

Oral History

Bernard M. Hollander

**Duty on Subchasers (SCs)
during World War II**

**Interview by
David F. Winkler
Naval Historical Foundation**

June 18, 1997

June 22, 1997




**Oral History Program
Naval Historical Center
1997**

Preface

How Bernard Hollander became the subject of the Naval Historical Foundation Oral History Program is almost as extraordinary as the narrative he presents. While recently traveling to the northwest, he came across a tale about a Japanese submarine that launched an aircraft against the U.S. mainland during World War II. Deciding to check on the validity of the story, Mr. Hollander found several references to the ship he commanded, the SC 1066, in Samuel Eliot Morison's *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II*. Much to his surprise, Morison's account of the events that preceded the landings of Americans at Eniwetok stated that the SC 1066 "took station off the wrong islet" and that "Admiral Hill, regarding the performance of SC 1066 as 'completely unsatisfactory' relieved the skipper of his command." Since Mr. Hollander was the skipper in question, he knew that this history was incorrect, and sought to rectify this published inaccuracy, starting with a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, in which he requested that, although it was more than 50 years after the event, the record be corrected. Mr. Hollander's request was funneled to the Director of Naval History, Dr. William S. Dudley and his Head of the Operational Archives Branch, Mr. Bernard Cavalcante. Neither could identify any documents supportive of Morison's contention. In contrast, as shown by the correspondence enclosed in appendix A, the records clearly supported Mr. Hollander's account that SC 1066 had performed its duties well and, in fact, had received commendatory reports to that effect.

Impressed with his thoroughness for detail, Dr. Dudley thought that Mr. Hollander could be an outstanding subject for an oral interview. Mr. Hollander graciously accepted the Historical Center's offer. Dr. Dudley's intuition proved correct. Besides detailing the attack on Eniwetok to rectify the record, Mr. Hollander paints a verbal picture of life on board one of the smallest commissioned vessels in the United States Navy during World War II. To prepare for the interview and jog his memory, Mr. Hollander reviewed hundreds of pages of deck logs, combat reports, official and personal correspondence, scrap books, and other records. Consequently, Mr. Hollander provides an accuracy unique in oral history. For his prior research and his follow-up review and editing of the transcript, we are most grateful.

David F. Winkler
Oral Historian
October 1997



Bernard M. Hollander

Bernard M. Hollander was born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland, where he was graduated from Baltimore City College (a high school) in 1933. He received a B.S. degree in Economics from Haverford College in 1937, and an MBA degree in Social Control of Business at the University of Chicago in 1938. From 1939 until the outbreak of World War II, Mr. Hollander was employed at Columbia Broadcasting System in New York as a research assistant and plans writer under Dr. Frank Stanton, then CBS Director of Research.

In December 1941, he resigned to serve in the Navy's office of cable censorship in New York, and was commissioned as an Ensign in the Naval Reserve in May 1942. Shortly thereafter, he was transferred to Northwestern University in Chicago and after completing an indoctrination course for Navy deck officers there, he received further training for sea duty at the Navy's Local Defense School in South Boston, Massachusetts, and at Sub Chaser Training Center in Miami, Florida, from which he was assigned as Third Officer on USS *SC 1065* during its shakedown at S.C.T.C.

In April 1943, after transiting the Panama Canal, the *SC 1065* joined the Western Sea Frontier's San Francisco Patrol Force, engaging in anti-submarine patrols out of San Francisco and Monterey, California. In November 1943, Lieutenant (jg) Hollander, who had by then become Commanding Officer of *SC 1065*, swapped commands with the Captain of its sister ship, USS *SC 1066*, which was about to depart for Pearl Harbor for a new assignment in the Hawaiian Sea Frontier. Thereafter, the *SC 1066* acted as the Head Beachmaster's control vessel during the capture of the Marshall Islands in January-February 1944, and carried out similar duties during the assault on Saipan in the Marianas Islands in June 1944.

Following Lieutenant (jg) Hollander's detachment from the *SC 1066* in July 1944 for reassignment at S.C.T.C. (now Naval Training Center) in Miami, he was named Navigator of the newly constructed USS *Medea* (AKA 31) in Providence, Rhode Island. The *Medea* joined the Pacific Fleet, participating in the Okinawa occupation, and was subsequently landing troops at Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945, as the Japanese were surrendering on the USS *Missouri*. Lieutenant Hollander was discharged from active duty on February 28, 1946, and returned to CBS for a year. In February 1947, he resigned to attend Harvard Law School where he received a law degree (LL.B) in June 1949.

Since October 1949, Mr. Hollander has been continuously employed by the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice in Washington, first as a trial attorney, then as Chief of the Judgment Enforcement Section, and finally as Senior Trial Attorney, a position which he still holds. In 1970, he was a recipient of the Department's John Marshall Award for outstanding legal achievement in preparation of litigation, and in 1992, he received the Attorney General's Award for Lifetime Career Achievement for his handling of "the preparation and prosecution of some of the most significant cases in the Division's history."

In addition, between 1966 and 1981, Mr. Hollander served part-time as a Special Assistant to the Governor of American Samoa, representing that Territory before the Civil Aeronautics Board in a number of matters concerned with obtaining and maintaining competitive air service for American Samoa.

Since 1958, Mr. Hollander has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Community Psychiatric Clinic of Montgomery County, a non-profit mental health clinic, serving several terms as its President. He lives in Chevy Chase, Maryland, with his wife, Joan Wolman Hollander; they have four children and five grandchildren.

