Martin Harris Oral History Interview

BRUCE PETTY: Today is Monday, 19th of January, 1998. I'm interviewing Professor Harry Martin in Aptos, California. The interviewer is Bruce Petty. Okay, first I'm going to start, where did you learn Japanese, and why? Or were you given a choice?

MARTIN HARRIS: When I was very young, as a child, I learned children's Japanese, but not really well. I came back to the United States to go to college in 1940.

BP: Now you left out quite a bit there. You were born in Japan?

MH: I was born in -- oh, yeah. I was born in Japan, actually at the time of the great earthquake.

BP: Nineteen twenty-three?

MH: Nineteen twenty-three, yeah. We lived in Tokyo for a while.

BP: Who is "we?"

MH: My family.

BP: And your family did what?

MH: My father was a professor of English at Aoyama Gakuin, Aoyama University. And he was dropped from the mission role at the time of the Great Depression, because he was

not an evangelical missionary. So he stayed in Japan, which was the smartest thing he ever did. He had a family, four children, I was the youngest. It was the depth of the Depression. So he stayed and taught English in Japanese schools. But I did not go to a Japanese school. I went to -- after he was dropped from the mission, we moved to Kobe. I went to a Canadian school, a Canadian Academy. I grew up learning a little bit of Japanese, but not enough to carry on a conversation beyond buying things, or going to the movies. Very simple stuff. But then when I came back to the United States and was in college at the time the war broke out, the Army and the Navy began to pick up people who were born in Japan, young men and women too, to see if they could be useful in the war effort. The Navy got to me first, so I joined the Navy. I didn't know enough Japanese to help them, but they knew I had a background in it. They sent me to the Navy language school.

BP: Like where?

MH: When I joined it, it was at Boulder, Colorado. It started out initially in two parts; one branch at Berkeley, UC Berkeley, and another branch at Harvard. Then they were united at Boulder, University of Colorado. Then after I was already out in the Pacific, they moved it to

Stillwater, Oklahoma, the University of Oklahoma. Some of the later students in the language school studied at Oklahoma.

BP: Now what college did you go to?

MH: I started at Sacramento Junior College because we had relatives in Sacramento. Then my folks came back, they were evacuated from Japan on the advice of the United States government, not the Japanese government, before the war. So they came back to the United States. My father, by that time, was reinstated in the mission, and was assigned to work at a Japanese church in Tacoma, Washington. In Tacoma, I went to the College of Puget Sound, now the University of Puget Sound, and was there for a little over a year when the war broke out.

BP: Okay. At Boulder, Colorado, there were several hundred in the Navy language program. These were people who either had some background in Japanese, or living in Japan, as myself. We were called the "BIJs," "Born in Japan" people. Or, there were other people who had shown an aptitude for languages, or at least for something. They were brilliant people. We had a brilliant concentration of people that I could think of. BIJs were not necessarily brilliant, but the others were. Many of them became leading scholars of

Japanese studies after the war. So that’s how I learned Japanese.

BP: Were there Nisei?

MH: No, because the Navy didn’t Nisei. The Army, however, did take Nisei. Most of them, at first, did not become officers. But some were commissioned through the ranks. So by the end of the war, there were a reasonable handful of Nisei officers.

BP: Is there some special reason why the Navy didn’t take the Nisei?

MH: I don’t really know, except distrust, snobbery, whatever. Subsequently, of course, Nisei have gone -- or the Sansei, have gone to Annapolis and become regular officers, yeah.

BP: Okay. So basically, you learned most of your Japanese after you came back from Japan.

MH: That’s right. Most of it. But I had an ear for it, which helped me a lot. I mentioned to you the other day on the phone that of the four language men in our military government unit, I was the most facile of the four, simply because I had this background that they didn’t have. They managed to get along, but they couldn’t converse as easily as I could.

BP: Who were the other three?

MH: Well, one was my roommate at Boulder, Phil Monahan, who came out of the Department of Justice. He was a lawyer. He's dead now. Another was Russell Stevens. He became a lawyer -- he was a little older. Well, so was Phil. I was the youngest. Russell Stevens became a lawyer after the war, and then a judge. And the third one, the third besides myself, was [Lance LaBianca?], who later -- I think he came out of Harvard. I don't remember much about his background. He later became an insurance executive with the American Foreign Insurance Company, was in Japan for some time, then went to Europe, which he liked. He was European-oriented. And we were a fairly close-knit group from the language school in the Navy. A lot of us knew others in different units. We had interesting experiences at the end of the war, but that's not part of your story.

BP: Okay. So the Navy recruited you, and you didn't go with them then?

MH: That's right. And after I was in the Navy, the Army tried to recruit me, but then they discovered I was already in the Navy.

BP: Okay. When did they first send you overseas?

MH: I went overseas April of '44. I was at the language school for 14 months. I was at the language school from December

of ’42, December 1st, ’42, until the early part of March of ’44.

BP: So you’re there almost just before the invasion of Saipan.

MH: Oh, yeah. I was sent out to Pearl Harbor, was sent to the Joint Intelligence Center of Pacific Ocean Area, JICPOA, which was under CINCPAC, and was there translating stuff, documents, with a whole bunch of others who were doing the same thing. And then as the Saipan operation, Mariana’s operation, developed, four of us were picked out and put with the military government. Of course others were sent to Marine divisions. Of course, there were Marines also, people who got their commissions in the Marines from Boulder. I didn’t, but some did. They were sent to Marine divisions as part of the division organization. But also, Navy people were attached to Marine divisions to augment the Marines, in the language and intelligence operation.

BP: I’m going to go back to Pearl for just a minute, because you said they used you for translating documents.

MH: Yeah.

BP: Do you remember anything in particular that you translated at --

MH: At that time, nothing.

BP: Nothing significant?

MH: No. No. Nothing I did was significant there. When I came back from Saipan, I was on Saipan for 11 months. I didn't leave Saipan until May of '45. When I came back, then they put me in the Interrogation Department at Pearl, because I was quite fluent at that point. I went out to -- I was near (inaudible), Indian Point I think it was called, where we had a stockade for Japanese prisoners. And I was interrogating prisoners. While I was given no important prisoners, they were really expert interrogators who handled them. I did have a couple of -- well, one very interesting prisoner who got quite talkative and told me about a huge aircraft carrier -- he thought it was an aircraft carrier -- he saw building at Kobe. He guessed it was upwards of 80 -- sorry, of 60,000 tons. I wrote that in my report. And my boss, Colton, Lieutenant Commander Colton, who was a Japan hand also, called me in and he said, "Look, Martin," he said, "You know that this doesn't make any sense. There aren't any ships that big. You've got to edit your own stuff before you write your report." Well of course, he didn't know about the Yamato and the Musashi.

BP: That's what I was thinking of.

MH: Yeah. That's what it was. It was one of the huge battleships. But I wasn't able to process that information, and neither was my boss.

BP: Yeah. Yeah. Now let's get back -- I want to try to keep it (inaudible).

MH: Yeah. Go ahead.

BP: So when did you first learn you were going to Saipan? What was the sequence of events?

MH: I would say it was toward the middle of May, probably. And we were assigned to a unit, to the military government unit. At that time it was called Naval Civil Affairs Unit. And there was some place near Hickam Field. I can't remember exactly where it was, but we left the BOQ at Pearl, where we had been, and went there and had indoctrination in Civil Affairs. Not a heck of a lot, I might add. Although the people that we worked with, the officers, had been at the center, I think possibly it was at Princeton, I'm not certain about that. Where they had been studying problems of Civil Affairs in the Pacific. And incidentally, their anticipation initially was that it would be more like in Europe, where you would take over the town, like we'd probably have a headquarters in Garapan. And we'd operate like that. Of course, it didn't turn out

that way at all, because of the way the battle went. We simply wiped out Garapan and Tanapag, and the rest. And [Chalan?] Kanoa, although there was a little bit of Chalan Kanoa -- I say "Chalan" because the Japanese called it "Chalan." And we took the Japanese spelling and pronounced it "Chalan." So we studied a little bit about principles of Civil Affairs, and I was given the task of teaching some of the enlisted men in the unit words of Japanese in preparation for this. But well, let's see, the landing was on June 15th. You know, I can't remember the date that we left Pearl.

BP: You left after the invasion?

MH: Oh, no no no no. We left -- we must have left Pearl about the beginning of June.

BP: What's the name of the ship?

MH: The ship we were on was the APA -- US Sheridan.

BP: APA?

MH: Yeah, it was an APA. The Sheridan. We were in Eniwetok on the 6th of June when the invasion of Normandy occurred. I was in the sick bay with food poisoning at the time, but I can remember some of us talking in the sick bay, saying oh boy, there goes the news of the landing on Saipan, because

of what was happening in Europe. But we landed on the 15th in Saipan, of ’44.

BP: Now, you went there after the first wave? Or were you --

MH: No, well, after the first wave, yes. D plus 5 is when we landed. Fifth day. But we were there for the first -- for the landing. And we landed assault troops, some from our ship. And then we served daily as -- they brought wounded out to many of the ships. And we had, of course, doctors with our unit. And a couple of them were good surgeons. One was from the U.S. Health -- Public Health Service, old guy. I remember him. He spent long days in the sick bay.

BP: Remember his name?

MH: Not at the moment. Operating on wounded. Now every night at dusk, we would pull up anchor and sail out to sea, because the Mariana’s Turkey Shoot was going on, the battle, air-sea battle. Actually it was --

BP: Air battle.

MH: Air battle, yeah. And we were afraid of the ships being caught mast off of Saipan, not realizing at first how disoriented the Japanese were. We didn’t know where they were at first, and they didn’t know where we were, except that they knew that we were in the Marianas. But they didn’t know where our ships were. So as it turned out,

that probably wasn't a necessary precaution, but it was a prudent precaution. The only plane we fired at, it turned out, was an American plane one day, as we were off the boat. But we watched the battle, the process of the battle.

BP: Now are you talking about the Mariana's Turkey Shoot? Or the pre-invasion?

MH: No no, the invasion.

BP: Okay. What do you remember about that, the pre-invasion bombardment and the aerial bombardment?

MH: Well, not much of the pre-invasion bombardment, because we got there in time to unload the troops. And we watched the whole process, and the troops going to shore. Then we watched the problems -- occasion by Japanese artillery on the troops. We saw the tank battle on the slopes of Mount Tapochau. The Japanese had small tanks, and they came down the slope. That area, later, it was near Susupe. That area later became the farm that --

BP: It's called (inaudible).

MH: Is that it?

BP: Yeah, there's a little valley in there. I think the tank -- there's still a Japanese tank back in there.

