recently appointed commander of the Texan army, arrived at Gonzalez on March 11, the very day that the last of the Mexican army arrived in Béjar. At that point Houston found “upward of three hundred men in camp, without organization, who had rallied on the first impulse.” (*Eighteen Minutes* Stephen Moore, pg. 44) Houston’s dispatch reported that he had 374 men available.

While it is true that, on March 11, Santa Anna sent troops, under the command of Joaquín Ramírez y Sesma, to advance on San Felipe, a closer look at this force and commander is warranted. Ramírez y Sesma’s division was composed of 100 cavalymen from the Dolores, Veracruz, and Tampico Regiments; the Aldama, Toluca, and Matamoros Battalions; two six-pounder cannons. (*Memories* pg.208—see original Spanish for correct translation). The strength of this force was about 894 men. (100 cavalry + 350 Matamoros + 280 Toluca + 364 Aldama—less 44 Matamoros Alamo casualties, less 94 Toluca Alamo casualties, less 62 Aldama Alamo casualties). It is interesting that Santa Anna chose to send three of the Battalions that had participated in the storming of the Alamo on March 6—three of the units that incurred the greatest number of casualties during that action. It is certainly curious that Santa Anna would send such a small force, composed of the units that had suffered the most in the storming of the Alamo.

Equally strange was his decision to have Joaquín Ramírez y Sesma command this force. In his Manifesto to the Mexican Government, Santa Anna stated that, as he approached Béjar,

It would have been easy enough to have surprise it [Béjar], because those occupying it did not have the faintest news of the march of our army. I entrusted, therefore, the operation to one of our generals, who with a detachment of cavalry, part of the dragoons mounted on infantry officers’ horses, should have fallen on Béjar in the early morning of February 23, 1836. My orders were concise and definite. I was most surprised, therefore, to find the said general a quarter of a league from Béjar at ten o’clock of that day, awaiting new orders. (*Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution* Castañeda pg. 13)

The San Luis Btn. daily log (included with the de la Peña papers at the Center for American History at UT) clearly indicated that this bungled operation was entrusted to Ramírez y Sesma.

In his memoirs of the Texas campaign, Lt. Col. José Enrique de la Peña had the following to say in regard to General Ramírez y Sesma’s operation (the advance on San Felipe) that commenced on March 11.

We left General Ramírez y Sesma on the march to San Felipe de Austin, and we shall now see how the errors he committed were instrumental to the fatal outcome. Arousing the hatred of influential persons is painful and harmful to me, but no consideration should cause me to shrink from stating the truth, however harsh, regardless of how it might affect me personally. General Ramírez y Sesma is a timid and irresolute commander, dilatory in his judgment and apathetic in his movements, and since with this poor attitude he worries about every possible difficulty, his plans are always exaggerated... The commander in chief [Santa Anna] never took a step that was not the wrong one; he did not even have the good judgment to use his lieutenants according to their abilities. General Ramírez y Sesma's previous deeds were well known, so he could mislead no one. The conduct observed during the march toward Béjar, the purposelessness and the folly he manifested within sight of this city, refusing to enter it at the stipulated hour, spoke against him and foreshadowed what he would do later, but General Santa Anna was determined to do what was not to be. Sesma foolishly compared Santa Anna with Napoleon and tactlessly styled himself as his Murat, as he sometimes was ironically called in the army.

We have already noted that our soldiers were able to see the flames of Gonzales. The enemy had retreated shortly before carrying this out; his march had been slow and cumbersome, as he took with him a great number of covered wagons, which carried all the families of the village and their possessions. Since General Ramírez y Sesma had under him seven hundred infantry, two field pieces, and one hundred horses, he could have easily dispersed the enemy, who was inferior both in numbers and discipline. He should have pursued him between Guadalupe and the Colorado to prevent his joining reinforcements on the left bank of the latter stream; It was a great mistake not to have done so. General [Adrian] Woll, who was under General Ramírez y Sesma's command, realized the importance of such a maneuver and requested the use of the choice companies and the cavalry to carry out this scheme, but he was refused... (*With Santa Anna in Texas* de la Peña pg. 79-80)

In spite of the fact that Santa Anna was so critical of Sesma's failure to take Béjar by surprise, and preventing the Texans from occupying the Alamo, he, inexplicably, chose Sesma for this extremely important task. As Peña feared, Sesma was very hesitant to move against Houston and prevent his small force from crossing the Colorado River. By that time

Sesma finally reached the Colorado, Houston was entrenched on the left bank of the river in a strong defensive position. Sesma took no action until Santa Anna and reinforcements arrived late in March. Thus the Mexican army lost a tremendous opportunity to destroy Houston's small army before it ever became a semblance of a viable fighting force.

Looking closely at the actions of Santa Anna during this delay in the campaign, it is highly suspicious that the Commanding General was occupied with his political concerns while placing his military responsibilities on hold. It must be remembered that the Texas rebellion was only a part of the larger civil war that had been raging in Mexico for years. Santa Anna had only recently put down a similar uprising in Zacatecas and other parts of Mexico were threatening to join in the liberal Federalist cause. For this reason Santa Anna had to continually look to his rear, taking care that his base of power, the conservative Centralist government, was not at risk in his absence.

The Journal of Col. Juan Almonte, special aide to Santa Anna, has several entries that make it suspicious that matters of state were of great concern to the Commander-in-Chief / Presidente after the storming of the Alamo.

Monday, 7th [March, 1836] ... The mail arrived from Matamoros and Mexico—dates to the 2nd and 3rd of February.

Tuesday, 8th ... Letters written to Mexico under the date of 6th inst.

Monday, 14th ... The correspondence from Mexico, Monterey and Matamoros was received...

Tuesday, 15th ... A courier extraordinary arrived with accounts of the sickness of Gen'l Barragar (Barragan) and the election of Mr. Corro as President, as interim by 27 votes. For Bravo 18 votes, and Parres 8. *This election did not please Gen'l Santa Anna; he preferred Gen'l Bravo.* It is said that Gen'l Michilena voted for Bravo.

Thursday, March 17th.—A Courier Extraordinary was despatched [sic] to Tolsa and Sesma, and to Matamoros; one for Mexico will start tomorrow; by it go my letters for Mexico and the United States; ... (Almonte Journal, SW Historical Quarterly, Vol. XLVIII July, 1944, No. 1 pg. 23-25)

Almonte left Béjar on March 18th and Santa Anna did not catch up with them until April 4th so Almonte's journal does not reflect any further political distractions prior to Santa Anna leaving Béjar.

Peña also documented that Santa Anna was devoting his energies to the politics of Mexico and to the internal strife within the army during the last three weeks of March.

When, on the 21st of March, general headquarters ren-

dered tribute to the kindly General Barragán, interim president of the Republic, the commander in chief rebuked all his aides and insulted even those closest to him in the presence of all the leaders and officers who attended the ceremony. General Castrillón was the only one who had the courage to confront him with the indecorous treatment that he had given them, so his Excellency appeared as having repented, admitting that it was not within his power to control his irascible character, which circumstances only made worse. (*With Santa Anna in Texas* pg. 93)

Peña also noted that Santa Anna was so confident of a military victory (or possibly concerned about losing his authority in Mexico City) that the Commander-in-Chief was ready to return to Mexico after the fall of the Alamo. He offered some interesting theories as to why Santa Anna changed his mind and remained in Texas to lead the campaign.

Also, if the commander in chief had returned to Mexico as he had thought of doing, and which was taken as a foregone conclusion after the death of the interim president and the engagement at Perdido [Fannin's defeat at Coleto Creek], very probably the campaign would have ended successfully, because the second in command would have given ear to the recommendations of his colleagues and would have conducted himself wisely, if slowly; he would not have been bewildered, as our commander in chief was, with the death blow that we received, nor would he have incurred the grave errors that the latter committed as a result of this;...

It must be noted that the commander in chief, with no pre-arranged plan and no firm base of operations, did not believe the campaign to be ended until he learned of the action on March 19[Fannin's defeat], which is proved by his orders of the 25th that the cavalry brigade, the artillery, the munition dump of the corps and their pickets return to San Luis Potosí, as well as by instructions given to the generals the 23rd of that month.

It was at least believed, and it was so stated in the army, that the jealousy inspired by General Urrea and the reproachable conduct of General Ramírez y Sesma forced him to alter the decision he had made to return to Mexico and leave General Filisola in command. He well knew how much he was being censured because of the costly and unnecessary sacrifices at the Alamo, and the wish to forget this blot, the fear that General Urrea would bring the campaign to an end, since up to now he had done almost everything, and the uneasiness brought on by the exaggerated news about Ramírez y Sesma

are probably the causes that force him to continue the march.
(*With Santa Anna in Texas* pg. 94-95)

This preoccupation with the happenings in Mexico City as well as his overconfidence in his military superiority eventually would result in Santa Anna's defeat at San Jacinto. As to how much jealousy of Urrea was a part, it is hard to say, but clearly Peña felt it to be a factor.

The second turning point selected as being particularly important in the campaign actually had three separate but similar incidences. Over the span of just over one week Santa Anna was to make three "mad dashes", with relatively small forces, leaving the main Mexican army to his rear. In each of these three dashes he exposed himself unnecessarily to the Texans.

Having decided not to return to Mexico, Santa Anna joined the division of Ramírez y Sesma at the Atascosito Crossing of the Colorado River (a few miles south of present day Columbus) on April 5. On the 6th of April Santa Anna undertook his first "mad dash". He left a large number of his troops crossing the Colorado and forged ahead, toward San Felipe, with the troops that had already completed the crossing. Almonte documented that Santa Anna forged ahead with only 80 cavalymen and 200 Cazadores (light infantrymen). He would do this two more times in the San Jacinto campaign and the third time would result in a devastating defeat.

Santa Anna stated that his purpose in forging ahead was to unite there with General Gaona, who had been ordered to proceed by way of Bastrop to Nacadoches. Santa Anna claimed that he felt that Gaona would be going through San Felipe, based upon a message sent by Gaona from Bastrop. The worst result of this first dash may be that Santa Anna got away with a daring movement. He may well have gained a false sense of security that he could venture when and where he wished with little or no risk.

Upon arriving in San Felipe on April 8 Santa Anna found the town burned. As his cavalry entered the town they captured an American, William Simpson. In both the account of Santa Anna and that of Simpson, it is revealed that Simpson told Santa Anna the exact strength and position of Houston's forces. Santa Anna states that he was told that Houston was "in a woods at Gross Pass, fifteen leagues distant from our left with only eight hundred men that he had left." [Memoirs, Filisola, pg. 220; For the Simpson account see "Recollections of Isaac L. Hill, *Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association*, 7 (July, 1903), 40-46]

Both these accounts prove that Santa Anna was absolutely aware of Sam Houston's strength and position. There can be little doubt that the Mexican Commander-in-Chief could have kept hot on Houston's trail and forced him to commit to battle or leave Texas. Surprisingly, Santa Anna chose to drop the pursuit of Houston and venture off in another direction. Claiming that the Texans (seventy men under the command of Moseley Baker) that were dug in on the opposite side of the Brazos, at San

Felipe, prevented him from crossing, Santa Anna wrote that he was left there to scout for another crossing.

Santa Anna, himself, said that nothing was more fitting than to quickly cross the Brazos and pursue and defeat Houston before he could recover from the hardships of the retreat. He claimed that he decided to reconnoiter up to ten or twelve leagues (one league = 2.68 miles) along the right (west) bank of the Brazos. It is odd that Santa Anna decided to go south to look for a crossing when he knew that Houston was to the north. Santa Anna's personal secretary, Ramon Caro noted the inconsistency in the Mexican general's comments.

“Why reconnoiter the right bank when it was known that the only enemy that existed was on the left? [In reality the Texans were still on the right or west bank at Groce's. However, Caro's argument is still valid in that Santa Anna headed south when he knew Houston and the Texans had gone north] Why not reconnoiter the left bank where the enemy was? With forces vastly superior to those of the enemy, now intimidated, and with fortune still smiling upon us, as His Excellency claims, why were we not led directly to the enemy in order to destroy it? The route along the right bank was better suited to the future designs of His Excellency, who already saw himself arriving in Harrisburg, proceeding on to New Washington, thence to Nacodoches, and as far as the Sabine, returning along the coast to C6pano, and embarking there for Matamoros. (Orders had already been issued to General Vital Fern6ndez at Matamoros to dispatch the Mexican war schooner *El Bravo* to El C6pano to await there orders from His Excellency.) From there he was to go on to Tampico, continuing by land to San Luis Potos6, where he would join the *travelers* and descend upon the capital of the republic to be received with triumphs, ovations, offers of the presidency, etc. This was the true motive for his decision” (*Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution* pg. 113)

In this statement Caro not only criticizes Santa Anna for not pursuing Houston and destroying the Texas army but also claims that his venture south was all about personal glory.

There is further evidence that Santa Anna's claim that he was trying to find a crossing of the Brazos in order to track down Houston was not factual. There may have been a second motive for not doing so. On April 8, Santa Anna wrote a letter to Filisola that included the following statement: “Since my march for Columbia and Brazoria is scheduled for tomorrow, I will be sought in one or both places...” (*Santa Anna's Campaign Against Texas*, Santos, pg. 94). This makes it obvious that he was not intending to immediately cross the Brazos but instead was planning

on taking the supply-rich Brazoria and Columbia. It is certainly possible that Santa Anna was interested more in all the supplies that were to found in these two locales than in chasing Houston to the north.

Peña documented that Santa Anna's brother-in-law, Ricardo Dromundo, Quartermaster General of the Army, had taken the stores captured at San Antonio and was selling them at huge profits. It certainly is possible that Santa Anna was a partner in this scheme. This profit motive likely was to raise it head again when Santa Anna was in Harrisburg.

There is another obvious fact which demonstrates that Santa Anna was not reconnoitering the Brazos, as he claimed. The path that he took was not south along the Brazos, on the road to Old Fort (the road that Sesma and Filisola would later take as they advanced from San Felipe to Old Fort). Santa Anna headed, instead, down the Columbia/Brazoria road. This is obvious, as he spent the night of April 9 at Gabriel Cole's home, which is on the San Bernard River, not the Brazos. The next day he went by Madam Powell's, which was often used by travelers as the midway point on the San Felipe to Columbia road.

When considering the April 8 document and the road on which Santa Anna departed San Felipe, it seems likely that Santa Anna had no intention of chasing Houston and his ragtag army. He was headed for Brazoria and Columbia, possibly to race Urrea to the rich stores at these points, or, as Caro believed, he was seeking glory and political power.

His dash south from San Felipe was the second time in the San Jacinto campaign that Santa Anna left the larger portion of his force and sallied forth at the head of a small vanguard of men. In his force were the preferential companies of the Guerrero, Matamoros, Primero Mexico and Toluca Btns., and a portion of the Dolores Cavalry. There seems to be no definitive documentation as to when and why Santa Anna changed his mind and marched to Old Fort instead of Brazoria. Caro does offer a hint that Santa Anna did revise his plans.

It is worth while noticing that his brilliant measure (the capture of Thompson's Crossing at Old Fort) was not decided upon prior to our departure from San Felipe, but that it was the result of an unforeseen coincidence. Soon after we left San Felipe four Americans on horseback were sighted and we left our road to follow them, but not succeeding in overtaking them, we returned to our former route. Colonel Treviño, who had gone ahead of us, found a negro and his wife in one of the houses and took them to His Excellency to whom they declared that they had come from Thompson's Crossing where there were a few Americans (Wiley Martin's company had deployed there to prevent the Mexicans from crossing at that point.) His Excellency offered the mulatto 100 *pesos* to return to Thompson's to tell the Americans he had seen us but that we had taken a different route. The mulatto fulfilled his

mission, going to Thompson's immediately and returning at once to serve as guide. It was thus that we captured the crossing, but the mulatto never received the 100 pesos. (*Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution*, pg. 113)

It is possible that Santa Anna was so anxious for a confrontation with the Texans that even the prospect of defeating a small band of Texans was enticing to him. Certainly his sudden change in plans was not unusual in the Texan campaign. There are multiple instances of this behavior as he continually ordered his various divisions here and there (Urrea to San Felipe then to Brazoria; Cos to Velasco then to San Jacinto; etc.)

One of the popular theories as to why Santa Anna took off in advance of his army was to chase the Texan cabinet. This does seem to be the case, but not until after he had arrived at Old Fort. Santa Anna wrote that several colonists at Old Fort informed him that Houston was indeed at Groce's and that the Texan government was at Harrisburg. Santa Anna specifically mentioned Lorenzo de Zavala and claimed that the capture of the cabinet was "certain if a few troops marched on them quickly. This news was important, and even more so the movement indicated, the success of which would disconcert completely the revolution." (*Memoirs of the History of the War in Texas*, pg. 221-222)

Santa Anna went on to claim that this mission was so important that he could not entrust it to anyone else.

In the orders that he wrote to Filisola when he left Old Fort, for Harrisburg, Santa Anna wrote:

Since the operations of the Army should not be paralyzed, I have decided to depart with a section to Harrisburg where the principle leaders of the rebellion are located and to which the entitled General Houston is marching with the band he has united and calls by the name of the Army of Texas.

While I am executing this and other forays to the banks of the Trinity River, Your Excellency is to remain at this place (Old Fort) . . . (*Santa Anna's Campaign Against Texas*, pg. 95-96)

It is very unlikely that Santa Anna knew anything of Houston's actions on April 13. Houston crossed the Brazos, at Groce's on April 12 and 13 and did not leave there until the 14th.

On April 14, 1836 (the same day Houston marched for Harrisburg), Santa Anna set out with a relatively small force of approximately 800 troops. This third "mad dash" would not be the charm for Santa Anna. This time he was to face Houston's army on Houston's terms. To make matters worse, Santa Anna had allowed Houston time to organize and train the small force into a semblance of a fighting force. He had done this by allowing Houston to escape his clutches both at Gonzales and at San

Felipe. At either juncture, had he been aggressive or pushed hard against the Texans, the results likely would have been very different.

As to the motivation for this third dash to the front, it seems very likely that it was initially intended to capture Lorenzo de Zavalla and the rest of the Texas cabinet. It is odd that Santa Anna felt that this would cause such a profound disruption of the revolution

When Santa Anna failed to capture the Texan cabinet at Harrisburg he sent Col. Almonte with a troop of cavalry to try to cut off the retreat of the cabinet at New Washington. Santa Anna's motivation now seemed to switch from the Texan cabinet to profit. He noted in his Manifest to the Mexican Government that he received notice from Col. Almonte, who was at New Washington, that a large train of supplies had been captured at that point. Santa Anna decided that it was so important to guard these supplies that he would have to rush to Almonte's aid. This movement placed the Mexican army in a tenuous position with only one route to exit New Washington.

The fourth turning point for the Mexican army in the San Jacinto campaign was the capture of one of their couriers. It probably had more of an impact on the decisions of Houston, but obviously had a negative impact on the Mexican army. Lt. Col. Peña documented that on April 17 Capt. Miguel Bachiller brought sealed documents from Santa Anna for Filisola. Apparently Filisola used this same messenger to forward documents from Mexico City to Santa Anna at New Washington. This incident happened on April 18, near present day Bellaire—Deaf Smith and Henry Karnes captured Bachiller and his escort and brought them back to Houston's camp, which was opposite Harrisburg on Buffalo Bayou.

Santa Anna later criticized the fact that Filisola used Bachiller to forward special mail from Mexico as Bachiller returned to New Washington. General Santa Anna wrote in his manifest that this messenger was captured by the Texans, giving them valuable information.

The Sending of Captain Miguel Bachiller with special mail that had arrived from that capital, dispatched to me by the supreme government, and which was intercepted, was no less a cause (of his defeat at San Jacinto). As a result, the enemy acquired positive information regarding our forces at a time when it was retreating, wondering what it could do, astonished by our operations and triumphs. Thus it became aware that I was at New Washington, it learned the number that made up the division that was operating in that region, and the situation of the rest of our forces, all of which cleared the confusion in which it found itself as a result of our continuous offensive and the appearance of our victorious columns at the points least expected. From the dispatches, it learned everything that it desired; and, coming out from the uncertainty that was making it retreat to the Trinity, it gained new

courage. This could not have happened without knowing that my force was inferior to theirs. The arrival of the reinforcement under General Cos was regarded by the enemy as a ruse, believing it a party sent out during the night before, to return in the morning in full view. This was told to me by the enemy afterwards. (*Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution*, pg. 81-82)

Ramon Caro pointed out that the capture of Bachiller could not have given the Texans too much information as the documents from Mexico City were dated and would have had no information concerning recent Mexican movements. Bachiller was "grilled" by the Texans and told them Santa Anna's location. Caro also downplayed the fact that the position of the division was divulged. He claimed that the Texans were very aware of what the Mexican army was up to. Caro also questioned why the Texans, if they were in a state of panic, fear, and terror about the Mexican columns appearing out of nowhere, could have possibly felt the reinforcements to be a ruse. (*Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution*, pg. 122-123)

One thing that Caro does not address, and was likely to have been very significant information for the Texans, was the fact that Santa Anna was indeed with the vanguard division in New Washington. There was even some belief that Santa Anna had returned to Mexico as he had earlier planned.

Santa Anna's claim that Filisola should not have sent Bachiller with sensitive documents, because of the risk of capture, is ludicrous. On April 17, Santa Anna had sent Bachiller to Filisola with orders that were likely to have been every bit as sensitive, taking an equal risk of capture and exposure of Santa Anna's whereabouts.

The actual battle of San Jacinto has been very well documented. The glaring fact that spelled doom for the Mexican forces was Santa Anna's continued arrogance. Like Fannin at Coleto, he showed no respect for his enemy. Santa Anna, most likely, felt confident that the Texans would remain in the woods, along the Lynchburg road, and that the Mexican army would be forced to find a way to flush them out or attack their position. With the reinforcement of Cos having just completed a forced march, there was no hurry to start anything on the 21st.

The San Jacinto campaign did not end with the devastating defeat of the Mexican vanguard under Santa Anna. (For a detailed account of the history and archeology of the retreating Mexican army, see *Sea of Mud*) There were still over 2500 Mexican troops in the area that were not involved in the battle. Filisola was at Old Fort, located on the Brazos River near present day Richmond, with just over 1400 men. Unfortunately for Filisola, he also had the women camp-followers of his force and those of Santa Anna's men (approximately 1500 women). General Urrea was at Brazoria and Columbia with over 1100 men at the time of the battle.

General Filisola got the word of the defeat of Santa Anna on April 22, but none of the survivors of the battle knew the fate of Santa Anna. He also reported that the soldiers who made it back to his camp gave very diverse estimates as to the strength of the Texans.

Not knowing the situation of Santa Anna's division, and not liking his position at Old Fort, Filisola decided to unite immediately with General Urrea and his division. He was to later point out, at his court martial, that Santa Anna had taken all the best troops for his vanguard division; that he (Filisola) was stuck with all the women, children, sick and wounded; that he was also burdened with all the baggage of his men as well as those of Santa Anna's troops; that his men were very poorly supplied and their clothes were rags; and that the morale of the army was decimated by the defeat of their Commander-in-chief. He also wrote that he was concerned for the safety of any prisoners that the Texans may have taken.

Filisola and Urrea brought their divisions together at Madam Powell's tavern, on April 24. The next day Filisola called a meeting of the senior generals meant to determine their course of action. They were still unaware as to whether Santa Anna was dead or captured. There were approximately thirteen stragglers from San Jacinto (out of over 1200) that eventually made it back to the Mexican camp. This meeting of the Mexican generals is the fourth turning point selected.

At the meeting it was decided to (1) recross the Colorado River to Goliad or Victoria; (2) obtain supplies from Mexico; (3) drill their troops as many were raw recruits that lacked the skill to fight; (4) unite all the Mexican forces in Texas (at the time there were over 4,000 scattered in Matagorda, Victoria, Goliad, Refugio, and San Antonio); (5) await for orders from the Mexican government as to what action the army was to take in the future.

Thus the meeting assured that the Mexican army would take the conservative, defensive attitude toward the campaign. Up until this point they had generally been the aggressor and had at least kept a semblance of pressure on Houston's Texans. Now the conservative Filisola was going to wait in a defensive position at Goliad or Victoria and let the Mexican government decide what steps to take next.

It is very likely that this was the best decision on that day. Due to many of the factors listed above, it is likely that any attempt of the Mexican army to have undertaken an immediate offensive maneuver would have been a total disaster. This is especially true when one considers the fact that the natural disaster that they were about to suffer would have affected their offensive movement as much or more than their withdrawal.

The main Mexican army left Powell's on the morning of April 26, 1836. As they started to cross the San Bernard River, heading toward Victoria, a torrential downpour commenced. Unfortunately for Filisola and his troops, they managed to cross the San Bernard before it became impassable. This left them trapped between the flooded West Bernard and San Bernard Rivers. The army had to eventually turn to the northwest

and cross the Colorado River at the Atascosito Crossing near what is now Alleyton. This was the same crossing the main Mexican army had used as it proceeded to the east during the advance. This "act of God" was the fifth, and likely the worst, turning point of the San Jacinto campaign for the Mexican army.

This turn to the northwest led the army into a huge quagmire that is now referred to as the Lissie Prairie. The Mexican army had to traverse the quicksand with 2500 troops, 1500 female camp-followers, 120 wagons, eight pieces of artillery and 1200 mules. Filisola wrote that the mud was so bad that the only thing that kept the mules from submerging was the cargoes on their backs. He reported that the soldiers had to carry the cargoes to higher ground and then carry the mules as well. He likened the scene to a battlefield where the army had suffered a terrible defeat.

Lt. Col. José Enrique de la Peña documented his sufferings as well. He described the remnants of canister shot, trunks, artillery gear, baggage, etc., spread all over the prairie. He detailed that he lost his spurs and eventually his boots in the mud and had to return to Mexico barefoot.

It took the Mexican army fourteen days to extricate itself from what Filisola labeled the "Mar de Lodo," or Sea of Mud. After the army had crossed the Colorado and headed to Victoria on May 9, they had left their fighting spirit in the mud. There was never any real attempt, after that point, to go on the offensive or halt the retreat.

