

Oral History

Commander Robert W. Herrick USN (Ret.)

**Interviewed by
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Preface

With the end of the Cold War, scholars are beginning to gain access to thousands of formally classified documents at various former Soviet archives that will broaden our understanding of the Soviet decision-making processes that affected the development and deployment of Soviet naval forces during the Cold War.

No doubt, during the 21st century, historians on both sides of the Atlantic will achieve a better grasp on why one strategy and shipbuilding program was pursued to the detriment of others. Of course, in conducting their research, future scholars will not be operating in a void. During the Cold War there were many analysts who published studies theorizing on the motivations behind Soviet naval development. The U.S. Navy published its own official thesis titled *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*. First published in the early 1970s, six editions of this book traced the history of Soviet seapower and focused on the increasing sophistication and threat of Soviet naval hardware.

However, the analyst whose work many historians will want to review is Robert Waring Herrick. A naval intelligence officer who earned his commission from the Naval Academy in 1944, Herrick postulated in the 1960s that the Soviet Navy had a defensive orientation. Part of what made Herrick's claim controversial was that he based his research most on open-source Soviet literature. Yet, the literature Herrick read was supposedly from the same Soviet Union that hid behind the Iron Curtain and guarded its phone directories as state security documents! Why should Herrick's open source literature hold any credence? Herrick found, through years of analysis, that the Soviet society was actually quite open. One merely had to understand the hidden meaning of a book or journal article. The primary source documents in the Russian archives can tell us much, but for proper context, researchers need also to review the open source literature.

At the time of this interview, Herrick was awaiting publication of his third book that covered Soviet naval strategy during the Admiral Gorshkov era. For this biographical overview of his life, Herrick focused much time on his two-plus years in the Soviet Union from 1954 to 1957. Although many of his tales of Cold War espionage are whimsical, it is easy to discern that Herrick came away with much during those years that would influence his future writings.

The oral historian is in debt to Robert Waring Herrick for making time available to conduct the initial interview. He is also appreciative to Commander Herrick for his promptness in reviewing and improving on the original narrative. The oral historian is also grateful to the Naval Historical Foundation for providing the financial support to make the project feasible and to Dr. Edward J. Marolda, the Naval Historical Center's Oral History Program Manager, who provided needed guidance to make the program reality.

David F. Winkler
September 1997

Robert Waring Herrick

United States Navy (Retired)

Robert Waring Herrick was born on May 19, 1923, in Sayre, Pennsylvania. His parents were both teachers; his father taught high school English and his mother served as a music supervisor for three towns. In addition to playing sports, young Herrick became an Eagle Scout, participated in his church Christian Endeavor program, sold magazines, delivered newspapers, and held jobs at the local grocery store and ice cream parlor. He graduated from Sayre High School in June 1941. Having earned a spot to attend one of the military academies through the competitive exam process, Herrick selected the United State Naval Academy and headed to Annapolis to become a member of the Class of '45.

With an accelerated program implemented to get young officers out to the fleet early, Herrick received his commission as an Ensign with a B.S. degree in engineering in June 1944 and immediately received orders to the battleship USS *Mississippi* (BB 41). He reported aboard in the Admiralty Islands just in time for the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea where the *Mississippi*, along with other veteran U.S. battleships, engaged Japanese warships coming up Surigao Strait to interdict U.S. landings at Leyte Gulf.

Mississippi, with Herrick aboard, provided gunfire support for U.S. landings in Luzon and Okinawa. Off Okinawa, *Mississippi* sustained three Kamikaze aircraft blows. One of the suicide planes destroyed Herrick's air-defense station, killing his division's gun crew on that quadruple 40 millimeter battery.

After participating with the armada the joined USS *Missouri* (BB 63) for the Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945, Herrick steamed back across Pacific on "*Ole Miss*." After transiting the Panama Canal, the veteran battleship took part in "VJ-Day" celebrations in New Orleans. Herrick left the *Mississippi* in Norfolk, as the ship began to undergo conversion to become a surface-to-air missile test platform.

Herrick volunteered for lighter-than-air (LTA) training at Lakehurst, New Jersey, and earned his "Naval Aviation (Airship)" wings in 1947. He reported to a blimp detachment based at Boca Chica Field near Key West, Florida, and spent two years logging about 2,000 hours of flight time conducting anti-submarine warfare training.

After his LTA tour, in 1949, Herrick received orders to Naval Intelligence School in Washington, D.C., where he also received six months of Russian language instruction. Receiving the 1630 naval intelligence officer designator, Herrick reported for duty to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Attached to ONI's Foreign Branch from 1951 through 1953, the newly minted intelligence officer began studying the Soviet Union and its navy. Herrick's education included coursework in Russian affairs and international relations at Georgetown University. In

1953, the Navy transferred Herrick to New York City to study at the Russian Institute at Columbia University. At Columbia, Herrick obtained his Ph.D. in political science (international relations and Russian area studies).

From Columbia, the Navy ordered Herrick to be the Assistant Naval Attaché, U.S. Embassy Moscow. Arriving in Moscow in December 1954, Herrick spent the next two years learning about the Soviet Union and meeting its people as he traveled extensively throughout the country. He completed his tour in 1957 and left with his wife and son via the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Herrick returned to ONI in the Pentagon to take charge of intelligence collection planning for the USSR, Eastern Bloc nations, Scandinavia, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey. After Herrick completed this three-year Washington tour, the Navy transferred him out to Hawaii to serve on the staff of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CinCPacFlt).

Arriving at Pearl Harbor in 1960, Herrick's responsibilities included planning naval intelligence collection throughout the Pacific region, utilizing planes, submarines, and surface ships as collection platforms.

Herrick's last tour on active duty began in 1963 as he assumed duties as Staff Intelligence Officer at the Naval War College. In 1964, he gave the annual address on "USSR - Sea Power's Challenge," which sparked controversy due to his thesis that the Soviet Navy would assume a defensive posture during time of war. A year later, Herrick again gave the annual address, bolstered by further documentary evidence to defend his defensive thesis. With senior members of the Naval Intelligence community strongly disagreeing with the views that Herrick stubbornly maintained, the twenty-year Navy veteran saw his future opportunities in the Navy as limited and he retired to accept a position with Radio Free Europe.

Moving to Munich, Germany, Herrick's first post-military job was to serve as the Deputy Director of Communist Area Affairs Analysis for the Eastern European States' relations with the USSR for Radio Free Europe. In 1968, with Herrick working in Munich for RFE, the Naval Institute Press published *Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice*, a product of years of research at the Naval War College and before. While the book became a topic of debate within naval circles in the States, Herrick transferred in 1969 to Radio Liberty as a senior analyst on Soviet affairs.

Due to a sizable reduction-in-force at Radio Liberty, Herrick returned to America in 1972. Since then he has worked as a Soviet analyst for the Center for Naval Analysis (1972-74), Ketron Incorporated (1974-83), and Science Applications International Corporation (1983-89). While with SAIC Herrick completed his second book *Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkov's Inheritance (1917-1956)*. The Naval Institute Press published this work in 1988. In 1989, Herrick left SAIC to complete *Soviet Navy Theory and Policy: Gorshkov's Legacy (1956-1985)*. At the time of the interview, the Naval Institute Press had the final manuscript draft for review.