Subjects Covered

June 18, 1997

Education--Interest in Broadcasting--Work at CBS
Joining the Navy--Cable Censorship duties
Training in Chicago and South Boston
Sub Chaser Training Center in Miami
Description of Sub Chasers--SC weapon systems
Assignment to SC 1065--Escort duty to Cuba
U-Boat attack
Transit through the Panama Canal--Up the West Coast
Arrival at San Francisco--Patrol duties--The Potato Patch
Assuming command--Trip to Monterey--Running aground
Dry docking--Handling the crew--Captain's Mast
Switching to command SC 1066
Deploying to Hawaii--Refueling mishap--Sea keeping abilities of SCs
Tarawa--Assignment to the Amphibious Force--Invasion rehearsal
USS *Ajax*--Refitting the ship--Gunnery practice
Acquiring a radar set--Finding a radar operator

June 22, 1997

Challenges of operating "pancake" engines
Deploying to Kwajalein--The assault--Capture of Japanese charts
Attack on Eniwetok--Details of amphibious assault--Functions of a Control Ship
Description of combat--Friendly fire incident
Post-invasion duties--Broken starboard shaft--Spread of dysentery
Inspection--transit to Kwajalein--return to Pearl
Another rehearsal--Departure for Saipan--Diversionary duties
Return to Pearl--Detachment from SC 1066
Epilogue

Appendices

Correspondence between Mr. Hollander and the Department of the Navy
"Events Leading Up to the Grounding of SC 1065"
Eniwetok Invasion Order of Battle
Investigation into Friendly Fire Incident


Naval Historical Foundation Oral History Program Release

I, Bernard M. Hollander, do hereby transfer, give and grant to the Naval Historical Foundation, as a donation, the following tape recording of interviews conducted on June 18th and 20th, 1997, concerning my tours onboard Subchasers during World War II. I know that the aforesaid tape recording has been transcribed and that I have been afforded an opportunity to review a final transcript of my interview. I hereby grant to the Naval Historical Foundation, a non-exclusive, royalty-free, perpetual license to my responses in said interview for all educational and research uses by the Foundation and third parties granted access by the Foundation for such uses. I understand that the interview is unclassified and may be made available to the public. No commercial uses of my interview may be made without my prior permission, or upon my death, prior permission from my estate. Should the Foundation donate the tape recording to the Naval Historical Center for archival purposes, the conditions set forth in this release shall apply to that organization as well.


This agreement will not preclude me or my estate from using the transcript or recording of my responses in any manner whatsoever, including, but not limited to, publication, transmission or distribution in any medium now known or hereafter invented.

24 Nov 1997

(Date)



David F. Winkler
Oral Historian




Bernard M. Hollander
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Chevy Chase, Maryland 20815

From: Executive Director, Naval Historical Foundation
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
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BERNARD F. CAVALCANTE

June 18, 1997

WINKLER: We're here at the home of Mr. Bernard Hollander. This is Dave Winkler, and the first question to start off deals with your background. Where were you raised, educated, and how did you find yourself coming into the Navy?

HOLLANDER: I was born in Baltimore and raised there. I went to Haverford College where I got a BS in Economics and then I had a year at the University of Chicago in graduate work which I took pretty much all over the university and I ended up with a Masters, an MBA in Social Control of Business. After that I began looking for a job and I was particularly interested in broadcasting. I had done some work on the effects of the Communications Act of 1934 on broadcasting. For a short time I was at the University looking into a possibility of a job with the University radio program called the University of Chicago Roundtable. When that didn't pan out, I went home to Baltimore and began looking in Washington because I knew I was interested in government service, public service. In the course of looking, I had a recommendation to the General Counsel of the Federal Communications Commission, in view of my background and the work I had done in Chicago. He was interested in possibly using me in conjunction with the economists and attorneys because the FCC was about to engage in a study of the network broadcasting that would have to be written up in a report to Congress. At that time it was just network radio. And so I had a couple of interviews, and the General Counsel was interested in having me come on if he could get me through Civil Service and get an appointment that way because I had no Civil Service background. By the time that we found out I wasn't going to be approved by Civil Service because I didn't have a Civil Service rating, the network hearings had begun in Washington and so I thought, "Well, if I was going to have anything to do with these hearings I better start attending." So I commuted every day from Baltimore and I learned more about network broadcasting there than ever afterwards, more than I ever needed to know.

WINKLER: About what year is this?

HOLLANDER: 1938.

WINKLER: Okay.

HOLLANDER: Toward the end of the hearings, one of the CBS witnesses was to be its Research Director. Earlier, I was sitting in the back of the room and all these people were in front of me. This guy in front of me was a very young man, and I noticed that while NBC was on the stand at the moment, he was being given copies of all their exhibits. I didn't know who it was, but I leaned over and asked him if he would mind if I looked over his shoulder at the exhibits he was getting. A week later I had an interview with the

Director of Research at CBS. It turned out to be Frank Stanton who had been sitting in front of me and we started talking about the network hearings and he said, "Well you know more about what's going on there than I do and maybe I can get you a job, a temporary job. I could use you in my research department, but in the meantime we'll see if we can do something else. So we exchanged correspondence, and finally after he had been on the stand at the FCC and had his hearing, during which time he'd come back to me and asked me how I thought he was doing, I ultimately got a job with CBS and started to work with them in March of 1939. I was at CBS as a Research Assistant and plans writer under Dr. Stanton. I later worked for the Sales Promotion Department.

The draft came along and I thought I was going to be drafted and I was put in contact with somebody, I don't remember exactly who it was in the Navy Department, and he said that he thought they could use me with my background. So the upshot was that the Navy asked for me to be deferred for three months or six months, I can't remember exactly what it was. It started off as being three, it may have been more. In any event, I alerted the Navy in New York to the fact that I was being deferred and they put me in touch, I can't remember with whom or what, but at that time the Navy thought it was going to have censorship over broadcasting. Actually the Army ended up with that job. But here I was working at a broadcasting network and they had me start taking training courses. All the training was directed towards censorship of cable for which the Navy ultimately ended up having responsibility. Anyway, the long and short of it was, right after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, I was asked to report as a Special Agent for the District Intelligence Office because censorship was then under Naval Intelligence. And so, from December 1941 until May 18, 1942, when I was commissioned as an Ensign, I worked as a Special Agent at the same place I ended up in for the next three months as a commissioned Ensign in the Navy, the cable censorship office in New York.

WINKLER: You didn't go to Boot Camp or Officers Candidate School?

HOLLANDER: No, the equivalent after I was commissioned.

WINKLER: Okay.