It should be noted that Filisola and his generals did not receive news of Santa Anna until April 27. On that day they received his orders to retreat. He ordered Filisola to proceed to San Antonio and Urrea to go to Victoria. Filisola and his staff felt that it would be best for the 600 Mexican prisoners if they gave the impression that they were obeying the orders of Santa Anna. However, they never changed the plans that they had made on April 25 at Powell's. The only thing that had changed was the fact that they accidentally stumbled into the Mar de Lodo.

Extensive archeological excavations have been undertaken by this author and members of the Houston Archeological Society. The extensive number of artifacts unearthed, over a huge area of rice fields, proves the extent of the disastrous quagmire into which the Mexican army stumbled. It was a testament to their determination and sense of duty that they were finally able to traverse the Sea of Mud.

There were many turning points for the Mexican army in the San Jacinto campaign. As documented above, some of these turning points were far more significant than others. Among the most significant were:

- Santa Anna playing politics in San Antonio after the fall of the Alamo.
- The three "mad dashes" that Santa Anna made; exposing himself to unnecessary risks. The third time was not the charm but the back-breaker.
- The capture of Capt. Miguel Bachiller by the Texans.

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- The meeting at Madam Powell's on April 25. At this meeting the Mexican generals decided to take a conservative approach and await orders from Mexico City rather than advancing immediately against the Texans.
 - The extreme bad luck of venturing into the Mar de Lodo. After the Mexican army extracted itself from the mud they were no longer a viable fighting force.

WHO FOUGHT FOR THE CONFEDERACY?

Harrison County, Texas as a Test Case

MIKE CAMPBELL

The question "Who fought for the Confederacy?" seems simple enough at first glance. It probably brings to mind images of thousands of young men such as Josiah Perry Alford, who was photographed in Harrison County, Texas, a little before he went to war in 1861. However, as is true of many historical questions, a broad inquiry leads immediately to more specific queries. And the answers that can be found in the evidence are usually anything but simple. Asking "Who fought for the Confederacy?" leads to at least three more specific questions, each with significant implications for the impact of the Civil War on Texas.

First, what percentage of the military-age men in Texas entered Confederate service in any capacity between April 1861 and April 1865? Was it one-third, one-half, two-thirds, three-fourths? The answer matters because the proportion of the male population who left for the army affected virtually every aspect of life on the home front during the war. To give just one example, the proportion of men who left determined how many farms and plantations had to be worked or managed by women.

Second, what was the economic status of Texans who served in the Confederate military? Were men from wealthy, slaveholding families more or less likely to serve in the military than those from poorer, non-slaveholding families? This is another way of asking: Was the Civil War a "rich man's war and a poor man's fight?" Granted this question has become well worn over the years, but the answer still matters in understanding the war.

Third, what happened to men who served in the military in terms of wounds, illnesses, and imprisonment? How many died in battle or as prisoners or war or from disease? The importance of this question really needs no argument. A large number of deaths among the military-age male population of any state or community can be a devastating blow requiring years to overcome.

Now, having asked three of the most important questions that arise from the more general inquiry "who fought for the Confederacy?" I want to offer answers, using Harrison County, Texas, as a test case. (If you are

thinking: why only one county?, why not the whole state, or why not the whole Confederacy? Please bear with me until you see what is involved in an analysis of just one county.)

Harrison County, which is located on the Louisiana border in northeast Texas, was among the most "southern" of the state's counties during the antebellum years. Natives of the South headed more than 90 percent of its households in 1860, and 61 percent of those households owned at least one slave. The county had 8,784 slaves, the largest population of bondsmen living in any Texas county at that time. The 1859 cotton crop was 21,440 bales, the second largest grown in any Texas county. Slavery and cotton made Harrison County very southern. When the secession crisis began in November 1860, Harrison County was one of the first to call for a convention to consider leaving the Union, and on February 23, 1861, its voters overwhelmingly endorsed disunion—866 to 44.¹

Secession, of course, soon led to war. When word of the firing on Fort Sumter reached Marshall, the county seat of Harrison, on April 17, 1861, the town resounded with cannon fire and patriotic speeches. And the county's men prepared to fight.² During 1861–1862, Harrison County provided most of the men in thirteen companies—a company having approximately 100 officers and men—that entered Confederate service. These companies saw varying amounts of action, and I do not have time to give even a brief account of each one. However, let me tell you a little about two of them as examples of the war experiences of Harrison County men from 1861 to 1865. Perhaps the most notable company raised in the county was one that called itself the "Marshall Guards." Formed soon after fighting began, the "Guards" left for Richmond, Virginia, in May 1861. They became Company E of the 1st Texas Infantry, which later joined three other regiments to form Hood's Texas Brigade, one of the most famous units in the Confederate Army. As part of Hood's Brigade, the Guards fought in thirty-eight battles and skirmishes, including Antietam, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, and the Wilderness and took massive casualties along the way. At Antietam alone, for example, the Guards suffered nineteen casualties.³

Another Harrison County company, one formed by men from the eastern half of the county soon after the war began, adopted the name, "Texas Hunters" and became Company A of the 3rd Texas Cavalry. The Hunters first saw action in the Arkansas-Missouri border area, most importantly in the Battle of Pea Ridge in the spring of 1862. Later in 1862 the Hunters crossed the Mississippi and fought in the effort to hold northern Mississippi after the Battle of Shiloh. In 1863 they became part of Ross's Texas Brigade (commanded by Lawrence Sullivan "Sul" Ross) and served in both the Atlanta and Tennessee campaigns in 1864.⁴

The "Marshall Guards" and "Texas Hunters," along with the eleven other companies raised in 1861–1862, included most, but not all, of the men from Harrison County who served the Confederacy in a military capacity. In 1863, some of the county's men who had remained at

home during the first two years of the war enlisted in a battalion of state troops. These men were generally older, only served six months, and did not engage in battle; still, they should be counted. Also, a significant number of Harrison County men served in units identified with other counties. For example, residents of the northern part of Harrison often joined the 18th or 19th Texas Infantries, both of which were raised primarily in neighboring Marion County. These units remained in the Trans-Mississippi as part of Walker's Texas Division and fought at the battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill in 1864.⁵

This brief sketch of military activity clearly establishes heavy participation in the Civil War by the white male population of Harrison County, but it does not provide the information necessary to answer key questions about who fought for the Confederacy. To go further requires quantitative evidence. So, let's turn now to look at a database that I compiled on the military-age population of Harrison County at the time of the Civil War, a population defined as all white males aged 13 to 46 in 1860. These age limits were used because by 1864 Confederate conscription laws applied to all men aged 17 to 50, meaning that a 13-year old in 1860 would have reached draft age in 1864 and a 46-year old in 1860 would have remained eligible four years later.

The 1860 United States Census for Harrison County reported 1,728 white men and boys between the ages of 13 and 46 inclusive, that is 1,728 males who were of military age sometime between 1861 and 1865. (See the first line of Table 1.) Once this military aged population of white males was identified, I collected data on the age, state of birth, marital status, and occupation of each individual and on the wealthholding and slaveholding status of their families. Once I had this basic information from the census, the next step was to search the compiled service records of Confederate veterans by going case-by-case through the companies raised primarily in Harrison County, to determine which of these individuals served and what happened to them during their time in the military.⁶ Confederate service records, however, are notoriously incomplete, especially for the later years of the war, and many names required confirmation beyond location in the service records. So, other sources also were searched for evidence on military service. For example, by an act of the Texas legislature, muster rolls containing the names of all men aged 18 to 50 in each county in the state were created in March 1862. These rolls indicated the men who were already in the military at that time as well as those who were eligible to serve.⁷ Also by act of the legislature, county judges in 1864 and 1865 made lists of servicemen whose families, widows, or dependents were eligible for relief payments from the state. These lists of Confederate Indigent Families were a good source to determine who actually served.⁸ Confederate pension rolls, created after Texas began in 1899 to pay benefits to disabled and indigent veterans or their widows, contained records on the service of many Harrison County residents.⁹ Finally, vertical files of family records in the Harrison County His-

torical Museum often provided direct evidence on service by family members.¹⁰

Even all this research did not complete the database because, as I already mentioned, sizable numbers of men who lived in Harrison in 1860 served in companies that were not recruited primarily in that county. Therefore, the service records of those units also were searched carefully and with considerable success. In total, 215 of the 1,728 men in the database were identified as members of companies raised primarily outside Harrison County.

Once the collection of data from the census and six sources on military service was completed, basic questions, beginning with “what percentage of Harrison County’s white men aged 13 to 46 in 1860 entered the Confederate Army or Texas State Troop units?” could be answered. Table I shows that almost half (49 percent) of those 1,728 men entered military service at some time between 1861 and 1865.¹¹ This proportion—one of every two military-age men—seems notably high, but even at that, it is somewhat low when compared to existing estimates of military service by men across the entire state. Most studies of Texas in the Civil War estimate the number who served at somewhere between a low of 58 percent and a high of 76 percent.¹² So, unless Harrison County was far less supportive of the Confederacy than were other Texas counties—and there is no reason to think that it was—information in my database suggests that existing estimates of the proportion of the state’s military-age men who entered the service are too high. Only when the age group is limited to young men does the proportion who served rise to previously estimated levels. Table 1, which shows a breakdown of the military-age population in terms of men who were in their teens, twenties, thirties, and forties in 1861, shows that only those who were in their twenties had a rate of service notably above 50 percent.

Turning to demographic characteristics, Table 2 reveals findings that, although not surprising, are worth confirming. First, an examination of

Table 1

Record of Military Service during the Civil War by Military-Age Men in Harrison County in 1860

<i>Age and Number in 1860</i>		<i>Number and Percent Who Served</i>	
13–46	1,728	844	49%
13–18 (Teens in 1861)	422	223	53%
19–28 (Twenties in 1861)	654	387	59%
29–38 (Thirties in 1861)	391	171	44%
39–46 (Forties in 1861)	261	63	24%

Table 2

Demographic Characteristics of Soldiers and Non-Soldiers
in Harrison County, 1860

	<i>Median Age</i>	<i>Native of Lower South</i>	<i>Native of Upper South</i>	<i>Native of Free State or Foreign Born</i>	<i>Married</i>
Soldiers	23	63%	31%	6%	34%
Non-Soldiers	28	54%	31%	15%	45%

age shows that the men who served were approximately five years younger than those who did not. Soldiers from the military-age group had a median age of twenty-three in 1860, whereas the median for non-soldiers was twenty-eight. Second, a comparison of the birthplaces of those who served and those who did not also confirmed a pattern that might be expected. Among those who entered the military, 63 percent were natives of states in the lower South, 31 percent were from upper South states, and only 6 percent were from the free states and foreign nations. Among those who did not serve, 54 percent were from the lower South, 31 percent from the upper South, and 15 percent from the free states and foreign nations. Clearly, men born in the lower South felt the strongest commitment to the Confederacy, and those born in free states and foreign nations felt the least. Third, unmarried men were more likely to serve than those who were married. Only 34 percent of the soldiers were married, whereas 45 percent of the non-soldiers had wives. To repeat, these findings are not surprising, but it is always worthwhile to confirm the expected.

Moving from demographic characteristics to economic information on the military-age white male population of Harrison County, brings us to the much-controverted "rich man's war, poor man's fight?" question.¹³ The first problem, of course, is the definition of "rich" and "poor." One key in differentiating classes in antebellum Texas was slaveownership, so one definition of "rich" is "slaveowner." Ownership of a single slave, however, did not make a person truly "rich," so a combination of slaveownership and wealthholding in general is probably more revealing. I will consider both definitions.

Table 3 shows that men who were slaveholders or members of slaveholding families entered military service at a notably higher proportion than did nonslaveholders. Of 770 slaveholders, 438 (57 percent) served, as compared to 406 (42 percent) of 958 nonslaveholders. Thus, if slave-

ownership is used to define "rich," it is clear that members of Harrison County's wealthier class did not leave the fight to the poor.

A combination of slaveholding and wealthholding in general provides four "classes" whose participation in the war may be analyzed in some detail. The wealthiest class was composed of men from families who owned slaves and also had total wealth (a combination of real and personal property) of \$16,000 or more, a number that placed those families above the mean wealthholding for slaveholders in East Texas. The second wealthiest class consisted of men from families who owned slaves and had a wealthholding of less than \$16,000. Nonslaveholding families were divided into those with total wealthholdings of \$1,500 or more (the mean wealthholding for nonslaveholding families in East Texas) and those with less than \$1,500 in wealth.¹⁴ Table 3 shows the military service of men in these four classes. There is a regular progression in terms of military service from the wealthiest to the poorest class as 59 percent of the former served as compared to 40 percent of the latter. This table also indicates that men from the wealthiest class entered the war earlier than others. Those from slaveholding families worth \$16,000 or more were the only group to have a larger percentage of those who served enter the war in 1861 rather than in 1862 (46 percent compared to 41 percent), whereas the majority in the three other classes joined in 1862. Please note also that regardless of the high percentages of soldiers from the wealthier classes, the largest group in absolute numbers (287) came from the poorest class. These statistics strongly support the conclusion that for residents of Harrison County the Civil War was a "rich man's war" and a "rich man's fight" and, when absolute numbers are considered, a "poor man's fight" as well.

Table 3

Service According to Economic Class:
Military-Age Men of Harrison County in 1860

<i>Economic Class</i>	<i>Total Population</i>	<i>Number & Percent Who Served</i>		<i>Year Entered Confederate Service</i>		
				1861	1862	1863
Slaveholder	770	438	57%	38%	47%	13%
Non-slaveholder	958	406	42%	32%	57%	9%
Slaveholder—\$16,000 or More	325	191	59%	46%	41%	11%
Slaveholder—Less than \$16,000	445	247	56%	31%	52%	14%
Non-slaveholder—\$1,500 or More	239	119	50%	25%	62%	11%
Non-slaveholder—Less than \$1,500	719	287	40%	35%	56%	8%

Table 4

Experience of Harrison County Soldiers During the Civil War

<i>Type of Experience</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Served Without Serious Illness or Wound	26
Killed/Fatally Wounded in Action	6
Died of Disease	11
Died while Prisoner of War	4
Suffered Serious Illness/Survived*	7
Wounded/Survived*	7
Prisoner of War/Survived*	13
Discharged After Passage of Conscription Act	6
Received Disability Discharge	5
Deserted/AWOL	2
Miscellaneous	2
No Record of Military Experience Except that Served	11

*A few individuals were counted twice in these categories because they both were wounded and were prisoners of war, or they both suffered illnesses and were prisoners of war.

A final, and critically important, question about the demographic impact of the war on Harrison County's white male population is: What happened to those who entered military service between 1861 and 1865? Table 4 shows that only about one-quarter (26 percent) can be documented as having served much of the war without suffering serious illnesses or wounds. At least one-half lost their lives or had experiences involving serious physical or psychological suffering. A little more than one-fifth (21 percent) died in the army—6 percent in battle, 11 percent from disease, and 4 percent in prisoner-of-war camps. Another 14 percent suffered serious illnesses or wounds but survived and continued to serve, and 13 percent spent time as prisoners of war, some on two separate occasions. Five percent received disability discharges, most of which resulted from illness. (So, 53 percent died or faced serious physical or psychological suffering.) Approximately 6 percent received discharges without disabilities, most of them for being over or under age at the time conscription began in April 1862. Only 2 percent were listed as deserters, although a higher percentage may have left the army in 1865 as defeat became imminent. (Service records that would reveal an increasing desertion rate are often unavailable for late 1864 and early 1865.) The military experiences of 13 percent fell into miscellaneous categories such as transferring to a non-Texas regiment or simply could not be documented.

In conclusion, then, several important suggestions about the impact of the Civil War on the white male population of Texas may be drawn from this quantitative study of Harrison County's white men aged thirteen to forty-six in 1860. First, the percentage of military-age men in Texas who actually served may have been somewhat smaller than is generally believed, closer perhaps to one-half than to two-thirds. Second, those who served probably were younger and more likely to be from the lower South than those who did not serve. Third, married men likely were a decided minority among soldiers. Fourth, wealthy slaveholders and their sons did not leave the fighting to men from poorer families. The war was not a "rich man's war and poor man's fight" in the sense that the rich did not fight. They did—and so did the poor. Fifth, among those who entered military service, two of every ten did not return, and nearly three in ten of those who survived suffered serious illnesses, wounds, or imprisonment. This casualty rate supports as especially important suggestion, I think, about the demographic impact of the Civil War on Texas. Consider this: If white males aged thirteen to forty-six across all of Texas in 1860 served in the Confederate Army at the same rate as did soldiers from Harrison County (49 percent) and died at the same rate (21 percent), the losses appear disastrously large—more than 12,000 men, most of them in their twenties and thirties. To appreciate the magnitude of such losses, think about this: If Texas had entered a war in 2001 with its population as reported in the 2000 census and had comparable percentages of its military-age males serve and die, total deaths would have been more than 540,000 men. It is not easy to contemplate the meaning of such a loss—in many ways—but almost certainly the deaths of so many young men would reduce productivity and growth for years to come. Moreover, do not forget that thousands of soldiers survived the war but came home weakened by wounds, disease, and imprisonment. Josiah Perry Alford, the young man whose photograph you saw when I began this presentation, suffered a thigh wound at the Battle of Chickamauga and had his left leg amputated on the field without benefit of anesthetic. He survived, came home, married in 1883, and lived productively, serving as the County Clerk of Harrison County for more than ten years. However, he died in 1897 at the relatively young age of 53, having, in the words of his widow "suffered from [the wound and amputation] as long as he lived."¹⁴ So the war had a massive demographic impact on Texas in the form of both the terrible losses suffered during the fighting and the post-war problems faced by many veterans; yet, Texas grew rapidly after 1865. For example, the state's population rose from 604,215 in 1860 to 1,591,749 in 1880.¹⁵ Cotton production rose from 431,463 bales in 1860 to 805,284 bales by 1880.¹⁶ Some 8,000 miles of railroad tracks were built in the state between 1870 and 1890. Texas's post-war growth and productivity is probably explained in part by the likelihood that half of its military-age white males did not serve and therefore did not suffer the often-ruinous impact of war, in part by the fact that a sizable

minority of the state's adult male population, the African-Americans who were slaves, suffered few wartime losses in the army, and in part by the fact that Texas had the good fortune to receive a huge influx of immigrants from the older southern states after 1865. Where that left much of the rest of the southern states—such as Mississippi that probably had a higher percentage of their military-age white population serve, had at least as high a casualty rate among those who served, and then lost many of those who survived when they migrated to Texas—is a matter that is not pleasant to contemplate. Look how far the investigation of a simple question “who fought for the Confederacy” can take you—all the way to wondering about the lingering demographic impact of the Civil War on the entire South!

NOTES

1. Randolph B. Campbell, *A Southern Community in Crisis: Harrison County, Texas, 1850-1880* (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1983), 24-27, 52, 190-191; United States Bureau of the Census, *Agriculture of the United States in 1860; Compiled from the Original Returns of the Eighth Census* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 140-151, 240-242. (The cotton crop produced in San Augustine County in 1859 appears to have been the second largest in the state because it was reported incorrectly at 31,342 bales. The actual crop was 3,142 bales, far fewer than Harrison County produced.) Walter L. Buenger, *Secession and the Union in Texas* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 164, shows that it was not uncommon for Texas counties to support secession by 95 percent or more of the total vote cast.

2. Campbell, *Southern Community in Crisis*, 200.

3. Simpson, *Marshall Guards*, *passim*; Campbell, *Southern Community in Crisis*, 201, 210, 216-217; Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies*, 106-108.

4. Campbell, *Southern Community in Crisis*, 201-203, 205-206, 210-211, 217; Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies*, 47-48; Hale, *The Third Texas Cavalry in the Civil War*.

5. Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies*, 70-72, 88-90, 128-130. Service by Harrison County men in these regiments raised primarily in other counties will be documented in detail below.

6. Index to the Compiled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from the State of Texas, Records of the Department of War, RG109, National Archives, Washington, DC; Compiled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from the State of Texas, Records of the Department of War, RG109, National Archives, DC. The search for Harrison County soldiers was aided greatly by a privately printed source, ?Confederate Soldiers That Served in Units Formed in Harrison County, Texas,? the work of Jimmy and Patsy Oliphant of Shreveport, Louisiana. Also, Janet B. Hewett, editor, *Texas Confederate Soldiers, 1861-1865* (2 vols., Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing, 1997), the most extensive listing of Civil War soldiers from Texas available, proved extremely useful in identifying men from Harrison County by unit.

7. H. P. N. Gammel, comp., *The Laws of Texas, 1822-1897* (10 vols.; Austin: Gammel Book Co., 1898-1902), V: 455-465; Muster Roll of the Harrison County Regiment, 1862, Archives Division, Texas State Library, Austin.

8. Gammel, comp., *Laws of Texas*, V: 675-676; Confederate Indigent Families List, 1863-1865, Archives Division, Texas State Library, Austin.

9. H. P. N. Gammel, comp., *The Laws of Texas, Supplementary Volume to the*

Original Ten Volumes, 1822-1897 (Austin: Gammel Book Company, 1902), 182-185; Confederate Pension Application Files, 1899-1975, Archives Division, Texas State Library, Austin.

10. Vertical Files on Harrison County Families, Harrison County Historical Museum Library, Old Courthouse, Marshall, Texas. Files with varying amounts of information exist for hundreds of families from the antebellum era.

11. The great majority of Harrison County soldiers served in what might be termed "regular" Confederate Army units, but some, mostly older men, enlisted in State Troop outfits that were organized in late 1863 and disbanded six months later without ever leaving Texas. Harrison County men were found in three companies of one of these units, the "Texas 1st Cavalry Battalion, State Troops." It may be stretching the point to say that these men served in the Confederate Army, but in an effort to be as inclusive as possible, they were counted as such. Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies*, 38.

12. Robert A. Calvert and Arnoldo De León, *The History of Texas* (2nd ed., Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1996), 134, gives the statistic 68,500 to 90,000. Stephen B. Oates, "Texas Under the Secessionists," *Southwest Historical Quarterly*, 67 (October 1963), 187, set the number at 88,000. The largest number, 90,000, was given by Governor Francis R. Lubbock as the total of Texans in service in 1863. Ralph A. Wooster, *Texas and Texans in the Civil War* (Austin: Eakin Press, 1995), 32, 95. According to Wooster, this meant that "nearly all adult males" were in military service. The male population of Texas in 1860 is found in United States Bureau of the Census, *Population of the United States in 1860; Compiled from the Original Returns of the Eighth Census* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 474-477. (The census reported only aggregate totals for males aged 10 to 14 and 40-49. To determine the number aged 13-14, I assumed that each year of age accounted for an equal part of the total and therefore took 40 percent—accounting for two of the five years—of the total. In the case of males aged 40-46, I made the same assumption and took 70 percent of the total reported for that age group.)

13. A recent study, David Williams, *Rich Man's War: Class, Caste, and Confederate Defeat in the Lower Chattahoochee Valley* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), indicates the continuing interest in this question.

14. Context on wealthholding in East Texas is provided by Randolph B. Campbell and Richard G. Lowe, *Wealth and Power in Antebellum Texas* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 64 (Table 22).

15. Application of Mrs. Addie Alford, 1926, Confederate Pension Application Files.

16. Bureau of the Census, *Population of the United States in 1860*, 483; United States Bureau of the Census, *The Statistics of the Population of the United States; Compiled from the Original Returns of the Ninth Census (June 1, 1870)* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1872), 63; United States Bureau of the Census, *Statistics of the Population of the United States at the Tenth Census (June 1, 1880)* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1883), 443.

17. Bureau of the Census, *Agriculture of the United States in 1860*, 140-151; United States Bureau of the Census, *The Statistics of the Wealth and Industry of the United States ... from the Original Returns of the Ninth Census, 1870* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1872), 252; United States Bureau of the Census, *Report on the Productions of Agriculture as Returned at the Tenth Census (June 1, 1880)* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1883), 242.

WHO FOUGHT FOR THE CONFEDERACY?

The Soldiers of Walker's Texas Division

RICHARD G. LOWE

“**W**e have waged this war not by strategy but by fighting, and the hero of it is not the general but the soldier.” That statement, by the anonymous author of an 1864 primer on warfare for junior officers, makes a point worth pondering: the privates and corporals and sergeants and captains of the Civil War decided its outcome, even more than generals and politicians. For 140 years Americans have learned more and more about Lee and Grant and Sherman and Jackson. We can't seem to get enough of them. Only in the last twenty years or so have some historians begun to shift their gaze and examine the rank and file of both armies, partly to understand how they managed in such a bloody slaughterhouse as the American Civil War. For four years, those soldiers endured casualty rates that today would have Americans rioting in the streets. What sort of men could march twenty-five miles a day over dusty roads, with little or nothing to eat, and then do the same the next day, and then die by the thousands on the third day, and then have the survivors resume the march on the fourth day? The answer to that question can't be found in biographies of Abraham Lincoln or Robert E. Lee or old-fashioned battle studies. Scholars have had to dig into census returns, tax accounts, courthouse documents of all sorts, and the military records of individual soldiers to try to understand the men who fought for the Union and the Confederacy.

My colleague Mike Campbell studied this subject by examining the military population of Harrison County in Civil War Texas. I have approached it by looking at the Texans who marched and fought in John G. Walker's Texas Infantry Division. What I would like to do this afternoon is, first, tell you a little about this important Texas unit in order to place it in the broader context of the war. Then, once you are familiar with the division's role in the conflict, I will talk about the type of men who marched in its ranks. The objective, of course, is to try to understand the question posed for this session, “Who Fought for the Confederacy?”

The *Walker* of Walker's Texas Division was Major General John G. Walker, a native of Missouri, a graduate of what is now St. Louis Univer-

sity, a veteran of the Mexican War, and a valued division leader in Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia before he was assigned to command the Texas Division in late 1862. The *men* who would form Walker's Texas Division, the largest body of Texans to fight in the Civil War and the only division on either side to consist of regiments from a single state, joined the Confederate army in the winter and spring of 1862, mostly in reaction to a series of battlefield reverses that seemed to threaten Texas directly—the Confederate defeat at Fort Donelson in western Tennessee in February 1862; the defeat at Pea Ridge, Arkansas, in March; the bloody disaster at Shiloh in southwest Tennessee in April; and the fall of New Orleans to Union forces three weeks later. These events prompted thousands of Texans who had not joined the war effort at first to march off to the nearest county seat, sign up for a particular company, and eventually report to a training camp ("camp of instruction") where these farmers and shoe clerks would be turned into soldiers. At least, the Confederate army *hoped* to turn them into soldiers.