Subjects Covered

Growing up in Sayre, Pennsylvania - Selection to the USNA
Duty on *Mississippi* - Leyte Gulf - Kamikaze attack
VJ Day - New Orleans port call - Arrival to Norfolk
Lighter-than-air duties - Blimps off of carriers

Assigned to intelligence school - Russian language studies
Georgetown studies - Russian Institute at Columbia and Ph.D.

Orders to Moscow - Transit on *Belo Ostrov* - First spy caper
Reception in Moscow - Preconceived notions - Travels
Personalities - KGB - Lend Lease craft destruction
National days - Ambassador Bohlen - Reciprocity
Soviet Navy Observations - May Day flyover
Return via Trans-Siberian Railway - Stopover in Japan

Orders to ONI - Working for Admiral Frost
Intelligence requirements - Understanding Soviet Navy strategy
Good intelligence versus junk - Assignment to CinCPacFlt - Duties

Tour at Naval War College - Providing briefings and studies
Volunteering to give the 1964 Annual Soviet Seapower lecture
Reaction - Hanson Baldwin - The Admiral
Again in 1965 - Visit from Deputy ONI - Retirement
Publication of *Soviet Naval Strategy* - Reaction
Commentary on aspects of Soviet strategy - Old vs. New school

Work for Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty
Work for Center for Naval Analysis - Ketrion, Inc. - SAIC
Publication of *Gorshkov's Inheritance* and pending *Gorshkov's Legacy*

October 3, 1996

Winkler: It is October 3, 1996. I'm at Commander Herrick's residence in Annandale, Virginia. The first question I have for you is, talk a little bit about where you grew up, about your parents, your background and education.

Herrick: I grew up in Sayre, Pennsylvania, which is on the New York state border, about eighteen miles south of Elmira, New York, and thirty miles southwest of Binghamton. I was one of four kids. I was the third. I had an older brother and sister and a younger sister. Pretty normal childhood in a small town. Had a newspaper route, and didn't do particularly well in high school, until my last year when I earned all A's because I'd fallen madly in love with a lady who was the class valedictorian, and wanted her to like me. It didn't work.

The highlight of my young existence was when I got the letter with the results of the competitive exam saying that I'd been selected, and had my choice of West Point, the Naval Academy or the Coast Guard Academy. I chose the Naval Academy because it was 1940 and the Naval Academy was the only one of the three academies that had reduced its course from four to three years, and that sounded very attractive. So I opted for that and entered the Naval Academy in June of '41. Looking back, I apparently was the only person in the world who didn't realize we'd be involved in World War II before long. But I did attend the Academy. I wanted to get out and see some action, and I asked to be let out, and the offer was declined. They had a desperate need for officers at that time, so I had to stay.

My first ship was the battleship *Mississippi*, which I joined in the Admiralty Islands off New Guinea just before the invasion of Leyte Island and Second Battle of the Philippine Sea. In that greatest seabattle of the century, my ship was one of four battleships at the head of the T that sank a lot of the Jap fleet when it came up the Surigao Strait at night in a futile attempt to prevent our invasion of Leyte Island.

Winkler: What was your assignment on the *Mississippi*?

Herrick: At the time of that battle, I was the junior officer of the deck, so I had a good view of what was going on, and it was exciting. Our first main battery broadside was so powerful that it knocked my garrison cap off about fifty yards out to sea. It's an impressive thing to see a battleship move a far distance sideways. You realize the force of the guns.

After that, we went up to the Lingayen Gulf for the invasion of the main island of Luzon. We were taken under shore fire and made a hasty exit out of the Gulf. I happened to be up in the top radar spotting place, and the shells were whistling right over our head. If they'd ever lowered their aim one mil, they'd have blasted us right off the ship, so that was interesting. Other than that, we got hit with three kamikazes. The first one hit the side of the ship, and the only person killed may have been the only one there who was ready to meet his Maker. It was the chaplain. The second one also hit the side of the ship and hit the warrant officer's mess. The third one landed

right on my 40-millimeter gun, killing the three dozen man crew. Along with the others, I was officially buried at sea that afternoon. So the gunnery officer was rather surprised when I showed up in the wardroom that night. People were badly burned, and I looked like every other kid, so it was not surprising that they had made a mistake.

Winkler: Where were you?

Herrick: I was up on the bridge. That was my turn to be on watch on the bridge, fortunately.

Then at the end of the war, we were off Okinawa, too, for a long time, but at the end of war we went into Tokyo Bay and were near the *Missouri* when the surrender was signed. But just before that, I was assigned ensign in charge of the landing force that was going to go ashore at the foot of Mount Fujiyama, which we found out later was very well defended. There was no time to train beyond a little skeet shooting off the fantail so we wouldn't have made much of a dent on their defenses. It was a relief to hear that [President Harry S.] Truman made the decision to drop the atomic bomb, because it almost surely saved our lives.

The *Mississippi* came back home through the Panama Canal and up the Mississippi River into New Orleans, sledging its way through the silt up all the way because the channel wasn't deep enough. Admiral Halsey came down for a VJ Day parade. Since one of my collateral duties was photographic officer, I was assigned to get some photos of the parade. I took my first-class photographer's mate and went up on top the Roosevelt Hotel to get a good shot of "Bull" Halsey as he came down the street in his convertible. Unfortunately, my photographer's mate forgot to take off the internal lens cover in the camera, so we didn't have anything.

Right after that, my ship went into Norfolk. They had decided to make her into the first missile ship. They were hammering on the bulkheads day and night and the reverberations made sleep impossible. So I went to the wardroom and looked at the bulletin board to see what was available, and the only thing that was available right away was lighter-than-air, so I took that. I had to get off that ship before the noise drove me out of my mind.

Winkler: About what time was this?

Herrick: This was the summer of '46.

Winkler: Summer of '46.

Herrick: Two weeks later, as a matter of fact, I was up in Lakehurst. Lighter-than-air was fun. In order to learn how to land a blimp that had lost its engines, they taught you free-ballooning, so you know how to valve gas or dump sandbags, depending on whether you'd want to go down or go up. We had a lot of good times making free-balloon flights, and later went down to Key West in the Blimp Squadron there, and my first son was born there in the naval hospital.

Winkler: Go back a little bit. Obviously you're married. When did that happen?

Herrick: That happened in '47. I married my childhood sweetheart, and a boy, Bobby, was born while we were in Key West.

That was fun. We had some interesting flights during that period. Flew down to Cuba to Guantanamo and landed very light, which means you had to drive the blimp down with the engines until the ground crew could grab hold of the drag ropes. Another interesting thing was test piloting off carriers to see if it were practical to use airships across the ocean. It was a little hairy, especially when the wind veered and we were wiped off the side of the carrier. But we proved trans-Atlantic employment of blimps off carriers was practical. After that, I went to Russian language and intelligence school at Anacostia.