MH: Yeah. Well, we saw that whole battle, and we saw the American planes, of course, that were called in for one purpose or another. We saw all of their activity. And in the early morning, when we arrived offshore, and the early evening, actually as dusk fell, we saw a lot more of the battle because of the tracers. We could see the tracers clearly. But we didn't go ashore until D plus five.

BP: Some of those wounded that were brought back, were any of them Chamorros or Japanese?

MH: No.

BP: They were all American?

MH: Yeah. There was one that some people thought were Japanese. That was a mistake. They found them eventually. He didn't even look Japanese. I saw him. I don't know why they thought he was Japanese.

BP: Not Chamorro?

MH: No. He was American.

BP: Oh, okay. I've got to stop. (inaudible)

(break in audio)

MH: All right.

BP: I'll ask you about Amelia Earhart later on.

MH: Okay.

BP: Okay, so you watched the landings, and did you see the plane shot down during that time?

MH: I don't recall. I don't recall.

BP: Okay. Actually, you were in Hawaii when you learned you would be going to Saipan?

MH: That's correct.

BP: You were attached to a civil service team?

MH: No, it was a Navy Civil Affairs Unit.

BP: Okay. You weren't attached to the Marine Corps?

MH: Well, the whole -- yeah. Everybody who went to Saipan, including the 27th Army Division, was attached to the Marine Corps, the 5th Amphibious Corps.

BP: Had you ever heard of Saipan or the Marianas before you --

MH: Yeah, I'd heard of them. You know, we'd heard in the late '30s even -- well, I probably didn't hear about it much in the late '30s. But in the -- before I got into the Navy, maybe when I was a freshman or sophomore in college, I knew about -- this book, (inaudible) who wrote it, *Japan's Islands of Mystery*?

BP: Oh, I have a copy of it. Yeah. Pierce? Price?

MH: Price.

BP: Willard Price.

MH: Willard Price. So I knew that the Japanese were charged with fortifying the islands. Actually, I think the only one they fortified was Truk, probably, before the war. Saipan, you know, they hadn't. The biggest guns they had, the Naval guns, weren't even mounted yet when we landed.

BP: Where did you find them?

MH: They were -- I don't know, maybe they were Tanapag or --

BP: That's what I read, yeah.

MH: Yeah, I think so. I didn't find them. But the only real fortifications they had were pill boxes and air raid shelters, especially up around Aslito. There were a lot of pretty substantial air raid shelters. And the pill boxes were substantial. But the plain fact of the matter is, their defenses, even though they gave us a hell of a time, were not very good. And their best -- they didn't have really first class troops there. They did have a unit from the Kwantung Army, "Kantō rikugun" in Japanese. And that sounded very impressive, but it was a unit that had been slapped together and brought to Saipan. Certainly there was no shortage of brave soldiers. But it was not the fortress that Iwo was, for example.

BP: Yeah. What do you remember about your first day ashore? You went ashore on a landing craft?

MH: Yeah, we went ashore on a landing craft, but they had already put floating piers out, so we got off onto a pier. And we went into Chalan Kanoa, and there was a little school that still had a roof and windows in it. And we were given quarters in this schoolhouse. I remember a couple of prisoners coming in -- maybe not the first day, maybe the second day. I don't remember. We were there for a few days before we went out to Susupe and pitched tents. In fact, we were there for possibly a couple of days. No, I'd say for about a week. Yeah, we had big howitzers right beside us, it scared the hell out of me every time they fired, because it would lift me right up. It was --

BP: These are Marine howitzers?

MH: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, we'd hear the bombardment back and forth. No shells landed near us of the Japanese, but they didn't have as bit artillery as we did that was serviceable. They probably had the equivalent of our .75s, and things like that.

BP: They had one --

MH: They had some bigger ones? One-oh-five?

BP: They had 150 millimeters up above -- up in the hills that were firing down.

MH: That were firing?

BP: Down on the beaches, yeah.

MH: Well, see, yeah. Maybe we'd taken those out by the time we had landed.

BP: They created quite a few casualties (inaudible).

MH: Yeah. Yeah.

BP: There's one still up there that they preserved.

MH: Is that right? I never saw that.

BP: On that standpoint, they had one that -- but most of them, like I say, never made the (inaudible).

MH: Yeah. Yeah. Well, in any case, we didn't have any big shells landing right near us. We did have some prisoners come in, and I don't know why they were brought in there. You know, we were right by Corps Headquarters. Corps Headquarters was in some other buildings nearby us.

BP: (inaudible)?

MH: Yeah. Yeah. And there was one Japanese prisoner, Major, I think the name was [Seito?]. I had nothing to do with him, but I did see him. I was at Corps Headquarters for some reason, talking to one of the Marine language men who I knew, I can't remember who it was now. And Seito was there for a few days, and then one day they took him away. I said, "How come he's gone?" And they found a poem that he wrote. And it expressed the sadness of being a prisoner,

or something like that. But anyway, he had been rather cooperative at first, and they got a lot of information from him that I think was good. I don't know, they didn't tell me, but they said he'd been helpful. And so I said, "Well, why did you take him away?" They said, "Well, we weren't sure how much we could trust him." That was because of this poem that he had written, giving vent to his feelings. And I don't -- I wish I had the poem, but I don't.

BP: When you said they took him away, did they kill him?

MH: No, no. Just didn't use him in the Headquarters.

BP: Okay. When did you first start interrogating?

MH: I didn't really interrogate at all until -- I was an interpreter for Civil Affairs.

BP: Okay, interpreter. When did you start --

MH: I interrogated prisoners after I returned from Saipan to Pearl Harbor.

BP: Okay. Okay, so let's put it this way, the first week or two you were on Saipan, what were your duties? What were you occupied with? Or did you have anything to do?

MH: Didn't really have anything to do for the first few days. Then when we got out to Susupe and our tents were pitched and our engineers started to figure out how they were going

to lay out the camp -- we had several civil engineers who were Navy officers. Really laid the plans, design, Susupe. You know, they were pretty flimsy buildings. The most important stuff was drainage and privies, and stuff like that. It was divided up into various cooking groups. But the buildings, the barracks, had corrugated roofs. They were open on the sides. And they were off the ground, about this high, so they wouldn't get wet.

BP: A foot and a half, two feet?

MH: Yeah, about that, I guess. Two feet maybe. At the most, two and a half feet. And they had several cooking centers, the Japanese called them [Japanese language], [Japanese language] means "cooking" and ba is "place." They were organized around these cooking centers, so people belonged to either this [Japanese language] or this [Japanese language] or that [Japanese language]. The most interesting thing that happened to me, probably, in the first -- a couple of interesting things, comments I had to make, first of all, I dealt primarily with Japanese. Yeah. I was not dealing with the Chamorros, although I saw them all the time, and talked to them. But I wasn't concerned with them.

BP: But what were you doing with them until the Camp was settled? The camp (inaudible).

MH: They were brought to Susupe even before we moved there, under guard. Everybody was brought under guard, whether they were Chamorros or Koreans or Japanese. And it took a while for us to get the idea of separating them. And the Chamorro camp in Susupe, which was near our Headquarters, our Headquarters was a little shack that had been a Japanese farmhouse. And there was a well there. And we set up a shower from the well by rigging the thing for it to go up to. First of all, we slept under tarps on cots, but finally the tents were put up for us, as the construction went ahead for the so-called "buildings" for the civilians. Then finally, after we'd lived in the tents through the rainy season, we put up Quonset huts on the beach. And that became our quarters, both for officers and enlisted men. By that time, we were under an Army colonel, Colonel [Huston?]. Huston-Houston, I don't know. He was a reserve officer. So he had this Navy unit under him, because the Army command -- by the time the Corps was gone, and it was the Army command under General [Jarmon?]. And Colonel Huston existed, I suppose, to occupy a place in the Army command hierarchy, and he had the Navy unit under him.

But before that, before we even had tents up, I remember two episodes very clearly. One episode the least important, but it's just a matter of impression, was what happened when the Nisei, the Army Nisei under Ben Hazard, first came to Susupe. Now they must have -- some of the civilians must already have seen them out in the field before they were brought in, without question. But others had not. And when they -- I could see these Japanese just staring, almost with open mouths, at the Japanese in American uniforms, bigger than most of the Japanese -- most of the Nisei were bigger and huskier than the Japanese. And I could just see the Japanese in astonishment, seeing this sight. That was just an impression.

BP: Did they make any comments to you?

MH: Not that I can remember. They did -- yeah, I'm sure later I discussed the Nisei with them, but I can't remember anything about it. But that was later, not at the time of that first impression. I did mention -- we discussed it later, because the Nisei, Army Nisei, came into the camp, and they were the ones who were trying to ferret out who were Japanese military, trying to pass themselves off as civilians. And Ben can tell you a lot more about that than I can. I was aware of it, but I wasn't part of it. And

even though I was in the so-called Intelligence section of Civil Affairs, we were not charged with that particular responsibility, because the Army people were present to do that, under island command.

Incidentally, Ben Hazard, who was from the 27th Division, stayed later than other elements in the 27th Division, because he was attached to the island command also with his Nisei, to carry on this process of ferreting out Japanese, military Japanese. The other thing that was interesting to me was, we had been told to keep our eyes and ears out for anybody who had an official position with the Japanese. And when the Japanese were brought in by Marines or Army people, daily trucks would come in with them. I would be there by the trucks, and trying to case them. I saw unbelievable things. I saw one woman who was trying to nurse her dead baby. They'd been in a cave. And of course, you know how through -- well, first we tried to get people out. But then we closed up the caves, and we'd throw phosphorous bombs in, grenades. And this poor woman was almost green in color. She still had her dead baby, and was trying to suckle it, which was one image that I've never been able to get rid of. I ran into hysterical

people. They'd been through hell. And it was -- and mostly, I was seeing the Japanese ones, because by the time -- well, at first, they were mixed. They were mixed. But mostly the Chamorros were separated by the time they came into the camp. Anyway, I found out from one man -- the men, the younger men, I was concerned with, even though the military aspect wasn't important to me, personally. So I said, "What did you do?" And he said, "I was a policeman." So I was told to take him -- where was it? I can't remember which direction it was. There was a field hospital in the fields, right across from the entrance to Camp Susupe. And we had our (inaudible) there. I can't remember whether I ran into him first at the field hospital, or whether I ran into him at the camp. But in any case, whichever way -- I took him one way between the hospital and the camp.

And I talked to him, found out that he had been a policeman up near Aslito. And I took him to talk to our administrative people. Incidentally, I was hauled into administration in the unit. Since we had Army orientation, we called the administrative officer in charge, the OD, Officer of the Day, an adjutant. And I was appointed as

adjutant for a while, so I had to keep the records and the daily count, things like that. So I took this guy, his name was Hirasawa.