The division spent the entire war marching and fighting in the trans-Mississippi theater of operations. In June 1863 the Texans, who soon acquired the nickname "Walker's Greyhounds" for their reputation as swift and long marchers, struck at Ulysses S. Grant's long supply line during the Vicksburg Campaign in a vicious hand-to-hand engagement at Milliken's Bend, just upriver from Vicksburg. Although successful at first, the Texans were eventually driven back by the heavy guns of Union iron-clad ships on the Mississippi River. Five months later they smashed the rear guard of another Union army marching overland from New Orleans toward Galveston and helped to convince Federal generals to abandon that approach to Texas. Their most important contribution to the Confederate war effort was the leading role they took in turning back another Union thrust aimed at Texas, the famous Red River Campaign in the spring of 1864. In seventy days they marched, often without food or tents, 930 miles and fought three pitched battles. That was the equivalent of a Civil War army marching from Washington, D.C., to Memphis and fighting along the way, all in ten weeks. At one point during this campaign, the Greyhounds were reduced to only about 1,500 soldiers, about one-eighth their original number. The men of the Texas division had a reputation as tough soldiers, capable of withstanding great hardship and able to handle themselves well on the battlefield. But they were not angels. They looked like scruffy thugs, they stole from civilians with a remarkable degree of proficiency, and they sometimes left the ranks without permission. Many of them whored and drank at every opportunity. They fought to preserve life as they knew it, including slavery, and they made no apologies for it. I wouldn't want to run across them on a lonely dark road in Arkansas, but I did find them a fascinating subject.

One of the first patterns that emerged when I began studying these men was their propensity to join up with brothers and cousins and neighbors. In my sample of 2,200 soldiers drawn from twelve regiments in the

division, you can see in Table 1 that most served with people they knew. For example, more than 96 percent of the men in Company D of the 6th Texas Cavalry Battalion were from the same county. This general pattern held true for most of the companies in most of the regiments of the division. What did that mean for their home communities? Among other things, it meant that the adult male population of a county could be severely reduced if the company or companies formed in that county happened to be in the thick of any fight. For the man in the ranks, it meant that his performance as a soldier would surely be reported back to his family and friends at home. For most soldiers, the war was a family and community undertaking.

Like most soldiers in most wars, the men of the Greyhound Division were young. The mean age of soldiers at the outset of their service was 26.9 years (median: 26). One-sixth were still teenagers when they enlisted and one-half were twenty-five or younger. One in four was in his thirties, and only 6.3 percent were forty or older. Although two-thirds of the men in the division were in their teens and twenties when they first signed the muster rolls, the Greyhounds were, on the average, a few years older than their enemies, older than Confederate soldiers in general, older than their comrades who had joined the army in the first months of the war, and older than United States soldiers in World War II.

Not only were these Texans older than the typical Confederate or Union soldier, they were also more likely to be married and more likely to be the head of a household. Slightly more than half (50.9 percent) of all men in the division were married, and about the same proportion (50.1 percent) headed a household back in Texas. Most Civil War soldiers were not married, and most did not support a family. The men of the Federal 12th Missouri Infantry, for example, were nearly all single, 90.7 percent. Similarly, only 22 percent of the horsemen in a separate Texas regiment, the 3rd Texas Cavalry, were heads of household in 1860. The same held true among U.S. privates in World War II: only 27 percent were married when they enlisted.

These figures on age and marital status point to a clear pattern of enlistments in Texas. In general, younger single men from financially stable families volunteered earlier in the war. Older men, with families and households to worry about, especially those in the middle and lower wealth groups, joined the war effort later. They had more to lose by going off to war, and only an emergency, such as that presented by Confederate reverses in the winter and spring of 1862, convinced them to leave wives and children behind and join the army.

Most of the Greyhounds—about two of every three—were natives of the lower southern states. Almost half had been born in just four lower South states: Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. Nearly one in three men in the division were natives of the upper southern states (from Maryland to Missouri), and only a small scattering had been born in the North or in foreign countries. These proportions—nearly two-

Table 1

County Origins of Enlistees in Sample Companies

<i>Regiment</i>	<i>Company</i>	<i>County</i>	<i>Percent of Enlistees</i>
6th Texas Cavalry Batn.	D	Leon	96.3
11th Texas Infantry	D	Titus	96.0
12th Texas Infantry	D	Grimes	87.8
13th Texas Cavalry	H	Newton	94.2
14th Texas Infantry	H	Harrison	80.3
16th Texas Cavalry	D	Grayson*	47.5
		Collin	39.3
16th Texas Infantry	D	36 counties	scattered
17th Texas Infantry	A	Burleson	78.8
18th Texas Infantry	K	Cherokee	95.5
19th Texas Infantry	E	San Augustine	61.0
22nd Texas Infantry	B	Leon	82.8
28th Texas Cavalry	H	Freestone	92.5

Note: Soldiers whose county of residence could not be ascertained (568 of 1,557, or 36.5 percent) were not included in these percentages.

*Grayson and Collin Counties are contiguous.

Table 2

Age Distribution of Men in the Division

<i>Age</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
13-19	16.2
20-25	33.6
26-29	18.3
30-39	25.6
40 and older	6.3

Table 5

Mean Property Holdings of Men in the Division, 1860

<i>Type of Property</i>	<i>Men in Walker's Division</i>	<i>Texas Heads of Households</i>	<i>Men in 3rd Texas Cavalry</i>
Real Property	\$1,397	\$2,699	\$12,787
Personal Property	\$2,180	\$3,692	NA
Wealth*	\$3,484	\$6,393	NA

*Wealth is defined as a combination of real and personal property as listed in the 1860 United States census.

Sources: Campbell and Lowe, *Wealth and Power in Antebellum Texas*, 116; Hale, "The Third Texas Cavalry," 26.

Star State owned slaves in 1860, but only about one-fifth (21.6 percent) of these soldiers. Once again, the relative youth of the military population helps to explain the difference: younger men simply had not had as many years to accumulate wealth and slaves.

These figures on slaveholdings in the division provide little support for the old argument that the Civil War was "a rich man's war but a poor man's fight." The soldiers were about as wealthy as other Texans their age and presumably would have accumulated slaves and property at the same rate as other Texans. In other words, they reflected the society around them. They were not poor cannon fodder thrown at the enemy by the wealthy. Indeed, some Texas units included far more than their share of the slaveholding elite of Texas. More than half of the horsemen in the 3rd Texas Cavalry, for example, were members of slave-owning households, and planters (those holding twenty or more bondsmen) were greatly over-represented.

The wealthiest families in Texas—the 7.8 percent who owned combined real and personal property worth at least ten thousand dollars in 1860—are another measuring stick for the old charge that rich men started the war and expected poor men to do the dying. In the regiments of Walker's Texas Division, owners of wealth worth ten thousand dollars or more constituted 10.5 percent of the original members of the division. In other words, even though the men of this division were not wealthy compared to Texas adult males in general, the division nevertheless contained more than its share of rich men. Prosperous planters huddled around the same campfires, blinked through the same summer dust, shivered in the

same freezing rain, and faced the same enemy missiles as their poorer neighbors. Rich men may have started the war, but they also fought it.

Further evidence of this is in Table 6. These figures demonstrate that those who became battlefield casualties were very much like those in the division as a whole. In terms of age, occupation, birthplace, wealth, and slaveholding status, the two groups were nearly identical. Wealthy men served and suffered at a rate one might expect from a group with their share of the overall population. The only significant variation among those who were battlefield casualties was in family status. Slightly more than half of all members of the division were married and heads of households, but only about two-fifths of those who were killed, wounded, or captured and missing were married and/or headed a household back in Texas. Neither the quantitative nor qualitative data I examined point to an obvious explanation for this difference, but a common-sense suggestion seems reasonable: married men and men who had households to support were probably less likely to expose themselves recklessly in battle than men without such responsibilities. This is only a conjecture, however, and further research is justified along these lines.

To sum up, then — compared to his neighbors who volunteered early in the war, the soldier in Walker's Texas Division was somewhat older, more likely to be married, less likely to be a slaveholder, and less prosperous. The "typical" soldier in the Greyhound Division was a native of the

Table 6
Characteristics of Soldiers Who Were Battle Casualties*

<i>Points of Comparison</i>	<i>Whole Sample</i>	<i>Sample Casualties</i>
Mean Age	26.9	25.8
Occupation	78% in Agriculture	73.8% in Agriculture
Born in Lower South	64.5%	59.6%
Mean Real Property Holdings	\$1,397	\$1,590
Mean Personal Property Holdings	\$2,180	\$2,327
Proportion Who Were Slaveholders	27.3%	27.3%
Proportion Who Were Married	50.9%	39%
Proportion Who Were Heads of Households	50.1%	39%

*All figures in the table are from the sample of officers and men in the division.

lower-South, in his mid- to late twenties, married and the head of a household, and a non-slaveholding farmer. He rubbed shoulders and shared tents with rich men and poor, and he fought because he wanted to preserve life as he knew it before the war—an agricultural, rural life that included slavery and a dominant white race.

The end of the war found the Greyhounds back where they had started, in their camps of instruction near Hempstead, northwest of Houston. When they learned in the spring of 1865 that Confederate armies in Virginia, North Carolina, and Alabama had surrendered, they realized, unlike some of their generals, that the cause was lost. On May 20, what was left of the Confederate army near Hempstead went to pieces. Some of the men quietly walked away from their campfires, turned for home, and depended on the kindness of strangers for meals on the road. Others, angry at the world they found themselves in, concluded that the Confederacy must pay for all their troubles: the wages they had never received, the meals they had never eaten, and the time they had missed with wives and children. These angry Greyhounds joined other Confederates from Galveston to Houston to Hempstead, broke open quartermaster and commissary warehouses, snatched all the supplies and food they could carry home, drove off in army wagons, led away army mules and horses, and cursed their luck all the way home. When their officers asked them to remain soldiers after all hope for victory had vanished, they turned almost overnight into civilians again. To resist when resistance was useless—when, in fact, resistance would invite massive enemy armies onto their soil—made no sense to the Texans. They had seen what happened to farms and communities visited by large armies, especially enemy armies. In one sense, then, by walking away and going home to their wives and children, they saved Texas one last time from the ravages of war.

The end of the war ended the career of Walker's Texas Division, but it did not end the Greyhounds' determination to preserve the old order as much as possible. A small, almost invisible federal government, an even smaller state government, a political system and social order controlled by traditional-minded southern white men, and a docile black laboring class—this was life as they remembered it before the war and life as they hoped to continue it. Some of them resumed public careers after the war (Oran Roberts and Richard Hubbard became governors), resisted Republican goals for the Reconstruction of the nation, and clung to the old ways as long as possible. General Walker fled to London after the war, where he wrote his memoirs and waited for a pardon from President Andrew Johnson. He returned to the United States in 1868, became a successful businessman, and served as United States consul in Bogotá, Colombia, in the late 1880s. He died while walking through Lafayette Park across from the White House in Washington in 1893, two days before his seventy-first birthday. Symbolizing the eventual reunion of North and South, both Confederate and Union generals formed an honor guard at his funeral in Winchester, Virginia.

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The veteran who doubtless lived longer than any of his twelve thousand comrades was Corporal Maston Thomas Hickman of the 22nd Texas Infantry Regiment. Born in 1841, he was a farmer in Polk County before he enlisted in future governor Richard Hubbard's regiment in March 1862. He was present for duty at every roll call throughout the war and returned to Polk County after the breakup. He celebrated his one-hundredth birthday just fourteen weeks before Pearl Harbor in 1941 by taking a ride on an airplane, a story that his Civil War messmates would never have believed. Just to prove he had done it, he posed for a photograph beside the aircraft. His own parents may well have been born as early as the administration of Thomas Jefferson or James Madison, but there was Corporal Hickman, several generations later, taking advantage of 20th-century technology to mark his first century of life. He finally died in January 1945, in his 105th year, and lived almost long enough to see the dawning of the atomic age seven months later. By the looks of this crowd, I believe that some of us were living when Corporal Hickman was alive. The Civil War is barely over.

ADMIRAL CHESTER NIMITZ:

From Fredericksburg to Tokyo Bay

ADMIRAL BOB INMAN

I must admit to being a little intimidated being with so many scholars who do great research and then who write so eloquently. When Al Hurley first asked me to join this effort about eighteen months ago, I willingly agreed. He's very hard to turn down.

It was much, much further along that the idea came up of a paper. And the reality is, I don't do papers. So pity the poor transcriber for these remarks, and the editor who's going to have to try to turn it into something that will be suitable for the *Proceedings*. Now, the honest answer is, I have written, occasionally, but half of it is all classified.

The intimidation disappeared with excitement about the topic that I was asked to cover. I had the great privilege of meeting the late Admiral Nimitz in 1957, when a friend of mine was his escort on one of his trips to Washington, and he was an astonishing figure to spend some time with.

Jane has already set the stage. He was born in Fredericksburg on February 24, 1885, near the hotel that his grandfather, a retired sea captain, had built. His father died before he was born. His mother remarried when he was five to his father's younger brother who promptly moved the family to Kerrville.

When he was a senior in high school, he decided he wanted to go to West Point. He couldn't get an appointment; the slots were already filled. So, somewhat reluctantly he took a competitive examination for the Naval Academy and was accepted. And so he actually left before he finished high school. He got his high school diploma in 1945 as a Fleet Admiral.

He entered the Naval Academy in 1901, graduated in 1905 as the seventh out of 114 select students. In those days, as a matter of law, you were not commissioned when you graduated. He went to sea and served two years on the USS *Ohio* out in the Far East.

And then after the two years, he was commissioned as an Ensign. 1907 was a very eventful year, because almost immediately as an Ensign he took command of a gunboat—the *Panay*—operating on the Yangtze, and then a little later, the USS *Decatur*. And not long after, ran the *Decatur* aground on the banks of the river and was court-martialed.

And that usually brings an end to the career of naval officers. Happily he was given the benefit of the doubt, having been in a river as opposed to the open oceans.

He came back, in 1907, to the United States and went into duty under instruction for submarines. For most of the rest of his career, until World War II, he worked his way through submarine assignments and tours, also occasionally in larger surface combatants. And that's important to remember as we get to the role he played in World War II.

He showed his personal courage clearly in 1912; standing on the deck of a ship, saw a seaman swept over the side of the ship and being swept away in a heavy current. He jumped overboard and held him aloft until they were rescued by people who had managed to man a boat and get it out. For that, the Treasury Department gave him the Silver Life Saving Medal.

In 1913 he went to shore duty in Groton, Connecticut, for the first time, and met and married Catherine Vance Freeman. They went together as a newly married couple to Europe to observe the building of diesel engines for ships there, and came back. Pretty soon thereafter he served in the first ship to have those diesels, and then became aide and chief of staff to the Commander of the U.S. submarine fleet in the Atlantic.

In 1917, he went to the battleship *South Carolina* as its executive officer just at the end of World War I. Then he held more duties back in submarines.

But then in 1922, he went to the U.S. Naval Academy. He looked at the requirement to do a major project and he elected to develop a plan for a hypothetical Pacific war. And the plan that he developed in 1922 became the focus of his efforts when he suddenly faced the challenge of a real war, not a hypothetical war.

A major event in the history of the Nimitz family was a decision in 1926 to send him to Berkeley to create a Naval Reserve Officer Training unit at the University of California, Berkeley. The war department had already been there, but the Navy had been very reluctant to look at creating an ROTC program.

So Chester Nimitz, as a Commander, went out to create a program, was promoted to Captain, and spent three years there. He and Mrs. Nimitz fell in love with Berkeley in that time frame.

He alternated in sea and shore assignments for the next ten years, was eventually selected for flag rank, and did a tour as an Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. In those days, that was the title given to what we now call the Bureau of Naval Personnel, career development and assignment of all naval officer and enlisted personnel.

In 1939, he was ordered back to Washington to be the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. And among his friends was the President of the United States, who occasionally would invite the Nimitzes to come to the White House for dinner.

He was serving in that role on the 7th of December, 1941. The deci-

sion was made within days to relieve Admiral Thomas Kimmel as Commander of the Pacific Fleet. On the 21st of December, Chester Nimitz was promoted from two stars to four and appointed as the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. He actually took over the duties on the 25th of December.

Assuming command at that very critical point after the huge losses suffered at Pearl Harbor, he focused on what was remaining and how the assets could be used. Now remember, this is the man who had served in submarines, cruisers, and battleships. Fortunately, most of the aircraft carriers had survived. They'd been at sea.

He made an early decision to focus on submarines and aircraft carriers. He took the battleships, to the great dismay of a number of his colleagues, and used them largely for convoy duty between the West Coast and Hawaii. And he shaped around the aircraft carriers fast strike units that could move.

His partner in all of this was Admiral King, the Chief of Naval Operations. He and Ernie King were comrade spirits, who both served as line officers, but who would come to appreciate the potential of naval aviation in the process. They were like-minded, they were simple, and they were very direct with one another.

Out of that dialogue grew the strategy for island hopping across the Pacific, gradually whittling away at Japanese outposts; much more importantly, creating bastions from which you could leapfrog the next leg; and most importantly, to begin to bring air power to bear against the Japanese homeland.

That strategy was strikingly different from what General MacArthur had proposed. Sitting in Australia after his evacuation from the Philippines, he had advocated a tran-Pacific advance from Australia to New Guinea up through to the Philippines, north through the Philippines, then directly to the Japanese homeland. In Admiral Nimitz's view of the General's strategy, the Navy would merely be a taxi driver to deliver the Army where MacArthur wanted to conduct his battles.

This provoked Admiral Nimitz. His strategy, in fact, envisioned a tri-service campaign, the Army, the Navy, the Marines, steadily advancing, capturing strategic points, and ultimately bypassing those where large casualties might be undertaken to get closer and closer to bringing the war directly to the Japanese mainland.

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to adopt Nimitz's strategy, MacArthur was understandably enraged. More importantly, Nimitz had developed a concept that would eventually become the antecedent for a joint task force approach to the conduct of military operations.

The fast carrier task force had been born out of necessity, in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. With the battle fleet crippled, Admiral Nimitz decided to dispatch the surviving carrier closest to the scene down to the Coral Sea to try to stop the Japanese fleet headed to take the battle to the northern part of Australia.

Initially both he and Admiral King were apprehensive. They thought that Admiral Fletcher was too timid, but his conduct at the battle at Coral Sea, even though he lost the *Yorktown*, persuaded them that he was the right man and that it, in fact, had bought them time.

As this effort proceeded, Nimitz solidified his view of how to unify the components of the Army, the Army Air Corps, the Marines, and the Navy. It was a principle essentially of unity of command and then direct delegation of authority to conduct operations. He recognized early the potential synergy that would ultimately become the hallmark, forty years later, of all joint operations.

From the tactical side, after the Battle of Coral Sea was over, he had to make a very wise and very fortuitous judgment about what to do next. There was evidence of Japanese movement toward capturing the Hawaiian Islands; at least that was the interpretation from Washington.

Admiral Nimitz took the time to understand how what was called radio intelligence was being derived. The success in breaking the Japanese codes had provided some alerting information that was overlooked, the dots were not connected, before Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Nimitz spent a lot of time trying to understand exactly what they had and what it possibly meant. As he contemplated the evidence he was presented, he made a decision to cast all the forces toward Midway. He concluded, based on the advice from his intelligence analyst, that the target was Midway, not Hawaii.

Therefore, he sent three carrier task forces with the intent to go ambush the ambushers. By a secure land cable, they ordered the one submarine at Midway to go out to a position 50 miles northwest of Midway and patrol, awaiting further instructions.

Nimitz summoned the final staff meeting on Wednesday, May 27 to review his own estimate of the situation. He was prepared to stake everything on Joe Roquefort's analysis of what would likely occur. Three days later, they reached a final decision point.

Captain Eddie Layton, his intelligence officer, made a presentation to him on exactly what he believed the Japanese were going to do. And Admiral Nimitz, sensing hesitation, said, "I want you to be specific. After all, this is the job I've given you, to be the Admiral commanding the Japanese forces and tell me what you're going to do." Captain Layton carefully recapped what he knew and delivered his assessment.

Japanese carriers would attack Midway on the morning of 4 June, and could be sighted at 0700 hours approximately 175 miles from Midway bearing 325 degrees. Six days later, when the enemy force was detected, Admiral Nimitz turned to Captain Layton, and remarked with a smile, "Well, you were only five minutes, five degrees, and five miles out."

The rest is history. The war turned. Admiral Yamamoto's plan was enormously elaborate. He had five separate forces, over 200 ships, 250 aircraft, 11 battleships, eight carriers, and 23 cruisers. The simplicity of the plan was to attack in advance while aircraft were off striking

Midway. The Americans sunk three of the carriers and later got a fourth.

Two critical features came out of it. The Japanese retreated, never again threatened to further expand their empire, and it did mark the end of the battleship era. From that point on, until we got to the missile age, aircraft carriers became simply the heart of U.S. Navy ability to reach out to the world.

This, from an officer whose career had begun in submarines and surface ships.

It also marked a major advance for understanding code breaking and the impact it could have on the conduct of war. You'll forgive a little personal pleasure on the side. I had the privilege, when I was the director of the National Security Agency, to declassify the seven volumes on the cryptographic successes in World War II and make them available for historians.

If Nimitz had followed Washington's analysis, the carriers would have been defending the Hawaiian islands, and not in place to ambush the Japanese.

I could go through many comparable conflicts on Leyte Gulf, the largest battle of the war, but instead I'd like to focus on Admiral Nimitz's style, his leadership, his temperament, his legacy.

His greatest gift was his leadership ability. Naval historian Robert Love writes that Nimitz possessed a sense of inner balance and calm that steadied those around him. He had the ability to pick able subordinates and the courage to let them do their jobs without interference.

He molded such disparate personalities as the quiet, introspective Admiral Raymond Spruance and the ebullient, aggressive William Halsey into an effective team.

His relationships with General MacArthur were somewhat more troubled. Nimitz did not share General MacArthur's need for publicity. In fact, one of the journalists, Robert Sherwood, noted that the admiral was frequently the despair of his public relations men. It was simply not in him to making sweeping statements or give colorful interviews.

But he could respond if he thought the Navy and its role were being slighted. He received an invitation to the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay, which was to be accepted by General MacArthur. He told the Secretary of the Navy to inform President Truman he would not attend, unless Truman changed the orders. Everyone got something. MacArthur ran the show; Nimitz took the surrender for the United States.

Over the course of the war, his clashes with General MacArthur were suitably epic. General MacArthur was the only commander in the theater outside Nimitz's command. He had the Southwest Asia command. And as I've already indicated to you, they had a very substantial disagreement on strategy.

Yet they demonstrated, ultimately in the time of need, they could work effectively together. And that really became apparent, beginning in 1944 with the campaign for the Mariana Islands and with Nimitz's support

across the Central Pacific for the landings in the Philippines. The success reinforced Nimitz's belief, ultimately, in a tri-service force.

When the war ended, he came back to Washington. I left out one critical event. In 1944, the Congress enacted legislation creating General of the Army and Admiral of the Fleet. Five-star rank—five in the Army, four in the Navy. Admiral Nimitz received his promotion to Fleet Admiral—again, he had an affinity for things happening in December, and he actually got that designation in December 1944.

He became the Chief of Naval Operations after the war, for two years. Fleet Admirals, Generals of the Army, were not permitted retire. So the Secretary of the Navy assigned him as a Special Assistant to the Western Sea Frontier in San Francisco in 1947, and he and his wife went back to their beloved Berkeley.

After he suffered a fall, they moved into quarters on Treasure Island and it was there that his pneumonia proceeded. He suffered a stroke and finally died in 1966 on February 20th. He is buried at the Golden Gate National Cemetery in San Bruno.

GENERAL WALTON WALKER

*The Eighth Army's Fight for Pusan*¹

ADRIAN R. LEWIS

Lieutenant General Walton Harris ("Johnnie") Walker died on 23 December 1950 in the vicinity of Uijongbu, Korea in a jeep accident while commanding the Eighth United States Army as it withdrew under pressure from North Korea following the surprise attack of Chinese Communist Forces. In the 1 January 1951 issue of *Time Magazine* the life and contributions of Walker were recognized:

Walker had earned a new nickname for himself in Korea. In World War II, as one of the late George Patton's favorite corps commanders, he had become a specialist in the armored attack. In Korea he had to turn to defensive tactics—first in the Pusan perimeter, where, with no reserves, he smartly shuttled front-line units from one crisis to another; more recently in North Korea, where he directed the pullback that saved his Eighth Army from destruction. Walker's new nickname: "Little Bulldog."

Last week sudden death came to the Little Bulldog. From his command post he was riding to the front north of Seoul to present unit citations to the 24th Division... and a Silver Star to his son, Captain Sam Walker.... A three-ton truck driven by a South Korean pulled out of line in a southbound column, directly in the path of Walker's jeep. The general's driver could not avoid a collision. Walker was thrown to the road. [He died from multiple fractures.] He was dead when an ambulance got him to a field hospital two miles away. Viewing his father's shrouded body, Captain Sam Walker wept. General MacArthur revealed that he had recently recommended a promotion for Walker to the four-star rank. (Walker was promoted to General posthumously.)

General Walton H. Walker contributed greatly to the security and welfare of the United States in three wars. In his last war, in Korea, he made his greatest contribution. The prosperous South Korea exists today because of the exertions and courage of General Walton Walker and his

Eighth U.S. Army.² In Korea, President Truman drew the line, committing the U.S. to stop the spread of Communism through the "Policy of Containment." Walker was the first operational commander to give teeth to that policy by meeting the attacks of the NKPA, and later, the Communist Chinese People's Volunteer Army. The world in which we live today was shaped by the policies and military actions that took place at the beginning of the "Cold War."

Walker was born in Belton, Texas on 3 December 1889 to Sam S. and May Harris Walker. On 15 June 1907 he took the oath on the Plain at West Point, becoming a member of the U.S. Corps of Cadets. Walker was commissioned second lieutenant in 1911. He served for thirty-eight years. Walker's son, Sam, followed in his footsteps. Sam also graduated from West Point. He too rose to the rank of general. General Sam Walker, who served under his father in Korea, has two sons, both graduated from West Point. Three generations of Walkers have been willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for their country. No higher calling can be answered by a man.