Winkler: When did you first study Russian?

Herrick: It preceded the six months intelligence school.

Winkler: The Russians during World War II, of course, were our allies. By the time you applied for Intelligence School, it was pretty clear that the Cold War was starting.

Herrick: Yes, the Cold War had started by then. The language school was a little distracting because the Navy band practiced right next to us, and you could usually hear them trumpeting their way along. But it was worth putting up with.

I went from there to a job in the Foreign Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Pentagon, and that was very interesting. While I was at the intelligence school I applied for and was accepted as a 1630 special duty only intelligence officer. The Foreign Branch was interesting. I started out as the analyst on the Black Sea and became aware at that time how much of the information is available from open sources rather than classified ones. A lot of other analysts seemed to have a fascination for classified material just because it was classified, regardless of its worth. And later on that awareness influenced my work a lot.

Winkler: Can you give examples of things that were available on the open sources.

Herrick: Mostly in publications. The Soviets were prolific publishers, books, and newspaper and journal articles, and it just seemed like most analysts never got around to reading them. I graduated with a qualification as a Russian translator and interpreter and had a better hold of the language than some of the other analysts.

Winkler: So these were articles that were written in Russia?

Herrick: Right. And the longer you read them, the more you could understand what they were getting at. They used surrogates a lot, historical surrogates or foreign-navy surrogates, when they were talking about themselves. It took me some time to learn that they usually were really talking about the Soviet Navy when they were talking about the U.S. Navy or the British Navy or talking

about what had happened in the past.

From there, the Navy sent me up to the Russian Institute at Columbia. I had gone to Georgetown night school in '50 to '53, and gotten the equivalent of a master's and was able to finish the course work and exam for a doctorate in international law and relations.

And then I went to Moscow as an assistant naval attaché, and that was really an exciting time that we could talk about almost at any length.

Winkler: What was the driver as far as getting orders to Moscow Was that something that you were approached on or the billet opened up?

Herrick: Since I had studied Russian, and that was sort of a hobby--and still is--I requested duty in Moscow. I probably would have gotten it anyway, because they didn't have that many Russian language-qualified officers in the Navy.

Winkler: Discuss your arrival in Moscow and some of the personalities and the embassy situation at that time. I guess this is during the time where Stalin had just passed on?

Herrick: Yes. This was December of '54 when I arrived there, and I left on the Trans-Siberian in late '57. I arrived at London and was scheduled to take a Russian ship called the *Belo Ostrov*, which means White Island, from London to Leningrad, through the English Channel and the Baltic.

In my farewell protocol call on the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Frost, his injunction was, "Get me some intelligence!" So as soon as I got aboard the *Belo Ostrov*, I walked around deck, and I noticed that the bridge was empty, and there was a light on through his open door down about six steps into the captain's cabin. I noticed there was a safe ajar there on the bridge, so I thought, "Well, I'll take a look at that and see if I can find anything useful."

I could hear the captain breathing, as a matter of fact, down the stairs, and the papers that looked most valuable at a hasty glance through the contents of the safe were some charts showing the Soviet mines in the Baltic. So I filched those and took them and sewed them in the lining of my wife's handbag in case they were missed. I found out later that they were Notices to Mariners that had been published worldwide! So my first venture in espionage was productive of nothing, except of a lot of good-natured ribbing.

We had a real rough passage both through the English Channel and the Baltic. An "old sea dog," as the Russians call him, and I were the only two non-crew members that were still on their feet and not sick in their cabins; and he helped me with my Russian for about a week.

When we went past Kotlin Island, where the Kronstadt main Baltic naval base was. I was standing in my cabin taking pictures through the porthole of the submarines and the ships that were there. The "old sea dog," who almost certainly was the resident KGB agent, must have

heard the click of my camera, because just as I lowered it below the porthole, his smiling face came in my window and said hello, and I said hello, and he went on. I suspect he knew what I was doing, but we liked each other, and I guess he wasn't going to give me a bad time.

As soon as I walked aboard the ship, before I even rifled the captain's safe, a Russian came up to me and said he was a mining engineer who was just returning to Russia from the British Embassy and he wanted to invite me for a drink. I said okay, and we went to one of those little windows that characterize Russian stores everywhere, just big enough for a hand to go through with a glass of something. He got two twelve-ounce tumblers full of vodka and handed me one and said, 'Now I'll teach you an old Russian tradition 'Do dnya'' (bottom's up).

I thought, "Oh, damn, this is a lethal dose of alcohol. What do I do?" Well, I drank it, and I followed him through the common room, where there was a jukebox that was playing, and I was right behind him, and he went, [slap], like that, and he fell right down on the floor. My cabin was about five feet away. I got in and stuck my finger down my throat, threw up, brought my camera and went back and took a picture of him still lying there. It somehow got lost. So I was sort of the hero of the ship. Everybody knew he was a KGB agent, except me, you know, and was trying to get me in trouble.

I had my wife and seven-year son, and they were sick. My son played a Russian boy a lot of chess and won several games. Later he played in a barbershop where I was getting a haircut and beat some thirty-five-year-old man. By the time they finished, they had an assembly about three deep all around the table.

Winkler: Where did your ship pull into?

Herrick: Leningrad. The naval attaché had been intimidated there. He had stepped into a doorway to light a cigarette, and the KGB jumped him and beat him up and took him inside and held a kangaroo court on him. They thought his lighter was something to take pictures with, and he was standing on the embankment across from the Sudomekh Shipyard, a submarine developmental yard where we would first see their new subs.

He'd been intimidated so much that he came up to Helsinki to warn me not to take any risks. Of course, Kronstadt lies between Helsinki and Leningrad, so I went ahead and took the pictures anyway, and he chewed me out for that. I walked into his office the next day, and there he was bragging to the British attaché about the pictures he'd gotten.

Winkler: Who was the U.S. attaché?

Herrick: Captain Willard Sweetser. He was an apple grower from Vermont. He spent most of his time traveling down to Alma-Ata, which is translated "Father of Apples." His great concern was to see how they grew apples and see what he could learn for his post-naval career.

The most complimentary thing on my fitness reports from him was, "He seems to know

something about Russia." I had graduated from the Russian Institute at Columbia and been exposed to Russian literature and music, politics and government, foreign and economic policy.

One of my early memories of my tour of duty in the Soviet Union, if I can regress a little bit: the day I arrived, Captain Sweetser had ordered the Marine colonel, who was the senior one of the four assistant naval attachés to get an apartment set up for me and get it stocked and get a maid and cook, and he did all that. And so out of gratitude I asked him to come to dinner with his wife, Jackie, and they did. I was mixing martinis at that time ten to one, and the colonel had a few too many. Dinner was delayed. That's why he had time to drink so many. He kept drinking. Just as the cook brought in the roast, the colonel stiffened up straight and slid right down under the table, all the way. His name, incidentally, was Colonel Stiff. And his wife never forgave me. and from that point on I mixed my martinis four to one, as a considerate host should.