HOLLANDER: I was there three months and a new Commanding Officer came in and the next thing I knew I and about six other officers were detached for duty at Northwestern's Abbott Hall, which was the Naval Reserve indoctrination school or whatever you call it. But we were already commissioned so we were in a slightly different position than the midshipmen. I took three months of training at Northwestern in downtown Chicago, their business school campus, and learned the elements of navigation, ordnance, I can't remember everything, seamanship. There was another subject which I don't remember. Anyway, the German submarine menace was really going into high gear at that point and so was the building program for sub chasers to try and offset the German submarines off the East Coast. And so practically our whole class after three months was

sent to Local Defense School in South Boston where I was for another three months. I got my first taste of going to sea from Boston.

WINKLER: Just going back a little bit, how big was your class in Chicago?

HOLLANDER: I can tell you there were two floors of officers at Tower Hall. I don't know how many that was. I would say 100, 150, maybe 200 people. Eddie Duchin was one of them, a well-known band leader who was a commissioned officer too. I don't know where he went after that. When we were finished with the local defense course in South Boston, the whole class was sent to the newly established Sub Chaser Training Center in Miami. I had a short leave and the next thing I knew I was in Miami where I reported for duty. I'll never forget the day, it was December 7, 1942. There we had training, not only retraining in the things we had had before, the subjects we had before, but we were actually training on the ships we would be on because they had sub chasers, both SCs, which were the smallest commissioned vessels in the Navy, and PCs. The SCs were wooden, 110 feet long, about 100 tons, and drew about 6 feet, 6½ feet draft. We did a lot of training on those, and after, I think it was more than a month, maybe eight weeks of training, where we went out almost every day on the ships, I was assigned to a Canadian-built sub chaser called a Fairmile, the *SC 1467* and it had minimal armament on it, but they had very good anti-submarine detection gear. But I was only on that ship about three days because my skipper turned out to be a very experienced person in small boat handling and they wanted him to take a new sub chaser where they weren't satisfied with the commanding officer. So the Skipper, Walter Koehn his name was, and the Exec, Lewellyn Owens, and myself, the Third Officer, were all transferred from the *SC 1467* to the *SC 1065* which had just come in from Wickford, Rhode Island, where it was built. It was built at Perkins & Vaughn Yacht Yard which later turned out my second ship, the *1066*, its sister ship. Do you want to stop there?

WINKLER: Yes, go ahead and talk a little about the Training Center.

HOLLANDER: The Sub Chaser Training Center (SCTC) was established under Commander E. F. McDaniels and he set the tone really for what we were going to be involved in. The school was on Pier 2 in Miami and at the end of the bulkhead, at the shore end of the pier, he had placed a life boat which was full of machine gun holes which had been found in the Caribbean floating with nobody in it, which kind of set the tone to get you kind of revved up to the idea that you better not fool around with these guys.

A story we heard at SCTC had a lighter tone. A lot of the officers that were coming to SCTC were right off ships that had been sunk or they'd been sent back for antisubmarine training.* One of these was an ex-destroyer skipper and he came in brand

* Among Hollander's classmates at SCTC were O.W. (Bill) Goepner who was gunnery officer on the USS *Ward* which attacked a midget submarine off Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Dudley S. Knox, who later as a DE skipper, assisted in the capture of a German submarine.

new in a brand new PC. That was a 173 foot metal ship, almost like a little destroyer. He came in on the ship and it had Fairbanks Morse engines in it. I'll never forget the story. This guy was in the habit on the destroyer of coming into the dock at high speed and then backing down just before he'd come to the end of the slip. When this Skipper came in on his PC, he came in at high speed and the next thing he knew when he backed down, there was no backing down, he went right into the end of the slip, into the cement. There were things like this that happened.

The third thing that I should mention was that because of the confidence that the Navy had in Commander McDaniels and because of his experience and because of the imminent threat of the German submarines, Commander McDaniels would get officers assigned to various sub chasers, SCs and PCs, over the telephone. He had this arrangement with the Bureau of Personnel, and you would get your orders later. I was initially, as I said, attached to a Canadian sub chaser, but my Skipper being experienced and transferring, took the Exec and myself with him. This was, of course, accomplished over the telephone with no written orders through Commander McDaniel's arrangements.


I should mention one other thing. We frequently went out at night, and of course, there was supposed to be a complete blackout of Miami and it was blacked out except for the dog race track which had brilliant lights, like those at a football field, and you could see out to sea for miles because of that. Anyway, those four things I guess I should mention about the school. It was a very impressive place.

WINKLER: As far as the *SC 1065* that you were on, talk a little bit about this type of vessel. Is it made out of wood? What's the ship built of?


HOLLANDER: Oh yes, it was wood. We were called the "splinter fleet." The SC, as I said a minute ago, is the smallest commissioned vessel in the U.S. Navy. They were building them in yacht yards, anywhere they could get to build them, and building PCs at the same time, all on an accelerated schedule. The ship carried about, as I remember, 25 crew and 3 officers, so when I came on as Third Officer I was Medical Officer, Communications Officer and Sonar Officer. You had a lot of things to do. Of course, as I'll mention later, we did pick up additional crew, such as a Pharmacist's Mate and radar operator, but that was only out of Pearl Harbor later on a different ship. I'll tell you about that later.

WINKLER: Okay. As far as the weapons onboard the ship.

HOLLANDER: We initially had a 3" 50 gun forward and three 20 millimeter Orlikon anti-aircraft guns. The magazine for the 3" 50 was on the front of the pilot house, but we were sent to a boat yard before we left Miami in order to have the 3" 50 replaced by a 40 millimeter anti-aircraft gun which was deemed more suitable for what we were going to do than a 3" 50. We also had depth charges. I don't remember how many there were, 2 or 3 or 4 on either side of the stern deck. And also side thrown depth charges, but I can't remember what they called those.



Construction of SC 1065 at Wickford.



Sub Chaser Training Center, Miami, Florida, Group 39A, January 1943. Bernard M. Hollander is in the back row, center, tallest. Dudley S. Knox is standing forward just to the right of him.

WINKLER: Were they like the Y?

HOLLANDER: Yes, Y-guns I guess. They were to spread the pattern if you dropped depth charges, you would also shoot these off at the same time so you would get some spread.