Few Americans recognize the name, Walton Walker, and there is only one undocumented biography of Walker. As Allan Millett has noted, "Walker deserves a better history." Unfortunately, Walker left few papers from which historians could glean insights into the general's thinking. A study of Walker's life would have to be based on the papers of the units in which Walker served; however, these types of documents are typically devoid of personal thoughts, feelings, and attitudes. Sam Walker has retained some of the records and letters of his father, but most of this material is on his World War II experience, and, amount to too little to produce a major work. Hence, historians will never produce a biography of Walker's life comparable to Carlo D. Estes' work on Patton, or D. Clayton James works on MacArthur. However, a man can and should be judged by his actions. And, in this regard there is much to say about General Walker.

Walker was not without controversy. During the early days of the struggle for the Pusan Perimeter, when the Eighth Army was continuously in retreat, General Matthew B. Ridgway and presidential advisor W. Averell Harriman, who had recently visited his headquarters, recommended the relief of Walker.³ They believed that Walker was in a fight that exceeded his capacity as a general. Ridgway stated that his concerns were: "over General Walker's leadership, lack of force, acceptance of a mediocre staff, and an unsound Base organization."⁴ And Harriman stated: "We all made up our minds that [Walker's] headquarters was rather disjointed and, although General Walker was a first-class divisional commander, this was too big a command for him. He was a very brave and competent soldier, but we came back with the view that we should recommend a change of command."⁵ (More accurately, successful corps command did not equate to successful Army command. Walker was an experienced proven corps commander in World War II.) Army Chief of Staff

J. Lawton Collins, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley and most importantly Truman, obviously did not concur with Ridgway. Besides, MacArthur was making the major decisions, and it was he who put Walker in command.

Some historians also have not been kind to Walker. The late military historian Clay Blair held Walker in low regard. In his book *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953*, he criticized Walker for committing the 24th Infantry Division piecemeal, "battalion by battalion well forward of the Kum River. The piecemeal destruction of these battalions left him without sufficient forces to defend a Kum River line." Blair concludes, "it was the mistakes by the NKPA generals and squad-level American courage rather than superior American generalship that 'won' the Battle of the Pusan Perimeter."⁶ Blair, however, charges Walker with offenses that took place before he took command in Korea. MacArthur committed the Eighth Army piecemeal, and he had no other choice, if he was going to save Korea. What is the story of the Pusan Perimeter?

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On Sunday at 0400 on 25 June 1950 the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), with the approval of Stalin and Mao, attacked across the 38th parallel, executing a well-developed invasion plan. Its objective was to complete the destruction of the Republic of Korea, and reunite the peninsula under Communist leadership. The NKPA numbered roughly 100,000 men, consisted of ten divisions, five separate infantry brigades, one armor brigade with 120 Soviet-made T34 tanks. Substantial numbers of Soviet advisors assisted the NKPA. And a large well-equipped, well-trained guerrilla force that had infiltrated into South Korea to instigate an insurgency facilitated the operations of the regular Army.⁷ The ROK was taken by surprise, and its armed forces were ill-equipped to halt the invasion. U.S. military assistance to the ROK had been intentionally restricted to defensive weapons, in part, to preclude South Korea, under the aggressive leadership of President Syngman Rhee, from attacking North Korea. The ROK Army had no combat aircraft, no tanks, or heavy artillery. As a consequence, it was quickly defeated. It was in retreat when President Truman made the decision to commit U.S. forces to the defense of South Korea.

Truman's decision to intervene was made in light of the "Policy of Appeasement" that he believed created the conditions for World War II, the loss of China to the Communists in 1949, and the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb. In July 1950 Truman decided to draw the line noting that: "Appeasement leads only to further aggression and ultimately war."⁸ Truman acknowledged that: "This was the toughest decision I had to make as President. What we faced in the attack on Korea was the ominous threat of a third world war."⁹ The poorly trained and equipped Eighth Army in Japan was the only force available capable of stopping the advance of the NKPA.

The initial phase of the war, delay and defend, was critical to the out-

come of the war. The mission of the EUSA was to deploy, get into Korea as quickly as possible, delay the enemy as far north as possible, establish a defensive position to stabilize the situation, and finally to create the conditions for offensive operations to regain the June 1950 borders of South Korea, the 38th parallel. MacArthur's initial strategic objective was to secure the port of Pusan, on the southeast tip of the peninsula, to do this he had to stop the advance of the NKPA. If the port of Pusan were lost the war between North and South Korea would be over. If Pusan were lost, to restore the situation would have required the mounting of a major amphibious operation that would have taken years to prepare, given the poor state of readiness of the Armed Forces of the U.S. And, once the entire peninsula was in Communist hands, the President and the United Nations may have accepted the loss of Korea, as they had the loss of China, a year earlier. Holding on to Pusan was of considerable strategic importance.

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Geography greatly influenced the conduct of the Korean War. Korea is a peninsula, roughly 600 miles long from its northern border with Manchuria to its southern tip. It varies in width from 125 miles to 200 miles and covers 84,000 square miles. Korea has contiguous borders with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the former Soviet Union (USSR). Just over a hundred miles across the Korea Straits lay Japan. Korea thus is strategically situated in the center of a triangle between three traditional rivals. As a consequence, Korea has been both the spoils of and an invasion route in competitions between these larger, more dominant states. Korea's common borders with the PRC and USSR made it possible for these states to intervene directly with supplies, equipment, military and/or insurgency forces. Geography thus eliminated exhaustion strategy. Short of war with the PRC or USSR there was no way to stop the flow of resources into North Korea. Annihilation strategy, short of nuclear war, was also eliminated if the PRC or USSR decided to intervene. The resources and population of either state exceeded the capabilities of the U.S., assuming they fought a more total war. While it was possible to annihilate the NKPA, it was not possible to annihilate the People's Liberation Army supported by the Soviet Union. *Given these geographic circumstances and the state of conventional U.S. forces, from a purely military view, the U.S. should not have fought the Korean War.* While theoretically Truman made the decision to fight a limited war to preclude a more total war, he took grave risks in bringing about what he was hoping to preclude. Had geographic and military considerations played a larger part in the deliberation for war, the decision would have been made against war. War, however, is a political act.

Because Korea is a peninsula, the U.S. Navy could dominate three sides of the fields of battle. And once forces were stretched across the peninsula certain forms of maneuver became impossible. Without airborne and/or amphibious forces it was not possible to conduct envelop-

ment, flanking movement, or turning movement. Offensive operations were necessarily frontal attacks, penetrations, or infiltrations; thus, the geography of Korea favored defensive operations. These restrictions on the forms of maneuver, caused by the narrowness of the peninsula, made it possible for the U.S. to employ firepower to balance the enemy's superior numbers. If the PRC or USSR intervened, short of a more total war or nuclear war, the U.S. was restricted to attrition strategy.

The Korean War in the new age of jet aircraft, missiles, and nuclear weapons was more primitive than World War II. In 1950 Korea lacked the infrastructure of modern Western states. There were few large cities, and little industry. Lines of communications, rail and road, were generally poor, and cross-country movement by vehicle, tracked and wheeled, was difficult. There was no space in Korea for the heavy armor and mechanized divisions that characterized World War II in Europe. Mobility in some parts of the country was restricted to foot movement. One main road and one main rail system linked the country. Like most peninsulas Korea had a spine of mountains running almost the length of the peninsula. The mountainous terrain was primarily in the eastern part of the country, and was excellent for defensive operations and infiltration tactics. The flat areas were covered with terraced rice fields that channeled vehicle transportation. The climate went from one extreme to the other. During the winter months, October to March, the weather was severe, approaching arctic conditions. The summers were hot with temperatures reaching over 100 degrees. The mountainous terrain, heat, and heavy loads carried by soldiers and marines combined to produce heat casualties and erode the mobility and combat power of the Eighth Army. In the summer months a stench emanated from the ubiquitous rice fields fertilized with human waste. War in Korea made enormous demands on the human body and spirit. Yet, Korea was a beautiful country, with 30 million people (20 million in the South and 10 million in the North) that ranked among the most industrious, adaptable, and enterprising on Earth. The character of the Korean people contributed mightily to the survival of The Republic of South Korea.



In Japan MacArthur had available the Eighth Army. It consisted of four of the Army's ten divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division (an Infantry Division), the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions (ID). General Walton Walker had assumed command of the Eighth Army in September 1948. He was selected because of his reputation as an outstanding trainer. He had served in World War I commanding the Thirteenth Machine Gun Battalion during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives, actions for which he received his second Silver Star. In 1944 and '45 his XX Corps had frequently led Patton's Third Army in its battles across Europe. To Walker, Patton once stated: "Of all the corps I have commanded, yours has always been the most eager to attack and the most reasonable and cooperative."¹⁰ Walker, however, was from the European

Theater. He was not one of MacArthur's chosen few, which created some friction.

Walker's mission was to improve the combat effectiveness of the Eighth Army. However, he faced many obstacles that impeded his efforts. The divisions were considerably below wartime strength in personnel and had a high turnover rate that damaged continuity and stability. The 24th ID had 10,700 men, the 1st Cavalry Division had 11,300, the 7th ID had 10,600, and the 25th 13,000 men. Wartime strength was 18,900 men. Each regiment had eliminated one of its three battalions, with the exception of the all black 24th Infantry Regiment. This meant the divisions could not fight in accordance with established doctrine. With a one-year tour of duty roughly half a division's personnel turned over every year. The divisions lacked equipment, supplies, space, and time to train. The divisions' tank battalions had been reduced to tank companies, and artillery battalions were short one battery. The Eighth Army was also psychologically unprepared for battle. General Roy K. Flint, observed: "... the Army was a hollow shell.... For young soldiers ... life in Japan was an adventure. Not only were they learning to live in the Army, but a new and strange culture beckoned just outside the camp gates. [M]any young privates lived with Japanese women just outside the camp.... Their only natural enemy was venereal disease.... Heavy drinking was a problem in all units and all ranks."¹¹ In war-torn Japan a sergeant was a wealthy man, and a private could supplement his income by black marketing. Japanese houseboys performed many of the routine duties of soldiers, providing them with additional free time. Life was good. Walker was well aware of the state of his army. Roy Appleman in the official history of the U.S. Army in Korea wrote: "General Walker was too good a soldier not to know the deficiencies of his troops and their equipment. He went to Korea well aware of the limitations of his troops in training, equipment, and in numerical strength. He did not complain about the handicaps under which he labored. He tried to carry out his orders. He expected others to do the same."¹² Part of generalship is recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of soldiers and subordinate commanders, and pushing them to exceed their limitations, but not so far as to break them. Walker understood this, but the urgency of the situation caused him to push men beyond their limitations, and many men and units collapsed under the pressure.

To bring the other divisions to approximate fighting strength the 7th Infantry Division was stripped of personnel and whole units. MacArthur informed Truman that additional forces were needed, whereupon Truman released the 2nd ID, the 3rd ID (the latter of which had fewer than 5,000 men) and 187th Regimental Combat Team of the 11th Airborne Division; however, it would take time for these units to deploy. And, still more forces would be required. On 1 September the Oklahoma's 45th and California's 40th National Guard Divisions were federalized.¹³ These eight divisions along with one Marine Division and the ROK Army

would fight the Korean War. The Eighth Army had some unique characteristics. It was an Army of regulars, National Guard and reserves. It was an Army of conscripts and volunteers. It was a segregated Army with one all black regiment. It was an Army that was integrated with Korean nationals, Korean Augments to the United States Army (KATUSAs). It was a joint Army with a division of Marines, and a combined Army with ROK, British, French, and forces from other nations. And, it was the first Army that flew the United Nation's flag.

The first Army unit deployed to Korea was Task Force Smith—a composite unit based on the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, of the 24th ID—commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith. The orders of the Commanding General of the 24th ID, Major General William F. Dean, to LTC. Smith were: “When you get to Pusan, head for Taejon. We want to stop the North Koreans as far from Pusan as we can. Block the main road as far north as possible.... Sorry I can't give you more information—that's all I've got. Good luck, and God bless you and your men.”¹⁴ On 5 July, Task Force Smith engaged a superior KPA force in the vicinity of Osan. In an uneven battle, TF Smith was enveloped and defeated. The unit disintegrated, having no weapon capable of stopping the Soviet-made T-34 tank. General Dean's 24th ID was deployed piecemeal. At each blocking positions American units fought, but the enemy's superior numbers enabled him to flow around the flanks. To preclude being surrounded and cut off, the units retreated. This pattern of fighting damaged the morale of the Eighth Army. Still, units from the division advanced as far north as possible and then fought desperate delaying actions without the support of tanks and lacking adequate artillery support and antitank weapons. One account written during the war read:

Some 10 days after the initial elements of the United States 24th Infantry Division were committed in Korea, the remainder of that understrength division was engaged with the enemy, and every battalion was attempting to defend a front greater than that normally allocated to a full-strength division. Artillery was spread so thinly that it frequently could reach the flanks of its supported unit with only one or two pieces. Engineers were employed as infantrymen in addition to their other duties. This inadequate force suffered many defeats, but still managed to regroup, pull together, and fight again over the long road from Osan to Taejon.¹⁵

The opening phase of the war was a race for time and space. The Eighth Army's objective was to deploy and build up sufficient forces to stop the NKPA as far north as possible, and to establish a defensive line from which the situation could be stabilized. The KPA's objective was to complete as rapidly as possible the destruction of the ROK Army, and push U.S. Forces back into the sea before significant U.S. forces could be

deployed.

On 13 July Walker formally took command of the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), establishing his headquarters in Taegue. Shortly thereafter he took command of ROK and UN forces in Korea. By 20 July Walker had deployed the 25th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, and redeployed the ROK Army, consisting of the 1st, 3rd, 6th, 8th, and Capital Divisions, under his command. In late July the 1st Marine Brigade joined the battle bringing the Eighth Army forces into rough parity with the NKPA. By early August the Eighth Army's troop strength had risen to 92,000 (45,000 U.S. and 47,000 ROK). At the same time the strength of the NKPA had declined to 70,000 troops. South Korea would continue to exist, but the enemy still held the initiative. The Eighth Army was psychologically in a defensive mode. It had not yet fought a successful offensive operation.

By the end of July the Eighth Army had withdrawn into the position known as the Pusan Perimeter. It was engaged on two sides with its back to the sea forming a rectangular area on the southeast tip of the Korean Peninsula, stretching roughly 100 miles from the vicinity of Taegue south along the Naktong River to the Korean Straits and east, roughly 50 miles, to the Sea of Japan. Walker lacked the manpower to establish a continuous defensive perimeter, or fight in accordance with Army doctrine. He used a system of strong points defenses and counter-attack tactics to maintain the perimeter. The timely arrival of Army regiments and the 1st Marine Brigade provided needed reserves for counterattacks. Walker used these forces as "fire brigade" plugging holes in the defense where enemy breakthroughs threatened.

On 31 July Walker ordered, "There will be no more retreating, withdrawal, readjustment of lines or whatever else you call it. There are no lines behind which we can retreat. This is not going to be a Dunkirk or Bataan. A retreat to Pusan would result in one of the greatest butcheries in history. We must fight until the end. We must fight as a team. If some of us must die, we will die fighting together."¹⁶ Throughout the month of August, Walker rushed troops from one threatened sector to another; however, he had a number of advantages. The Eighth Army's troop strength increased steadily as more United Nations forces arrived. A railway system and road network gave him interior lines and the ability to reinforce his separated units faster than his enemy. Tactical communication intelligence provided Walker with the locations and time of almost every major attack, enabling him to start the movement of forces to the threatened area before the attack took place. Air reconnaissance provided detailed information. Control of the air, close air support, and the ability to interdict the enemy's supply lines, which extended from North Korea, diminished the enemy's combat power. The Army was able to adapt new tactics to defeat enemy attacks. Soldiers and marines fought desperate battles to retain or retake hilltops. Communication between positions was frequently broken by enemy penetrations. Army RCTs and

the Marine regiment were moved to blunt the enemy's advance and then counterattack to restore the perimeter. Instead of placing two battalions on line and one in the rear as a reserve force, one battalion was placed on line and the second battalion in the rear. Once the enemy broke through, which was expected, the second battalion was deployed to defeat the enemy advance and restore the line. This was not Army doctrine. This was a new tactic innovated in the heat of battle. This tactic was necessary because each regiment consisted of only two battalions, instead of the normal three battalions.

Air Force, Navy, and Marine aviators became the heroes of the close air support war. They assisted soldiers and marines in plugging holes in the line and fighting off breakthrough attacks. Because of their proximity to the battlefield, Marine and Navy aircraft had a longer loiter time over the battlefield than Air Force aircraft—flying off aircraft carriers or from within the perimeter. They could, as a result, answer urgent calls more rapidly. They were effectively integrated into the battle as forces continued to arrive from the U.S. and other United Nations countries. In regards to air interdiction General Almond wrote that: "... despite concentrated air efforts by the Marines, the Navy, and the Air Force thus far in the fighting, it had been impossible to prevent the North Koreans from moving tremendous quantities of supplies to the support of their forces then some 300 miles south of the 38th parallel. The interdiction of roads, railroads, and bridges had no decisive effect on their overall movements."¹⁷ Airpower was not decisive, but it was important. By the end of the month the Eighth Army with the support of the FEAF had stabilized the situation. In September MacArthur was ready to go on the offense. Walker's delay and defend operation had succeeded in stopping the advance of the NKPA.

The performance of the soldiers of the Eighth Army had in too many cases been poor. Some units exhibited "bug-out fever" when under enemy attack. The Eighth Army had been thrown into battle psychologically, physically, and materially unprepared to fight. Units had been pieced together in an effort to get them up to strength. Some leaders took command the week they went into battle. To compensate for the lack of trained infantry, firepower from artillery and airpower was used extensively. In Training Bulletin No. 1 dated 20 March 1953, it was noted:

General Van Fleet has stated many times that one of our major advantages over the Reds is our ability to mass supporting fires rapidly on any target. In X Corps in late 1950 and early 1951 we found that ability primarily in the artillery; the infantry was not making maximum utilization of the weapons available. For example, we found attack after attack where the recoilless rifles were never placed in position because it was too much of an effort to hand-carry the guns and ammunition up the rugged mountains. Our company and

platoon orders too often merely mentioned the attachment of support of crew-served weapons—no targets or areas of fire were assigned, with the consequence that many infantry weapons were never used in the attack. To reduce casualties and add effectiveness to our attacks, we must get the crew-served weapons 100 per cent into the game. We are often too anxious to get the job over with as soon as possible; consequently, we tend to tackle the job with comparatively little time spent in planning.... Full utilization of all weapons requires considerable time for planning and movement of weapons.¹⁸

The Army improved as it gained in combat experience and more cohesive, better-trained units arrived from the United States. However, when it met its most severe test against the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) it was still not proficient in many of the skills required to succeed on the battlefield. Many units were simply incapable of fighting as teams. They lacked the unit training required to perform essential combat operations. Too much of the Army was in a poor state of physical readiness, incapable of sustained marches carrying the fifty-to-sixty pounds of weapons and equipment necessary to fight. The result was higher casualties and decreased combat effectiveness.¹⁹ The poor state of Army readiness was partially the fault of the Truman Administration; however, the Army deserves much of the blame.

The Marine brigade was qualitatively a better fighting force than Army units deployed from Japan. The Marine Corps had fewer missions and less responsibility than the Army. It had not been preoccupied with the forming of new governments and policing occupied countries. Its small size allowed it to focus more narrowly on its combat missions. It benefited from the experience of a relatively large number of veteran leaders and infantrymen who had seen combat in World War II. It benefited from greater stability and a consistent training program. Marines were simply better trained and physically fit than the soldiers of the Eighth Army that deployed from Japan. Marines deployed as cohesive units, and came with their own air support. Finally, Marine culture was a factor. In its long struggle against the Army for survival, marines were infused with a strong desire to perform demonstrably better than soldiers in combat. This disposition had its pluses and minuses; nevertheless, in the opening days of the Korean War Marine units consistently performed better than Army units.

In 1950 the Armed Forces of the United States were segregated. While many Army units had "bug-out fever" the criticism of the all black 24th Infantry Regiment was particularly severe. Given the racial climate—the prevalence of Jim Crowism—at the time, objective consideration was impossible; nevertheless, the status of inferiority placed burdens on the unit that were difficult to overcome; and as a consequence, some elements

of the 24th did in fact perform poorly. Others, however, fought well.²⁰ In Korea, the Army would take the lead in transforming America's racial policies and culture.

The Eighth Army achieved its first strategic objective. It retained control of the port of Pusan. And, given the suddenness of the deployment and the state of the Army, Walker and his soldiers and marines deserve great credit for their conduct of the defense. Walker has received considerable criticism for his conduct of operations in Korea and particularly the initial "delay and defend" operation. It is argued that: "The Americans' lack of imagination in their scheme of maneuver and their failure to employ existing doctrinal concepts cost them heavily in both lives and lost opportunities."²¹ And, that given Eighth Army's overall superiority in forces Walker should have taken the offensive much sooner. Yes, there were numerous defects in the performance of the Army. However, context is important. The psychological shock of being thrown into battle; the knowledge of inadequate equipment, training, and forces; and the lack of understanding of and affinity for the nation the U.S. was trying to save damaged the ability of the Army to generate combat power. Before an army that has been defeated and has retreated can take the offensive, it must first make the transformation to the offense in the minds of the men that have to fight the battles. Both the ROK Army and U.S. Army had received severe blows that damaged their fighting spirit. The transformation required could not take place overnight. In Korea, Americans did what they do best, adapt and improvise.

Of General Walton (Johnny) Walker, Major General Courtney Whitney wrote: "Walker, after surviving five months of extremely dangerous fighting from Pusan to the Yalu, had been killed in a freak jeep accident. It had been Walker who had held out, with some of the most courageous and brilliant generalship in military history, at the bottom of Korea.... It had been Walker who had almost always greeted MacArthur on his visits to the front with cheerful confidence and rugged determination. Only a few days earlier Walker had predicted that the Eighth Army would by no means be defeated by the Chinese hordes." However, in death even one's critics can find something positive to say. Given the information available what assessment can we make about the life and career of General Walton Walker?

Walker never had the freedom of command later enjoyed by Ridgway. In fact, throughout his entire operational military career he was subject to the thinking and decisions of more dominant personalities, first Patton and later MacArthur. What we can say is that Walker executed every order to the fullest extent possible within the parameters of the commander's concept; that he never said no; that he accepted every mission with confidence; that he led from the front exposing himself to the same dangers his troops faced, that he always had the welfare of his troops in mind; that he improvised, adapted, and made do with what was available; and most importantly, that he won. Walker never suffered a major defeat, and

that is probably the best we can say about any general. The British historian Max Hasting, who has typically been critical of American performance in war, wrote the following of General Walker:

The Communists had reached the limits of men, guns, supplies, [and] ammunition. The Pusan Perimeter held, and more than a few of its defenders had now heard the astonishing rumors of a great operation for their relief already being mounted from Japan. The spirit of the Eighth Army rose perceptibly, and with it their respect and gratitude to Walker, the fiercely energetic little Texan who had made their survival possible. Walker would not go down in history as a military intellectual, a man of ideas. But he would be remembered for bringing to the battle for the Pusan Perimeter the qualities that made its survival possible: ruthless dynamism, speed of response, dogged determination. He was leading one of the least professional, least motivated armies America had ever put into the field. Even many of its higher commanders seemed afflicted by bugout fever, a chronic yearning to escape from Korea and leave the thankless peninsula to its inhabitants. Walker kept his men at their business by sheer relentless hounding, goading, driving, with a support of a handful of exceptional officers and units whose competence decided the day. The Eighth Army's performance at Pusan narrowly maintained the United Nations' presence in Korea.²²

Walker was buried at Arlington National Cemetery on 3 January 1951. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense George Marshall, General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower, Generals Omar N. Bradley, J. Lawton Collins, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and numerous other history makers attended his final roll call. At his graveside service, Dean Walthour, gave the eulogy: "Grant that we may always prove adequate in whatever crisis may arise within our lives. And, above all, grant that out of this strife may come that permanent peace which is built upon the foundation stones of justice, truth and righteousness. For we know it was for this that our brother Walton gladly laid down his life. Accept his sacrifice and help us follow his example." Walton H. Walker was a great man. He deserves recognition for his contributions to the security of the United States and the existence of the prosperous South Korea.

NOTES

1. This study is based primarily on the War Diaries of the Eighth United States Army, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, RG 407, Box 1081, Archive II, College Park, Maryland.

2. General Walton Harris Walker regrettably did not leave historians personal papers that would enable them to write a scholarly study of his life and contribu-

tions. Wilson A. Heefner has published a biography of Walker, entitled: *Patton's Bulldog: The Life and Service of General Walton H. Walker* (Shippenburg, Pennsylvania: White Mane Books, 2001). Walker's son, General Sam S. Walker, U.S. Army retired of Pinehurst, North Carolina, has provided some information of value to historian, but little that would support a comprehensive study.

3. Oral Reminiscences of Governor W. Averell Harriman, Interview with D. Clayton James, 20 June 1977, RG-49, MacArthur Archives and Library, Norfolk, Virginia. Also see: Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987), 185-190; and Heefner, *Patton's Bulldog*, 198.

4. Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, Deputy Chief of Staff Correspondence, June 1950-January 1951, Box 16, Archive, U.S. Army Military History Institute.

5. Reminiscences of Averell Harriman, R6-49, B, 9.

6. Blair, *The Forgotten War*, 555.

7. When the 120,000 men of the Soviet 25th Army withdrew from North Korea they left behind all their equipment. The NKPA also inherited the equipment of defeated Japanese 34th and 58th Armies. Stalin provide more weapons and equipment to KPA than it did to the PLA during the Chinese Revolution.

8. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 784.