During the meal, they delivered some of our household goods from the States. They brought in two things that were noteworthy. One was a spinet, that had the keys knocked to a 45-degree angle from normal and the other was a garbage can with a lid raised a good six inches above the top by frozen garbage! The Russian movers sat it right down in the living room by our dining room table. So that was a memorable evening

Winkler: You came to Russia, I assume, with some preconceived notions.

Herrick: I had one that was quickly dispelled. I thought most of the people were going to be hostile, but I only met a couple of hostile people the whole time I was there. Most Russians I met were more like us than any other nationality--friendly, loved their families and partying, and were very generous--would give you the shirt off their back.

There was a Foreign Service officer there named Nathaniel Davis, who later became famous for his involvement in Chile. We were friends from Columbia University and we went together on several occasions out to restaurants. This one time a fanatic Communist Party member came up and harangued us about being "agents of imperialism."

I traveled a lot, and old Colonel Chikin in the military foreign liaison office told me just before I left that I had traveled more than any Westerner since World War II. I had traveled a lot. I like to travel. It was interesting.

Preconceived notions, as I just said, the first was that Russians were much more friendly than I thought they would be, and they like Westerners. I remember getting on a tram in Baku, and because my clothes were different, the conductor, an attractive young lady, asked me where I was from, and I told her the United States. She simply couldn't believe it and said, "Oh, no, you must be an East German." That was as far west as her imagination could stretch at that point.

Some of the trips were interesting, and I could tell a lot of stories. One of the things that tickled me most, my predecessor, Commander John Palm was traveling down in the Ukraine, and he noticed that the KGB limousine that had been tailing him at a not very discreet distance had

broken down. So having a good sense of humor, he turned around and went back and waited three hours until they got it fixed and said, "All right, gang, let's go," and off he went. I thought that was so cool.

Winkler: Obviously you were tailed, but how much freedom did you have to travel around?

Herrick: There were places that were off limits. For example, we could go to Murmansk, but we couldn't go on to Severomorsk, where the Northern Fleet was based, or to any of the submarine bases further out on the Kola Peninsula.

We were kept away, fairly effectively, from large military installations. The law forbid taking pictures of even industrial plants, let alone military installations. What we did had to be done covertly. We were each equipped with a Minox camera, which was only about two inches long.

Winkler: Did you get to take many pictures?

Herrick: Oh, yes. One time, after a particularly productive trip to Leningrad, which, of course, was the main target for the Navy because it was the hub of all their naval activity, much more important than anywhere else in the country, I had about forty rolls of exposed film in a belt around my waist, and I was trying to cross a bridge over the Neva River to a submarine school. I saw a gang of men waiting for me and realized that I was going to be stopped by the usual groups of "outraged citizens." Just fortunately at that time a tram came along, and I got on it. As it came down over the hump of the bridge it picked up speed, enough so the guys couldn't jump on, so I just waved at them and went on. It was like a game of cops and robbers.

One of the more amusing situations involved an officer named Jeff from the Canadian Embassy. He said, and I believe him, that his government had exiled him permanently to Moscow. After I left, he did something so flagrant they had to declare him *persona non grata*. He tried to climb the walls of the Kirov Shipyard. I mean, he did it deliberately, obviously, to get back home. He had been in the Soviet Union for eight or ten years, I think, by that time, and was desperate to get home.

But he was a weird duck. He knew Chinese, and he had a bad back, so he'd sleep on a 45 degree inclined board. We went on a train out to Ufa on the Kama River--and again, we were the first Westerners to ever reach there--and they closed a whole big restaurant to the public, one which must have seated 200 people, I guess. It was circular, and it had windows all the way around it. There must have been about thirty windows. There was a staff of about twenty young ladies to wait on the two of us, if you can imagine that, and Jeff, the damn fool, got up, took a newspaper, and went around the windows and swatted flies. When he came back, I said, "Jeff, you son of a bitch, you're really gratuitously offending these nice people." He just laughed. That's the last time I traveled with him.

A much more compatible traveler was a Brit named Humphrey James. I liked his Cadbury

chocolates, which I couldn't get, and he liked my Cheese Whiz, which he couldn't get. So we did quite a bit of traveling together. He was very innovative in his intelligence collection. One of the prized trophies was a Soviet telephone book, because they weren't available in any public places. So Humphrey ingeniously thought of just going into the Telephone Exchange and asking for one. He actually managed to get one and got a half a block away before the KGB stopped him and wrested it out of his hands.

We went down to Baku together. The Soviet Navy was doing some research, test and development on ships down there, with ships radar particularly, and I was looking at one of them through a pair of binoculars, and the first thing I knew, a pair of Russian eyes are staring at me through the end of the binoculars. The KGB agent was checking to see if there was a camera built into the binocular lens. Fortunately, there wasn't, and otherwise the surveillance was discreet.

After Sweetser left, he was replaced as the U.S. Naval Attaché by Captain Leonard Morse. We called him "Red." He was a bachelor who was supporting his brother and thirteen children out in Chicago. He was an amazing man in many ways. I accompanied him on a trip up to Murmansk to go out into the Kola Gulf to witness the sinking of some Lend-Lease craft so the Russians wouldn't have to pay us for them, mostly minesweepers and PT boats. I remember we had for breakfast one time with our Russian hosts the worst brandy I've ever tasted in my life and raw fish! It was tough sledding but I managed to eat enough and drink enough not to offend any of the hosts. The weather was frigid but we witnessed the sinking of the ships. The Northern Fleet naval people were accustomed to drinking 100 proof Stolichnaya vodka to ward off the sub-zero weather out in the Kola Gulf and were amused that my first shot of their vodka gave me the hiccups.

Later Captain Morse and I went out on a Soviet destroyer in the Pacific Fleet to witness the sinking of more Lend-Lease craft off Sakhalin Island. They deliberately doped the drinks of the captain and myself. I can remember standing there and watching my glass slip out of my hand before I passed out. We had diplomatic cards which were encased in plastic. I noted later that mine had been carefully cut up and glued back together, obviously looking for intelligence collection notes.

Winkler: How was your relations as far as the Soviet naval ministry was concerned?

Herrick: We had very little contact with them. Most of our contact was done through the office for service to foreigners and diplomats. It was called Burobin (Bureau for Foreigners).

Every country had its National Day celebration, like our 4th of July, and when we were in town, attendance was obligatory. My job was to go down a half an hour early and memorize the names, these multi-syllable names of people from India and other places, so that when the Naval Attaché came down I could introduce him to them. I'd always considered I had a terrible memory, but I found out I could remember these names almost perfectly. I never could later, so I guess it's more a matter of motivation than memory capacity.

Winkler: So it was at these National Days where you actually had some interface with Soviets.

Herrick: Yes. There would often be some senior naval officers there. We had a reception at Spasso House on the 4th of July 1955, to which Khrushchev came, and also Admiral Gorshkov made his first appearance as acting Commander in Chief of the Navy.