BP: Hirasawa?

MH: Hirasawa, Akira. And I saw his name in *Time* magazine after the war, some years after the war, he got into *Time* magazine for some reason, I can't remember now, and a picture of him. But it had nothing to do with Saipan, as far as I know. Something that happened in Japan. But Hirasawa and I became very good friends. And he told me later, after we had appointed him as the police chief -- I didn't appoint him as police chief, the unit did, officers who were lieutenant commanders, they were the people who made these decisions, and they were Civil Affairs people. And they decided he should be the police chief.

BP: Of Camp Susupe, you mean?

MH: Of Camp Susupe. And they also chose another man, an older man, whose name was Kotari.

BP: Kotari?

MH: K-O-T-A-R-I. I don't remember his first name. But my guess is he must have been with the company. Almost everybody was with the company, the South Seas Development Company. And he worked as Hirasawa's clerk. And we made

one little office for the Japanese police; two people, Hirasawa and Kotari. And I spent a lot of time talking to them. And that's the way I kept aware of what was going on in the camp. That was mostly after I was no longer adjutant; I was adjutant only for a short period, a few weeks.

BP: Now what sort of things did you learn from these two?

MH: Well from Hirasawa, I learned that he was convinced when I took him one way or the other -- I forget which way I was taking him between the two places -- he was convinced I was taking him to be shot. He were that because he had been a policeman, and I had been so interested in the fact that he had been a policeman. And of course, I had no notion of -- it didn't occur to me that he would even think such a thing. But he told me later, he said, "I was sure I was being taken to be shot." What kind of things did we talk about? Well, whenever there was any question about something that happened in the camp that we didn't know completely about, then I went directly to him. And I suspect there were things he didn't tell me.

BP: Mm-hmm. Like Japanese [stragglers sneaking in?]?

MH: You know, they didn't deny that they were there. But he never picked one out for me. They cooperated, to some

extent, with the Nisei, the Nisei investigators. I can remember after an attack, an air attack one night, Hirasawa with a big grin on his face, and saying, "Boy, breakfast tasted good this morning." But of course, we'd shot down all the Japanese planes. He wasn't happy -- he was just happy that the Japanese had attacked. You know, the Japanese were constantly looking for months after the landing, they were looking for the imperial forces to return, they anticipated a counterattack, which, of course, never happened. But I took Kotari and Hirasawa out to the field -- I'm going the wrong way, I should aim this way -- up to Isley Field, once we started the bombings.

BP: B-29 bombings?

MH: Yeah. And of course, they were aware of the planes coming in and out anyway. But I had wanted to show them the field, because I -- there was a little bit of feeling on my part that they should understand that this was final. That there was not going to be any comeback by the Japanese. And they were really astonished by what they saw. This was early on, before the regular daily bombings that started. Once those started, of course, you couldn't hide. But it took a long time to build Isley Field, a few months because they had to get coral from the lower parts of Tapochau.

They had to build a road first, and then they had to carry the coral to build the landing strips. This all took time, and Japanese, by that time, were going out and working for different units as labor. So they got some income from that.

BP: Okay, so you're taking Japanese civilians out there to do labor?

MH: Yeah. To do labor. And this gave them some income. So there were -- it was like a little PX where they could buy stuff. And then the craftsmen made stuff, which was then sold to military units on the island. Plus we raised farm crops, truck farming. And these things were sold, or delivered to -- I don't know how they accounted for it. I have no idea how the accounting was done. But there was a lot of activity. Incidentally, [Oba?] apparently -- and Hirasawa may have known this -- Captain Oba did get people to come in. He did infiltrate. But we didn't know it at the time.

BP: Yeah. But there was a shootout at least at --

MH: Oh yeah. I went up the morning after the shootout on the farm. We'd been watching a movie on the beach and saw the tracers and heard the racket, and everything. So first thing in the morning, I took a jeep and went up to the

center of the farm, and I saw a big pile of shells from, I guess, a .50 caliber machine gun that they'd had set up there. And so I figured they must have fired across the field that way. And I went around to look to see if there was anything there, and I found one body, for the Japanese. He was a Navy -- he had a Navy uniform on.

BP: Was this near a communications trench? Or just out in the field?

MH: It was out in the field. It was in what might have been a shell hole from the battle. But this was sometime later. This was, I'm thinking, October. It was kind of a sad sight. He was a very handsome young man. The caricature of Japanese during the war was always ugly people. I saw a lot of dead Japanese after the battle, but many of them had been dead for some days, and they were bloated. This guy was just -- he was freshly dead. His leg was broken; it must have been a .50 caliber bullet that broke his leg. And so I went and simply reported that there was a dead Japanese out there. I don't know who came and got him, or anything. But he -- there's something else. I don't think it was associated with that, but I found a poem. Vaguely it's associated with that incident; whether -- I didn't

frisk him or anything, I didn't touch him. But a poem was found. I think it was a poem that was found at the farm.

BP: I know the story coming up, okay, go ahead.

MH: And it was very touching. And the thing that impressed me so much about it was the allusion to nature and to insects. It was not the kind of poem you would expect most soldiers to write; a very sensitive poem full of longing, and a feeling of connection with nature. Now there may have been another poem that I didn't see, but I did see that poem. And it touched me at the time. You know, I didn't keep copies of these things. I wish I had. We also didn't keep -- most of us did not keep diaries, because we had been indoctrinated not to keep diaries. Well, for people in my position, it wouldn't have made a damned bit of difference. And I wish I had. I really wish I had. But I didn't. Hirasawa -- to go back to the police -- remained, of course, a very loyal, ardent Japanese throughout. But he also became very friendly and trustworthy in all matters, except possibly where it touched on the interest of the Japanese military.

BP: (inaudible)?

MH: Yeah. Yeah. And I don't think he was likely to volunteer information about that. But as far as management of the

civilian people in the camp was concerned, I think he was completely open and honest with me.

BP: This person you're talking about is also mentioned in an interview I did --

(break in audio)

MH: There was a young Okinawan boy who was -- I don't know how he was before the battle, but obviously he was unsettled mentally by the battle. And he was a troublemaker in the camp. He kept giving a problem to -- I can't remember any physical attack, but he -- I'm guessing he was 15 or 16 years old. And there was something that I can't remember, but there was something he did that led the camp administration -- I didn't decide it, but the camp administration decided that he should be put in the military stockade. There was still one in Chalan Kanoa at that time.

BP: Oh, for POWs.

MH: For POWs. For POWs.

BP: I thought that was up in (inaudible). Was that later?

MH: This was a small one. And he was put there. And during an air raid -- these -- when I mention air raids, they were really small air raids. Just a few planes. At most a handful. And during an air raid, he lit some matches. He

somehow had gotten hold of matches, and he started lighting matches. And the guard shot him. He was also trying to climb up over the barbed wire enclosure. So the guard shot him. And I told Hirasawa, I said -- I forgot the kid's name -- I said, "He was shot last night because he was trying to light a light, and trying to escape. Hirasawa said, "I thought that way." Hirasawa was an experienced cop, and he knew a lot more about people than I did. I was just a young -- by that time I was a JG. I can remember when Stevens and I, and the others too, when we were promoted from Ensign to JG. And I was the youngest. I was still in the -- by that time, I was 21. I was 20 still when we landed. I was 21 when we were promoted. And while I was growing up real fast, as other young men did in the war, I didn't have the sophistication about human behavior that Hirasawa had. And he was a very good man, really. I have nothing but praise for him. He was a good cop. Good cop.

BP: Okay. Now there were several tons of documents captured out there.

MH: Yeah, we didn't deal with those.

BP: Did you come across any, particularly intelligence in your duty?

MH: No. No, I didn't. I mean, we found stuff, but the men with the military units were assigned the task of picking over stuff. I did pick over some stuff, but I didn't see anything -- I saw some accounts. Now, accounts can be important. But I never got to them before the military incident.

BP: Now whatever happened to all those tons of documents?

MH: We got them all back to JICPOA.

BP: Hmm? Oh --

MH: Joint Intelligence Center.

BP: Oh yeah, in Hawaii.

MH: In Hawaii.

BP: And are they still someplace?

MH: I have no idea.

BP: How about -- did you ever hear any rumors about Amelia Earhart then, when you were in?

MH: Yes. I did.

(break in audio)

BP: About Amelia Earhart. Okay. Now, this is certainly not the focus of my book.

MH: Yeah, yeah.

BP: But people are always volunteering what they think, and what they think they know.

MH: Okay. The first mention of this was by somebody in 5th Corps. The first I heard of it was when somebody in 5th Corps mentioned it, and came to the camp to interrogate some Chamorros. The information all came from Chamorros, not from the Japanese, as I recall. And it was the Chamorros who said there was an American woman flyer who was brought by the Japanese to Saipan, and who was executed.

BP: Did they say how she was executed?

MH: I think shot, by shooting. Firing squad. But not everybody said this. Only some people said it. And so where the -- who first heard about this, and from whom, I don't. I mean, what American first heard it from a Chamorro, I do not know. But the person who was investigating this obviously had orders from higher up. So somebody higher up was interested in this. I don't know whether this was an initiative from Washington, D.C., or whether it was an initiative from 5th Corps.

BP: So there was actually an organized investigation?

MH: There was.

BP: And who was in charge of this?

MH: I don't know.

BP: But somebody in the Marine Corps, though?

MH: Yeah. It was someone in the Marine Corps. And it was one of the language people, as I recall -- but I don't remember who it was -- who came to interrogate. And I sat in on one interrogation. So from that point on, it was interesting. So we listened to anything that we heard about this. But I went up to Tapochau to a place called [Tarajojo?]. The Japanese called it Tarajojo.

BP: Is that right --

MH: Talofofo?

BP: Oh, Talofofo. That's on the other side of the island.

MH: On the other side of Tapochau, on the slope going down toward --

BP: There's a little street that's there.

MH: Yeah. Okay, Talofofo. I have to translate back from the Japanese sounds to the other sounds. One of the Chamorros said that the -- that she was buried at Talofofo. And I went up in a jeep with her, and I think a 5th Corps person. Might have been Robert [Sheits?], Bob Sheiks, who was with the 2nd Division.

BP: Sheiks or Sheits? With a "T?"