9. Truman, *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, 1946-52: Years of Trial and Hope*, Vol. II, 463.

10. Walker biographer, Wilson A. Heefner wrote: "As Walker prepared to return to the United States, he reviewed XX Corps's accomplishments since entering combat in Normandy on August 4, 1944: 279 day in combat; a thirteen hundred mile advance across France, Germany, and Austria; a six hundred mile advance from Normandy to the Moselle in only 28 days; the first force to capture Metz by assault... the farthest advance east of any American ground unit; the crossing of 18 major rivers; and the capture of 431,419 Germans—the equivalent of 43 divisions." See Heefner, *Patton's Bulldog*, 134. Also "Old Pro," (cover story on General Walker) *Time Magazine*, Vol. LVI, No. 5, July 31, 1950, 18-20.

11. Roy K. Flint, "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950," *America's First Battles 1776-1965*, edited, Charles E. Heller and William A Stofft (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas), 269-272.

12. Roy Appleman, *The United States Army in Korea: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950)* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986), 114.

13. Jim Dan Hill, *The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole, 1964), 506, 507.

14. T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (New York: MacMillan, 1990), 97.

15. Leon B. Cheek, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Artillery, "Korea, Decisive Battle of the World," *Military Review*, March 1953, 20-26.

16. James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1972), 126. Michael Langley, *Inchon Landing: MacArthur's Last Triumph* (New York: Times Book, 1979), 11. Also see: *Time Magazine*, August 7, 1950, 18. Walker added: "It would be impossible to get out."

17. Edward M. Almond, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army and MacArthur's Chief of Staff in Japan, "Conference on United Nations Military Operations in Korea, 29 June 1950-31 December 1951," Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Army War College, 8.

18. U.S. Army, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, Training Bulletin No. 1, Combat Information, 20 March 1953, MHI.

19. Fritzsche, Carl F., Brigadier General U.S. Army, "Physical Fitness—A Must!" *Army Information Digest*, July 1955, 41-43.

20. For the official U.S. Army history account see: Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, U.S. Army in the Korean War* (Washington DC:

Center of Military History, 1986), 194. Appleman wrote: "The tendency to panic continued in nearly all the 24th Infantry operations west of Sangju. Men left their positions and straggled to the rear. They abandoned weapons on positions. On one occasion the 3rd Battalion withdrew from a hill and left behind 12 .30-caliber and 3 .50-caliber machine guns, 8 60-mm mortars, 4 3.5-inch rocket launcher, and 102 rifles." It is hard to believe that soldiers—no matter how poorly trained and motivated—left their rifles, their only form of protection; however, Appleman's major argument was in keeping with the general feelings of the time—black men are racially inferior lacking the qualities of character necessary to make good soldiers. For another assessment by a black officer who fought with the 24th Regiment in Korea see: Charles M. Bussey, Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army, *Firefight at Yechon* (New York: Brassey's Inc., 1991). Bussey wrote: "After my firefight at Yechon the colonel told me that I should receive the Medal of Honor, but because I was a 'Negro,' he could not let that happen. Other controversy has raged over the role and performance of black soldiers in Korea. The white press emphasized stories about Negroes bugging out. In those early days in Korea, the black 24th Infantry Regiment performed better than the regiments of the white 24th Infantry Division and just as well as the other regiments that came later to Korea. The U.S. Army's official history of the first part of the Korean War... by Roy E. Appleman, strikes me as unfair and not representing what I saw personally. His book suggests that the Negro soldiers and their units were no good. The official history cites twenty-four instances of poor behavior by the 24th Infantry that I served in. Mr. Appleman was never in the combat zone, and some of the interviews upon which his account is based took place as much as five years afterward. Mr. Appleman interviewed only one black officer and no black enlisted men. He never talked to me." This controversy was addressed in William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle's *Black Soldier White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1996).

21. Dr. William Glenn Robertson, *Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950, Leavenworth Papers* (Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 1985), 108.

22. Max Hastings, *The Korean War*

THE IMPACT OF AVIATION ON TEXAS

The Military and NASA Example

HANS M. MARK

I.) INTRODUCTION

We had a very interesting day yesterday examining various aspects of Texas history. Our focus was on the military activities since the founding of the Republic of Texas and the prior events that led to this signal event. There is a very long tradition of military aviation in Texas going back to the days immediately prior to and then following the entry of the United States into the First World War. The very first use of airplanes by the U.S. Army occurred during the Philippine Campaign which ended in 1913. However the first use in the continental U.S. was later in 1916 in the punitive expedition that was mounted to chase down Pancho Villa following his raid on Columbus, New Mexico. After the war in Europe the U.S. Army developed an extensive aviation training and operational complex around San Antonio. The focus is still at Randolph Field and the facilities south of the city's center. Good flying weather the year around and warm weather were the critical factors. Flight testing and training could both be carried out easily all year round. Furthermore, hangars did not have to be strengthened against snowfall or heated in freezing weather. These were very substantial cost factors. I still remember looking at our housekeeping budgets for air bases when I was Secretary of the Air Force. In terms of our strategic air command bases, believe me that it was much more expensive to maintain Minot Air Force base in North Dakota than Bergstrom Air Force Base in Austin.

During the Second World War, a strong aviation industry developed in Texas. Such famous names in aviation as Chance Vought and Lloyd Stearman are good examples. But, from my rather prejudiced viewpoint the most important of these people is Larry Bell who moved his company to Fort Worth from Buffalo, New York in 1946.

In the case of the nation's space program, the dominant position of Texas in this area is the result of the work of two extraordinary people, Lyndon B. Johnson and Albert Thomas. What started as the NASA-Manned Spacecraft Center and is now the NASA-Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center was located in Houston because of the clout that these two leaders possessed.

To sum up our meeting here, I thought that it would be appropriate for me to describe my personal experiences working with Bell Helicopter and with the NASA-Johnson Space Center. I worked for more than thirty years on two very important programs. The first one was a military endeavor, the tilt-rotor aircraft. The second dealt with space exploration, the Space Shuttle. I will discuss both of these programs in some detail.

2.) MILITARY AVIATION: THE BELL TILT-ROTOR AIRCRAFT

The Bell-Textron Helicopter Plant and Corporate Headquarters are located in Hurst, Texas, just east of Fort Worth. The concept of the tilt-rotor aircraft originated in England and in Germany in the years before World War II. The Baynes Heliplane and the Focke Wulf Achgelis were never built as real airplanes. However, the idea took hold. After the end of the Second World War, a Texan, Dr. Robert L. Lichten established Transcendental Aircraft Company to develop tilt-rotor aircraft. The basic technical idea was to create a flying machine that can take-off and land like a helicopter and fly like an airplane. Once it has reached an appropriate altitude, it can fly just as a conventional aircraft in which normal wings provide the lift. The technical means for accomplishing this objective was to change the orientation (ie. the tilt) of the axis of the rotors (or prop rotors, as they are called) so that it is vertical in the helicopter mode and horizontal in the airplane mode. The Transcendental 1-G Tilt-Rotor Aircraft developed by Dr. Lichten could fly in the helicopter mode but never made the full transition to full horizontal flight. The 1-G was too small, flimsy and under-powered to perform this maneuver.

Nevertheless, the concept was pursued. Even though the Transcendental Company failed, the Army expressed an interest in the tilt-rotor idea. Funding was provided to develop and build a tilt-rotor aircraft that would prove the concept by building a larger and more capable tilt-rotor aircraft. This was the XV-3 and Bell won the contract to build the tilt-rotor aircraft of this type. The NASA-Ames Research Center in Mountain View, California was designated by the Army to monitor the technical progress and to supervise the contract. The extensive wind tunnel facilities at the Center were also to be used to make certain that the XV-3 performed as intended. The Bell XV-3 made over one hundred flights in which transition from vertical to horizontal flight was achieved.

In February 1969, I was appointed director of the NASA Ames Research Center. In 1969, the XV-3 was still at Ames and there was a general feeling that it was time to take the next step in tilt-rotor aircraft technology. The Transcendental 1-G and the Bell XV-3 both had the same fundamental configuration. The engine was mounted in the center of the fuselage behind the pilot. In the case of the 1-G the Lycoming engine developed 160 horsepower to lift the 1750 pound aircraft. The XV-3 carried a 450 horsepower air cooled Pratt and Whitney radial engine for a 4890 pound aircraft. In both aircraft the engine power was transmitted

to the prop rotors mounted on the wing tips by a system of gears and shafts that necessarily resulted in significant power losses. Both of the aircraft were therefore seriously under-powered. While the XV-3 proved that conversion from horizontal to vertical flight was a practical proposition, it could carry no payload.

A technical achievement developed after the XV-3 was designed in the late 1950s was the turboprop engine. These powerful engines had a much better power-to-weight ratio than the reciprocating engines they replaced. Largely on the initiative of Ames engineers, Woodrow L. Cook, Wallace Decker and Charles William Harper and their colleagues at Bell, Henry Smyth, Rod and Ken Warnicke and Richard Spivey, a new concept was developed. The new turboprop engines were light enough that the entire engine could be mounted on the wing tip. This change in configuration eliminated the complex power transmission system characteristic of the XV-3. The aircraft designed to develop the new concept was designated the XV-15. The concept of the XV-15 was developed in detail by engineers at Ames and Bell and by Army officers who established the military requirements in 1970 and 1971. In early 1972, I signed a contract with Bell president James Atkins to build two XV-15 aircraft for a total cost of \$50 million. Half of the funds were to be provided by the Army and the other half by NASA. Mr. David Few at NASA-Ames was selected as project manager. He turned in a superb performance and the success of the whole effort was largely due to his work.

The Army's requirement was to build a tilt-rotor aircraft with a gross weight of a little more than 13,000 lbs. It would be powered by two 1250 horsepower Lycoming turbo prop engines. The requirement for which the Army people felt that the aircraft was peculiarly well-suited was the medical evacuation mission. The advantage of the tilt-rotor airplane for this mission is that it was faster and had a longer range than the Bell UH-1 helicopter. The first flight of the XV-15 occurred on May 3, 1977. It was exhilarating for all of us to participate in this success. Indeed, it was an elegant time. The XV-15 underwent an intensive three year test program between 1978 and 1981. During this time it flew operations from ships, search and rescue operations, combat support operations and finally achieved a high speed flight during which the aircraft reached a maximum speed of 290 knots in straight and level flight. The XV-15 flight test program was terminated by Army Undersecretary James Ambrose in 1981 even though the program was deemed to be very successful. It was, what I believe, a mistaken priority judgment made by the Army's leadership.

The Falkland Islands War in the spring of 1982 revived interest in the tilt-rotor aircraft concept. The French-built Exocet ship attack missile was used for the first time in this war by Argentina. Three British ships were sunk by these missiles, which have a range of about 50 miles, well beyond the range of conventional artillery or aerial bombs. In an amphibious operation, U.S. Marine Corps doctrine called for a stand-off distance for the assault ships of 15 miles. Helicopters would take off from

the ships and would deliver troop re-enforcements and supplies to the beach 15 miles away, out of range of small caliber artillery. The existence the Exocet changed all that. With long range missiles, the stand-off distance had to be increased to something like 50 miles. The tilt-rotor aircraft was seen as the solution to the problem. If a tilt-rotor airplane with some payload capacity like the Sikorsky CH-53 helicopter (25,000 lbs.) could be built, then the superior range and speed of the tilt-rotor compared to the helicopter would be decisive. With such airplanes, the Marine Corps could supply troops on a beach with assault ships standing off shore fifty miles at sea.

In 1981 and 1982, I was serving as Deputy Administrator of NASA so that I had standing to advise the Navy and Marine people on aviation matters. In addition, the new Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, was himself a naval aviator. Richard Spivey and George Leitman of Bell and I arranged several meetings with Secretary Lehman and Marine Corps Commandant General P.X. Kelley. We succeeded in persuading them to take a serious look at the tilt-rotor aircraft as a solution to the new problem presented by the Exocet missile. Eventually, these conversations led to the development of the V-22 "Osprey" aircraft concept.

The V-22 program was initiated in May 1986 with a full scale development contract to the Bell-Boeing team to build a large tilt-rotor transport. The Bell-Boeing V-22 would be a big airplane with a maximum gross take-off weight of 60,000 lbs. which was a major change from the much smaller XV-15. The V-22 was given the name "Osprey" by Secretary Lehman and the first flight of the airplane was executed on March 19, 1989. The first full conversion from vertical to horizontal flight occurred on September 14, 1989. The "Osprey" also has the ability to fold its wings and its rotors. This folding of the wing and the rotors is a very complex operation, but it is absolutely necessary. With the wings folded, it is possible to place twenty V-22 aircraft on an LPD assault ship, which provides a formidable new military capability for the U.S. amphibious assault forces. As we speak, there are now fifty operational V-22 "Osprey" aircraft in the Marine Corps inventory. All of these aircraft were manufactured in the new Bell-Textron factory in Amarillo. So I am pleased to report that tilt-rotor aviation is still an all-Texas story.

A very rewarding event for those of us who have been associated with tilt-rotor aviation for a long time was the decision of the Smithsonian Air and space Museum to include the XV-15 in the exhibit of important aircraft that were examples of major advances in aviation. The XV-15 is now included in the exhibit at the Museum's new facility near Dulles airport.

Finally, it is important to mention what lies in the future of tilt-rotor aviation. One direction is to see if the tilt-rotor concept can be used to replace the Lockheed C-130 conventional turboprop transport. This cannot be done without increasing the number of engines on the aircraft. The concept now being explored is the "Quadrotor". The most important

technical problem that needs to be solved is the interference between the forward and the aft wings, which will clearly affect the performance. Wind tunnel measurements and computer simulations show promising results. However, the jury is still out and it will take much more work to determine whether the quadrotor concept is a workable proposition. The other development has to do with commercial applications of the tilt-rotor aircraft concept. From the beginning, many of us connected with the tilt-rotor technology thought that there would be important commercial applications. About two years ago, Bell reached an agreement with the Italian aircraft firm Agusta, to develop and build an executive utility tilt-rotor aircraft. Last March, the Bell/Agusta 609 flew for the first time. The current estimate is that there may be as many as 3000 customers for aircraft of this type.

3.) HOUSTON AND THE SPACE SHUTTLE

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was established in 1958 in response to the Soviets launching of the first man-made satellite, Sputnik I. The first flight was followed rapidly by a second satellite and that carried a dog, "Laika," the first living being to go into space. The fact that the United States was beaten to be the first in space was an acute embarrassment to a nation that thought of itself as the leader of the world in technology. The crowning blow came in April 1961 when Soviet Air Force Captain Yuri Gagarin became the first man to orbit the Earth. By this time, John F. Kennedy had succeeded Dwight Eisenhower as President. He was acutely aware of the political problem that would be created for him if the United States remained behind the Soviet Union in what had by now become a "Space Race."

On April 20, 1961, a week after Yuri Gagarin's flight, the new president sent a memo to Vice President Lyndon Johnson in which he asked the following questions:

Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space or by a trip around the Moon, or by a rocket to land on the Moon, or by a rocket to go to the Moon and back with a man? Is there any other space program which promises dramatic results in which we could win?

Wernher von Braun received a copy of this letter in his capacity as the director of the NASA-George C. Marshall Space Flight Center. Here are von Braun's answers to the president's questions:

- a.) We do not have a good chance of beating the Soviets to a 'manned laboratory in space'.
- b.) We have a sporting chance of beating the Soviets to a soft landing of a radio transmitter station on the Moon.
- c.) We have a sporting chance of sending a three man crew around the Moon ahead of the Soviets.

d.) We have an excellent chance of beating the Soviets to a first landing of a crew on the Moon (including return capability, of course).

The last point in von Braun's response is the important one and it caught President Kennedy's attention. In spite of opposition from most of his cabinet and other senior advisors, including his science advisor, MIT Professor Jerome Wiesner, he decided to pick up von Braun's suggestion. Only a month after receiving von Braun's letter, Kennedy, in an address to the Congress on May 25, 1961 said, "This nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the Moon, and returning him safely to Earth." Thus, von Braun became the initiator of the trip to the Moon.

In February 1969, I joined NASA as the director of the NASA-Ames Research Center. The Center is located at the south end of San Francisco Bay at what used to be the old Naval Air Station at Moffett Field which is now a Federal Air Field operated by NASA-Ames. Almost immediately, I became involved in the planning of the "Post Apollo Program." This process had been initiated by President Nixon who, anticipating a successful landing on the Moon sometime in 1969, asked the NASA managers to start planning for what comes next. The planning function was given to a "Management Council" that would be headed by Dr. George Mueller, the NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight. The directors of the nine NASA centers were all members of the Council and it was in my capacity as a new center director that I became a member of the "Management Council."

It was during the early months of 1969 that the "Management Council" was particularly active. The dominant members of the council were Drs. Robert R. Gilruth and Wernher von Braun who were, respectively, the directors of the NASA-Manned Spacecraft Center (MSFC) in Houston and the NASA-George C. Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. The overall plan of Gilruth and von Braun was to create an infrastructure in near Earth orbit that would involve a space station that would be permanently occupied by people and a space shuttle vehicle that would be used to move cargo and people between the ground and the space station. During the early months of 1969, Dr. Gilruth and his highly talented technical deputy Dr. Maxime Faget visited NASA-Ames several times. They were looking for support from Ames because we had many of the facilities and also the people who would be necessary to successfully execute the program that was evolving from the work of the "Management Council." Max Faget was especially important. He was a genuine engineering genius who had designed the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo space craft and was now deeply involved in the design of the space shuttle.

The space station/space shuttle idea was first broached in a series of articles that were first published in Collier's Magazine between March 1952 and June 1954. Wernher von Braun was the principal author of these articles, so the discussions in the "Management Council" really revolved

around the implementation of von Braun's ideas. These were developed in October 1969 by the "Management Council" for briefings to the then NASA administrator Dr. Thomas O. Paine. The space station /space shuttle idea was accepted by the NASA management and implementation was delegated to the NASA-Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston.

The decision to locate the headquarters of NASA's program to put people in space in Houston was made late in November 1960. Texas U.S. Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the Vice President-elect, was determined to place a major NASA facility in Texas because he foresaw that the space exploration program would grow. He believed that Texas, with its aviation industry developed during World War II, would provide the technical capability to make important contributions to the program. Within NASA, the "Space Task Group," which had the responsibility for planning NASA's manned space program, was located at the NASA-Langley Research Center in Virginia at the time. Robert Gilruth was a division chief at Langley and Max Faget was his deputy. When the decision to move the "Space Task Group" to Houston was made, Gilruth was designated as the director. The plan was that construction of the new center in Houston would begin in 1962 and that the move from Langley would begin in 1963 and would be complete by 1964. Johnson enlisted the aid of Houston Congressman Albert Thomas to organize things in Houston. The land on which the Center is located was leased to the government for a nominal sum by the owner, Rice University. The condition put on the lease was that the building at the new center would have to be "university style" so that if the government pulled out, the buildings would revert to the university and could use them profitably. (Note: The name of the Manned Spacecraft Center was changed to Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center when President Johnson died in 1974.)

My first visit to the Manned Spacecraft Center was in July 1969. As a newly minted NASA center director, I rated a ticket to the event. My wife and I showed up in Houston a day before the scheduled landing of Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin on the Moon. We were seated in the visitor's gallery that is separated by a glass partition from the Mission Operations Control Room late in the evening of July 20th, 1969. From this vantage point we could see all the activities in the room. We could also see the television screens at the front of the room that would show the first telemetry pictures from the Moon. It was a great moment when the flickering picture of Neil Armstrong's foot as he stepped down the ladder from the lunar excursion module "Eagle" appeared on the screen. It was indeed "one small step for a man but a giant leap for mankind." It was also a moment that I shall never forget.

My second and much longer visit to the Manned Space Center Spacecraft Center was in April 1970 following the explosion aboard Apollo 13 that almost destroyed the spacecraft. NASA Deputy Administration George Low called me shortly after the accident and told me that I would be appointed to serve on the Apollo 13 Review Board and that he want-

ed me to come to Houston as soon as possible. Thus, I had the opportunity to observe the work of the flight control team in the Mission Operations Control Room (MOCR) save the lives of the Apollo 13 astronauts. It was a unique example of working under great pressure with exquisite judgment and competence. To this day, I believe that the saving of the Apollo 13 astronauts was NASA's finest moment. I saw the photographs of the severely damaged service module and this greatly enhanced my respect for the people who worked in NASA's manned space flight program. Without question, they were extremely competent and courageous.

During 1970, decisions were made about the proposals for the space station/space shuttle program that were developed by the "Management Council." Generally, the response of the NASA management was positive. The basic idea of creating an infrastructure in Earth orbit that could be used for research and as a staging base for more ambitious missions out into the solar system was accepted. The one major modification was caused by the circumstance that funding to do both the space station and the space shuttle at the same time was not available. Therefore we had to decide which to do first. This issue was thoroughly debated in the "Management Council" with Wernher von Braun leading the discussions. During this time, I developed a strong friendship with von Braun. We shared the same native language (German) and we also had a passion for sailing boats. I was very impressed by his technical knowledge and judgment. Ultimately, we recommended to acting NASA administrator George Low that we should build the space shuttle first. (Note: Dr. Thomas Paine had resigned as NASA Administrator early in 1970 and his deputy, George Low acting administrator.) Our reasoning was that this project was more difficult technically than the space station. Therefore, it was the pacing item that would determine the schedule for the entire program. This recommendation was accepted and the development of the space shuttle began in earnest. The Ames Research Center was designated to be the prime center for the development of the thermal protection system of the space shuttle orbiter and a contributing center to the flight control system and the human factors connected with space flight. It was a great new experience for me to participate in all of this and to have the opportunity to associate with the distinguished people who participated in these events.

Work on the Space Shuttle Program was very intense in 1970 and 1971 and it was carried out under the superb leadership of George Low. The configuration of the Space Shuttle that finally evolved is called the "stage-and-a-half" configuration. It consisted of two large solid fueled rocket boosters, a large externally mounted fuel tank that contained the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen that was used by the three large rocket engines mounted under the vertical fin of the shuttle orbiter. President Nixon gave the "go ahead" for the Space Shuttle Program in February 1972 during the beginning of the term of NASA Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher.

The years following the approval of the space Shuttle Program were

busy and very interesting. At Ames, we executed the tasks on the thermal protection system that had been given to us. On September 17, 1976, I had the great privilege to attend the roll-out of the first space shuttle orbiter, the *Enterprise*. The *Enterprise* was not a working spacecraft. The airframe had been built to the same specifications that would be used for all the other shuttle vehicles. However, she had no rocket engines. The *Enterprise* would be used to perform a series of approach and landing test flights to explore the flight envelope of the shuttle orbiter flying in the atmosphere. This was clearly important if the shuttle was to become the fully reusable space ship that we had planned for seven years before. In addition, the *Enterprise* would also be used to perform the "form, fit and function" activities at the NASA-John F. Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral in Florida.

I spent the years from 1977 to 1981 in the Pentagon serving first as Undersecretary (1977-1979) and then as Secretary of the Air Force (1979-1981). In these capacities, I had supervisory responsibilities for the Air Force Space Program. The important point here was that the Air Force would use the space shuttle to launch some its most important military spacecraft into Earth orbit. Late in 1979, there was a major budget crisis in the Space Shuttle Program. A cost problem of more than a billion dollars had accumulated over the years largely because of problems with the large liquid fueled rockets—the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME). Several had failed in the test program and as a result, the initial launch of the shuttle had to be delayed from 1979 to 1981. All of this added to the total cost of the program. Because of the large amount of money involved, President Carter considered cancellation of the entire program. Such a move would have to be a presidential decision. Accordingly, when all the analyses were complete, there was a meeting in the White House on November 14th, 1979. It was attended by the president and his principal budget and technical advisors. The president's science and technology advisor, Professor Frank Press of MIT, orchestrated the discussion. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, James McIntyre and his assistant W. Bowman Cutter began by laying out the budgetary considerations. They were followed by Dr. Robert A. Frosch who eloquently advocated the continuation of the program. I followed Dr. Frosch and as the Secretary of the Air Force, I also represented the Department of Defense. I supported the arguments made by Dr. Frosch as strongly as I could. During these presentations, the president asked a number of questions. Since he had a strong technical background, having earned an engineering degree from the Naval Academy, the questions were good and to the point. No decisions were reached at the meeting. However, a few days later, we were notified that the president had made the decision go ahead. All of us were relieved by this move. We had invested much time and money in the program and it would have been wrong to stop at this point.

When the Carter administration ended in January 1981, I was ready to go back to California and to assume a research position at Ames. In

fact, I had already made the arrangements to do that. As things turned out, my old mentor and boss, Mr. James M. Beggs, was named NASA administrator by President-elect Reagan and would lead the new administration. Jim Beggs called me shortly after the inauguration asking me whether I would be willing to work with him as the deputy administrator of NASA. I agreed to do so and sometime in March, I was formally notified by the White House personnel office that the new president would submit a nomination for me to hold that post.

As it happened, the first flight of the space shuttle *Columbia* was scheduled for April 12th, 1981. Dr. Frosch had already resigned but his deputy, who was now acting administrator, Dr. Alan M. Lovelace was an old friend of mine. I called and asked him whether I could attend the first shuttle launch in the Mission Operations Control Room. He readily agreed to my request. Not only that, he told me that I would have a place in the MOCR with the people at the Manned Spacecraft Center who had managed the Space Shuttle Orbiter Program. This was quite a privilege for me because I was not yet confirmed by the U.S. Senate in my new position. On the appointed day, I arrived at the MSC and went to the MOCR. Because of our long collaboration on the space shuttle while I was director at Ames and because they all knew that I would soon be the deputy administrator, I was warmly welcomed. On April 12th, we were all in the MOCR during the countdown. When the great moment came and the great white bird lifted off the ground without a problem, there was a great cheer. In those days, we could still follow the old tradition of lighting up cigars following a successful launch and that is what we did.