Anyway, Philip Mosely, who'd been my Ph.D. mentor at Columbia, was there. He had come over and was staying with me, and he told me he had arranged to introduce me to Khrushchev. But standing fifteen feet away, I got trapped into translating for Hanson Baldwin, the then military editor of the *New York Times*, and Marshal [Ivan] Konev, so I never did get over there for the half hour or so that Khrushchev was there. But I did meet [Anastas] Mikoyan when he first came in and talked to him for a minute.

The highlight of my talk with Gorshkov came when the French naval attaché came up and slapped me on the shoulder and said, "Admiral Gorshkov, don't pay any attention to Herrick. He's just a broken-down blimp pilot." Reflecting the professionalism of Admiral Gorshkov, he said, "Ah, but blimps are marvelous antisubmarine warfare vehicles."

Winkler: Our ambassador at this time period was "Chip" Bohlen -I've read his book, *Eyewitness to History*.

Herrick: Mosely had written a letter introducing me to him, but it had no noticeable influence on anything I did until the very end. When I was scheduled to leave, he held a reception for me, the only one for any military officer during Bohlen's whole tour, and I'm sure that was due to Mosely's influence. They were close friends-which was very nice for me.

Winkler: During this time period, as far as the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, you had a, I guess it's a political "thaw" period. You had the summit in Geneva, but you also had the incidents along the perimeter of the Soviet Union, where you had some shootings down of U.S. aircraft. Describe some of those global events and how that may have affected your situation in Moscow.

Herrick: Anything I'd say would be retrospective, based on what I've learned since. We were so absorbed in our constant traveling, that we didn't read any newspapers regularly. We got newscasts about the Soviet Union, but not much about world events. I guess I was probably totally oblivious to what was going on most of that time. We were just really focused on our work and on some of the high jinks.

Ambassador Bohlen had a good sense of humor. The KGB post to keep the embassy personnel under observation was in the basement of the building right across the street. He decided one time he wanted to see what their total capacity was, so he had us all emerge from the embassy at once. Would you believe it, we were all tailed! There must have been hundreds of thousands of hours that their agents just sat over there and played chess and did whatever and

weren't utilized, because very few of us went out at one time.

We heard before we left Washington that there was a little boy at the American Embassy in Moscow who was a son of the caretaker, so we took him a present, which was a mistake, but we didn't know. We took it to his house one night, and we knocked on the door and explained what we were doing, and the father said thank you and closed the door. Two months later he showed up with a little wooden train for my son, who was about seven at the time, and I realized that the man must have spent a month's wages on that. So I had made a real mistake.

Another Russian custom is that if you admire any paintings or anything in their house, they're obliged to give it to you by custom, no matter how much it hurts.

Winkler: I guess reciprocity is very important. If you give a gift, there's an obligation.

Herrick: That's true, much like the Germans. They'll take you out for dinner, and then they'll ask you when you're going to take them out in return. I found that out by living there for eight years later on.

Winkler: Your wife and son, growing up, how many years were you there?

Herrick: A little over two.

Winkler: So that must have been a very interesting experience for them.

Herrick: Yes. I had taken a television to Moscow. It was a RCA set, that cost \$700 to convert to Russian current, more than the set cost. Our maid, Katya was absolutely fascinated by it.

After warning Katya three times that when we came in with guests, she had to vacate the living room, yet she still wouldn't do so. So, I finally canned her, knowing we would be maidless for a long period, and so it was for several months. I saw her again only once: she was secretary to the Afghan ambassador! She'd apparently gotten a good promotion for her work in informing on us.

Katya was an interesting woman. She was a Latvian and told us right off that her two children were being held hostage in Latvia for her performance in keeping track of us and that she had to report to the KGB every week. She had had ambitions to be an actress, but for awhile she had lived down at the American house where the U.S. enlisted men lived and had caught a ball on the nose playing softball, and that ended her aspirations. At one point she declared, "Mrs. Herrick, you look very tired. Why don't you go down and vacation on the Black Sea, and I will take care of Mr. Herrick" You could imagine my wife's reaction to that one. Needless to say, she never went.

Winkler: I guess she must have gotten some good information.

Herrick: There wasn't really much to get.

Winkler: You didn't talk in your sleep, did you?

Herrick: I don't think so. Ambassador Bohlen, at that time found a wiretap in his bedpost. He and his wife used to talk over the business of the day, and he was quite upset about having been wiretapped in such a way.

He thought they were beaming harmful rays at us from across the street, and there was a big to-do about that years later. They went back and checked everybody's health records to see if anybody had gotten sick from radiation, but I don't think there were any conclusive results. We did have electronic intercept gear that the Army attaché ran up on the fourth floor where we had our offices, and they were probably trying to negate its activities.

Winkler: What were your observations of the Soviet Navy at the time that led you to draw your later conclusions about its role? I guess this is a very transitional period, which you talk about in your book about the differences between the Old School and the Young School of Soviet naval strategy.

Herrick: There weren't any overt signs of naval development that early on. It was still quite a few years before their building program got underway. Theory still had it that Stalin's "Principles of War" were most important.

Most of what I learned about the Soviet Navy, other than just seeing some of their ships and their people, I learned later, and mostly from open Soviet literature. They wrote voluminously. I have an enormous library in here of just Russian materials, a whole basement room full, seventeen bookcases full of it, which I willed to the Office of Naval Intelligence, at their request, because they don't have anything comparable.

I had a couple of interesting experiences that might give you some insight. When I went out on a minesweeper in Kola Gulf to sink the Lend-Lease craft that I told you about, there was a young officer, probably in his early thirties--from the Main Navy Staff. He and the captain of the minesweeper were aboard and the contrast between the two of them was stark. The Navy staff officer was bright and sharp, and it was so clear that the captain was just a timeserver. It was hard to find anything admirable about him, put it that way. I guess you could call him a goof-off. I thought then that the Navy must have a poor selection system to ever pick anybody like him as captain of any ship. But I learned later that an awful lot of Soviet naval officers were not well motivated. They were mainly looking out for themselves and their families because living conditions were so bad for everybody in the Soviet armed forces.

One thing always amazed me at the National Day receptions. Even the high Soviet dignitaries, as soon as they threw open the door where the food was, would all rush in and grab all the oranges for their grandkids. That was just standard practice. Everybody expected it. They all wanted to take home an orange, because they were unavailable otherwise, even though they

grew them down in the Black Sea area.

Winkler: Speaking of celebrations, there is a story which led to the belief about the bomber gap, where at a May Day or October celebration they had a big military parade and fly-by. Were you there at that time?

Herrick: Yes. We used to go up on the roof of the embassy and take pictures of the planes as they flew over us. The Air Attaché naturally was in charge of that matter. In fact, somewhere I have a letter of appreciation from him for helping to take photos of the bombers.

Winkler: The story was that we were counting the same bombers being flown over more than once and that led to a miscalculation.

Herrick: Yes. It was like the Potemkin Village effort to mislead observers. But I think our attaché detected that at the time.