WINKLER: Something like the Hedge Hogs?

HOLLANDER: Well now you're getting into something different. In addition to the 40 mm gun, at the Miami yard we were also fitted with what were then called Mouse Traps. They were the smaller edition of what you're talking about, Hedge Hogs. They had at least four tracks on each of two racks located on the deck forward of the 40 mm gun. When the racks were elevated at the front and armed by loading the projectiles, they gave us the ability to attack a submarine ahead of us by activating these forward thrown rockets. They weren't just rockets. They had charges on the front of them like a depth charge, but instead of having to set them to a depth like you did with a depth charge and guess at the depth that the submarine was supposed to be, these would sink and would explode on contact. So they gave us a much greater ability to go after submarines.

WINKLER: Okay, as far as after you were assigned to the SC 1065, then what?

HOLLANDER: Well, we were told to proceed one night to Key West, to the submarine base in Key West, the Navy Yard there which was also a sub base, to practice with actual submarines. They had old R-boats there, no modern submarines, but we were able to exercise with them and perfect, hopefully perfect, our ability to attack a submarine. We were there for several weeks as I remember, and then we were assigned to escort a convoy, a group of merchant vessels, also one troop carrier, the *Cuba*. I remember very well having dinner the last night before we went out of Key West at which we were at a restaurant, and at an adjoining table there was a Captain of one of these merchant ships who was speaking in a very loud voice and was telling everybody that would listen that they wouldn't let him come in with his ship into the harbor because he was carrying explosives. What he was carrying was what were called Blockbusters which were destined for India. I've always wondered since then, in light of what happened afterwards, whether somebody else heard that and selected us. But I think it was just a coincidence. Anyway, the next day we formed the convoy up. Because my Skipper was a two-stripe Lieutenant and everybody else was a lower grade, we were the lead, the guide, on the convoy and I had the job of laying out the sound pattern of the anti-submarine detection screen we were supposed to have. As I said, we were in front and laid out a sound pattern on either side of the bow. We had two Canadian sub chasers who had very little armament, very much like the 1467 that I was originally assigned to, who had very good, we knew, very good anti-submarine detection gear, sonar gear we called it, but didn't have much armament. They didn't have the Mouse Traps or anything like that. So we put those ships on either side of us, sort of 45 degrees either way as I remember.

WINKLER: What you're telling me is, you had sonar gear onboard but it really was not that good.

HOLLANDER: Well, the English had perfected their ASDIC sound gear and they were much more advanced than I think ours was. We had only been, as I recall, we had only been making sonar gear for a much shorter time. The sonar gear, I didn't mean to indicate that it wasn't good because I think it was perfectly good gear to the best of the ability of the maker. It was Raytheon, and it was a very good manufacturer, and I think it was a good sonar but it just didn't have the accuracy, I don't think, the British had. Then we had another sub chaser, an SC, that we put in the rear and I don't remember whether there were any more in the screen or not. If there weren't, we probably had those Canadian sub chasers a little further back than I indicated. I said 45 degrees, they may have been as far as 90, and we had this other American SC at the rear. We were designated guide on this convoy, which as I remember, now I'm not sure I'm not making this up, was called KW123. Before we left Key West we were to get all the materials we needed, like the identification codes for the days that we would be out, or the week we would be out, so that we wouldn't have to call on the radio in plain language, but we would have particular codes. But we were assured by everybody there on the beach--I'll never forget this--that the German submarines were all down around Trinidad. They hadn't been up in the Caribbean at all during the winter. This was March of 1943. I think the day we left was March 10th. I know the night was March 10th anyway, because it was my grandparents' anniversary. Anyway, we were assured that we were unlikely to have any problems. However, we hadn't been out of Key West more than about three hours when a C-47, which is the equivalent of a DC-3, flew overhead and circled and dropped a white flare which meant that he had sighted a periscope that was astern of the convoy. So there was nothing much we could do. The small SC that was in the back searched around but he didn't make any contact. We had one ship as I remember, it was a tanker I think, that was lagging behind everybody else. It was a straggler I guess we called it. He was lagging behind and we had this one SC in the stern stay with him. We soon saw the landscape of Cuba and started along the shore because we were supposed to go to Guantanamo Bay which was the Naval Station at the eastern end of Cuba. The trip was uneventful until about sundown, and all of a sudden one of the Canadian sub chasers sent us a blinker message that he had a contact with a submarine. So because we had the superior armament, we started to go for him and of course, by design, it was right when the sun had just gone down and so we couldn't see very well. I was at the sonar and I was about to order firing of the Mouse Traps when I found, I don't know how, I guess from our lookout, that we were going straight for the Canadian sub chaser. What the sub had obviously done was dive under that sub chaser. And so I didn't give the order to fire and we didn't. At about this time, our sub chaser in the rear reported that the tanker that had been straggling had been hit. It didn't explode or anything. I don't know what it was carrying. But it was also around dusk, and soon there were these little lights all over the sea and the sub chaser behind was picking up all these people who had abandoned ship from the tanker. The tanker didn't explode, it just floated, and when the Captain was hauled aboard the sub chaser he swore that he had not been torpedoed, but that his boiler had exploded from trying to keep up. The tanker had to be sunk the next day by our