After the first shuttle launch, I made it my business to be present in the MOCR during every shuttle launch operation. I felt that it was my responsibility to do this because I was the one who would have to take the blame if anything went wrong. During *Columbia*'s second mission in September 1981, President Reagan visited the MOCR. It happened this way: I was sitting at my console a few hours before the launch and Dr. Chris Kraft, the director of the Johnson Space Center was sitting at the one to my left. He had been reading the morning *Houston Chronicle* and showed me a story about the president's plan to visit Houston in two days. Chris leaned over and asked me whether it might not be a good idea to invite the president to visit the MOCR. I agreed with Chris and made some telephone calls to Washington. A few hours later, Chris and I were notified that the White House people had agreed that this would be a good idea and that the president would indeed come for a visit. A day later at about 2:00 PM President Reagan showed up with a small entourage. By this time, *Columbia* had been launched and was in orbit. We patched President Reagan into the communications system and he had a short conversation with astronauts Joe Engle and Dick Truly. He truly enjoyed himself. In a few minutes, the voices of the astronauts faded in the middle of the conversation. The president turned to me and asked, "What happened?" I told him that we could only speak to the astronauts

when *Columbia* was over one of our ground stations distributed around the world (this was before we had the relay satellites that made continuous communications possible). Thus, we would have to wait for a few minutes before we could have access to *Columbia* again. The president turned to Mike Deaver, one of his principal assistants who was standing behind the console with us. He asked him to cancel the rest of the day's schedule so that he could stay in the MOCR and learn about our operations. He did just that. The president talked some more with the astronauts, visited all of the consoles in the MOCR, and asked the people there what they were doing. The president spent an hour and a half with us with us rather than the scheduled twenty minutes. After the visit, we knew that the president was very much interested in our program.

About three weeks later, we all received an invitation to the White House for a ceremony. It turned out that the president had decided to award NASA's Distinguished Service Medal personally to the astronauts who flew *Columbia*'s second mission. It was a great moment. Two years later, Jim Beggs and I would be in the same office with the president as he signed the order that initiated the International Space Station Program. It was a memorable time for all of us.

(Note: The quotes came from *Exploring the Unknown, The Evolution of Space Policy and Plans*. Vol I, NASA-SP4407, p 424 and 430.

MEMORIALS

REX GAVIN BAKER JR.

1920-2004

Rex Gavin Baker, Jr, born in Beaumont, died March 27, 2004 in Houston at the age of 83. Affectionately know as "Pete," he was a man of many parts.

A high school football star, he earned a degree in economics in 1947 at The University of Texas. He was a member of Kappa Sigma Fraternity. He served as a Naval Officer in both the Pacific and European Theatres. Following service to his country he earned a law degree from "The University" in 1947.

He returned to Houston, became immersed in the law, in business and civic activity. In 1952 he founded Southwestern Savings and Loan Association, beginning a long association with and leadership of that part of the financial world. He was an active director of Western National Bank.

His association with "The University" was extensive. He endowed a Chair of Natural Resources in the School of Law and Professorships in Economics and at the Mc Donald Observatory.

He was named a distinguished alumnus in 1977 and in 1998 was one of four graduates to receive the prestigious Pro Bene Meritis Award.

He attended River Oaks Baptist Church where he was trustee, deacon, choir member and Sunday school teacher. He was one of the founders of their school. He served as Chairman of the Board of Houston Baptist University.

He was survived by his wife, three daughters and a son.

Pete was a loyal friend and family man, dogged in pursuit of his goals and a remarkable Texan whose positive influence will long be felt.

P.G.B.

ALBERT V. CASEY

1920-2004

Albert Casey was a big, tough, funny Irishman, a Bostonian whose broad accent never faded no matter how many places he lived and worked. He was proud of his Harvard education, which he paid for himself, working three or four jobs at a time while he attended school. As an undergraduate, he majored in economics, then enlisted in the Army during World War II, and returned to complete business school, concentrating in finance. His association with Harvard served him well in his many

private- and public-sector positions over the course of his long career, with friendships that opened doors and enriched his life. He loved Harvard.

Al was smart. His mind was quick and practical, easily assimilating mountains of data, and arriving at action-oriented conclusions. He was not intellectual, though he was curious and learned constantly. One of his first assignments was compiling bond tables, performing the thousands of accurate calculations by hand that now would be done in seconds with today's technology, an exercise that gave him total facility with numbers. He taught accounting ("Assets by the window, liabilities by the door") as one of his Harvard jobs. He could spot a computational or accounting error a mile away, and delighted in finding mistakes in the small print of financial documents. Woe to the investment banker who gave him a faulty prospectus. He could be a terror.

With his MBA in hand, Al's first job was in New York at Railway Express in the finance department. He was hired away by the Southern Pacific Railroad, which moved him and Ellie, to whom he was married for over forty years, to San Francisco. Many years later, in his eighties, he could still cite the routes of the various railways in California and throughout the West, and describe the small towns (Sparks, Nevada, was a favorite) where Southern Pacific facilities were located.

His first senior position was as President of the Times Mirror Company, publisher of the *Los Angeles Times*. There he hit his stride, dealing with top Washington politicians as well as leaders in corporate world. He resigned over an ethical matter that he could well have overlooked, setting a pattern for scrupulous behavior that characterized him always.

Al's most visible corporate assignment was as Chairman of American Airlines. The company was in perilous shape when he took it over, with hardly enough cash to operate. He refinanced it in Japan, a bold move for that time, and guided it to the leading position in its industry. He moved the company to Dallas to save on costs, learned to love country and western music and became Dallas's most enthusiastic booster.

Al's retirement from American opened the door for a series of high level assignments. He joined the faculty of the Cox Business School at SMU, and taught there off and on for the rest of his life. He left intermittently, first to chair First International Bankshares, a flawed merger of two large Dallas banks, as it emerged from bankruptcy. He served as United States Postmaster General under President Reagan, and reorganized and streamlined the postal service.

His most important post was his last, as Chairman of the Resolution Trust Corporation, a position offered to him by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, and President George H.W. Bush. The RTC was established to dispose of the hundreds of billions of dollars of assets—financial and real estate—of failed savings and loans in the late eighties. It was the biggest financial assignment of Al's generation, a job that nobody thought could be done. Congress was under constant pres-

sure from constituents to interrupt the process of selling the assets, and Al acted fearlessly to maintain momentum, selling almost all of it back to the private sector by the time the Clinton administration came into office.

Personally, Al was a fierce gin rummy and dominos player. He enjoyed a drink. He held court at his camp, Lost Angels, at the Bohemian Grove each summer. He had no interest in social position ("There are two kinds of guys: the ones who get things done and the ones who sit around deciding who can belong to the club."). He had a school teacher's attitude toward money, which was never particularly important to him. He said, "You don't have to be mean to be tough," and proved it every day. He was consistently thoughtful to those around him, and inspired loyalty. His friends would do anything for him. He slept through the symphony and was actively hostile to opera, but enjoyed painting and sculpture. He loved a good fight. He earned the affection of the people who worked for him, particularly at American. He would dash past a long line of irritable customers to board his plane, and call back to the embattled American employees at the counter, "Take the rest of the day off!"

Al was devoted to Ellie, who died in 1989, and their two children. Following Ellie's death, he and Patricia Patterson kept steady company.

Al died on July 10, 2004, of a heart attack at home in Dallas, at the age of 84.

P.P.

GILBERT DENMAN

1921-2004

Gilbert M. Denman, Jr., a member of the Philosophical Society of Texas since 1965, died in San Antonio on Sunday, May 16, 2004. He was born in 1921, the only son of Gilbert M. Denman, Sr. and Pearl Zilker Denman. He was one of the outstanding philanthropists in San Antonio's history, taking an active role in the building of Trinity University, the San Antonio Museum of Art, and the San Antonio Botanical Center. He, more than anyone in his generation, had the vision for what he wished these institutions to be and he had the resources necessary to make this vision take place. His death will leave a void in San Antonio that will be hard to fill.

Gilbert attended Jefferson High School in San Antonio, the University of Texas where he entered as a 15 year-old in 1936, the University of Texas Law School where he graduated in 1942. At the University he was a member and president of the Sigma Chi fraternity. His grandfather, Judge Leroy G. Denman was a Texas Supreme Court Justice and his father Gilbert Denman, Sr. was active in the practice of law in San Antonio. He is survived by two cousins, Leroy Denman, Jr. and Mrs. Margaret Whisenant Block.

After service in the Navy during World War II, he took his place with

his father and cousin in the law firm of Denman, Franklin and Denman. He was active in that role until his death. He was also chairman of the San Antonio Bank and Trust Company which was sold later to the Bank of the Southwest.

One of his greatest achievements was the stature Trinity University has received nationwide. The University was moved to San Antonio in 1942. Gilbert was a Trustee for 39 years. He was Chairman in 1970-73, but these responsibilities do not in any way reflect his unbelievable contribution to the institution. He noticed that approximately 25% of the student at the University were Roman Catholics and that they did not have a Chaplain. He provided funds for them to have an active Chaplain with a service every Sunday in the Trinity Chapel. He noticed at the entrance of the University some land that had never been landscaped. He gave funds for a running track in that area, not only for Trinity students, but also for the neighborhood as well. The Trinity Press had been discontinued and it was Gilbert's desire for it to be re-established. He saw to it that funds necessary to bring this about were at hand. Always he wanted the very best for Trinity University and through his efforts with the Ewing Halsell Foundation and the George Brackenridge Foundation, he made numerous commitments to that end—endowed scholarships, endowed professorships, buildings, whatever it took.

Since 1926, San Antonio had enjoyed the wonders of the Witte Museum, established primarily for natural history, but encompassing all areas of the arts. It was Gilbert's push that helped the Witte establish what is now known as the San Antonio Museum of Art in the old Lone Star Brewery on Jones Avenue. With the help of Director Jack MacGregor, he saw the vision of putting a museum in that old industrial complex. He was fiercely determined that this museum would first be a unique structure and second would hold priceless objects of art. Under his sponsorship, the museum raised the money to buy the building and have it redone. Then he stayed with the project, contributing his enormous Greek and Roman collection for what is now known as the Gilbert Denman Collection at the museum. His presence was never obvious, but his strong determination produced what will ultimately be one of the finest museums in the State of Texas.

His last major achievement was building the San Antonio Botanical Center in 1989. M. Emilio Ambasz had designed this most complicated and beautiful glass conservatory to be placed on George Breckenridge's land near New Braunfels Avenue, built by the firm of Guido and Company, an almost impossible task. Gilbert saw that it got done and was then interested in delivering the center to the City of San Antonio for its maintenance. It attracts enormous attendance annually.

Gilbert lived on Mockingbird Lane on a hill overlooking the City of San Antonio in a house built by his mother and father. Many of the building materials came from the Sullivan home in downtown San Antonio. It

sat on 14 acres with a pond on the side. Many festival occasions were spent by San Antonians as Gilbert's guests. He owned the famous El Capote Ranch on the Guadalupe River near Seguin. This ranch was purchased by his family in 1897 and Gilbert left it in his will to one of his cousins to continue family ownership. Mr. Ewing Halsell was one of Gilbert's clients in his law practice. He was a famous rancher and cattleman who died in 1965 leaving his entire estate to the Ewing Halsell Foundation where Gilbert was Chairman. At Gilbert's death, this foundation had \$100 million, half of it came from the sale of the Farias Ranch in South Texas, one of Gilbert's last important pieces of business for Mr. Halsell. He was also Chairman of the George W. Brackenridge Foundation, established primarily for education. These two positions consumed a large part of Gilbert's active business life in the last 20 years. He was also a member of the Blaffer Foundation in Houston and for many years spent a generous amount of time handling the affairs of his long-term clients. He negotiated an arrangement between the Roman Catholic Church and the state on the ownership and responsibility of the San Antonio Missions. It gave both parties a clear understanding of their responsibility and an opportunity to redo these missions and insure their long-term value to the community.

For many years, Gilbert was an active collector of Greek and Roman antiquities. This interest began when he was in Rome in his 40s, when he realized that these priceless antiques could be bought. He began a lifetime of collecting which never stopped. He would add pieces with regularity, housing them first in his apartment on the San Antonio River at 215 Losoya and then in the old engine room of the San Antonio Museum of Art where he established the Ewing Halsell Wing of the museum housing his collection. It is one of the dramatic opportunities to see Greek and Roman art in the country.

Gilbert Denman was a friend of San Antonio and of its citizens. He gave himself fully to the job of making it a finer city in which to live with the arts, education, with a sense of commitment and vision. He was a true philosopher in every sense of the word. He treasured his membership in the Philosophical Society of Texas and with its members. We will long remember Gilbert as one of our finest.

B.D.

JAMES M. HARGROVE

1922-2004

James Ward Hargrove was born in Shreveport, Louisiana in 1922 to Reginald Henry and Hallie Ward Hargrove. He moved to Houston with his parents and brothers at an early age where he attended Montrose Elementary School, and Sidney Lanier Jr. High School. He then attended

Sewanee Military Academy and later Rice Institute (later known as Rice University). In 1942 he married Marian Elizabeth Hargrove. While at Rice he was named to Phi Beta Kappa, graduating in the class of 1943. Always loyal to Rice, in 1960 he was named to their Board of Governors.

He was called to active duty by the U.S. Army in 1943, where he was a member of a team responsible for interrogating prisoners of war in Europe, and experience he later recorded in his book "The Way It Was."

He returned from army service in 1945 and joined Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. in Shreveport, LA in 1947, a pipeline firm developed by his father and his father's associates. Over the course of the next twenty-two years he served in a number of capacities, culminating as Sr. Vice President of Finance and Director. In 1959 he moved with the headquarters of Texas Eastern from Shreveport to Houston.

Jim left Texas Eastern in 1969 to go to Washington to serve as Asst. Postmaster General for Finance. While there he was instrumental in the reorganization of the Post Office into the semi-autonomous US Postal Service.

In 1976 he was appointed U.S. Ambassador to Australia by President Gerald Ford. At the end of Ford's administration he returned to Houston. By coincidence his departure from that country coincided with a visit to Australia by Her Royal Majesty, the Queen of England. Impressive celebrations in her honor took place, which Jim always referred to as actually being for him "though, of course, she never knew it."

On returning to Houston, he joined the investment management firm of Vaughn, Nelson, and Boston, later renamed Vaughn, Nelson and Hargrove. He was also on the Board of Directors to Transco Energy Co., Inc, and Blount International Inc.

Jim died on Sunday, July 25, 2004, survived by his wife, Marian, and his children, James Ward Hargrove Jr. and wife Linda of Austin; Florence Hargrove Ray, Thomas Marion Hargrove and wife Lizzy, and William Henry Hargrove and wife Lynn, all from Houston; as well as grandchildren, great grandchildren, nieces, nephews, cousins in-laws and friends from everywhere he went in his 81 years. Together from childhood, Jim and Marian traveled the world during their marriage years, meantime generously supporting their primary areas of interest, in particular the Presbyterian Church. Always a devout Christian, Jim's loyalty to the First Presbyterian Church of Houston was paramount. He was an active elder for many years as well as teacher of an especially popular Bible class.

A memorial to him was entered in to the permanent minutes of the Session of the First Presbyterian Church of Houston on the 21st of September, 2004, AD.

E.K.

JACK S. JOSEY
1916-2003

Jack Smyth Josey, son of a Spindletop-era wildcatter, who became a petroleum engineer, war hero, and oil and real estate entrepreneur, died of heart complications February 28, 2003 at his winter home in California. He was 86.

A 1939 graduate of The University of Texas at Austin, Mr. Josey earned a Bachelor of Science degree in petroleum engineering. During his career he became Chairman of the Board of Josey Oil Company in Houston and assembled an Austin ranch which later became the Lakeway community on Lake Travis near Austin. Josey's friends criticized him for paying the "exorbitant" price of \$45 per acre for the Lake Travis land which they said was "not even fit for goats."

Appointed to a six-year term on the University of Texas Board of Regents in 1965 by Governor John Connally, Mr. Josey was twice elected to the position of board Vice-chairman. One of many accomplishments on the Board was his handling of the Larry Caroline affair during the turbulent 1960s. The University refused to pay Professor Caroline's salary because of his controversial public comments. With UT threatened with blacklisting over academic freedom, Josey solved the problem by volunteering and paying Caroline's salary from his own pocket. Upon completion of Josey's tenure, Chairman of the Board Frank C. Erwin, Jr. stated in a proclamation that Josey's "gregarious nature and tenacious dedication toward these specific accomplishments within the System that yielded a greater and more balanced distribution of the System's offerings to our State's citizenry have resulted in the establishment of new institutions that will forever stand as a testimony to his service."

Mr. Josey also served on the boards of Rice University and was Chairman of Hermann Hospital. For many years he was Chairman of the charitable Robert A. Welch Foundation.

The family had deep roots in East Texas and the state. His great-grandfather, George W. Smyth signed the Texas Declaration of Independence and was the first Land Commissioner of Texas. Josey's father, Lenoir M. Josey, sold an ice company in Beaumont during the Spindletop era to invest in drilling for oil. After succeeding in oil, Lenoir Josey moved the family into one of the first mansions in River Oaks in Houston.

Lenoir M. Josey, II, Jack Josey's son, said people often mistakenly linked his father to the stories of his grandfather's lifestyle as a beloved nightly and legendary gambler.

"My father was a businessman, war hero, and a friend of education who many people admired," he said. "Whereas my grandfather was the wildcatter, my father went on to become a petroleum engineer bringing more technology to our family oil company."

Jack Josey grew up in Houston. He graduated from San Jacinto High

School in 1934 in the same class as Walter Cronkite. The two remained lifelong friends. In fact, in 1934 Cronkite was elected Most Popular Boy of San Jacinto High School and Josey's high school and college sweetheart, Elva Johnson, was elected Most Popular Girl. He married Elva and they had three children.

While at UT Josey was a student leader and officer of the Texas Cowboys and President of Kappa Sigma. His little brother in the fraternity was Dr. Denton Cooley, another lifelong friend.

The day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Josey volunteered to serve in the Navy. Assigned as the gunnery officer on a destroyer escort, he saw many battles in the South Pacific, earning a Bronze Star for shooting down three kamikaze pilots in the battle of the Coral Sea, thus thwarting their attempt to destroy an aircraft carrier. He and his ship survived the terrible 1943 typhoon in the Pacific only by filling all their empty fuel tanks with sea water as ballast. The typhoon snapped the mast off his ship and capsized and sank most of the Navy vessels accompanying his destroyer. He was extremely proud to have witnessed from the deck of his ship the Marine flag raising on Mount Suribachi at Iwo Jima and was forever impressed by the valor and bravery of the young marines in the Pacific.

Josey loved to travel and collect art and antiques. He sponsored dozens of scholarships anonymously and helped many charities.

He was predeceased by his second wife, Gretchen Bryan Josey. He is survived by his wife, Donna, daughter Carolyn Josey Young, and sons Robert A. Josey, II, and Lenoir M. Josey, II, and first wife, Elva Johnson Josey Johnston.

Lenoir M. Josey II

AMY FREEMAN LEE

1914-2004

Dr. Amy Freeman Lee was born in San Antonio, Texas, to Julia Freeman and Joe Novich on October 3, 1914. She spent her early years in Seguin. After her mother's death in 1918, her grandmother, Emma Freeman, adopted her legally. In 1929 the family moved to San Antonio to enroll Amy in St. Mary's Hall. She attended the University of Texas and graduated from Incarnate Word College where she earned several degrees.

Born to a family with strong ranching roots, Amy was a skilled horse-woman who competed nationally. While riding she broke her neck and back in separate riding accidents, yet never gave up her enthusiasm for horses. In a characteristic stand, she took opposition to circus, rodeo, bullfighting and other animal-bashing spectacles. She was well-skilled in ranching management, having helped run the extensive Freeman family holdings.

Dr. Lee's profound reverence for life was the guiding principle in her

distinguished career as artist, educator and humanitarian. Although she was married for three years to Ernest Lee, an aide to Gen. Dwight Eisenhower during World War II, she had no children of her own. As a teacher and humanitarian she touched the lives of enumerable people, young and old alike. A Quaker by choice, she described her spiritual convictions as based in the concept of reverence for the unity of life. She fought against racism and discrimination from her earliest years and was among the staunch supporters of the pecan shellers strike in San Antonio.

In recent years she made presentations on San Antonio's history discussing racial and social equality. She was appointed by the Supreme Court of Texas to serve on the Grievance Oversight Committee, the Lawyer Discipline Commission and was elected to the Board of Trustees of the Texas Center for Legal Ethics and Professionalism. She was an artist, art critic, poet, writer and philanthropist who numbered many distinguished artists among her close friends. She was an early supporter of the Witte Museum, a founder of the San Antonio Art League and later of the Texas Watercolor Society. She amassed a superb collection of art by many of the leading contemporary artists of her day and made important donations to the McNay, the San Antonio Museum of Art and other museums. Beginning in the 1950s Lee served as a member of the Incarnate Word College's Fine Arts Advisory Council. In 1973 she assumed the presidency of the Board of Trustees of the College, a position she held until 1990. During that time she encouraged the College's theatre, music, and arts program and improved its dormitories. She also spent many years as Chairman of the Board of the Houston-based Wilhelm Schole International created by her friend Marilyn Wilhelm, an adopted daughter.

She was a founder of the San Antonio Symphony where she nurtured a passion for chamber music and supported many other musical organizations. She was deeply involved with the San Antonio Lighthouse for the Blind and funded scholarship awards there in addition to serving on the Board. She was a strong advocate of the Bexar County Humane Society and Wildlife Rescue and Rehabilitation.

Among honors awarded Dr. Lee was the Joseph Wood Krutch Medal by the Human Society of the United States, its highest recognition which she received in 1985. She was given the American Civil Liberties Union's Maury Maverick Award for lifetime achievement. She received the first Living Treasure of San Antonio Award for outstanding achievement as Artist, Scholar, and Humanist. She was elected to the Women's Hall of Fame by the Governors of Texas Commission for Women. She is survived by her foster daughter, Marilyn Wilhelm, her god-daughter, Carol Karotkinn and a second cousin, Maxine Goodwin.

She died on July 20, 2004 in San Antonio where she will always be remembered as one of those who in her lifetime helped build the City's uniqueness.

B.D.

JAMES M. MOUDY
1916-2004

Dr. James Mattox Moudy, chancellor emeritus of Texas Christian University, died on August 6, 2004, in Fort Worth. Dr. Moudy served as TCU's chancellor during a pivotal time in the university's development. He played a key role in higher education as chairman of the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, the organization that serves as the voice of private education in the United States. He also was moderator of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), the highest elected office in the denomination.

Dr. Moudy entered TCU as an economics/sociology major in 1939, but his heart was set on becoming a minister. After serving as a U.S. Army Chaplain in Europe and earning a Silver Star and Purple Heart, he returned to TCU to complete a bachelor of divinity degree from Brite Divinity School. While earning the degree, he served as assistant minister of University Christian Church and later of A&M Christian Church in College Station.

In 1953, Dr. Moudy earned a Ph.D. from Duke University, where he was a Kearns Fellow and member of Phi Beta Kappa. He then became dean of instruction at Atlantic Christian College in Wilson, North Carolina.

Dr. Moudy began his career in administration at TCU in 1957, holding the posts of dean of the graduate school, vice chancellor for academic affairs and executive vice chancellor. He was named TCU's chancellor in 1965. Dr. Moudy advanced graduate education at TCU and elevated the university's academic stature by establishing six doctoral programs along with the undergraduate honors program. When asked to pick his most significant contribution, he singled out the establishment of a Phi Beta Kappa chapter on campus. TCU Chancellor Emeritus William E. Tucker, who succeeded Moudy, remembered him as "A gentleman of first rank and an exceptional intellect, [who] epitomized excellence and dignity as well as moral fortitude. Through his principled and unflappable leadership, he played a pivotal and indeed decisive role in grounding and shaping the university today."

Dr. Moudy also headed the premier national and state organizations representing private higher education. In addition to chairing the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, he chaired the Independent Colleges and Universities of Texas. Dr. Moudy was a key architect of the Texas Tuition Equalization Grant, a state fund that for more than a quarter of a century has provided financial assistance to students attending private schools in Texas.

Dr. Moudy was a leader of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), the denomination with which TCU is affiliated. He served as chairman of the board of the Division of Higher Education and president of the Texas Council of Church Related Colleges. In 1969, he became moderator of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), its highest elective office, and

held the position until 1971. "Jim Moudy was a man of informed and vibrant faith to the very core of his being," Dr. Tucker says. "University Christian Church was integral to his life and work."

Current TCU Chancellor Victor J. Boschini, Jr., recalled that "Dr. Moudy told me that his chancellorship was a calling, in the same way that individuals are called to the ministry. He encouraged me to think of the job in the same way."

R.T.

WILLIAM SEYBOLD

1915-2004

The State of Texas lost a most distinguished and respected citizen with the passing of Dr. William Dempsey Seybold who died in Dallas, Texas, on July 18, 2004, at the age of 89. Known by close friends and colleagues as "Bill," Dr. Seybold was recognized nationally as an outstanding chest surgeon. His entire life was marked by honors and high achievement.

Bill Seybold was born in Temple, Texas, on February 23, 1915, to Claude Dempsey and Lillian Cochrane Seybold. Although Temple was a small city, it was an important medical center and Bill Seybold had an uncle in the city who was a leading physician. It was in this environment that young Seybold decided to become a doctor. After graduating from Temple High School in 1932, he attended the University of Texas for two years, as a premedical student, later receiving a Bachelor of Science degree in 1936. He entered the University of Texas Medical Branch in 1934. At that time, medical students were still doing home deliveries. He graduated in 1938 as a member of the Alpha Omega Alpha Honor Society.

Seybold remained in Galveston for two years as an instructor of anatomy. While instructor, he became famous in anatomical circles for making a discovery in human anatomy (lateral ligaments attached to the spinal cord). The human body had been dissected by hundreds of anatomists but this was probably the first published description of a new anatomical finding in four centuries.

Seybold wanted to enter the new field of chest, or thoracic, surgery. He won a much sought internship at the Barnes Hospital, Washington University, in St. Louis, Missouri, under Dr. Evarts Graham who was the world's first surgeon to remove an entire lung with the patient surviving. In 1941, Seybold obtained a surgery fellowship at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, majoring in chest surgery. After an interruption, when he served as a ship's surgeon in the U.S. Navy during World War II, he returned to the Mayo Clinic to complete his training. After training, he won a coveted appointment as a chest and general surgeon on the Mayo Staff.

Although Seybold was honored and happy to be on the prestigious

Mayo Clinic Staff, his wife had developed multiple sclerosis, which was thought to become less severe in a warm climate. Bill was a fifth generation Texan. He often talked with his friend from medical school days, Dr. Mavis Kelsey, also a fifth generation Texan and a Mayo Staff member. The two, along with Dr. William V. Leary, a Mayo Staff member from Minnesota, decided to leave the security of the Mayo Clinic and try their luck in establishing a multi-specialty clinic in Houston, adjoining the fledgling Texas Medical Center. This was at a time when critics said the concept of a Texas Medical Center would not succeed because it was located too far from downtown. The Texas Medical Center and the Kelsey Seybold Clinic succeeded well beyond even the founders' imaginations.