We had an interesting assistant naval attaché at the embassy named Charles Winfield Tuck who was a full blooded Cherokee Indian. He detected the first missile site in the Soviet Union, outside of Moscow, one which was near Kiev. The Air Force refused steadfastly to believe him, but a year and a half later they found the missile site exactly as Charlie had reported. I don't know whether it was his Indian skills as an observer that helped him or what it was, but the Air attaché flew over that place several times and never could spot the site.

A little personal note there, Tuck's wife wouldn't go with him to Moscow, and he got involved in an affair with a secretary named Jeannie, that he subsequently married, or at least who had a baby of his. He had had to get some kind of special authorization from the Pope, I guess, to marry her, to annul his first marriage.

But anyway, he was an extremely nice guy, and the KGB tried their damndest to entrap him. They gave him the most inviting maid you ever saw in your life. She must have been the pride of Russian womanhood. But Charlie was so much in love with Jeannie that he didn't fall in their trap, unlike some of the Marines in the embassy who did. I guess that was her extracurricular assignment, and she did get some of them in trouble, including one of the attachés, as I remember.

Winkler: You left there what year? About '56, '57?

Herrick: In '57.

Winkler: This is just before Sputnik.

Herrick: Yes. I left on the Trans-Siberian railroad with my wife and seven year-old son, and to fill up the compartment so we could take pictures on the way out, we took a Marine corporal along with us.

One of the freshest memories was when we were going by the airport at Chita, way out in Siberia. They had a big bomber base there, and I knew four KGB agents were in the next compartment and would be listening to us, so I didn't say anything. But as I was taking pictures of the Chita bomber base, with a lot of bombers on it, my son innocently said, "Daddy, why are you counting the haystacks?" The KGB agents were in my compartment ten seconds later. Somehow I managed to get the camera hidden, and they didn't find it in their search. I don't remember how I did that. But I was prepared for that eventuality. So we got those pictures of the bombers at Chita back safely.

And apparently at that time there were four little old ladies in tennis shoes at CIA who did nothing but try to work out the geography of the Soviet Union and the location of things by their kilometer markers. For the ten days of the trip, I kept track of kilometer markers for the 11,000 kilometers.

At Artem, a six-man Soviet Navy shore patrol detail ensured that we left the train so I wouldn't be able to go into the "closed" city of Vladivostok where the main base of the Soviet Pacific Fleet was located. Instead we were shunted off to the commercial-shipping port of Nakhodka. I was chased down by a border guard on horseback in the hills overlooking the port area, which gave a good view of the layout of the port. I invoked diplomatic immunity to keep him from searching me but he persisted--unsuccessfully--in trying to persuade me to accompany him to the border guard station.

Catching a ride to Japan on a British freighter, we arrived at the Japanese port of Nagasaki. I took the opportunity to climb a hill to gain a view of the devastation of the city from our atom bombing. The city was still leveled to the ground, an awesome reminder of the folly of war between supposedly civilized nations.

Winkler: So after your tour in Moscow, then what happened?

Herrick: From Moscow, I came back and was assigned to the Intelligence Collections Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Pentagon again, and I was responsible not only for the Soviet Union, but all of the East European countries, Greece and Turkey, and the Scandinavian countries. I was charged with initiating programs of collection by whatever means were available. I enjoyed that work a lot.

One humorous aspect resulted from having to have our recommended collection projects approved by the Director of Naval Intelligence, so we'd write them up and send them in to him, and mine were always so complicated it seemed to me that it took at least four or five pages. One time, after two years or so, one project was so simple I managed to get it on one page, and when I gave it to Admiral Frost, who was a wonderful, benign, nice man, he approved it, and as I was going out he said, "By the way, Herrick, I want to congratulate you for complying with memorandum number so-and-so." Well, I had to go back and look up memorandum so-and-so, which said, "All memos on collection will be one page or less!" He'd endured dozens of longer ones without ever saying a word until I finally did one right.

Winkler: How would an intelligence requirement be generated? It wouldn't be you just sitting there thinking, "I think we need to do this."

Herrick: No. A lot times they were generated by learning a little more about something that would indicate new aspects that you might not have thought about before or new technologies the USSR was developing. And of course, the U.S. fleets often submitted requirements, things they really needed to know, and we gave a lot of attention to that. Some requirements were generated by the National Intelligence Estimates. It would become obvious there were things that we didn't know that we should know, and that generated some requirements. Also, the CIA levied many requirements on naval intelligence.

Winkler: Where was the greatest need for intelligence? Would it be, for example, technologies, their submarine forces, their intentions?

Herrick: Mostly analysts felt that their submarine force was a top priority need. The thing that always fascinated me was their strategy, what the hell were they going to do if they went to war? That question was never really resolved. We knew their ballistic missile submarines could be used if they dared risk retaliation, but even then, there was the doubt they might be planning to hold them in reserve as a fleet in being to influence the outcome of the war. It was obvious that their surface fleet, without aircraft carriers, couldn't begin to operate outside their own coastal waters.

As I tried to show in my writings, we did not understand what they were doing at all. We pictured them in our own image, coming out to sea and getting ready to fight us, and some people, particularly the Navy, in its effort to get larger appropriations, or at least ensure the big budget level they had, felt it necessary to exaggerate the threat. There was always talk about the Soviet submarine force coming to sink us. Is this a good point to talk about the War College experience?

Winkler: I guess if there are some other things we want to touch base on with your period back in the Pentagon, any other additional insights. One thing is, now you're back here and you're having an opportunity to--it gives you a retrospective on your two years over in the Soviet Union. Were there revelations, now that you had an opportunity to sit back and see the big picture, of something that, it goes back and says, "Oh, okay, that's what the significance was when I was at such and such a place."

Herrick: No, not really. One of the things I remember, we had a civilian in our office in Munich, Germany, named Val Richly. He was a character. When he came to this country on business, he would swish around the corridors of the Pentagon in a cloak, surely the only individual that ever did that. I came into my office one morning to find him digging in my safe, and I said, "What are you looking for, Val?" He said, "I was trying to find those papers incriminating me for diamond smuggling."

This man passed out huge amounts of chocolate, cigarettes, and women's lingerie to the females in Munich. In return he was getting huge amounts of intelligence, but most of it was just

junk. He was running a production belt to crank out as many reports as he could. I spent a very unpleasant time with him one time that morning telling him we wanted some quality and much less quantity. He was just inundating the analysts with mostly worthless paper.

Winkler: That's a problem. Sometimes too much material actually can be--

Herrick: Self-defeating, yes. I don't know that he improved greatly after that, but at least I tried.

Winkler: He worked for ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence] at the time?

Herrick: Yes. He was under contract to ONI. He was just a guy who was there in Munich and took advantage of the situation to build an empire for himself.

Winkler: How long did you have this assignment in the Pentagon?

Herrick: For a normal three-year tour.

Winkler: So that takes you to about 1960?

Herrick: Yes. Next I was assigned to the staff of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. My job was head of the Intelligence Collection Branch, with three officers, one each to handle submarine, air, and surface ship intelligence collection. The subs and planes were employed largely for surveillance of Soviet Pacific Fleet maneuvers and bases, while surface ships monitored the telemetry of Soviet missiles fired into the USSR's Pacific test ranges.