MH: Sheits, with a "T." Bob Sheits. There were two brothers. And Bob was with the 2nd Division. And his job, most of the time, was -- or, I think it was sort of a self-

appointed job that he had after the battle phase itself was pretty much concluded. He spent a lot of time and effort trying to get Japanese and other civilians -- civilians of all kinds -- but military people too out of caves, trying to save people. I made a tour of the island one day with him that was very interesting, but probably not important for your account here. But it might have been with him. He was the -- even though he was with the 2nd Division, he might well have been the person assigned the task of finding out about -- that's just a possibility.

BP: What is the first name again?

MH: Robert. Bob Sheits.

BP: Are you sure it was Sheits?

MH: Sheiks, Sheits --

BP: I can go look it up.

MH: It's either a T or a --

BP: Who is the Chamorro that was looking at it?

MH: I don't know. But you know, the Chamorro people should know.

BP: Yeah. I'll look it up in (inaudible).

MH: Well, we went up to Talofofo and looked and looked, and we couldn't find it. The person who took us there couldn't find anything. So I began to doubt that it ever happened.

But where the stories originated, I cannot imagine, especially now that we have pretty good consensus that she was lost at sea.

BP: Yeah. See, I talked to another woman who said she was killed at the jail and buried by the jail.

MH: By the jail.

BP: I won't dwell on that.

MH: Yeah.

BP: Were you still in Susupe during the (inaudible)?

MH: Yeah. I was, oh, yeah. We had, in fact, the (inaudible) was the 20-what?

BP: Seventh of July.

MH: Seventh of July. Yeah. I was thinking the 23rd day, the 23rd day of our landing.

BP: But you were pretty far away from it.

MH: Yeah. God, I got the two sides; the Army side and the Marine side. My first information about it was from a Marine, a guy named [Darrel Hofskey?]. I can't remember whether he was with the 2nd or the 4th Division. But he was furious at the 27th Division, because he felt that they were responsible for it. Then when I met Ben Hazard, Ben said that I was rather antagonistic towards the Army, because I had the feeling that the Army had caused this.

And he said, “Hell, no.” He said, “I was there.” He said if it had gone for a few more yards, he would have been overrun himself, personally. He was right at the point of stopping of the (inaudible). And furthermore, he said the Army did not break, which the Marines claimed had happened. A book has been written on this.

BP: [Galey?].

MH: Galey’s book, yeah.

BP: I have it.

MH: Yeah.

BP: Another thing, was that a battle you remember about?

MH: About the (inaudible)? No, I don’t remember it. This book on Saipan tells a lot about it, this Japanese book on Saipan.

BP: Okay. Of course, I can’t read Japanese, but I do want to get the name of the author and the name of the book, and take it back to Historic Preservation.

MH: Okay.

BP: Okay. Did you ever come across any information about -- do you remember Unit 731?

MH: I know about it, yeah.

BP: Okay. Were you aware that --

MH: At the time I didn’t know anything about it.

BP: Oh, okay, because General Ishii had sent a 17-man biological warfare team through Saipan to launch the flag and the other things against the attacking troops. But the ship was sunk.

MH: Oh, I see.

BP: Only one man on the team survived, and I guess he was interrogated. But you knew nothing about that? Okay.

MH: I was never given -- on Saipan, I was never given a job of interrogating prisoners. I did interrogate some -- or discuss with some, before they were taken away from the camp. And Stevens castigated me. He said, "You know, you're not supposed to talk to them." What I was trying to do -- I don't know why I felt the need to do this -- we were trying to get them to admit that the Japanese had lost this battle, finally, irretrievably. But they realized it, by the end, I'm sure.

BP: Did you ever come any information about a little bit north of Tapochau, the peak, and down in the valley, a place called Chalan Galaide, there were a lot of Chamorros out there, and 21 were killed.

MH: Who killed them?

BP: It was -- they got caught in the bombardment. Yeah. Mostly American bombs, artillery shells. And the Marines

came through with tanks and machine guns and killed (inaudible).

MH: No, I never --

BP: What do you remember about the Koreans, if anything?

MH: Actually, very little, except that Monahan was the one in charge of them. I remember their antipathy toward the Japanese. I remember the antipathy of many of the Okinawans toward the Japanese. I have one little interesting episode, it's a footnote maybe. Sometimes when the Japanese were sick, they were sent away to the field hospital, and they were brought back in the ambulance. So when the ambulance came into camp, we'd open the doors, and I would say, "okay, all the Japanese get out here." If there were any Koreans, they would go on to a Korean camp, which was farther, was on the side of the Japanese camp. By that time, I don't -- well, I don't remember when the Chamorros moved out of the camp. They all moved back into Chalan Kanoa, yeah. But when they moved, I can't remember, in fact. But anyway, I was distinguishing between Japanese and Koreans. Japanese, get off here. And one of the old Okinawans was still sitting there. And I said again, "Japanese, we order you to get down." And he didn't move. And one of the Japanese girls said to him, "[Japanese

language]" -- old man -- "He says for the Japanese to get off here." And he said, "I'm not Japanese." But he was an old man. And he still had not been indoctrinated like this young, Japanese Okinawan kid, who was such a firebrand Japanese. The old guy wasn't like that at all. He said, "I'm not Japanese. I'm from Okinawa."

BP: Did he finally get off?

MH: Oh yeah, sure.

BP: Do you remember any other incidents like that? Did you actually physically have to pull Koreans and Japanese apart?

MH: You mean, fighting between them?

BP: Yeah.

MH: No I didn't. I don't know if anyone did. Hirasawa was living with a Korean. He had a Korean in the camp, in the Japanese camp.

BP: Oh, okay.

MH: We didn't take her away. We didn't insist that she go back.

BP: Did you ever -- there were a number of downed American pilots that were on Saipan. There was a group, supposedly, of four, I think it was, that were shot down in Truk, and they were brought to Saipan, interrogated there, and they

said later were shipped off to Japan. Now, whether they were taken out and killed --

MH: I've never heard of --

BP: They were off during the pre-invasion bombardment two American pilots shot down, and they were kept in the old Japanese jail. One was killed in the pre-invasion bombardment from the shells.

MH: Yeah. Yeah.

BP: The other one was taken and decapitated, right there outside the jail. You have no information about that?

MH: I'm sure the Corps -- all of that stuff was handled by either the Division Intelligence or the Corps Intelligence. I had really nothing to do with --

BP: I just though some of this might have filtered back to you.

MH: Well, I didn't hear about those. Didn't hear about them. This is the first I've heard of them.

BP: Okay. And you didn't have any contact with the comfort women?

MH: No. But I did see what I thought was a whorehouse up by Aslito.

BP: Okay. Now like I told you on the phone, the number of Chamorros that complained that American soldiers tried to sneak into the camp and get to the young women, and they

had different devices for protecting them. Now you said you had --

MH: I don't know who maintained the guard. The camp did have a fence, barbed wire around them. Some people did try to get in. Some were apprehended. I was at a court martial of one; I hadn't apprehended the guy, and I didn't even know who he was. But I was simply taken to the court as a kind of a resource person. But I didn't know anything actually about this specific case.

BP: So you didn't know -- he was being court martialed for trying to break in -- he had actually committed a crime, do you know?

MH: I don't know. I can't remember.

BP: Were there any --

MH: But there was a lot of hanky panky among the Japanese. Which I didn't know about at the time, but I subsequently learned about.

BP: Okay. So nobody was arrested and court martialed for a rape?

MH: I can't say that they were not.

BP: You don't remember any specific cases.

MH: I don't remember a specific case.

BP: Oh, okay.

MH: But it might -- maybe it was a case of that. Maybe the one that the court was up at Island Command Headquarters, was up on the mountain.

BP: Capitol Hill?

MH: Yeah. Is that what it was called? Well, it was the high part of Tapochau.

BP: That's what Capitol Hill is.

MH: Oh, okay. Anyway, that's where the court was.

BP: Okay. You remember any Chamorros or Carolinians being used as scouts by the Marines, to go out and try to get the Japanese or others out of caves?

MH: Kanakas.

BP: They called them Kanakas? The Japanese called them Kanakas?

MH: Yeah.

BP: They were also used as guards at Camp Susupe. I interviewed one [and his girl, Coprera?].

MH: He was a Chamorro.

BP: He's a Chamorro?

MH: Chamorro, yeah. No, the Kanakas had different names.

BP: Well yeah, this is Carolinians. The Japanese called the Carolinians "Kanakas."

MH: Yeah. Yeah. Well, because I think it was probably from the Carolinian language.

BP: Well, the Carolinians call themselves [inaudible].

MH: Oh, they do?

BP: Yeah. So I don't know.

MH: I don't know where that came from, then. Yeah, I didn't have anything to do with that aspects of camp security. I was an information guy, rather than a -- see, sometime after the landing, a guy named [Shattle?] from either Cleveland or Cincinnati, I can't remember which.

BP: Shattle?

MH: Shattle. Yeah. He was a lieutenant commander. He had gone through Civil Affairs training back in the States, and was sent out to join the unit. So he became the top security officer for the camp. So the four of us language people -- no, not all four of us came under him. Stevens, I don't think, came under him. But LaBianca and I did. We were part of the Intelligence section. And I did various things; I was the censor, for example, for the unit for a long time.

BP: People who were writing letters home? You would censor it?

MH: Yeah. Then when Japanese wrote letters to friends on Tinian. I would be the censor for that. I was also sent

with some Japanese to Tinian one day on a little LCI, because there was an arrangement made -- I think it was finally, they had been separated before the battle, and they were sending them back to Tinian. And I went with a couple of Japanese on this landing craft infantry, LCI, to Tinian to deliver them.

BP: Their families?

MH: Yeah, reuniting people. So you know, I did all kinds of odd jobs. But --

BP: You didn't have a specific job description?

MH: No. No, but I was in Shattle's Intelligence section.

BP: Right. Who was the overall person, who's overall in charge of the Civil Unit --

MH: Colonel Huston. Oh, oh, for all the camps?

BP: Well, isn't there somebody who's overall in charge of the Civil Affairs?

MH: Yeah. That would be Colonel Huston.

BP: Okay, [continue, sorry?]. And then Shatler was the --

MH: Shattle.

BP: Shattle was --

MH: Shattle, yeah. We called ourselves "Shattle's Chattles." (laughter) Shattle was an interesting guy. He was a cop.

And one of the problems our people -- this is an anecdote, I don't know whether it's --

BP: Well, let's see. I'll record it, see.

MH: Yeah. When we sent workers out, we didn't usually send women out. We sent men out to work at the military units on the island. And sometimes there were sexual attacks made on them by American soldiers.

BP: On the men?

MH: Yeah.