Seybold spent the remainder of his professional career in the Kelsey Seybold Clinic as Chief of Surgery and onetime Chief of Staff. He spent years as Chief of Surgery and Chief of Staff at St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital. The William D. Seybold Chair of Surgery at St. Luke's Hospital was established in his honor. He was also on the surgical staff of Houston's leading hospitals including the M. D. Anderson Hospital and Tumor Institute. Among the hospitals was the now defunct Harris County Tuberculosis Hospital which eventually closed after antibiotics began curing the disease.

Dr. Seybold became certified in both general and thoracic surgery. He was a founding member of the American Board of Thoracic Surgery. He held faculty positions at the Mayo Foundation, The University of Texas institutions in Galveston, M.D. Anderson Hospital and Tumor Institute, and the Post Graduate School of Medicine in Houston. He became a Clinical Professor of Surgery at Baylor University College of Medicine where he served on the Teaching Research Committee and won an Excellence in Teaching Award.

Seybold was a member of many medical organizations. He was never too busy to serve a leading role on boards and committees. Among these groups were the American College of Surgery where he served on the Board of Governors, Membership Committee, Cancer Committee, and Texas Advisory Committee. He also served in the American Association of Thoracic Surgeons; the Texas Surgical Society as President and Chairman of the Council; Western Surgical Society serving on the Program Committee; and the Texas Medical Association as Scientific Consultant to the State Journal, Chairman of the Section on Surgery, Chairman on Nursing and Chairman of Scientific Exhibits. Seybold served on the Board of Directors, Advisory Board and Credentials Committee of the American Association of Medical Clinics. He served as President of the American Cancer Society for the Harris County Unit, The Dallas County Unit and the Texas Division. He was on the National Board of Directors, Executive Committee and other committees of the Multiple Sclerosis Society. He served for years on the Board of Trustees of the Kelsey Seybold Foundation.

Bill Seybold also participated in a number of other organizations. For

the University of St. Thomas in Houston, he served on the Board of Directors and was named an Honorary Trustee for Life. Most of all was his dedication to the University of Texas where he served on the Committee of 75; the Development Board and the President's Club of the Medical Branch in Galveston where he received the Ashbell Smith Distinguished Alumnus Award and the Chancellor's Council; and the Centennial Committee. He created the Frances Rather Seybold and Frances Randolph Rather Seybold Endowed Scholarship and was honored by a gift from wife Adele in 1984 of a Lectureship in Surgery at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical School in Dallas.

Seybold thoroughly enjoyed membership in the Philosophical Society of Texas where he was on the Executive Committee and was President in 1992. He was a director of the Republic Bank of Houston. When his close friend and Phi Delta Theta fraternity brother, Eugene Locke, ran for Governor of Texas in 1968, Seybold served as the chairman of the doctors election committee. Years later the widow of Eugene Locke became Seybold's second wife. Seybold retired from practice in Houston in 1979. He moved to Dallas in 1981, the home of his wife, where he again contributed to the affairs of the city including the Southwestern Research Foundation; the Chamber of Commerce; the Dallas Museum of Fine Arts, the Episcopal Church; and various volunteer charitable organizations.

While in practice, Seybold had no time for golf, but after retiring he thoroughly enjoy the game. He loved nature and the outdoors. He made a lifetime study of plants and trees and enjoyed teaching children how to identify them. He maintained a greenhouse where he grew orchids and other plants. He was well-informed in history and biography which he enjoyed reading. Bill Seybold enjoyed a wide circle of friends and kept up with them by writing hundreds of letters of congratulations or sympathy. There was a large group of patients who admired him greatly, especially those whose health or life he saved.

Bill Seybold first married Frances Randolph Rather who died in 1977. There were three children: Frances, who died as a youth of congenital heart disease; William R. Seybold, M. D.; and Randolph C. Seybold, M.D. After his first wife died, Seybold married Adele Neely Locke, a longtime family friend. She is the mother of John P. Locke, a member of the Texas Philosophical Society; Thomas N. Locke; and Aimee Locke Jacobs. In all, there are nine grandchildren and three great grandchildren. Seybold is also survived by his brother, Herbert Seybold, M. D.

The Texas House of Representatives honored Dr. Seybold's memory with a resolution and the presentation to his widow of a Texas flag that flew over the Texas capitol in Dr. Seybold's memory. The Kelsey Seybold Clinic and St. Luke's Hospital have honored his memory by establishing teaching funds in his name.

In addition to being an accomplished general surgeon, Dr. William Seybold was a pioneer in the field of chest surgery, the development of which paved the way to open heart surgery, which has saved millions of

lives. Seybold trained dozens of young surgeons. He was admired by his colleagues for his surgical skill and knowledge. He was also a pioneer in health care delivery as a founder of a large multi-specialty clinic which was among the first to develop a system of branch clinics and prepaid care. Most of all, Bill Seybold will be remembered for his integrity, compassion, hard work, deep sense of responsibility, and devotion to his patients.

M.K.

JEROME SUPPLE
1936-2004

Jerry Supple spent almost every chapter of his life in the Yankee Northeast until he came to serve as president of Texas State University in 1989. From that very first day in the Lone Star State, he became a beloved Texan—because of his dedicated and very successful leadership of Texas State, his service to the educational and civic community, and the witness of his personal life, joy, and integrity. Jerry was born in Winthrop, Massachusetts, on April 27, 1936. He completed his bachelor's of science degree in chemistry at Boston College, his doctorate in chemistry at the University of New Hampshire, and pursued a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of California-Berkeley.

Jerry moved through the academic ranks from chemistry faculty member to acting president, serving at campuses in Plattsburgh, Fredonia, and Potsdam. That experience gave him a very strong commitment to high standards of quality for all students and support for a great faculty.

He immediately saw the opportunity for Texas State University to be a regional model of service to the State's diverse demographics and a place of nationally recognized faculty and programs.

Highlights of Jerry's presidency at Texas State included:

- Improved student retention from 57% to 75%;
- Raised admissions standards several times, making it one of the most selective public universities in Texas;
- Began offering its first doctoral degree programs;
- Successfully completed the university's first major gifts capital campaign, raising more than \$74 million;
- Increased the amount of research funding from \$5 million annually to \$32 million.

While his campus was growing and becoming stronger, Jerry also contributed significantly to the region's academic and civic leadership groups. He led significant efforts to improve the accreditation process at the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. He worked with other col-

leges and universities to develop the new multi-institutional teaching center in Round Rock. He was an active civic leader in both Austin and San Marcos.

One of the reasons why Jerry was such an effective leader in so many arenas is that it was a joy to be with him. He played as successfully as he worked and was known particularly for his love of folk music. Jerry and his wife, Cathy, sang in the folk band The Newton Street Irregulars.

Jerry's courage was painfully visible in the last seven years of his life when he fought cancer. During most of that time, he continued as president of Texas State and only reluctantly announced his retirement for August 2002.

Jerry died January 16, 2003. He is survived by his wife, Catherine, son James and his wife Karlyn and grandson Keagan, sons Andrew and Paul, his sister and brother-in-law, 10 nephews and nieces, and 14 great nephews and nieces.

P.H.

OFFICERS OF THE SOCIETY

For the Year 2004

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ALFRED F. HURLEY

First Vice-President

HARRIS L. KEMPNER JR.

Second Vice-President

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PAST PRESIDENTS

*Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar	1837-59
*Ira Kendrick Stephens	1936
*Charles Shirley Potts	1937
*Edgar Odell Lovett	1938
*George Bannerman Dealey	1939
*George Waverley Briggs	1940
*William James	1941
*George Alfred Hill Jr.	1942
*Edward Henry Cary	1943
*Edward Randall	1944
*Umphrey Lee	1944
*Eugene Perry Locke	1945
*Louis Herman Hubbard	1946
*Pat Ireland Nixon	1947
*Ima Hogg	1948
*Albert Perley Brogan	1949
*William Lockhart Clayton	1950
*A. Frank Smith	1951
*Ernest Lynn Kurth	1952
*Dudley Kezer Woodward Jr.	1953
*Burke Baker	1954
*Jesse Andrews	1955
*James Pinckney Hart	1956
*Robert Gerald Storey	1957
*Lewis Randolph Bryan Jr.	1958
*W. St. John Garwood	1959
George Crews McGhee	1960
*Harry Hunt Ransom	1961
*Eugene Benjamin Germany	1962
*Rupert Norval Richardson	1963
*Mrs. George Alfred Hill Jr.	1964
*Edward Randall Jr.	1965
*McGruder Ellis Sadler	1966
*William Alexander Kirkland	1967
*Richard Tudor Fleming	1968
*Herbert Pickens Gambrell	1969
*Harris Leon Kempner	1970
*Carey Croneis	1971
*Willis McDonald Tate	1972

*Dillon Anderson	1973
*Logan Wilson	1974
*Edward Clark	1975
Thomas Hart Law	1976
*Truman G. Blocker Jr.	1977
Frank E. Vandiver	1978
*Price Daniel	1979
Durwood Fleming	1980
Charles A. LeMaistre	1981
*Abner V. McCall	1982
*Leon Jaworski	1983
Wayne H. Holtzman	1983
Jenkins Garrett	1984
Joe R. Greenhill	1985
William Pettus Hobby	1986
Elspeth Rostow	1987
John Clifton Caldwell	1988
J. Chrys Dougherty	1989
*Frank McReynolds Wozencraft	1990
William C. Levin	1991
*William D. Seybold	1992
Robert Krueger	1993
Steven Weinberg	1994
*William H. Crook	1995
Charles C. Sprague	1996
Jack S. Blanton	1997
William P. Wright Jr.	1998
Patricia Hayes	1999
A. Baker Duncan	2000
Ellen C. Temple	2001
George C. Wright	2002
J. Sam Moore Jr.	2003
Alfred F. Hurley	2004

*Deceased

MEETINGS

of the Philosophical Society of Texas

- | | |
|--|---------------------------|
| 1837—Founded at Houston,
December 5 | 1967—Arlington |
| 1840—Austin, January 29 | 1968—San Antonio |
| 1936—Chartered, January 18 | 1969—Salado |
| 1936—Reorganizational meet-
ing—Dallas, December 5 | 1970—Salado |
| 1937—Meeting and inaugural
banquet—Dallas, January 29 | 1971—Nacogdoches |
| 1937—Liendo and Houston,
December 4 | 1972—Dallas |
| 1938—Dallas | 1973—Austin (Lakeway Inn) |
| 1939—Dallas | 1974—Austin |
| 1940—San Antonio | 1975—Fort Worth |
| 1941—Austin | 1976—San Antonio |
| 1942—Dallas | 1977—Galveston |
| 1943—Dallas | 1978—Houston |
| 1944—Dallas | 1979—Austin |
| 1945—Dallas | 1980—San Antonio |
| 1946—Dallas | 1981—Dallas |
| 1947—San Antonio | 1982—Galveston |
| 1948—Houston | 1983—Fort Worth |
| 1949—Austin | 1984—Houston |
| 1950—Houston | 1985—College Station |
| 1951—Lufkin | 1986—Austin |
| 1952—College Station | 1987—Kerrville |
| 1953—Dallas | 1988—Dallas |
| 1954—Austin | 1989—San Antonio |
| 1955—Nacogdoches | 1990—Houston |
| 1956—Austin | 1991—Galveston |
| 1957—Dallas | 1992—Dallas |
| 1958—Austin | 1993—Laredo |
| 1959—San Antonio | 1994—Austin |
| 1960—Fort Clark | 1995—Corpus Christi |
| 1961—Salado | 1996—Dallas |
| 1962—Salado | 1997—Houston |
| 1963—Nacogdoches | 1998—Abilene |
| 1964—Austin | 1999—Austin |
| 1965—Salado | 2000—San Antonio |
| 1966—Salado | 2001—Austin |
| | 2002—Fort Worth |
| | 2003—El Paso |
| | 2004—Denton |

PREAMBLE

We the undersigned form ourselves into a society for the collection and diffusion of knowledge—subscribing fully to the opinion of Lord Chancellor Bacon, that “knowledge is power”; we need not here dilate on its importance. The field of our researches is as boundless in its extent and as various in its character as the subjects of knowledge are numberless and diversified. But our object more especially at the present time is to concentrate the efforts of the enlightened and patriotic citizens of Texas, of our distinguished military commanders and travelers,—of our scholars and men of science, of our learned members of the different professions, in the collection and diffusion of correct information regarding the moral and social condition of our country; its finances, statistics and political and military history; its climate, soil and productions; the animals which roam over our broad prairies or swim in our noble streams; the customs, language and history of the aboriginal tribes who hunt or plunder on our borders; the natural curiosities of the country; our mines of untold wealth, and the thousand other topics of interest which our new and rising republic unfolds to the philosopher, the scholar and the man of the world. Texas having fought the battles of liberty, and triumphantly achieved a separate political existence, now thrown upon her internal resources for the permanence of her institutions, moral and political, calls upon all persons to use all their efforts for the increase and diffusion of useful knowledge and sound information; to take measures that she be rightly appreciated abroad, and acquire promptly and fully sustain the high standing to which she is destined among the civilized nations of the world. She calls on her intelligent and patriotic citizens to furnish to the rising generation the means of instruction within our own borders, where our children—to whose charge after all the vestal flame of Texian liberty must be committed—may be indoctrinated in sound principles and imbibe with their education respect for their country’s laws, love of her soil and veneration for her institutions. We have endeavored to respond to this call by the formation of this society, with the hope that if not to us, to our sons and successors it may be given to make the star, the single star of the West, as resplendent for all the acts that adorn civilized life as it is now glorious in military renown. Texas has her captains, let her have her wise men.

MEMBERS OF THE SOCIETY

(NAME OF SPOUSE APPEARS IN PARENTHESIS)

ABOUSSIE, MARILYN (JOHN HAY), chief justice, Texas Third Court of Appeals, *Austin and San Angelo*

ADAMS, PHIL, board of regents, Texas A&M University; director, American Momentum Bank, headquartered in Tampa, Florida; Texas Public Policy Foundation Board, *Bryan*

ALLBRITTON, JOE LEWIS (BARBARA), lawyer; board vice-chairman, Riggs Bank, N.A., *Houston*

ANDERSON, THOMAS D. (HELEN), lawyer, *Houston*

ARMSTRONG, ANNE LEGENDRE (TOBIN), former U.S. ambassador to Great Britain; regent, Texas A&M University System, 1997, *Armstrong*

ARNOLD, DANIEL C. (BEVERLY), private investor, *Houston*

ASHBY, LYNN COX (DOROTHY), former editor, editorial page, Houston Post; member, Houston Philosophical Society; author, columnist, *Houston*

ATLAS, MORRIS (RITA), lawyer; senior managing partner, Atlas and Hall, *McAllen*

BARNES, SUSAN J., The Reverend, assistant rector, St. Matthew's Episcopal Church, *Austin*

BARNETT, LYNN (RANDY), director, Abilene Cultural Affairs Council, *Abilene*

BARROW, THOMAS D. (JANICE), president, T-Bar-X, Ltd., *Houston*

BASH, FRANK (SUSAN), director, McDonald Observatory, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*

BATISTE, JOHN PAUL, executive director, Texas Commission on the Arts, *Austin*

BELL, PAUL GERVAIS (SUE), retired general contractor, *Houston*

BENTSEN, LLOYD (BERYL ANN "B.A."), former U.S. senator and U.S. secretary of the treasury, *Houston*

- BIGGS, EDWARD GLENN, (ANN), former chairman Baylor University Board of Regents and First National Bank, *San Antonio*
- BLANTON, JACK S., SR., former chairman, current board member, Houston Endowment, Inc., *Houston*
- BOLES, JOHN B. (NANCY), William Pettus Hobby Professor of History, Rice University; managing editor, *Journal of Southern History*, *Houston*
- BONJEAN, CHARLES M., Professor of Sociology and executive director of the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*
- BRANDS, H., Member of society of American Historians; Dickson Allen Anderson Centennial Professor of History at the University of Texas; Author, *Austin*
- BRANDT, EDWARD N., JR. (PATRICIA), physician-medical educator; Regents Professor, University of Oklahoma-Health Sciences Center, *Oklahoma City, Oklahoma*
- BRINKERHOFF, ANN BARBER, chair, UTMB Centennial Commission; Hogg Foundation national advisory board; vice-president, Houston Community College Foundation; chairman emeritus, Liberal Arts Foundation, University of Texas at Austin; chair, Women's Institute, Houston, *Houston*
- BROWN, MICHAEL S. (ALICE), professor of molecular genetics and director, Jonsson Center for Molecular Genetics, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center; 1985 Nobel laureate in physiology or medicine, *Dallas*
- BROWNELL, BLAINE A. (MARDI), president, Ball State University, *Muncie, Indiana*
- BRYAN, J. P., JR. (MARY JON), CEO, Torch Energy Advisors, Inc.; former president, Texas State Historical Association, *Houston*
- BURNS, CHESTER R. (ANN), James Wade Rockwell Professor of the History of Medicine, University of Texas Medical Branch, *Galveston*
- BUSH, LAURA WELCH (GEORGE), first lady of the United States of America; founder of the Texas Book Festival, *Washington, D.C.*
- BUSH, GEORGE W. (LAURA), president of the United States of America, *Washington, D.C.*
- BUTT, CHARLES C., chairman, HEB, *San Antonio*
- CALDWELL, JOHN CLIFTON (SHIRLEY), rancher; former chairman, Texas Historical Commission; former president, Texas State Historical Association, *Albany*
- CALGAARD, RONALD KEITH (GENIE), chief operating officer, Austin, Calvert and Flavin, Inc.; former president, Trinity University, *San Antonio*

- CAMPBELL, RANDOLPH "MIKE" B. (DIANA SNOW), Regents Professor of History, University of North Texas, *Denton*
- CANTRELL, GREGG, Professor of History at Texas Christian University, author, *Fort Worth*
- CAPPER, JOYCE PATE (ROBERT), founder, Abraham Lincoln Appreciatio Society; honorary consular, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg; organized first Edna Gladney Auxiliary in 1965; opened Pate Museum of Transportation in Cresson, Texas, *Fort Worth*
- CARLETON, DON E. (SUZANNE), director, Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*
- CARPENTER, ELIZABETH "LIZ", former assistant secretary of education, Washington correspondent, White House press secretary; consultant, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library; author and speaker, *Austin*
- CARSON, RONALD (UTE), Harris L. Kempner Distinguished Professor in the Humanities in Medicine and director of the Institute for the Medical Humanities University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, *Galveston*
- CATTO, HENRY E. (JESSICA), former U.S. ambassador to Great Britain and El Salvador; vice-chairman, Aspen Institute; former vice-chairman, National Public Radio; former director, U.S. Information Agency, *San Antonio*
- CAVAZOS, LAURO F. (PEGGY ANN), former U.S. secretary of education; former president, Texas Tech University and Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center, *Port Aransas*
- CIGARROA, FRANCISCO, President University of Texas Health Science Center; pediatric and transplant surgeon, *San Antonio*
- CIGARROA, JOAQUIN G., JR. (BARBARA), physician, internal medicine and cardiology, *Laredo*
- CLEMENTS, WILLIAM P., JR. (RITA), former governor of Texas; former chairman, SEDCO, Inc.; former U.S. deputy secretary of defense, *Dallas*
- COOK, C.W.W. "TEX" (ETHEL FRANCES), *Longview*
- CORMIER, RUFUS (YVONNE), attorney and partner in the Houston office of Baker Botts, LLP, *Houston*
- CORNYN, JOHN, US Senator, Deputy Whip in Senate
- COX, PATRICK, Assistant Director, Center for American History at University of Texas; Historian; Writer, *Austin*
- CRAIN, JOHN WALTER, (MIMI), president of Summerlee Foundation; board of directors, Texas State Historical Association, *Dallas*
- CRAVEN, JUDITH LYNN BERWICK (MORITZ), past president, United Way of the Texas Gulf Coast; regent, University of Texas System, *Houston*

- CRIM, WILLIAM ROBERT (MARGARET), investments, *Kilgore*
- CROOK, MARY ELIZABETH (MARC LEWIS), author; member, Texas Institute of Letters, *Austin*
- CRUTCHER, RONALD A. (BETTY), provost and executive vice-president for academic affairs, Miami University; cellist, *Oxford, Ohio*
- CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM H. (ISABELLA), former president, University of Texas at Austin; former chancellor, University of Texas System, *Austin*
- CURTIS, GREGORY (TRACY), editor, *Texas Monthly*, 1981-2000; author, *Austin*
- DAILEY, MACEO (SONDRA) director of African American Studies and assistant professor of history at The University of Texas El Paso; board chair of Humanities Texas, *El Paso*
- DAVIDSON, CHANDLER (SHARON L. PLUMMER), professor of sociology and political science emeritus, Rice University, *Houston*
- DAVIS, D. JACK (GAIL), dean of the School of Visual Arts, University of North Texas, *Denton*
- DAVIS, RAMONA, executive director, Greater Houston Preservation Alliance, *Houston*
- DE WETTER, MARGARET, author of three books of poetry, as well as a biographies and three books of genealogy, docent and member Huntington Library Live Poets Society, UT El Paso Distinguished Alumna, El Paso Women's Hall of Fame, widow of former mayor of El Paso Peter de Wetter, *El Paso*
- DEAN, DAVID A. (JEAN), lawyer; former secretary of state, Texas, *Dallas*
- DEBAKEY, MICHAEL E., cardiovascular surgeon; chancellor emeritus, Baylor College of Medicine, *Houston*
- DECHERD, ROBERT W. (MAUREEN), chairman, president, and CEO, Belo Corp., *Dallas*
- P. LYNN DENTON, (MARK), founding Director of the Bob Bullock Texas State History Museum; Past-President, Texas Association of Museums, *Dripping Springs*
- DELCO, WILHELMINA (EXALTON), former member, Texas House of Representatives; civic leader; adjunct professor, Community College Leadership Program, University of Texas at Austin; chair, Board of Trustees, Huston-Tillotson College, *Austin*
- DENIUS, FRANKLIN W. (CHARMAINE), lawyer; former president, University of Texas Ex-Students' Association; member, Constitutional Revision Committee; Distinguished Alumnus, University of Texas at Austin; decorated veteran of World War II, *Austin*
- DEWHURST, DAVID, Lieutenant Governor of Texas, veteran, businessman, rancher, (*Austin*)

- DICK, JAMES, founder-director, International Festival-Institute at Round Top; concert pianist and teacher, *Round Top*
- DOBIE, DUDLEY R., JR. (SAZA), successor trustee, Clayton Foundation for Research; shareholder, Brorby & Crozier, P.C., *Austin*
- DORN, EDWIN (FRAN), dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*
- DOUGHERTY, J. CHRYS, III, retired attorney; former Honorary French Consul in Austin; former president, State Bar of Texas; former trustee, St. Stephen's Episcopal School, Austin; former trustee, University of Texas Law School Foundation; trustee, Texas Supreme Court Historical Society, The Austin Project; administrative, Texas Appleseed, *Austin*
- DOUGHERTY, J. CHRYS, IV (MARY ANN), director of research, Just for the Kids, *Austin*
- DUGGER, RONNIE E. (PATRICIA BLAKE), reporter, writer, social structure activist, *Austin, Texas, and Somerville, MA*
- DUNCAN, JOHN HOUSE (BRENDA), businessman; chairman, board of trustees, Southwestern University, *Houston*
- DUNCAN, CHARLES WILLIAM, JR. (ANNE), chairman, Duncan Interests; former secretary, U.S. Energy Department; deputy secretary, U.S. Defense Department; president, Coca-Cola Company; chairman, Rotan Mosle Financial Corp., *Houston*
- DUNCAN, A. BAKER (SALLY), chairman, Duncan-Smith Investments, Inc., *San Antonio*
- EARVIN, LARRY L., Dean of School of Arts and Sciences at Clark Atlanta University; Political Scientist
- ELKINS, JAMES A., JR., trustee, Baylor College of Medicine; trustee, Menil Foundation, *Houston*
- EMANUEL, VICTOR LLOYD, naturalist, founder of Victor Emanuel Nature Tours, *Austin*
- FARABEE, KENNETH RAY (MARY MARGARET), former vice-chancellor and general counsel, University of Texas System; former member, Texas Senate, *Austin*
- FAULKNER, LARRY R. (MARY ANN), president, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*
- FEHRENBACH, T.R. (LILLIAN), author; historian; former chairman, commissioner emeritus, Texas Historical Commission; former chairman, Texas Antiquities Committee; fellow, Texas State Historical Association, *San Antonio*
- FEIGIN, RALPH D. (JUDITH), president and CEO, Baylor College of Medicine, *Houston*

- FINCH, WILLIAM CARRINGTON (LUCY), retired dean, Vanderbilt Divinity School; former president, Southwestern University, *Georgetown*
- FISHER, RICHARD (NANCY), ambassador and deputy U.S. trade representative; vice-chair, Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC); former managing partner, Fisher Capital Management; former executive assistant to U.S. secretary of the treasury; adjunct professor, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin; democratic nominee for U.S. Senate, 1994; founder, Dallas Committee on Foreign Relations, *Dallas*
- FLATO, EDWARD (KATY), architect, Lake/Flato, *San Antonio*
- FLAWN, PETER T. (PRISCILLA), president emeritus, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*
- FLEMING, CHERYL (JON) dean, Margaret Petree School of Performing Arts in Oklahoma City; Served as advisor-consultant of the Metropolitan Opera; award winning poet, *North Zulch*
- FLEMING, DURWOOD (LURLYN), former president and chancellor, Southwestern University, *Dallas*
- FLEMING, JON HUGH (CHERYL), educator; consultant; businessman; former president, Texas Wesleyan College; former member, Governor's Select Committee on Public Education, *North Zulch*
- FLORES, DIONICIO, Texas State University Board of regents; Executive Vice President and Editor of El Paso Times, *El Paso*
- FLOWERS, BETTY SUE (JOHN), director, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, *Austin*
- FRAZIER, DONALD (SUSAN), professor of history, McMurry University; fellow and executive director, Grady McWhiney Research Foundation, *Abilene*
- FROST, TOM C. (PAT), senior chairman of the board, Frost National Bank, *San Antonio*
- FURGESON, W. ROYAL, JR. (JULI), U.S. district judge, Western District of Texas, Midland Division, *Midland*
- GALBRAITH, JAMES K. (YING TANG), professor, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*
- GALVAN, ISRAEL J. (MARSHA ANN PERLMAN), founder and president of GHG Corp., *League City*
- GALVIN, CHARLES O'NEILL (MARGARET), centennial professor of law, emeritus, Vanderbilt University, Nashville; of counsel, Haynes and Boone, LLP; distinguished professor of law, emeritus, Southern Methodist University, *Dallas*
- GARCIA, JULIET VILLARREAL (OSCAR E.), president, University of Texas at Brownsville and Texas Southmost College, *Brownsville*