After two years I was selected to attend the Naval War College where I was Staff Intelligence Officer for three years. The duties were fairly light. I only had to give an hour long briefing on Friday morning to the assembled students covering current intelligence. That allowed me time to take both the Command and Staff junior course and the Naval Warfare senior course.

Winkler: So your job on the Naval War College staff was to prepare a weekly briefing on the world situation?

Herrick: Right. On whatever intelligence's insights were. The briefing could be given at the top-secret level, so almost everything could be included that could be of interest to an audience of naval officers and a few civilians from State and CIA.

During that time, I heard a commander give a lecture on the Soviet Navy that I thought was deplorable. It was one of those "they're-coming-to-get-us" pitches. I had just finished my research on Soviet naval strategy up to 1941 for my doctorate at Columbia, and it was obvious to me that the commander was all wet, that he was just kowtowing to the party line. So I volunteered to give the talk for the following year, the annual lecture on "Soviet Seapower."

When the time came to give the lecture, I concluded that "as late as '41, there wasn't a

any trace of an offensive strategy on their part.” Hanson Baldwin, the long-time military editor of the *New York Times* and an earlier graduate of the Naval Academy, was there. I hadn't seen him since I'd interpreted for him and Marshal Konev in Moscow in 1955. When I finished Baldwin called out: “You know Herrick that I disagree with you.” I merely replied: “Yes I know Sir,” and left the podium.

After the lecture, as soon as the admiral could get free of Baldwin, he called me into his office. Instead of asking me to sit down and have a cup of coffee like he usually did, he kept me standing at attention. He pulled a manuscript out of his desk drawer and he said, “Now here's what we believe,” and he handed it to me.

I took a couple of minutes and looked it over. It was an article he'd submitted to *Foreign Affairs*, which was never published, fortunately, since it was the same old stuff that the Soviets had a big navy and offensive naval strategy. I said, “Admiral, I believed that as an article of faith when I started this research, but the evidence is just overwhelming that their strategy is defensive.” The admiral just stared at me for a long second, and said, “You may go.”

So the next year I'd finished my research, and I really laid it on in great detail. Soon after that I was passed over for promotion to captain. The Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Rufus Taylor, on a trip up to Newport from Washington, told me, “If you behave yourself, we'll promote you next year.”

I replied, “I've already accepted a job as deputy director for Soviet area affairs analysis at Radio Free Europe (RFE) in Munich and I'll be retiring shortly.” That was that.

A friend of mine from the Russian Institute was the Director of Communist Area Affairs Analyses at RFE and had offered me the job as his deputy, and I really wanted to take it. I was quite happy to go.

When I finally finished my dissertation and it was published, after being delayed several years, the *New York Times* carried an article on March 5, 1966, saying publication had been delayed because of objections. The man who was designated by the Chief of Naval Operations at that time to look it over thought it would be against the Navy's interest to publish something saying that the Soviet Navy was defensive.

They called me regarding what they said about it in the front of it, and they did put in a bookmark to call people's attention to the foreword, which said they didn't believe a word of what I had written.

Winkler: The assessment, one of the things you mentioned, you gave great credibility to the open source material, and I think this is an important point for future researchers on the period. Why did you find the open source material so credible?

Herrick: It was more comprehensive, to begin with, and once you understood the Soviet naval

system of surrogate writing, it became pretty transparent what they were thinking about their wartime naval strategy. I once went up to CIA at their request and explained to their analysts about surrogates, because it's not readily apparent. We had one good defector, Nick Shadvin, who came out in the mid-fifties and told us a lot about the Soviet Navy. Everything he said tended to confirm the fact that the Navy was defensive.

Winkler: He's the fellow you refer to in the book as "former Soviet naval officer."

Herrick: Yes. There's a real interesting story about him. *Reader's Digest* interviewed several of us who knew Nick and published a book called *Shadvin*. I had been called back to from Hawaii to interrogate him, and we became great friends. In '75 he disappeared in Vienna; abducted by Soviet agents, and there are conflicting stories how that happened, even one story recently has it that he is still alive in Moscow, after having been in prison for some years after he went back, but you don't know.

Winkler: So he confirmed many things which you were able to extract from the open source literature.

Herrick: Yes.

Winkler: As far as the Naval War College students themselves, do you think there was any influence there or do you think you raised some eyebrows?

Herrick: Probably not at that time, but I think later on, after the book was published, the *Naval Institute Proceedings*, carried several dozen reader's letters about it for over a year. Many book reviews discussed the issue, and there were people strongly for it and strongly against it. It was an extensive debate. I can't remember any other subject that had been given that sort of attention for so long. Admiral Felt, who was CinCPac at that time, got up in a Congressional hearing and denounced the view of "some people" that the Soviet Navy was defensive.

As you probably know, in classical theory the submarine, at least before it became a ballistic missile submarine, was a defensive weapon of the weaker naval power, used mostly against merchant shipping. That's why I've always stressed in my writings that until the Soviet Navy could take air power to sea on aircraft carriers so it could fight on the oceans, it couldn't be considered a first-rate surface naval power.

Winkler: Do you think part of the problem was what one's definition of defensive was?

Herrick: Oh, yes, no doubt about it. That's a source of great confusion. You have to say they're defensive in a strategic, not tactical sense. However, the Russians had a third category, "operational art," which added to the confusion.

Winkler: I'm learning a bit of that right now in my War College classes. A lot of thinking emanated from the Soviet Union, especially in the 1930s, on operational art. Once you left

the Navy, did you continue to follow the progress of the Soviet Navy through your studies?

Herrick: Yes, I did.

Winkler: In the 1960s there was one thesis that the Cuban missile crisis provided the impetus for the Soviet Navy to go to sea while another thesis stated that the United States deploying the SSBNs was the real motivator.

Herrick: No question about that latter having been the major factor. They couldn't really do much against the ballistic missile submarines of the U.S., U.K., and France except build a countervailing force of SSBNs. Gorshkov said in one of his articles in February '73, that the USSR's ballistic missile submarines were built as a counterforce to our SSBNs, because they were unable to conduct antisubmarine warfare in the open ocean, again because they couldn't fight a naval engagement in the open ocean without aircraft carriers, without any air power at sea to gain and maintain command of the sea.

Winkler: Well, you had some bigger ships coming on, the *Kyndas* and then the *Krestas* and so on, and then the Kiev class. But it's only in the late '80s when they started constructing real aircraft carriers instead of just VTOL carriers. As far as your model, though, do you see a consistency as far as the Soviet Navy being a defensive force, or with regard to the different exercises, the Okeans, for example, in '70 and '75, do you see advancements there?