BP: American soldiers on Japanese --

MH: Yeah. And this was appalling to me, and I suppose to others. Shattle said -- I said, "How come? How come there are so many homosexuals?" He said, "They're not homosexual." He says, "These are homosexual acts by heterosexual people." And as a policeman, he was familiar with this. But I had never heard of it. I might also add that Hirasawa asked me, "Why don't you have women here for your troops?" He didn't use the word, "comfort" women. But, "Why don't you have women here?" Imonfu is a good name. He didn't use that word, but that's a Japanese word. Comfort woman is the literal translation of Imonfu.

BP: How would you spell that?

MH: I-M-O-N-F-U, Imonfu. Imon is the comfort, giving comfort to, commiserating with, and fu is a woman. One word for woman. There are different words. And you know, the Japanese were annoyed by this -- the civilians were annoyed by the fact that American troops were bothering their men.

BP: American service men were raping Japanese --

MH: Well, I don't know whether they got as far as rape. But they tried, or they --

BP: The attempted. And the Japanese would come back and report it to --

MH: Yeah. Yeah.

BP: Was anything ever done about this?

MH: I don't know. I don't know. I was not part of anything. I suppose if it was every done, it was handled pretty much in the unit, rather than through Civil Affairs. And I was never brought in for anything like that. But I heard about it.

BP: Did you ever come about any stories of mistreatment of Japanese by your military personnel? Or that's more -- you have to be out in the field to see it.

MH: No, I didn't hear of it.

BP: Okay. Now, once the Chamorros were moved into Chalan Kanoa, was there any fraternization between the troops and the women at that time? Any marriages?

MH: No. No, no, I don't think so. There was -- yes, certainly no marriages. There was probably a degree of fraternization. I was still a pretty young, idealistic kid at that point. I'd just been married myself before --

BP: Coming over?

MH: Yeah. I was married when I was 20, before I left for overseas. And I took very seriously the responsibility that we had to protect our charges, who were the civilians. But there were a lot of other officers who were trained in Civil Affairs, who probably were the ones who dealt with details of that sort. And one of us would be brought in only to translate from Japanese. That would be the only purpose. Now as you know, some of the Chamorros, they all spoke Japanese. Some of them spoke English. I don't remember if you've heard of the old fox, Gregorio Sablan?

BP: Oh, yeah, as a matter of fact, I thought I had some stuff on him.

MH: His son, Elias.

BP: Oh, Elias, I interviewed Elias' son, David Sablan.

MH: Oh, yeah?

BP: He was interviewed.

MH: I see. Well, both Gregorio and Elias spoke very creditable English.

BP: Yeah. Mm-hmm.

MH: And I said, "How come?"

BP: And German.

MH: Yeah. And German and Spanish. And I said, "How come?" Elias told me that he learned it by listening to the radio.

BP: Wow. Well, you know, Elias --

MH: He must have had a fantastic ear.

BP: Well, he was sent to (inaudible), because they had a cable station there. And they learned the language, and they learned telegraph communication, stuff like that.

MH: I see.

BP: So he got a good education with the Germans, too.

MH: I see.

BP: He may have picked up English by listening to the radio. But I think English may have been one of the languages they had to know for handling cable traffic.

MH: That's possible. That's possible.

BP: To pass this in a cable, keep their juncture doing that.

MH: Yeah.

BP: So anyway, could have been.

MH: Well, I think that Elias spoke better English than the old man, Gregorio.

BP: But he died in ’45.

MH: Yeah. Yeah. I heard he’d died, actually, but I don’t know how. I heard it from somebody. I guess someone who stayed on the island longer than I did.

BP: He was the first mayor, and then died right away. And Elias became --

MH: Maybe he died while I was still there.

BP: Nineteen forty-five.

MH: Yeah, well, I was there until May of ’45.

BP: And Elias was, of course, elected mayor. Now Gregorio, I interviewed his son Jesus. He’s still alive. I interviewed David Sablan, the son of Elias Sablan.

MH: Yeah.

BP: A very prominent business man, public figure (inaudible) ’65.

MH: Yeah.

BP: Okay. Now, I do a lot of (inaudible) stomping, and there’s a hill just to the northeast of Tapochau. And I found the remains of a B-29 there.

MH: Oh, you did?

BP: I talked to B-29 pilots and Historic Preservation, and nobody --

MH: Knows about the crash that would be --

BP: Do you remember ever --

MH: Not of a wreck on the island, no.

BP: In fact, right into a mountain. The engines, the cockpit.

MH: I'll be darned.

BP: Nobody knows who it belonged to. It's one of those mysteries (inaudible).

MH: Yeah. No, I don't know. That would be just above the little island off the coast of the northeast --

BP: No no, if you have --

(break in audio)

MH: After the (inaudible).

BP: Do you remember something like that, though?

MH: I wasn't there, but I remember hearing about it.

BP: So you left?

MH: Yeah, I left in early May of --

BP: Forty-five?

MH: Forty-five.

BP: Okay, so --

MH: But I think Gregorio might have already died by then.

BP: As I recall, I have the information on him. I don't know if I brought it with me. But he died in 1945, right after -- he hadn't served very long as mayor. And he was an appointed mayor. Then Elias Sablan was the first elected mayor.

MH: Mm-hmm. I don't think there was any election while I was there.

BP: Okay, maybe I'll try to bring that stuff about --

MH: No, it doesn't matter.

BP: But this, are you familiar with?

MH: Oh, yeah. Yeah. Willard Price.

BP: So you left Saipan, and do you remember anything about the effort to bring Oba in at that time, or no?

MH: No.

BP: You don't remember anything about it?

MH: No. I didn't know Oba by name, even. I knew only that there were Japanese organized out in the hills.

BP: Okay.

MH: But that they were under a guy named Captain Oba. I didn't know. Ben, I think, knew at that time. And then I read about this in that Japanese book. And of course, Oba wrote the book, I guess.

BP: Well, with the help of Don Jones, who was in the 2nd Marine Division on Saipan.

MH: I see.

BP: He was almost killed by Oba's men.

MH: Oh, I see. Now, did you know Guy Gabaldon at all then?

MH: I didn't, I never knew him. The first I heard about Gabaldon was when I saw the movie.

BP: Not a very good one.

MH: Terrible movie, though.

BP: Don't tell Guy that.

MH: And then I talked to -- I mentioned it to my friend, Jim [High?], who had been in the 2nd Division. He said, "Of course, I know Gabaldon. He worked for me. And I don't remember much about Gabaldon, except that he was terribly gung-ho.

BP: Right. Yeah.

MH: Yeah. I mean, from what I heard.

BP: Yeah, from what you heard.

MH: I didn't know him at all.

BP: He still is. He's still a fighter.

MH: He is?

BP: Yeah. Okay, so you left Saipan May, and where, you went back to Hawaii?

MH: I went back to Hawaii. And then was interrogating prisoners, the most recent ones from Okinawa, which was a mistake, because they sent a bunch of Okinawans, labor troops, back as prisoners, which they should never have done. They were usually -- well, they weren't useless as sources, because you never know where you're going to get some information. But until they came, I had been interrogating low-level interrogees. Some from the Marshalls, none from Saipan. Then they brought in this bunch of Okinawans. I had picked up a few words in Okinawan on Saipan, so I had some interesting chitchat with them. Of course, they mostly spoke good Japanese. Then we were -- I got orders to go out to Okinawa. This was in July, more or less, I think, early July. Before the middle of July. The orders were cut to send me and some others out to Okinawa to help with interrogations on Okinawa. And that was cancelled. Indeed, it might have been late, it might have been late July. It might have been around the time that the Potsdam Declarations, making -- when did that -- when was Truman in Potsdam?

BP: It was in '45, I think.

MH: Yeah, it was. But I'm trying to think of the time. It was in late July. And I think that that had something to do

with it, because it was before the A-bomb. And we were going to go out, and then I think things got tenser. And the A-bomb happened. Okay. The A-bomb dropped, and of course that was -- you weren't born yet, right?

BP: Born in September of '45.

MH: September of '45, okay. That was just unbelievable. And when the second one fell, and then two days later the Japanese accepted the Potsdam requirements. Well, we fudged it a little on that. We understood that they accepted it, and they accepted that we weren't going to change the imperial institution. Which, incidentally, in retrospect, that was smart. We were smart. There was a strong American faction that wanted to get rid of the emperor. And I think the smartest thing we ever did was not. Because it made the whole occupation, of occupying Japan relatively simple.

BP: Now, did you go in with the occupation?

MH: I went in there. I landed the first day.

BP: First day, with MacArthur?

MH: No, I landed a few minutes after MacArthur. I landed in the first boat ashore Yokosuka Naval Base. But that was on the 30th of August. The 28th of August, I went into Tokyo Bay on the first ship besides the --

BP: (inaudible)?

MH: No, no. No, way ahead of them. The first big Naval unit into the Bay, the first ship after the destroyers ahead of it, and the mine sweeps which had already gone in. But this was in -- we were taking -- this was the USS San Diego. And it was taking Admiral Badger in (inaudible) with the Japanese Admiral at Yokosuka, to arrange for the Moroccan landing at Yokosuka. This is all about me, and it's not really important.

(break in audio)

BP: This is Tuesday, January 20, 1998, Aptos, California. This is the second tape of the interview with Professor Harris, Martin. The interviewer is Bruce Petty. I want to find out more your -- because you kind of brushed over your father and your mother, didn't even mention your mother much, or your brothers and sisters. I want to know, first of all, when did your father first go to Japan, and was he married in Japan? Or did he marry before he went to Japan? Were all of your siblings born there?

MH: Yeah, all my siblings were born there. My father first went to Japan by chance. My father was old enough to be my grandfather. He was born in 1875. And he was a fairly devout young Christian youth, he was a Methodist, but he

was not a minister. And when he was 25, he took a job with the Methodist Board of Missions, Foreign Missions, to go out to Peking, Beijing, to work as an assistant to the treasurer of the North China Mission. And when he got there, the crisis of the Boxers was happening.

BP: Boxer Rebellion?

MH: Boxer Rebellion was happening. And he observed some of the preparations for the defenses of the mission compound, and the diplomatic area where the legations were, the legations quarter. But then with some other missionaries who managed to get a train together -- the train service had stopped -- they managed to get a train together to go down with women and children to [Kim Sen?] on the coast. And he got on that train with them. It was after the service had been stopped, so it was effectively the last train out of Peking, before the siege. And he participated in the siege at Kim Sen. There was also a siege -- the Boxers also attacked the foreign community, Kim Sen. And he was part of that, as was Herbert Hoover, in Kim Sen, the same place at the same time. So he got on the ship to go, they didn't need him. But the mission was in turmoil, and they didn't need extra people at that point. They needed to pull themselves together, and get back on an even keel. And it

wasn’t new personnel that they needed, but just the few people they had there. So he got on a ship to go back to the States. And the ship called at Nagasaki, in Japan. And they didn’t tie up to piers then, lighters or launchers came out to the ship. And he heard an American voice calling up from the ship below, “Is there anyone who can stay here for a year and teach English?”