destroyers. Well, we went on from there and nothing further happened until the next change of watch. And as I remember, the Exec and I were doing a Heel and Toe watch; four hours on and four hours off. I came on at midnight, and I had not been there more than five minutes when there was a tremendous explosion. One of the two ships that had been carrying these Blockbusters was hit, obviously torpedoed. And, of course, we headed directly for where the ship had been to try and pick up the submarine which we were unsuccessful in doing. We were also very nervous because our appearance was very much like the conning tower of a submarine and we were afraid that the other Navy gun crews-- "the armed guard" on the merchant vessels--would see us and, it was pitch dark, would start firing on us. They didn't of course. The only evidence that the torpedoed ship had been there at all was a single work glove and a piece of twisted metal that we picked up off our deck the next morning. And as I think I mentioned, the *Cuba*, which had been a passenger vessel in civilian time, was very fast, and the next thing we knew he took off. He didn't wait for anything. He just took off for Guantanamo Bay and he was there in the morning when we got there. But we started trying to contact Guantanamo because we were right near Cape Maisi, which is a favorite spot, we learned later, of the submarines, where it's very deep along the coast of Cuba and they would lie there during the daytime and come up at night. It was also a junction point for convoys coming from New York or from Key West. We tried to raise Guantanamo by radio and apparently we had been given the wrong code and we just couldn't raise them at all. Finally our Skipper, Lieutenant Koehn, went on the air himself in plain language and said we needed help and we had been attacked by submarines and so forth. Well you would have thought they'd have been out there, we were quite close to Guantanamo. You would have thought we would have help from Guantanamo. But the next morning when we got there the destroyers were just going out. You could imagine where the submarines were, they were down lying on the bottom. It really caused some consternation. We got to the base, and of course they had all kinds of questions about what had happened and we told them we were given the wrong code at Key West. We called in plain language and nobody came and helped and we just did the best we could. Of course the *Cuba* was already there, as I mentioned, and none of the other ships were attacked.

I mentioned that there were two Canadian sub chasers with us who were down from the St. Lawrence because that was frozen during the winter, and their skippers were very disgusted by what had happened and the fact that no help had come out in response to the call. And they decided that on the way back they would use their own names as call signs and see if anything came up in the way of submarines because they were convinced, as we were too, that the submarines were lying off of Cape Maisi there on the bottom during the day. Another interesting item connected with that was that when we got to Guantanamo and talked to some of the people there, they told us freely that they had felt the explosion from that ammunition ship going up. They also said they heard somebody named Koehn calling for help, but they didn't know who Koehn was. So it wasn't surprising that the destroyers never went out till the next morning.

WINKLER: The purpose of the sub chasers were for these coastal convoys. During the early part of the war we were taking a beating along the coast with German

submarines sinking a lot of our ships. The whole concept of the sub chasers was to provide an escort to try at least, if not destroy the U-boats, at least keep them away.

HOLLANDER: Well, I should mention that parenthetically, after this experience, and after I had been detached months later, I went back to Gulf Sea Frontier Headquarters in Miami to see what report was made about this convoy. I looked up what I think was KW123 and it said two ships were lost, *possibly* by German submarines. I really couldn't believe what I was reading, but anyway, that seemed to be the attitude.

While I was at Guantanamo I remember that we had a Chief Boatswain's Mate, John Thomas, who was a very experienced sailor, and he took the occasion when we were there, and I remember this very well, to drill me on how to dock and undock the ship because we were not busy at the moment. Anyway, shortly thereafter, I don't remember how many days it was, we formed another convoy and went to the Panama Canal. We experienced no submarines between Guantanamo and the Canal, fortunately. We stayed, I think, a day at the Atlantic entrance to the Canal and then we went through and one of the pilots came aboard and he looked at our "spitkit" and he said, "You mean to tell me this is a United States Navy commissioned vessel." We said Yes. It turned out that the day before he had been the Pilot on the *Saratoga* which had gone through the Canal and knocked over lamp posts and everything else because its deck was so broad. I can understand the consternation of this guy wondering whether this little wooden vessel, the "spitkit" he called it, was a Navy vessel. Anyway, we arrived at the other end of the Canal, the Pacific end of the Canal. I remember the tide was so great there. We tied up for overnight and I think we tied up with the deck quite well above the dock. The next morning we were down about 25 or 30 feet below the dock due to the tide. From there on we went up the West Coast, first Nicaragua, then Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico. We were destined, I never mentioned this, for the Western Sea Frontier in San Francisco, the Northern sector, but we were pretty much on our own at first. There was a Navy seaplane base in Corinto, Nicaragua, and that was our first stop. That was right on the coast. The next thing I remember that was important to us, the next night en route after we stopped in Corinto, was crossing the Gulf of Tehuantepec. We had been warned that the Gulf of Tehuantepec has a permanent wind storm. There is almost a funnel of mountains on the land that lead into this gulf and they just funnel the wind and it's so extreme there's no way to escape it. I remember as we went across there, the helmsman had a bucket by him into which he was vomiting. The ship had a clinometer over the wheel and it would roll from one extreme mark to the other. The ship was rolling so, you wouldn't believe it, you'd have thought it would go over. Anyway, we went for about two or three hours like that and then proceeded up to Manzanillo, Mexico, that was our next stop, and we stayed there overnight. I don't remember much about that except that we had dinner at the Consul's or whatever the State Department representative there was. Manzanillo was thought to be pretty loaded with Nazis and everybody thought there wasn't any security really. Again we had no adverse experience. I remember though, after that, we were proceeding up towards San Diego and it didn't seem to us that we were really seeing the things on land that we should be seeing, and we came to a fishing vessel and asked him to check what his compass was showing for the direction we were going. It turned out we

were going about 15 degrees out to sea from where we should be, so we corrected for that. I should have mentioned we had a magnetic compass and this had to be swung, the ship had to be swung fairly frequently in order to ensure it was on. Anyway, we arrived at San Diego and this was another sub base, and so again we exercised with the submarines. I don't remember how many days we were there. And then finally we proceeded up to San Francisco where we arrived in April of 1943.