Herrick: As far as their major naval maneuvers, they seemed to be tactically defensive in Okean '70 and '75. I think Gorshkov was probably a closet Mahanian, and probably the naval officer corps always was basically Old School oriented and from the early '20s wanted to build a navy like the United States and England, but the Army blocked Navy efforts every time. Finally, in the '70s, when it was too late, the Navy was finally authorized to start building real carriers. It was really a case of too little too late. As a U.S. Navy man, one feels sorry for the Soviet Navy, having had such bad luck at being under the thumb of an Armed Forces General Staff dominated by the Army.

Winkler: The Russians boasted Soviet naval missiles eliminated the need for aircraft carriers, and that became a concern for many of us, especially after the Israeli-destroyer *Eilat* was sunk by a Soviet missiles in the '67 war.

Herrick: Nuclear weapons and missiles must have seemed heaven sent to the Soviet Navy. It clearly gave them the hope of being able to equalize forces. They wrote that even small boats, subs or planes could sink a carrier with missiles. They were totally dependent on nuclear-missile weapons and platforms, and they knew that if they tried to fight a conventional war, they would be wiped out in short order. But their nuclear weapons and nuclear missiles gave them a chance, a fighting chance anyway.

Winkler: So there was a heavy deployment of these surface-to-surface nuclear missiles?

Herrick: Yes. And sub and plane-launched missiles and nuclear mines and all the kind of terrorist and guerrilla tactics that they thought might be effective.

Winkler: You mentioned that these are still strategically defensive moves, yet this constitutes a threat to our forces. They have an objective of protecting the flanks of the Soviet Army, mainly in Europe, and obviously our Navy's job is to support NATO forces. Why do you think your thesis was really such a threat in the Navy's budgeting process?

Herrick: Mostly from the violent reaction to it and the objective factors of the situation. Congressmen and Senators have traditionally had to have their pants scared off to really give generous appropriations for the military, and the "Soviet naval threat," as portrayed by our naval commanders, was always the key to appropriations. I've read enough about that over forty years to have an awareness of the matter, and I could see how 'the threat' was invariably grossly exaggerated or misleadingly presented, including by some of our Directors of Naval Intelligence. They would stress the submarine threat and not talk about the big picture including the Soviet Navy's weaknesses.

Ten years after my book was written, there was an article in the *Naval Institute Proceedings* written by James Westwood, an intelligence analyst who had worked at the National Security Agency (NSA) and was well informed on all NSA knew about the Soviet Navy.

Winkler: Was this the article that revisited your book?

Herrick: Yes. That was the "Naval Strategy Revisited" article. Have you seen that article?

Winkler: A long time ago.

Herrick: That article concluded that "Herrick was right then, and he's right now."

Winkler: Yes. And that generated a few responses, too.

Herrick: Yes, as late as '78. This extremely well-informed analyst had access to communications-intercept intelligence from NSA that I didn't that showed conclusively that the Soviet Navy basically was strategically defensive.

Winkler: Leaving the Navy, you then worked in various positions. How many years did you work as an analyst in Munich?

Herrick: I was three years with Radio Free Europe (RFE) and then three years with Radio Liberty (RL), the difference being there that Radio Liberty broadcasted only to the Soviet Union and RFE broadcasted only to Eastern Europe including news about the Soviet Union.

Winkler: What were your duties for those stations?

Herrick: Writing reports. We had what we called the news budget, which was just daily stacks of paper that had reports from every wire service in the world including from China, the Middle East, and South America. Our job was to go through the news budget and write up whatever new developments we found. Some of the reports were broadcasted. I didn't know until some senator named Case blew the whistle on Radio Free Europe in the U.S. Senate that it was a CIA-funded operation, and it was taking donations from people to help keep RFE's cover, make it credible. I thought I was going to get my throat slit over that, because my barber up in Appalachian, New York, where my sister lives, was a poor man from Poland with a large family who had been donating every year to Radio Free Europe because he was East European and thought it was a very worthy cause. He found out that it was a sham, so when I came into his shop for a haircut, he started fingering his razor, looking at me, questioningly. I thought, "My God, he's going to cut my throat." But he didn't, of course. But that was an eye-opener to me. I had no idea that RFE had government connections. Their cover fooled me. I didn't know anything about Radio Liberty at that time, but Radio Free Europe did take donations, solicit donations from everybody in the country to help the cause.

Winkler: As far as the news you broadcast, you weren't broadcasting propaganda, from your perspective.

Herrick: No. They were honest and factual. I would say perhaps a fifth of our reports were used for broadcasting. The whole idea of both radios were to be a field assembly point and clearinghouse for raw data, and the reports we wrote were widely disseminated to universities and others, as well as to CIA and were useful for research on the USSR and East European countries.

Winkler: You were writing reports on things that were happening in the Eastern Bloc?

Herrick: Yes. At one point, I wrote a series of reports on Czechoslovakia in '68, before the Russians marched in, and my last report a month before concluded that it was very unlikely that the Soviets wouldn't resort to force. That was very clear to people at RFE, but nobody had said it yet publicly.

Winkler: What you meant is, it was very likely that the Soviets would resort to force.

Herrick: Yes.

Winkler: You saw all the warning signs.

Herrick: Yes. The matter seemed to be insoluble to Soviet interests by other means.

Winkler: Now when did you join Radio Liberty?

Herrick: I transferred to Radio Liberty (RL) in 1969 as a senior analyst on Soviet affairs. This was even more rewarding since the work was directly in my specialty on Soviet studies and I worked there until my job was terminated in March 1972 by a sizable reduction-in-force, my

French assistant being well-trained to replace me and at a pay scale for non-Americans one-fourth my salary and allowances.

Winkler: So then what happened with your career?

Herrick: Three months later, in the summer of '72, I was back in the U.S., employed as an analyst on the Soviet Navy by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) in Arlington, Virginia. This involved the research and writing of numerous studies and the attendance at many conferences on Soviet affairs.

In June 1974, having lost my position with CNA in another reduction-in-force, I went to work as a Soviet analyst for Ketron, Inc., a Navy-oriented think tank in Rosslyn, Virginia. This continued to also require participation in frequent conferences on Soviet affairs, especially on the Soviet Navy.

In September 1983, I resigned my job with Ketron to take a much better-paying position as a senior Soviet analyst with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in McLean, Virginia. The work was similar to that of CNA and Ketron, including participation in numerous conferences on Soviet matters. After a year I was awarded a stock bonus for good performance.

In February 1989, I resigned from SAIC to work full time on researching and writing a sequel to my second book, one entitled *Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkov's Inheritance (1917-1956)* that had just been published by the U.S. Naval Institute. This third book is to be titled *Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkov's Legacy (1956-1985)* and to cover the nearly thirty years that Admiral Gorshkov had served as commander in chief of the Soviet Navy and transformed it from a coastal force to a predominantly submarine navy. This took me until '95 when I submitted the first draft to the Naval Institute Press. It was sent out to reviewers, a process that required almost a year. After four months of my making recommended changes, the second draft was resubmitted. At present I am waiting to hear further from the Naval Institute Press. If the book draft is approved for publication by the Institute Press's board of directors, its publishing schedule is such that the book would appear no earlier than late '98.

Winkler: That's something to look forward to. Good luck! Thank so much for your time.