BP: And was your father a college graduate?

MH: That was my -- oh yes, he was. Yeah.

BP: Bachelor’s degree?

MH: At that time he had only a Bachelor’s degree. Later he got an MA. He got an honorary doctorate once, but he didn’t earn a doctorate.

BP: So where was he from originally?

MH: He was from Iowa.

BP: So he got his degree?

MH: He got his degree at a small college called Cornell College, which was funded by the same Cornell who later made Cornell University in New York. But Cornell College in Iowa was before it. Anyway, that’s where he got his degree.

BP: Okay, I interrupted your narrative, I’m sorry.

MH: Oh. Well, what he thought was, my plans are up in the air. I came out here to the Far East; I might as well stay and teach. So he said, “Yes, I’ll stay.” So he spent actually two years in Japan. That was his introduction to Japan. That was 1900 1902. Then he went back to the States and taught at various places. He taught at a place called the Dakota Wesleyan in South Dakota. Dakota Wesleyan was where he met my mother. My mother was a college graduate, from DePauw University in Indiana, Greencastle, Indiana. And she was teaching Latin and Greek at Dakota Wesleyan. And they became attached at that time. They didn’t actually get married right away. But my father decided in about 1913 or ’14 that he wanted to go out and teach in Japan. And he found that there was an opportunity to do that at Methodist University in Tokyo, called Aoyama University. And he went to New York and made all the arrangements, and they said, “Okay, we’ll send you out there. But you’ve got to get married first.”

BP: Were they cohabitating?

MH: Oh no, they weren’t co--

BP: They were just dating?

MH: Yeah. No no, he was very --

BP: Religious.

MH: Religious. Right. And he said, “Well, that’s okay, I think I know just the person.” And he sent her a telegram, and she responded, “Yes.” So they then got married and went to Japan. That was in 1914. The first child was born in 1915. That’s my oldest sister, who lives in Palo Alto. Second child was born in 1916, and that’s my older brother, who was in Washington, D.C. after a career in the foreign service. The next child was my next sister, who was born in 1919. And she died, unfortunately, some years ago. And --

BP: Here in the States?

MH: Yeah, well, she came -- her husband was also in the foreign service. And she got cancer. And they caught it too late. They came back to the States to see if anything could be done, but it couldn’t. But she left -- she had three children, and they’re thriving, and their father is still living. He’s about a year older than I am, he was younger than my sister. He was two years younger than she was, about that. I guess he’s two years older than I am. Anyway, I was born, then, in 1923, and I don’t think I was planned. I think I just happened, because I was some years later. And my father was 49 and my mother was 45 when I

was born. And then I told you about his being dropped from the mission, and teaching in Japanese government schools.

BP: Yeah, that was another question I had. So he taught at a Methodist college, then?

MH: Yeah.

BP: But he was a Methodist, and he was a devout Methodist.

MH: But he was a layman.

BP: Okay, so he was not -- so he didn't have priority during the Depression.

MH: That's right. That's right.

BP: Okay. Okay. Now --

MH: Well, there were also other teachers at the university who were not ordained, who did not -- who were not dropped. My father had a rather advanced view of teaching English, and it was by the use of phonetics. He was a follower of phonetics, and he knew all the great phonetic scholars in England and in America. And he was quite successful teaching, but it wasn't a method that was particularly admired by most other English teachers at that time. It later caught on. So I think they thought, if we're going to drop somebody, let's -- and there was another factor, too, which I don't like to think of as part of their policy, but he was paid a higher salary because he had been

there for quite a while. So he cost more than some of the others. So I think they felt this was the place to cut. I don't like that last judgment, but I think it might have been a factor.

BP: Okay. Now, I wanted to -- the college, I wanted to make sure I got the spelling.

MH: A-O-Y-A-M-A. Ao is green and Yama is mountain, or hill. It's a section of Tokyo, actually.

BP: Okay. Oyemen --

MH: Aoyama. And the words were, the kind of school it was is Gakuin, G-A-K-U-I-N, Gakuin.

BP: Okay. Okay.

MH: Aoyama Gakuin. But that was in Tokyo. When we came back from China, where he was teaching at Yenching University outside of Peking, that's where Peking University is now.

BP: But he didn't stay there very long.

MH: No, one year.

BP: (inaudible)?

MH: Yeah. He taught for one year. We spent two summers and a year -- we spent a summer a year, teaching, and then a summer. And while we were still in China in that second summer, my father was back in Japan looking for jobs. He found some jobs, and he managed to hold the family together

and send kids back to college -- I didn't go to college until 1940. And it was about that time that he was reinstated in the mission. He had to leave Japan, but he was still --

BP: But you said it was the smartest thing he ever did was that, because he probably would not have found employment --

MH: He couldn't have found employment. He was what, he was in his fifties.

BP: Yeah. Is it fair to say he liked Japan, too?

MH: Oh, yeah, I think so. There were things about Japan that I think that annoyed him. He was very American, very middle-Western, but with a cosmopolitan -- more cosmopolitan than most Midwesterners, simply because he lived abroad and had seen the outside world. But he was basically a conservative Midwesterner.

BP: Okay. Okay, I think you've answered some of the questions. You answered about that already. You said your brother was Intelligence. Now, was he in the military at the time?

MH: He was in the Navy. Yeah. We were both in the Navy. He went to the language school before I did. He went to it when it was first organized.

BP: In Boulder?

MH: No, before Boulder.

BP: Harvard?

MH: He was in Harvard. He went at Harvard. Some others who started at the beginning started at Berkeley. Then, as I say, we were brought together at Boulder. And I didn't come to Boulder until about the fourth -- it was summer -- there was a summer group, and there was a fall group, and then I was in the winter group. So I was in the third. Then there were several winter groups that followed. But my small group of classes began December 1st of 1942.

BP: Okay. But your brother was in the Navy before the war?

MH: No.

BP: Before Pearl Harbor?

MH: No, not before Pearl Harbor. But he -- Pearl Harbor came along. Now we're -- let's see, I entered a year after Pearl Harbor ended, maybe a year after Pearl Harbor.

BP: You said the 1st of December, '42.

MH: Yeah. That's when I started.

BP: So you came after, okay.

MH: In Boulder. They organized the language school immediately when the war started, and he was with the first group of students.

BP: So was he drafted, or enlisted?

MH: He enlisted. We all -- I enlisted, too.

BP: Now, what's his name?

MH: James Victor Martin. He's junior. He has the same name as my father, James Victor Martin. I was named Harris after a Methodist bishop. And my middle name came from a friend of my mother's, (inaudible), and Martin. So I'm Harris Martin -- James, for years, even after my father died, he appended the junior after the name. Now he doesn't anymore. Just James V. Martin. But --

BP: Now, did he serve on ships?

MH: No. No, no. We were both language -- we were called "language officers."

BP: Okay, so where was he stationed?

MH: Japanese language officers.

BP: Where was he stationed?

MH: Mostly in Australia.

BP: (inaudible)?

MH: Yeah, well, with FRUPAC. FRUPAC was also in Pearl Harbor.

BP: FRUPAC stands for --

MH: Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.

BP: Okay. Okay.

MH: That's just to hide the fact that it was --

BP: [Intelligence?]?

MH: Yeah, it was radio. They were interceptors. It was radio intercepts. And they were using these fancy machines for decoding.

BP: I read a couple of books on that.

MH: Yeah. Okay. Well, so it was really top secret, and quite a bit is known about it now. But as I told you the other day, he was sworn to secrecy, and there was no time limit put on it. And for that reason, he doesn't talk about it. Even though books have been published about it.

BP: And after the war he got into the foreign service?

MH: That's right. He was studying for the foreign service before the war. After he graduated from college, he went to Tufts School of Law and Diplomacy, which is attached to Harvard. He went to Tufts. Actually, it was a Fletcher School attached to Tufts. But it's near Harvard. And he was all ready to go into the foreign service when the war broke up.

BP: So he was drafted?

MH: No, he wasn't drafted. He enlisted. Right away.

BP: And did you enlist too?

MH: I enlisted, too.

BP: Okay, now did your brother, the fact that he had been to language school have some -- it was on your being -- or do you --

MH: Oh, I don't think so. We were both recruited. We were both recruited. They knew what Americans had been in Japan. Well, the guy who was in charge of this was a professor from Harvard called [Hindmarsh?]. He was Captain A. E. Hindmarsh. And he had helping him a man by the name of Glenn Shaw. And Glenn Shaw, who lived in Kobe, was very, very well known in the foreign community in Japan. And he had wide contact. And he knew families, and he knew, with kids, that they'd grown up in Japan.

BP: So he had a list (inaudible).

MH: Sure. So he, yeah, when they interviewed me, he asked me some questions in Japanese, and I wasn't good enough to keep up to any standard at all. As I told you, I spoke very childish Japanese. And he turned to Hindmarsh and he said, "Well, he's not doing very well, but take him anyway, because he's got the ear." I didn't know the language, except for the simple stuff. But I had an ear for the sounds.

BP: I know exactly -- because I've studied foreign languages. I know how important that is.

MH: Yeah. Well, you were there in the ’30s too, in the militarization going on.

MH: Oh, yeah. Oh, yes.

BP: So I’m just wondering, did that have a special effect on you? Were you aware of any tensions? Were you being watched?

MH: Yeah. Yeah. We were aware that as foreigners, we were watched. Nobody watched us particularly closely, because we weren’t in a position to do very much. But always, yes. Not under constant surveillance by any means, but they kept tabs on all foreigners. And have you heard about the February 26th incident, the mutiny in the Japanese Army in Tokyo?

BP: The assassination?

MH: Yeah. Yeah. Well, a little -- I don’t know whether you are interested in this or not, but we were in Kobe, of course, and that all happened in Tokyo. But an old student of my father’s, who lived nearby --

(break in audio)

BP: The people that went to the language school with you became important scholars, and (inaudible).

MH: Oh, yeah. Well, one of them is Donald Keene, have you heard -- K-double E-N-E, perhaps the most famous and

foremost of Japanese scholars who came out of Boulder, anyway. Literature was his field. He was from Harvard, and --

BP: I know [Richau?].

MH: Well, Richau, of course, didn't go to Boulder. Richau already knew Japanese quite well. He was a famous scholar too, and more in my line and in Keene's line. Keene was the literary scholar. Oh, what's his name? Good heavens, the guy who translated the [AON?] literature. I can't think of his name right now. I know him perfectly well.