When we arrived at San Francisco we were ordered to put in at Treasure Island which was the Headquarters of the San Francisco Patrol Force. We were to become a member of this anti-submarine patrol force off of the Golden Gate. I should mention that there was a very deep channel that came in, of course, to San Francisco so the larger ships could come in, with buoys on either side. Either side of the channel, a way out, were mine fields, so we had to be pretty careful where we were when the mines were turned on. I should've mentioned that my Skipper was detached in San Francisco and Lieutenant Owens took over as Skipper and I became Executive Officer. The Potato Patch was a shallow area in which mines were and in which we were supposed to be patrolling, just off the channel. We had to stay off the channel because the large ships could very well run into us in the fog and it was very difficult because we had no radar or anything and it was difficult to see, and you were supposed to be challenging each ship that came in, which we did. But it was sort of a joke with us because having done some elementary study of anti-submarine warfare, we knew that the Japanese I-boats, which were their largest submarines and the only ones that could have come that far, had a much deeper draft than what I believe was a 45 foot channel, and there was no way those submarines were going to get in there. Moreover, our sound gear was ineffective under these shallow conditions. In addition to that, there was a net around the bay entrance, guarded by a net tender, through which ships had to come in and out, plus underwater loops, hydrophones and sonobouys that could pick up propeller sounds. The net tender and entrance to San Francisco Bay were inside the Golden Gate Bridge. There was also a Ready Duty Buoy nearby. Sometimes we were on duty at the Ready Duty Buoy which had a telephone, and theoretically, we were then able to go out much quicker. I remember one night we went out when there was a submarine alert and we were looking around the Potato Patch trying not to get too far over and the next thing we knew we heard the HECF, the Harbor Entrance Control Post, order the mines turned on in the Potato Patch area and we had to call like crazy to stop these maniacs from turning on the mines when we were out there supposedly looking for a submarine.** When we first relieved the sub chaser that was on duty the first time we had this duty, the Skipper of that ship had been in the head and there had been a rough stretch of the waves, there was a set, a constant set of waves from the Northwest. It was so severe over the Potato Patch, which was shallow, that this guy had been in the head and had been thrown across the head and broke his wrist. This was the guy we relieved, so you could imagine how we were going to feel about going on duty

** Some 20 years later, Judge Victor Hansen, assistant attorney for the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, told Hollander that while he was in the Army stationed at the San Francisco Presidio, he had participated in laying out the antisubmarine defense for San Francisco and he freely admitted that he had little knowledge of antisubmarine warfare.

then. Anyway, the long and the short of it was I was quite concerned about being there, particularly when we were on duty at night, because you couldn't see a thing in the fog and so what we did was, there was one buoy that was lighted and had a bell and we would circle just outside the channel using that buoy as a departure point so even if we couldn't see it, we could hear it, and by the time we made our turn we could see it again. I became, as I say, quite concerned. I felt that we were really a menace to navigation where we were. Actually, I have a copy of a letter I prepared to the head of the Patrol Force suggesting that I was concerned and that I thought it would be helpful if the Skippers of the antisubmarine vessels were included in the daily meetings that the Patrol Force had. Of course, I never sent the letter. Sometime later, we read that at San Francisco, an SC had been sliced in two by a freighter, that there had been casualties and that depth charges had been scattered about the bottom of San Francisco Bay.

Not long after that we were on patrol out of Monterey because we would alternate between San Francisco and Monterey. Every one week out of four, I think we were out of Monterey which was a small section base for the Navy. Generally when we were operating out of Treasure Island we were in three days and out three, I think that was it. When went to Monterey, our patrol area was from Monterey south to a small beach town called Avila which had a loading facility for tankers and the idea was that when the tankers loaded we would escort them out to sea until they were far enough out from the beach and we just let them go. On September 28th of 1943, I assumed command of the *SC 1065* upon detachment of Lieutenant Owens. He followed the usual pattern and returned to SCTC for reassignment. Always, when we felt that the Executive Officer was ready for Command, we'd call or write Commander McDaniels and he would arrange the relief by telephone with the Bureau of Personnel.*** In any event, that's when I became Skipper, September, 1943.

WINKLER: So Commander McDaniels had, like, control even from Miami of the whole force around the country?

HOLLANDER: In the ocean. October 15th, shortly after I'd assumed command, we were to go from Monterey down to Avila. There was a heavy fog and I remember when we left Monterey, the point around it, the name of which I can't remember, we sailed around the point in a complete fog. The Exec or the Third Officer had the conn, and in the morning, it was just beginning to get light, I heard somebody yell, "Rocks dead ahead," and I was out of my cabin and up to the flying bridge and sure enough, there were rocks dead ahead. I immediately ordered all engines back full. I found out later that the port engine control which regulated the pitch of the port propeller and also acted as a brake, like an airplane engine in reverse, hadn't operated, so that I was really only backing on one

*** In January 1944, after Hollander had recommended the Exec of the SC-1066 for command, Commander McDaniels wrote, "The operating forces have objected so strenuously to unofficial recommendations not through the chain of command that I am forced to stop sending such recommendations to the Bureau [of Personnel]." Consequently, Hollander sent the recommendation to the Bureau through channels.

engine. In any event, we started to turn around and the next thing I knew we were up on a rock. We tried to get unwedged from that rock and we just didn't seem to be getting anywhere. It was getting pretty spooky and I gave the order to prepare to abandon ship. I remember the Chief Motor Machinist's Mate coming up from the engine room holding his dress uniform in his hand and just about that time I noticed that, due to the action of the waves, we seemed to be backing off a little. So I told them to relight the engines, which they did, and I followed our wake out. Fortunately we were able to extricate ourselves and by then we knew we were leaking pretty badly in the engine room. So we went down to Avila.

Each sub chaser had a small, what we called a Handy Billy Pump, which was a gasoline pump and very effective. We started of course, using our pump to pump the water out of the bilges. We proceeded that way, by this time the fog had lifted and we could see we were north of Avila, and went into Avila with no problem. There was another sub chaser there. We borrowed his Handy Billy and then proceeded back to Monterey with both of these Handy Billy pumps pumping water out, as fast as we could go.

We got to Monterey and the Commanding Officer of the base was concerned about us going back by ourselves so he had us go with a YMS, that's a small wooden mine sweep, as far north as he could go to the entrance to San Francisco Bay and we proceeded to Treasure Island to the Patrol Force Headquarters. We then were assigned a tug and he towed us over to a dry-dock at the Pacific Dry-dock Company in Oakland and we were put up in the air on blocks. You could see the damage that had been done. Actually we were showed how lucky we were. The keel had been chewed out until there was a small part of it holding the ship together and we were just awfully lucky that it had held.****

I should have mentioned that both the *1065* and my later ship, the *1066*, had two General Motors Pancake engines which were rotary engines that were developed for airplanes and sort of put up on their ends so that they looked like pancakes. The cylinders were, there were 16-cylinders I think, four in each bank, and they were right on top of one another, whereas in an airplane they would have been placed horizontally in the wing. That gave us the ability to use the pitch shifters and shift the pitch of the propellers as an additional way of getting additional speed on and also being able to back down more quickly. I also failed to mention that these were serviced regularly by General Motors at Treasure Island where they had a facility.