- GARNER, BRYAN A. (PAN), author; lecturer; lawyer; president, LawProse, Inc., *Dallas*
- GARRETT, JENKINS (VIRGINIA), lawyer; former member, board of regents, University of Texas System; former chairman, board of trustees, Tarrant County Junior College; distinguished alumnus award, University of Texas at Austin, *Fort Worth*
- GARWOOD, WILLIAM L. (MERLE), judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, *Austin*
- GEORGE, ROGER JAMES, JR. (CHERYL), trial lawyer; founding partner, George & Donaldson, LLP, *Austin*
- GILLETTE, MICHAEL (LEANN), director, Humanities Texas; retired, National Archives, *Austin*
- GILLIS, MALCOLM (ELIZABETH), president, Rice University, *Houston*
- GOETZMANN, WILLIAM H. (MEWES), Jack S. Blanton Sr. Endowed Chair in History and American Studies, University of Texas at Austin, Pulitzer Prize-winning author, *Austin*
- GOLDSTEIN, JOSEPH L., professor of medicine and molecular genetics, University of Texas Southwest Medical Center; Nobel laureate in medicine or physiology, *Dallas*
- GORDON, WILLIAM EDWIN, distinguished professor emeritus, Rice University; foreign secretary (1986-1990), National Academy of Sciences, *Houston*
- GRANT, JOSEPH M., chairman and CEO, Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc., *Dallas*
- GRAVES, HOWARD (GRACIE) former Chancellor of the Texas A&M University System, *College Station*
- GREENHILL, JOE R., lawyer; former chief justice, Supreme Court of Texas, *Austin*
- GUEST, WILLIAM F. (AMY), attorney; chairman, American Capitol Insurance Company, *Houston*
- GULLETT, JOHN, Physician, *Abilene*
- GUNTER, PETE A. Y. (ELIZABETH), Regents Professor of Philosophy, University of North Texas; member, Texas Institute of Letters; board of directors, Southwest Philosophy Review; president, Association for Process Philosophy of Education; lifetime board member and past president, Big Thicket Association, *Denton*
- GUTHRIE, JUDITH K., United States Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Texas, *Tyler*
- HACKERMAN, NORMAN, former president, Rice University; former president and vice-chancellor, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*

- HAMILTON, ANN THOMAS, grant officer, Houston Endowment, Inc.; vice-president, Jacob and Terese Hershey Foundation, *Houston*
- HAMM, GEORGE FRANCIS (JANE), president, University of Texas at Tyler Foundation, *Tyler*
- HANNAH, JOHN, JR. (JUDITH GUTHRIE), chief judge, Eastern District of Texas, *Tyler*
- HARDESTY, ROBERT L. (MARY), former president, Southwest Texas State University; former assistant to the president of the United States; former chairman, board of governors, U.S. Postal Service; former vice-chancellor, University of Texas System, *Austin*
- HARRIGAN, STEPHEN MICHAEL (SUE ELLEN), author; contributing editor, *Texas Monthly*, *Austin*
- HARRISON, FRANK, physician; president emeritus, University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio; former president, University of Texas at Arlington, *Dallas*
- HARTE, EDWARD HOLMEAD, former publisher, Corpus Christi Caller-Times, *Corpus Christi*
- HARTE, CHRISTOPHER M. (KATHERINE STODDARD POPE), investments, Portland, *Spicewood*
- HARVIN, WILLIAM C. (HELEN), lawyer, *Houston*
- HAY, JESS (BETTY JO), chairman, HCB Enterprises, Inc.; chairman, Texas Foundation for Higher Education; former member, board of regents, University of Texas System, *Dallas*
- HAYES, PATRICIA A., interim president, CEO, Seton Healthcare Network, *Austin*
- HECHT, NATHAN LINCOLN, justice, Supreme Court of Texas, *Austin*
- HERSHEY, TERESE TARLTON "TERRY", civic leader; Houston Parks Board; National Association of Flood Plain Managers Foundation; National Recreation and Park Association; Texas Women's Hall of Fame; former board member, National Audubon Society; Trust for Public Lands; Texas Parks and Wildlife Commission; founder, fellow, advisory board member, Lady Bird Johnson Wildflower Center; Frances K. Hutchison Medal for distinguished service to conservation, Garden Club of America, *Houston*
- HEYER, GEORGE STUART, JR., professor emeritus of the history of doctrine, Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary, *Austin*
- HIGGINBOTHAM, PATRICK E. (ELIZABETH), judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, *Dallas*
- HILGERS, WILLIAM B., attorney; former chairman, Supreme Court of Texas Grievance Oversight Committee, *Del Valle*
- HILL, JOHN L., JR. (ELIZABETH), attorney; former chief justice, Supreme

- Court of Texas; former attorney general, Texas; former secretary of state, Texas, *Houston*
- HILL, LYDA, president, Hill Development Company and Seven Falls Company, *Dallas*
- HINES, GERALD DOUGLAS (BARBARA), chairman, Hines Interests, *Houston*
- HOBBY, DIANA (WILLIAM), *Houston*
- HOBBY, WILLIAM PETTUS (DIANA), lieutenant governor, Texas, 1973–1991; Radoslav A. Tsanoff Professor, Rice University; Sid Richardson Professor, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, 1991–1997; chancellor, University of Houston System, 1995–1997, *Houston*
- HOFFMAN, PHILIP GUTHRIE (MARY), president emeritus, University of Houston; former president, Texas Medical Center, Inc., *Houston*
- HOLLAMON, ELIZABETH E., former head, Trinity Episcopal School; educational consultant; president, Cavalry Consulting, Inc., *Galveston*
- HOLTZMAN, WAYNE H. (JOAN), professor emeritus of psychology and education; past President, Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*
- HOOK, HAROLD SWANSON (JOANNE), retired chairman and chief executive, American General Corp.; trustee, Baylor College of Medicine; former national president, Boy Scouts of America; Texas Business Hall of Fame, *Houston*
- HORCHOW, S. ROGER (CAROLYN), founder and former CEO, Horchow Collection; author; theatrical producer, *Dallas*
- HOWE, JOHN P., III, physician; president and CEO, Project Hope, *Washington, D.C.*
- HUDSON, EDWARD R., JR. (ANN FRASHER), independent oil producer; board member, Kimbell Art Foundation, Burnett Foundation, Modern Art Museum of Fort Worth, Aspen Art Museum, and Aspen Center for Physics, Friends of Art and Preservation in Embassies, *Fort Worth*
- HUEY, MARY EVELYN (GRIFFIN), president emerita, Texas Woman's University, *Denton*
- HUGHES, VESTER T., JR., lawyer; partner, Hughes & Luce, *Dallas*
- HUNT, WOODY L. (GAYLE), Chairman and CEO, Hunt Building Corporation; member, University of Texas System Board of Regents; member of numerous local and state business and charitable boards, *El Paso*
- HURLEY, ALFRED FRANCIS (JOANNA), professor of history, University of North Texas, chancellor emeritus, University of North Texas System, Brigadier General USAF (retired), *Denton*

- HUTCHISON, KAY BAILEY (RAY), U.S. senator; former state treasurer, Texas, *Dallas*
- INMAN, BOBBY R. (NANCY), admiral, U.S. Navy (retired); investor, *Austin*
- JACK, JANIS GRAHAM (WILLIAM DAVID), U.S. district judge, *Corpus Christi*
- JACKSON, LEE, Chancellor, University of North Texas System, former Texas House of Representatives, four-time Dallas County Judge, *Denton*
- JACOBS, GARY, Chairman, President, and CEO Laredo National Bancshares, Inc., *Laredo*
- JAMAIL, JOSEPH D., JR. (LEE), attorney; philanthropist, *Houston*
- JAMES, THOMAS N. (GLEAVES), cardiologist; Professor of Medicine, Professor of Pathology, Inaugural Holder of the Thomas N. and Gleaves T. James Distinguished Chair in Cardiological Sciences, former president, University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, *Galveston*
- JOHNSON, LUCI BAINES (IAN TURPIN), chair, LBJ Asset Management Partners, *Austin*
- JOHNSON, RICHARD J. V. (BELLE), chairman emeritus, *Houston Chronicle, Houston*
- *JOHNSON, CLAUDIA TAYLOR "LADY BIRD", *Stonewall*
- JOHNSTON, MARGUERITE (CHARLES W. BARNES), journalist; author; former columnist and editor, *Houston Post, Houston*
- JORDAN, BRYCE (BARBARA), president emeritus, Pennsylvania State University, *Austin*
- JUSTICE, WILLIAM WAYNE (SUE), senior judge, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Texas; sitting by designation in the Western District of Texas, *Austin*
- **KAIN, COLLEEN T., retired executive assistant, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*
- KECK, RAY (PATRICIA), president, Texas A&M International University, former provost and vice-president for Academic Affairs, *Laredo*
- KELLY, DEE J. (JANICE), attorney, *Fort Worth*
- KELSEY, MAVIS PARROTT, SR., retired physician; founder and former chief, Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, *Houston*
- KELTON, ELMER (ANNA), fiction writer, livestock journalist, *San Angelo*
- KEMPNER, RUTH, *Galveston*
- Kempner, Harris L., Jr. (Hetta), trustee, H. Kempner; president, Kempner Capital Management, Inc., *Galveston*
- KESSLER, JAMES LEE (SHELLEY), rabbi, Temple B'nai Israel; founder and first president, Texas Jewish Historical Society, *Galveston*

- KING, CAROLYN DINEEN, chief judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, *Houston*
- KING, JOHN Q. TAYLOR, SR., chancellor and president emeritus, Huston-Tillotson College; major general, AUS (retired), lieutenant general, Texas State Guard, *Austin*
- KLEBERG, SALLY SEARCY, financial educator, family office manager, *New York* and *San Antonio*
- KLEIN, MELVYN N. (ANNETTE), managing partner of GKH Partners, L.P.; attorney; adjunct professor, Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi, *Corpus Christi*
- KOZMETSKY, GEORGE (RONYA),
- KRIER, CYNDI TAYLOR (JOSEPH), former member, Texas Senate; vice-president of Texas government relations, USAA; partner, Vallejo Ranch, *San Antonio*
- KRUEGER, ROBERT "BOB" CHARLES (KATHLEEN), former U.S. ambassador to Botswana; former U.S. senator, congressman, ambassador to Burundi, ambassador at-large to Mexico; former Texas Railroad commissioner; former vice-provost and dean of Arts and Sciences, Duke University; author; president, Krueger Associates, *New Braunfels*
- LABOON, ROBERT BRUCE (RAMONA), partner, Locke Liddell & Sapp LLP, *Houston*
- LARIVIERE, RICHARD W. (JANIS), dean, College of Liberal Arts, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*
- LAW, THOMAS HART (JO ANN), lawyer; former member, board of regents, University of Texas System, *Fort Worth*
- LEBERMANN, LOWELL H., JR., chairman, Centex Beverage, Inc., *Austin*
- LIEDTKE, JOHN HUGH, chairman emeritus, Pennzoil-Quaker State Company; trustee, Rice University, *Houston*
- LEMAISTRE, CHARLES A. (JOYCE), president emeritus, University of Texas System Cancer Center, M. D. Anderson Hospital and Tumor Institute, *San Antonio*
- LEVIN, WILLIAM C., physician; president emeritus and Ashbel Smith Professor, University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, *Galveston*
- LINDSEY, JOHN H. (SARA), businessman; art collector; civic leader; former member, board of directors, Museum of Fine Arts; director, Alley Theatre; member, board of regents, Texas A&M University System; former member of the board, U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Board of Directors, George Bush Presidential Library Foundation, *Houston*

- LIVINGSTON, WILLIAM S. (LANA), senior vice-president, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*
- LOCHRIDGE, LLOYD, lawyer; former president, State Bar of Texas; former member, board of governors, American Bar Association, *Austin*
- LOCKE, JOHN PATRICK (RAMONA), president, Locke Holdings, Inc., *Dallas*
- LORD, GROGAN (BETTY), senior chairman, First Texas Bancorp; member, Texas Securities Board; trustee, Southwestern University, *Georgetown*
- LOVE, BEN F. (MARGARET), retired chairman and CEO (1972-1989), Texas Commerce Bank, Houston, and Chase Banks of Texas, *Houston*
- LOW, GILBERT, lawyer, *Beaumont*
- LOWE, RICHARD (KATHY), Regent's Professor, University of North Texas; author and recipient of Jefferson Davis Award of the Museum of the Confederacy for *Walker's Texas Division, CSA: Greyhounds of the Trans-Mississippi*; author of several books, *Denton*
- LOWMAN, ALBERT T. (DARLYNE), past president, Texas Folklore Society, Book Club of Texas, Texas State Historical Association; managing partner, Lowman Ranch, Ltd., *San Marcos*
- MACKINTOSH, PRUDENCE M. (JOHN), author; member, Texas Institute of Letters, *Dallas*
- MACON, JANE (LARRY), attorney, city and trial attorney, City of San Antonio, *San Antonio*
- MADDEN, WALES H., JR. (ABBIE), attorney; former member, board of regents, University of Texas System, *Amarillo*
- MARGO, ADAIR WAKEFIELD (DEE), owner, Adair Margo Gallery; member, Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board; State Advisory Council, Texas Book Festival; chairman, President's Committee on the Arts and Humanities, *El Paso*
- MARK, HANS (MARION), professor of aerospace engineering, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*
- MARSH, GWENDOLYN "WENDY" O. (STANLEY), civic volunteer active in *arts and education*, *Amarillo*
- MARTIN, JAMES C., interim director, Texas State Historical Association; former executive director, San Jacinto Museum of History, *Houston*, *Austin*
- MARTIN, ROBERT S. (BARBARA), director, Institute for Museum and Library Services; former director, Texas State Library, *Corinth* and *Washington, D.C.*

- MARTINEZ, PHILIP, El Paso district judge, former director El Paso Legal Assistance Society, El Paso Holocaust Museum, El Paso Cancer Treatment Center, and Hispanic Leadership Institute, *El Paso*
- MARZIO, PETER CORT, director, the Museum of Fine Arts, Houston, *Houston*
- MATTHEWS, KATHLEEN SHIVE, dean, Wiess School of Natural Sciences, Rice University; elected to American Association for the Advancement of Science, *Houston*
- MATTHEWS, JUDY JONES, president, Dodge Jones Foundation, *Abilene*
- MCCOMBS, B. J, "RED" (CHARLINE), owner, Minnesota Vikings, *San Antonio*
- MCCORQUODALE, ROBIN HUNT, novelist, *Houston*
- MCDERMOTT, MARGARET, UT Austin Distinguished Alumna, patron of the arts, education, and medicine in various community involvements, member International Council of Museum of Modern Art in New York, the Dallas Shakespeare Club, an Honorary Alumnae of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *Dallas*
- McFADDEN, JOSEPH M., president emeritus, professor of history, University of St. Thomas, *Houston*
- MCGHEE, GEORGE CREWS, former U.S. ambassador to *West Germany* and *Turkey*, *Middleburg, Vermont*
- MCHUGH, M. COLLEEN, partner, Bracewell & Giuliani, LLP, *Corpus Christi*
- MCKNIGHT, JOSEPH WEBB (MIMI), professor, Southern Methodist School of Law; legal historian; law reformer, *Dallas*
- MCLAUGHLIN, JOHN MARK (AMY), rancher; lawyer; chairman, Texas State Bank, *San Angelo*
- MCNEILL, LARRY, board member, Texas State Historical Association; board member, Texas Supreme Court Historical Society; president, managing shareholder, Clark, Thomas & Winters, P.C., *Austin*
- MCREYNOLDS, JIM (JUDY), member, Texas House of Representatives; former faculty member, Stephen F. Austin State University; owner, Chapparral Energy, Inc., *Lufkin*
- MIDDLETON, HARRY J. (MIRIAM), director emeritus, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library and Museum; executive director, Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation, *Austin*
- MILLER, CHARLES (BETH), chairman, Meridian National, Inc., *Houston*
- MONDAY, JANE CLEMENTS (CHARLES), former regent, Texas State University System; public commissioner, Southern Association for College and Schools; author, *Huntsville*

- MOORE, J. SAM, JR., retired lawyer; former chairman, Texas Committee for the Humanities; former member, Texas Law Review Association, *El Paso*
- MOSELEY, JOHN DEAN (SARA BERNICE), president emeritus, Austin College; former director, Texas Legislative Council; consultant, *Sherman*
- MOSLE, PAULA MEREDITH, trustee and chairman, Hockaday School; former dean of women, Rice University; former governor, current trustee advisor, Rice University, *Dallas*
- MULLINS, CHARLES B. (STELLA), professor of internal medicine, J. Fred Schoellkopf Jr. Chair in Cardiology, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, *Dallas*
- MURPHY, EWELL E., JR., lawyer, retired partner, Baker Botts, LLP; distinguished lecturer, University of Houston Law Center, *Houston*
- NATALICIO, DIANA S., president, University of Texas at El Paso; member, Texas Women's Hall of Fame; author, *El Paso*
- OLSON, LYNDON L., JR. (KAY), former U.S. ambassador to Sweden, *Waco*
- OXFORD, PATRICK CUNNINGHAM (KATE) managing partner, Bracewell & Giuliani LLP; board of regents, University of Texas Systems; board member, M.D. Anderson Outreach, Inc. and Texas Medical Center, *Houston*
- PALAIMA, THOMAS G. (CAROLYN), professor of classics, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*
- PHILLIPS, THOMAS R. (LYN), chief justice, Supreme Court of Texas, *Austin*
- POPE, JACK (ALLENE), former chief justice, Supreme Court of Texas, *Austin*
- POWELL, BOONE (DIANNE), chairman, Ford, Powell & Carson, Architects; fellow, College of Fellows, American Institute of Architects; former president, Texas Society of Architects; peer professional, U.S. General Services Administration, *San Antonio*
- POWERS, WILLIAM, Dean University of Texas Law School, John Jeffers Research Chair in Law, Hines H. Baker and Thelma Kelly Baker Chair, University Distinguished Teaching Professor, *Austin*
- PRADO, EDWARD C. (MARIA), U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, former U.S. District Court Judge, Western District of Texas; former U.S. Attorney, Western District of Texas, *San Antonio*
- PRESSLER, H. PAUL, III (NANCY), justice (retired), Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth Supreme Judicial District, *Houston*
- RAMEY, TOM B., JR. (JILL), lawyer; chief justice, Twelfth Court of Appeals, *Tyler*
- RAMIREZ, MARIO E. (SARAH), physician; past member, board of regents,

- University of Texas System, vice-president for South Texas/Border Initiatives, University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio, *Rio Grande City*
- RANDALL, RISHER (FAIRFAX), former senior vice-president and director, American General Investment Corp.; manager, family trusts, investments, and real estate, *Houston*
- RANDALL, EDWARD, III (ELLEN), private investor; board of directors, EOG Resources, Inc., Kinder Morgan, Inc., and EcOutlook.com, Inc., *Houston*
- REASONER, HARRY MAX (MACEY), lawyer; senior partner, Vinson & Elkins, *Houston*
- REAUD, WAYNE A. attorney and philanthropist; member of University of Texas System Chancellor's Council, *Baumont*
- REAVLEY, THOMAS M. (FLORENCE), judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, *Austin*
- REYNOLDS, HERBERT H. (JOY), president emeritus, Baylor University, former Air Force/NASA psychologist and neuroscientist, *Waco*
- RHODES, CHARLOTTE W. (ALEC), patron, Shakespeare at Winedale; Chancellor's Council, University of Texas at Austin; Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center Advisory Council, University of Texas at Austin, *Dripping Springs*
- RITER, A. W. "DUB", JR. (BETTY JO), former president, NCNB Texas-Tyler, vice-chairman, board of regents, University of Texas System, *Tyler*
- ROBINSON, MARY LOU, U.S. district judge; former state appellate and trial judge, *Amarillo*
- RODRIGUEZ, RAUL (LORENA), managing director and CEO, North American Development Bank, *San Antonio*
- RODRIGUEZ, EDUARDO ROBERTO, attorney, Rodriguez, Colvin & Chaney, LLP, *Brownsville*
- ROMO, RICARDO (HARRIETT), president, University of Texas at San Antonio, *San Antonio*
- ROSTOW, ELSPETH (WALT), Stiles Professor Emerita, former dean, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin*
- ROVE, KARL C. (DARBY), senior advisor and assistant to the president of the United States, *Washington, D.C.*
- RUTFORD, ROBERT HOXIE (MARJORIE ANN), Excellence in Education Foundation Chair in Geoscience, University of Texas at Dallas; former president, University of Texas at Dallas; former director, Division of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation; president, Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, *Richardson*

- SCHRUM, JAKE B. (JANE), president, Southwestern University, *Georgetown*
- SCHWITTERS, ROY F. (KAREN), S. W. Richardson Regents Chair in Physics, University of Texas at Austin; former director, Super Conducting Super Collider, *Austin*
- SCOTT, JENNY LIND PORTER (LAWRENCE E.), poet and educator; former poet laureate of Texas, *Austin* and *Los Angeles, California*
- SELDIN, DONALD W., William Buchanan and University of Texas System Professor of Internal Medicine, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, *Dallas*
- SHERMAN, MAX RAY (GENE ALICE), professor and dean emeritus, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin; former president, West Texas State University, *Austin*
- SHILLING, ROY B., JR. (MARGARET), president emeritus, Southwestern University, *Austin*
- SHIPLEY, GEORGE, president and chief executive officer, Shipley & Associates, Inc., *Austin*
- SHIVERS, ALLAN "BUD," JR. (ROBIN), chairman, Shivers Group, Inc.; chairman, Seton Fund, *Austin*
- SMITH, CULLEN (MICKEY), attorney, former president of the State Bar of Texas; member, Advisory Council, College of the Arts and Sciences, Baylor University, *China Spring*
- SMITH, STEVEN ESCAR (NATALIE) director and C. Clifford Wendler Professor, Cushing Memorial Library and Archives, and associate dean for advancement, Texas A&M University Libraries, *College Station*
- SMITH, EVAN, Editor Texas Monthly, Secretary of the Boards of the American Society of Magazine Editors and the Austin Film Society, member of the Boards of the Jack S. Blanton Museum of Art, the Headliners Club, Marfa Public Radio, and Austin public television station, KLRU, *Austin*
- SMITH, BEA, Texas Court of Appeals in Austin, Adjunct Professor UT School of Law, *Austin*
- SMITH, FRANK C., JR. (KATHERINE), electrical engineer; specialist in data processing and geosciences, *Houston*
- SPIVEY, BROADUS A. (RUTH ANN), past president, State Bar of Texas; shareholder, Spivey & Ainsworth, P.C., *Austin*
- SPECTOR, ROSE (MORRIS) former Texas Supreme Court Justice, trial judge, and District Judge, San Antonio
- SPRAGUE, CHARLES CAMERON (ALAYNE), president emeritus, University of Texas Health Science Center at Dallas; chairman emeritus, Southwestern Medical Foundation; former dean and professor, Tulane Uni-

- versity School of Medicine; chairman, Association of Academic Health Center; president, American Society of Hematology; Chairman, Association of American Medical Colleges, *Dallas*
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 LESLIE WAGGENER (1951)
 AGESILAUS WILSON WALKER JR.
 (1988)
 EVERETT DONALD WALKER (1991)
 RUEL C. WALKER (2000)
 THOMAS OTTO WALTON
 FRANK H. WARDLAW (1989)
 ALONZO WASSON (1952)
 WILLIAM WARD WATKIN (1952)
 ROYALL RICHARD WATKINS (1954)
 WALTER PRESCOTT WEBB (1963)
 HARRY BOYER WEISER (1950)
 PETER BOYD WELLS JR. (1991)
 ELIZABETH HOWARD WEST (1948)
 CLARENCE RAY WHARTON (1941)
 JOHN A. WHARTON
 WILLIAM H. WHARTON
 WILLIAM MORTON WHEELER
 (1937)
 GAIL WHITCOMB (1994)
 JAMES LEE WHITCOMB
 WILLIAM RICHARDSON WHITE
 (1977)
 C. G. WHITTEN (2001)
 WILLIAM MARVIN WHYBURN
 (1972)
- HARRY CAROTHERS WIESS (1948)
 DOSSIE MARION WIGGINS (1978)
 PLATT K. WIGGINS
 DAN C. WILLIAMS (2001)
 JACK KENNY WILLIAMS (1982)
 ROGER JOHN WILLIAMS (1987)
 LOGAN WILSON (1992)
 JAMES BUCHANAN WINN JR. (1980)
 JAMES RALPH WOOD (1973)
 DUDLEY KEZER WOODWARD JR.
 (1967)
 WILLIS RAYMOND WOOLRICH
 (1977)
 BENJAMIN HARRISON WOOTEN
 (1971)
 SAM PAUL WORDEN (1988)
 GUS SESSIONS WORTHAM (1976)
 LYNDALE FINLEY WORTHAM
 FRANK MCREYNOLDS WOZEN-
 CRAFT (1993)
 FRANK WILSON WOZENCRAFT
 (1967)
 WILLIAM EMBRY WRATHER (1963)
 ANDREW JACKSON WRAY (1981)
 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT (2000)
 RALPH WEBSTER YARBOROUGH
 (1999)
 RAMSEY YELVINGTON (1972)
 HUGH HAMPTON YOUNG (1945)
 SAMUEL DOAK YOUNG
 STARK YOUNG
 HENRY B. ZACHRY (1984)
 PAULINE BUTTE ZACHRY (1998)