BP: Well, that was just an aside.

MH: Yeah, well, there were several others, too. If I set my mind -- I didn't come prepared for this, but if I set my mind to it, I could come up with a list, probably, of over a dozen scholars who came from the Army and the Navy programs, who have been prominent scholars in Japanese studies of one kind or another. They came out of the language programs of the Army and the Navy.

BP: Okay. Well you also said, now, the Army took Nisei, but the Navy didn't.

MH: Yeah.

BP: Now, that was all the way through the end of the war? They never took any, even at the end? Or you don't know?

MH: Well, as I mentioned to you, some of the -- at the end of the war, there were Nisei officers in the Army, yeah. In the Army. But I don't think there were any -- some of them stayed in, because of the occupation of Japan, they stayed in. And when I went back in to the Navy during the Korean War and went to Tokyo, there were some Nisei officers of the rank of Major.

BP: In the Army?

MH: In the Army.

BP: But no Nisei in the Navy.

MH: Not yet. I worked with it in the joint -- I worked in what was called -- under MacArthur, it was called ATIS, Allied Translation and Interpreter Service, which was organized during World War II. And then when he went to Japan, he took ATIS with him. It was under General [Rolby?]. And then in the Second -- not the Second -- the Korean War, when I arrived there, its named had been changed to Military Intelligence -- or, Military -- yeah, I think it was Military Intelligence Service Group-slash-Far East. We called it MISG-FE. And I was assigned to that as a -- it was an Army unit. I was assigned to it as a Navy liaison officer. And at that time, I ran into my friend, Ben

Hazard, again for the second time, after our first meeting was on Saipan.

BP: Yeah. You mentioned that. Just one small thing, how do you spell Atsugi?

MH: A-T-S-U-G-I.

BP: Okay. I spent two years in the Navy, but I can't remember what APA means. It means Auxiliary Personnel --

MH: Oh, I don't know what the -- AKA were cargo, and APA were personnel.

BP: Yeah. Okay.

MH: So it was a troop ship. But I don't know what the last "A" stands for.

BP: Okay. It was just a small question.

MH: Yeah.

BP: Now I want to get back to -- I've read that most Japanese prisoners, I guess they were kind of -- they more than brainwashed by their superiors to expect to be tortured and killed if they were captured by the Americans. The ones who were captured and expected it, and it didn't come to pass, they were so relieved that they were almost overly cooperative. Was that generally true? Or were there prisoners who weren't, that you had that --

MH: First of all, I didn't deal with prisoners in an interrogator's position at the time they were captured. The ones I interrogated, they'd been processed through, and they'd already been interrogated. As I told you, the ones that got to me were pretty low-level prisoners. So I didn't do any high-powered --

BP: But did you ever hear of --

MH: Yes. Yeah. There were some who refused to talk, and there were others who reacted the way that you suggested. There were some very able interrogators, most of all were BIJs like me, but who spoke really good Japanese. Some of them were mixed, American and Japanese parentage, mixed parentage, but they were Americans. And some of them -- there were a couple of full-blooded Caucasians who had gone through the Japanese school system, right through Tokyo University. And these people were the ones who interrogated the prisoners that were especially knowledgeable, who could really help. And they were so good that I think it took the Japanese by surprise, to find Americans who could speak Japanese at that level. Yeah, we got an awful lot of good information.

BP: But do you know of any situations where Japanese prisoners were tortured or mistreated in the interrogation process?

MH: I remember hearing -- I don't want to use his name -- about one interrogator who -- not that he used brutality, but that he was very forceful in his language. He used rough -- he could use rough language, and he could threaten. I don't think he ever physically -- I don't know of any who were physically -- I know plenty of prisoners -- about prisoners who were killed. I know about commanding officers who told their men not to take prisoners. We've all read about that. And that happened. I know of worse things that happened, and Ben knows of worse things that happened, where actual mutilation occurred.

BP: Like taking the teeth?

MH: Yeah. Well, taking of teeth and other parts of the body. These things did happen. And some people take a certain amount of comfort in the idea -- I don't know if "comfort" is the right word, but they claim that Americans weren't quite as bad, because this was not a policy. If a commanding officer says, "Don't take prisoners," for the unit, that's a policy. When Japanese ships were sunk and American planes strafed survivors in the water, and there wasn't a court martial because of it, then that can be accepted as having been a policy, or at least something that was overlooked. So my whole point is that as a young

-- what explains my feeling about this, emotion about it, is that when people claim that the Japanese were particularly cruel, I can think of occasions when Americans were particularly cruel, too. It is also, however, I think, true that we never, during the war, organized a unit like 731, like the Ichi unit.

BP: But it did take advantage of their [data?] after the war, to the point of actually --

MH: Yes, not only that -- yes, to the point of --

BP: Protecting.

MH: -- protecting them, exactly. And you know how people scoffed at the idea that the Chinese claimed there was germ warfare going on in Korea, do you remember that?

BP: In Korea, I don't remember.

MH: During the Korean War.

BP: I don't remember.

MH: The Chinese claimed Americans were using germ warfare. Well, I don't think we were. I don't think we were. But the Chinese knew about 731, and they knew that we had the data from 731. And they knew that we were in a position to use the information. But no, we did not use it. On the other hand, we have done things like the Tuskegee program

here on the West Coast. We subjected people to certain -- in the service to certain treatments, as an experiment.

BP: Radiation experiment?

MH: Yeah. Without them actually knowing that that's what was going on. So yeah, I suppose you could say there's a difference of degree. But when you're talking about violation of human rights, I'm not sure how important the degree is. We didn't bomb Tokyo out of the blue like the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor out of the blue. We didn't do that. But I'm not sure that killing people with the A-bomb, whatever its ultimate achievement was -- and I think it did hasten the end of the war. Not by much, I think, but I think it did hasten it. We -- the people we killed were just as numerous and just as dead.

And just as horribly dead as the people that the Japanese killed. So I find that there's not a whole lot of difference. And each side -- each culture tends to defend its own position, it's familiar with its own position. And if somebody else does it to us, it's a little bit worse than if we do it in the heat of battle to somebody else. And I'm not sure that that's a valid conclusion.

BP: Yeah. Actually, I talked to one Marine during the 50th anniversary, and he made a blanket statement that we were just as bad as they were.

MH: Eh.

BP: I had an inkling of what he was talking about, but didn't really pursue it at that time.

MH: Well, I'll tell you. I told you we watched the battle from the ship. And one of the things that caught my attention was the flamethrowers, because you could see those. You could see, especially before it was fully light, full light of day, or in the early evening, before our ship left the shoreline. You could see these flamethrowers going after the pillboxes and caves, caves on the hillside. And I thought that's a horrible, horrible --

BP: You could see it from the ship?

MH: Yeah. Well, you wouldn't see it clearly. But we had glasses. No, I couldn't make out -- but you could tell what was happening. You knew what was happening.

BP: Okay. Okay, this is maybe a small point, but I like to be as clear as possible. You talked, using the term, "military government unit," and then you'd say Navy Civil Affairs Unit.

MH: Okay --

BP: Were these interchangeable terms, or --

MH: Yes, they were --

BP: I'll tell you what, let's stop.

(break in audio)

MH: When I joined the unit, before we went to Saipan, it was called, "Civil Affairs Unit." "Navy Civil Affairs Unit." Somewhere along the line, possibly because we came more under Army command after the 5th Corps left and we went under Jarmon's command. And because the Army spoke of military government rather than Civil Affairs, possibly that's the reason we changed our address from Civil Affairs to Military Government.

BP: Okay. So originally you were called Navy Civil Affairs Unit.

MH: Yeah.

BP: Then once you went under the Army in Saipan, it was --

MH: At some point, it --

BP: -- Military Government Unit.

MH: Yeah. It -- okay, Military Government, I'm not sure it said "Unit." I tell you, Military Government -- maybe it did. I'd have to -- you know what I'd have to do? I'd have to look at old letters that I wrote to my wife and see what the -- first it was -- I think we used "Military

Government" finally on the envelopes, besides the APO. You know what I mean? It had the APO numbers. I'd have to go back. I don't know if she saved the envelopes. But she might have saved enough that I could find that out. But I think that the Navy continued to call it "Civil Affairs," but that on Saipan we became known as "Military Government."

BP: Okay. I have to find a way of putting this so that I don't get bogged down in a bunch of nomenclature that will put the readers to sleep, if you understand what I mean.

MH: Yeah. Yeah.

BP: It's a small thing; I'm sure I can look it up in one of my many [case books?]. But were talking about the Japanese Army, I think they came over from Manchuria, that was the Kwantung?

MH: Yeah. That would be spelled -- in those days, I'm not going to go to the new kind of spellings, all of the spelling is changed.

BP: Yeah, well, I can probably pull that from --

MH: It's K-W-A-N-T-U-N-G.

BP: Yeah. I know it from my text --

MH: Yeah.

BP: -- but I'm not a very good speller, and I always have to go back and check. When you say it was "slapped together," is this something you had read? Or this is part of the intelligence information on the island? I mean, I've read a lot of --

MH: You mean the defense of Saipan generally? Or --

BP: Well, you said the Kwantung Army was rather impressive, but it was "slapped together."

MH: Oh. No, what I was trying to say was that the nucleus of the Kwantung Army had been dissipated pretty much --

BP: From fighting China.

MH: -- from fighting in China. So it wasn't -- for example, when the Russians came into Manchuria, the Kwantung Army wasn't then what it once had been. Not by a long shot. So what they had there, when my friend -- I don't know if I told you about it, it was my friend, Ted [Van Gohan?] -- he has a Dutch name, but he couldn't provide his Dutch citizenship. In fact, he apparently didn't have Dutch citizenship. His father was Dutch, his mother was Japanese. So he was drafted into the Japanese Army.

BP: There are a number of cases like that.

MH: But he knew very good English. He spoke excellent English. He went to the same schools we did. So they had the sense

to use him for his English, even though he was a private. He was attached to Kwantung Army Headquarters in Manchuria, and was put on the radio to listen.

BP: Okay. Just as an aside.

MH: Yeah.

BP: And this is just another small point. You said you landed there about D plus five, and there were floating piers already there.

MH: Yeah.

BP: Were these put down by CVs?

MH: Probably by CVs. That was on the part of the beach where the port division landed, I think. We went right into -- we were right out of the Chalan Kanoa and near Susupe -- between --

BP: Okay, that’s where they had the sugar dock.

MH: The sugar -- yeah. But I think the sugar dock was pretty well beat up.