**** A report on the grounding, which Hollander received months later, concluded that no culpability should attach, based on the fact that "the ship was well handled when rocks were first sighted ahead," and "piloting in the fog which prevailed prior to the grounding would not have been an easy task for a more seasoned seaman." On August 9, 1944, Commander Service Force recommended "no further action." Hollander's description of the event is included as an appendix.

I should also mention that since we had no Medical officer on board the *1065*, as the Third Officer, I was the Medical Officer. I remember that I had to diagnose two appendectomies that were acute when we were in San Francisco. One of which was easy to handle because we could just take the man to the hospital at Treasure Island. The second appendectomy occurred when we were out on duty at the ready duty mooring buoy close to the Golden Gate Bridge. While his appendix didn't burst, it became obvious that the guy had acute appendicitis, at least I thought so. So we rowed him into Fort Mason which was the Army fort right at San Francisco's Harbor entrance practically, and put him ashore at their hospital. So that was one of the unusual duties we had on these ships, acting like a doctor.

Another episode that I failed to mention was that when we were at Treasure Island, the Pan Am Clippers, which were flying boats at that time, would come in and dock at Treasure Island very close to where our Supply Depot was. One episode that we had, we had the ship over at the Supply dock for replenishment or something and we started to leave the dock, here came a Pan Am Clipper taxiing in on the water. When I would make a turn to the right, he would turn to his left. When I turned to the left, he would turn to his right. I'm sure that episode didn't go unnoticed somewhere.

One of the problems that many ships had, including us, and I should have mentioned it, was that no matter what you did you couldn't avoid taking roaches on board. They came in cardboard and everything else. We would unwrap ammunition and there would be these roaches running around. So it wasn't long before we were infested with roaches. I didn't know what to do, but I remembered that at home we had an exterminator called Rose Exterminator and I looked in the San Francisco phone book and sure enough there was a Rose Exterminator. So I picked up the phone and I called the Rose Exterminator and the guy came out and sprayed the ship and we got rid of the roaches. When I reported that to Commander Jockstad who was the Commanding Officer of the San Francisco Patrol Force, and who had also been Commanding Officer of one of the President Liners in China before the war, I think it was the Dollar Line, he said, "You should never do that, you should get a flashlight and follow the roaches to their nests." He said we shouldn't have bothered with an exterminator. I was glad we had gotten the exterminator.

But anyway, Jockstad told us one very interesting story. He said before the war when he had gone up the Yangtze River on his ship, I think it was to Shanghai or somewhere, the Japanese had insisted that they have escorting vessels on either side of the bow. And he said, "I fixed them good". He said, "I made a sharp turn to the right when I knew I was in a narrow place where the river was close up to the beach. The guy on the right went right up on the beach." He told that one with great relish.

WINKLER: One of the things, the ship as far as habitability. It sounds like it's kind of cramped spaces.

HOLLANDER: The crew lived forward and aft. The after quarters also housed a small galley and a table where the crew's mess and our mess was. Officers' quarters were below the pilot house.

I should have mentioned also that we were very fortunate. We had a cook who had come from the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles, and when we were moored at the ready duty buoy waiting for any word of submarines, the crew would put over lines, just string lines with any kind of bait on the end, bacon or anything else, and we would pull up these tremendous San Francisco Bay crabs, and the cook would prepare these like you never tasted. He got into trouble later because he and several of the petty officers, when we were down in Monterey, had decided that while we were on this Monterey/Avila patrol they would bring their wives down there and it would be much more fun for them. So they moved their wives from San Francisco down there. Well the next thing I knew we were getting tremendous bills for meat and various things, and it turned out that the cook would order large amounts of groceries, meats, you name it, and they were living it up ashore. This later resulted, unfortunately, in a Captain's Mast when I found out what had happened. But anyway....

WINKLER: I did notice records of the food coming aboard and later having Captain's Mast in *SC 1065's* operational reports. I'm glad you explained that.

HOLLANDER: The punishment meted out was restriction to the ship for a time, it was nothing serious, but we couldn't imagine what was happening to our bills.

On November 21, 1943, when we were again shipworthy and operating on patrol, I was asked to swap my command with John Davidson, Ensign John Davidson, who was Commanding Officer of our sister ship, the *SC 1066*, which had arrived in port recently. His wife was pregnant and he asked me if I would swap ships with him, which I did. We did it in a few hours, again by telephone, and on the same day we departed San Francisco for the Hawaiian Sea Frontier at Pearl Harbor. We were to escort--now I was the Commanding Officer of the *1066*--we were to escort a number of LSTs which were quite slow moving. Actually, our ship could get up to 15, possibly 16 or 17 knots in an emergency, and these ships would go something like 8 knots top. And so the whole way to Hawaii, which took two weeks, we were going on one engine and doing figure eights alongside these LSTs. I should have mentioned that Davidson was the only officer that transferred to the *1065*. I brought with me my Gunner's Mate, in whom I had great confidence, and an Electrician's Mate, who were exchanged for two crewmembers of the *1066*. But other than that we just swapped Commanding Officers. My new Executive Officer was the Executive Officer who had served under Davidson, Albury Bull, who, strangely enough, I had met for the first time on a double date the night before. He and the Third Officer didn't change ships at all, it was just Davidson and myself.

WINKLER: Before you departed you made this swap with Ensign Davidson. Kind of indicates to me is that there is a community within the sub chasers that you know everybody.

HOLLANDER: Well more or less we did. I should have mentioned one interesting thing; it was that the Navy had no ships that were officered by blacks. There was a ship that worked with us, it was called a YP, that was a converted yacht that was used on patrol in San Francisco. The entire crew was black and the officers were black. This was an experiment I think on the part of the Navy. They had had nothing like this before.