BP: It’s still there.

MH: It’s still part of it.

BP: Okay, and you said Army Nisei were trying to find Japanese soldiers --

MH: In the camps.

BP: -- trying to pass themselves up as civilian Japanese. Did they have any success at that?

MH: Yeah, they had some.

BP: Okay. And why would the soldiers want to be in the civilian camps? Just to be around the women? Or they thought they'd get better treatment?

MH: Probably. My guess is a survival instinct. They figured that going in with the prisoners, they'd have a much rougher deal than if they were taken for civilians, which is probably true. Except no, actually not. You would think it would be true. Actually, the military prisoners, the POWs, were well -- probably better fed than the civilians. We fed civilians mostly on Japanese rations at first, then we began to import rice and stuff like that. But we had big stores of rice on the island. And we were able to use a lot of the stores. A lot of the stores that we should have been able to use, and we weren't able to because the American troops were so destructive. They went into store houses and stuck their bayonets in the cans, just to see what was in the can. I went around -- this was up at Isley Field that day that I saw the house where I think the women were -- some of the women were held. I went up to put pre-printed signs up, saying, "By order of

St. Pat, these stores should be left alone." This was Civil Affairs' policy. It was futile. Absolutely useless. Here I was, a young ensign, just a kid, and I was picking these things up. And grizzled, old sergeants who'd been through the battle were poking around. And I started to criticize one of them. I said, "Look, we need this stuff for the civilians." And some other Army guy, an old -- he looked older than me, he might have been in his 30s. He said, "Take it easy, son." (laughs) And I was annoyed, because I took my responsibilities seriously. And I knew that we needed food supplies for the civilians. I also knew, very quickly, that most of these food supplies were not going to be available to us. Some were. We did get some, enough to feed them at first. Then we gradually began to get it in. We also built -- we got the sunken fishing boats that were along Tanapag Harbor, at Garapan. We got those together. Our engineers worked together with the Japanese ship rights and Okinawan, actually. And we got several large, like, big sampans, but big ones, really big fishing boats. And we got new marine engines for them. And within two months, we were sending out a fishing fleet. And we fed not only the civilians, but also military units on the island we supplied fish to, fresh fish.

BP: They must have appreciated that.

MH: Yeah. Oh, yeah.

BP: There were a lot of (inaudible) coming back in our interview yesterday.

MH: I guess so. I hadn't been thinking about that.

BP: Yeah, well some of the [fresh stuff?] is -- another small point. Hirasawa, I wanted to get his name spelled.

MH: All right, his surname is H-I-R-A-S-A-W-A.

BP: Okay, I got it right.

MH: And his given name was Akira, A-K-I-R-A.

BP: A-K-I-R-A. Okay, I misspelled that one. Okay. And Kotari was K-O-T-A-R-I?

MH: That's right. And I don't know what his given name is.

BP: And there's a Monahan?

MH: Monahan, yeah. M-O-N-A-H-A-N. Philip. With one "L." Phil Monahan. Yeah, I don't know when he died. I know he's dead. But he was my roommate at Boulder. And then we got sent to the same unit in Saipan. Then I saw him again at the end of the war, he came through Yakosuka. I forget where he was going; he had his duties. And he ran into me at Yakosuka.

BP: Shattle was S-H-A-T-T-L-E?

(break in audio)

BP: You said there were some women at the language school.

MH: Yeah.

BP: Were they sent overseas?

MH: Yeah, some -- well, I don't think most of them were. My younger sister, she's not younger than I, but she was the younger of my two sisters, was at Boulder. But she was washed out because of her health. She had had tuberculosis in Japan. While it was not active, the Navy decided after studying her case that they would not take a chance. They also ordered me to have special x-rays to see whether I had it. The fact is, I had had a very mild case of TB when I was a kid. But they looked at my -- they saw the scars, no problem. But my sister didn't die from that. She died from cancer later. Years later.

BP: Yeah, but there were other women, too, do you know --

MH: There were lots of other women, and as far as I know, the farthest they probably got was to either Pearl, or -- this is my conjecture.

BP: But in other words, you never worked with any of them?

MH: I never worked with them over there. But they got as far as Pearl or as far as Australia. Probably not to the battle area.

BP: Okay. When you got the orders to leave Saipan, how did you feel? I mean, were you happy to leave?

MH: Oh, yeah. Geez, I'd been there 11 months. And the war was going on. You know, we had the fleet for Iwo gathered first off Saipan, before the attack on Iwo. And we knew that the Philippines battle as well. Look at what happened between the time I landed in Saipan and the time I left Saipan. The Peleliu campaign. The Philippine --

BP: Oh, yeah, (inaudible).

MH: Peleliu, yeah, Paladin. The Philippine Campaign. The Iwo Jima. And then finally, Okinawa. All of those were -- was the war advancing. And I was -- and Saipan was important as a major base, no question. But I felt that I was being left behind. So when I went back to Pearl, I was happy to get back to Pearl. But I was also thinking possibly, this would be a chance to be sent out to the forward area again. Of course, it was, but only at the end of the war, because the end of the war came so quickly. Because I said I was tapped along with some others to go out to Okinawa, and then those orders were cancelled, and within a few days came the A-bomb and the new plans to send us to Japan.

BP: Yeah, you felt -- now you're saying you felt like the war was leaving you behind, and you wanted to sort of, like, be

in the thick of it. But before we started the tape, you said you felt almost like being an atheist afterwards. Is that something --

MH: A pacifist.

BP: A pacifist. Not an atheist, excuse me.

MH: Well, I think the war made me into almost an atheist for a long time, too.

BP: Did this come from after reflection afterwards, or at the time? Because you're saying you wanted to be in the thick of it --

MH: I'll tell you -- yeah. I can see where you perceive a possible contradiction. I don't think there is a contradiction. I was young and was interested in being where things were happening. My work in Saipan had become a fairly dull routine. And we were all following the progress of the war in our wardroom on the beach at Susupe. We had maps of China and maps of Europe, and we were following the progress of the war in both theaters. It seemed to me as if there wasn't really a whole lot I could do, at least not enough to excite me on Saipan. And I think that I did, probably, serve a purpose. I think I was useful. I was used, as you perceived yesterday, I was used for a variety of different things. I don't know that there

was a job description, except Intelligence. And the scope of, or my area of Intelligence, my scope was the camp. I wasn't supposed to be working on intelligence for anything else, except in the camp itself. And my source, pretty much, was the police station. I had to depend on them. So what they didn't want me to know, I didn't know, unless I knew it through some other means.

The other thing I was useful for, and probably the most important as far as the unit was concerned, was simply for my language ability, which, poor as it was, was still better than the other guys, who were doing the same thing. But they were given other responsibilities, organizational responsibilities, that I wasn't. And I don't think that was because I was necessarily a lousy organizer -- although I think I probably would have been (laughter) -- but I think it was because I was recognized as the man to get for the language purposes, if needed. When Admiral Spruance came to the camp and wanted to look around, [Tagger?], he was a full lieutenant, and much older, he was in his thirties, called on me to accompany Spruance. I said, "How come me?" He says, "Because you know Japanese much better than these other guys do." And so that was my main role.

And I felt very inadequate at times. But I was able to help; I was certainly able to help. And I was able to bring understanding between our people and the Japanese leaders that we dealt with. I say "leaders," they were leaders like Hirasawa. I can't remember the name now of a distinguished older guy who was an official of the company. And I didn't even know he existed until a few months before I left. He finally came around to helping us. And he was kind of a counselor to Hirasawa. And he was a very distinguished, gentile person. But I guess either he had decided, well, the war is actually lost, and so I might as well, or he was impressed with the fact that we were actually trying to help the civilians. And I think both of those had something to do with his cooperative attitude, whereas he had stayed in the background and not volunteered anything. When he did volunteer it, it was through Hirasawa that he did it. He didn't come directly to us.

BP: But getting back to my point, when did the pacifistic, or near-pacifistic --

MH: I think it began then, but I didn't --

BP: Was there any special event or something that really disgusted you about the whole thing that made you start thinking that way?

MH: Not special, just seeing all the wounded. I saw both American wounded and -- I saw more civilian Japanese and Korean -- mostly Japanese. I saw mostly that. But I saw films of the American wounded. And I heard stories about the American wounded. On the ship I saw some of the American wounded, right away, at the very beginning of the battle. But I think it took some time to sink in. And what appalled me -- and this developed in retrospect. It was already -- it was going on in my mind. But it wasn't really until I got out of the Navy at the end of the war and went back to college that I began to think of this as appalling waste of both the human resource and natural resources. Manufactured. Wealth. God, when you see those fleets, you know the invasion fleet -- as far as you can see, all around you are ships. And then you -- when we came up to shore, we were still hearing the bombardment, although the main Naval gunfire had stopped by that time -- our ships took position to unload troops. But the gunfire ashore was continuing. But we knew about the three days of bombardment that had gone on. Then when I went off Japan with the 5th fleet, an even larger fleet, and when that fleet came together in Sagami Bay, the extent of it, and the power and all these men being paid. You know, we were

paid in cash, they didn't pay us by check. Every payday, even during the battle, we got paid -- well, actually not during the battle. During the battle it piled up on the books. They kept records of it. But if you were anywhere, except in battle, and they started to pay us in cash again pretty soon after the battle -- we could leave in what we didn't want. We'd leave it in, and it would pile up. All of that, to all these men, millions and millions and millions, and indeed billions of dollars, and then all the dead people.

I can't -- while it was necessary to stop the aggression both in Europe and in Asia, I am not absolutely sure that the Germans and Japanese would not have overextended themselves and found themselves unable to maintain their empires, even without the great battles that took place. I guess humankind is too impatient to wait.

BP: Maybe they didn't want to take a chance.

MH: Maybe they didn't want to take a chance. Yeah. No, I was not a pacifist during the war at any time. But in retrospect, I very nearly became -- I stayed on in the Navy Reserve for many years. It wasn't until the Vietnam War that I took an open antiwar position. In the Korean War, I

was a cynic. In World War II, I was gung-ho. And we still think of that as the so-called “good war,” quote-unquote. The Korean War, I was cynical. And in the Vietnam War, even though I was still in the Naval Reserve, and indeed had some conflict with the Navy in all of this, I opposed the war.

BP: Did you have to?

MH: No, no, no, no.

BP: You stayed in the Reserves.

MH: I was in the Reserves. But I went out to Japan -- no, I wasn’t called back. I went to Japan. I was in Japan at Waseda University, when the war in Vietnam got worse. It was during ’64, ’65.

BP: This is not about Saipan.

MH: No, no.

END OF AUDIO FILE