But one interesting thing that happened, I was saying that we were on our way to Pearl Harbor and we were going very slowly and we took this occasion to learn something about refueling at sea and what it would involve. We had instructions as to how to do this, but I had never done it nor had the ship, or anybody on the ship. Anyway, we learned a lot in this refueling and I was glad we had tried it because first of all you were told that you had to have a bow line going forward to the ship from which you were taking on fuel and water. Mind you we were underway at the time, so I put Harry Feldthouse, the Gunner's Mate, on the wheel because I knew he was a very good helmsman. We tried to do it by the book where we had this line out that was taken aboard the LST, forward of our ship, and what we learned was that the swaying back and forth and the yawing of the two ships made the line taut almost like a violin string. It was bouncing up and down and ultimately it pulled the cleat right out of our wooden deck, we had a big hole in the deck. So we learned that we better not do that again. And so, in all future refuelings we just took the hoses for the diesel fuel and the water and used a good helmsman and did not try and attach ourselves in any other way to the ship from which we were refueling. So that was one lesson well learned.

WINKLER: The sub chasers were more designed for coastal work and here you're making a Trans-Pacific cruise. Was there some discomfort....?

HOLLANDER: Yes, there was discomfort, particularly on long trips. Quarters were crowded and water was always short and rationed. Once early on when our third officer came on deck clean shaven and reeking of after-shave, he was told off in no uncertain terms.

The SCs were built all over the country. They were built as far north as Minnesota and brought down the Mississippi River. They were built on the West Coast and as I mentioned, Perkins and Vaughn, and other yacht yards on the East Coast that had never built any ship for the Navy built these. I think the PCs, which were the larger ones, were built at more routine shipyards, like Bath Iron in Maine, and other shipyards that were used to building Navy ships that had hulls that were metal and not wood. But because of the emergency, they had to use whatever they could put together. We were mainly a platform for antisubmarine gear and had enough guns and depth charges that it should deter some submarines, and I'm sure it did. I read recently in, excuse the expression, *Morison's History of Naval Warfare in World War II*, that only one PC had sunk a sub and got credit for sinking it.

We were on our way to Pearl, and it took two weeks, and we finally sighted land, and it was during night time, and by morning we were off Pearl Harbor, off the entrance to Pearl Harbor. But we couldn't go into Pearl Harbor for the entire day because the Fleet was coming back from the invasion of the Gilbert Islands at Tarawa and Makin I think was the other atoll. Anyway, ship after ship came in of every type; aircraft carriers, destroyers, cruisers, everything else, and of course transports. Anyway, finally at the end of this parade that went on all day, we were allowed to go into Pearl and we tied up at, I think it was Bishop's Point, which had small docks, small enough for our ship and others like us. It was probably the equivalent of Treasure Island as the section base for patrol craft right near Hickam Field.

Well, it turned out that they had had tremendous losses at Tarawa, and part of the problem was the vessels which were controlling the landings were destroyers. What I meant by controlling the landing was that one of the destroyers would be designated as a control vessel and would have aboard the Beachmaster and representatives of the Army or Marine force that was landing, the Medical Corps, experts in ordnance and so forth and so on. The idea being that you would have them collected near enough to the beach where they could observe the beach and direct outgoing traffic. For example, sending wounded people to the proper LST that had a sick bay, a large sick bay, or if ammunition was needed, that they would theoretically be able to direct boats to the proper ship. It turned out that because of the reefs at Tarawa, the destroyers couldn't get anywhere near where they should have been, near the beach. Because of their draft, they were well out, and so the Beachmaster who was aboard didn't have nearly the control he should've had, and what happened was that Amtracs and landing craft would be stranded on the beach and one might be calling for ammunition which might be in the Amtrac next to it but nobody in control knew that. Or water, the same thing. Then here came six sub chasers that went out to Pearl in the group we were in, and the Amphibious Force saw these six small shallow draft vessels coming in and the next thing we knew we were attached to them instead of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier where we were supposed to be used on antisubmarine patrol duty. We found ourselves assigned to the Service Force and very quickly found that a new invasion was being planned for the Marshall Islands, at Kwajalein Atoll in particular, but also at Majuro. And so we were quickly attached to the Fifth Amphibious Force which was commanded by Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner with its Headquarters at Pearl Harbor.

WINKLER: Were all the sub chasers assigned or just yours in particular?

HOLLANDER: I think we all were. I can't tell you that all were. I know that there were landings at Roi and Namur islets at the north end of Kwajalein Atoll in which a couple of sub chasers were involved. I know that at least two of us (the 1066 and 539) were to be control vessels at the southern end of Kwajalein and once we were assigned to the invasion group, they began to tear our ship apart.

It had been decided that there would be a period of rehearsal for this invasion and that the sub chasers that were to be used as control vessels would practice with the

transports. Since I was senior to the skipper of *SC 539*, our ship had been chosen as the vessel to carry the Control Officer and Chief Beachmaster, Commander Beverly M. Coleman. He was a lawyer who was regular Navy but had gotten out and then came back in when the war broke. I should mention before I forget it, there also, on our ship, when we got actually to the invasion, was Richard Black, who had gone with Admiral Byrd to the South Pole. He didn't of course arrive until we were actually at Kwajalein, so I am getting ahead of myself. Anyway, the rehearsal was to take place in Maui, at Maalaea Bay, which was a nice sand beach and a good place to rehearse, deep water and so forth. The next thing we did was proceed to this rehearsal for the Marshalls invasion. As I remember it, there were two transport divisions there and we were to act as a control vessel marking the line of departure for their LCVPs just as we would at the invasion, at about a thousand, or 2,000, I'm not sure exactly how many yards off the beach. These two transport divisions lined up and anchored and we took what we thought was a proper position, at which we took tangents on the island and also took bearings on the anchor chains of the transports, and we knew from the charts we had received where they were supposed to be relative to us. Well that was fine as far as it went. I didn't have any problem. But then after the couple of days of rehearsal, the Commodore--I think it was Captain Daniel Loomis--in charge of the rehearsal and the transports, called a meeting of all Commanding Officers to which I went and when he got around to me at the end of the thing he wanted to know how we knew what our position was and how we knew it was exactly where we were supposed to be, it was 2,000 yards off the beach, and that that's where we were. I told him how we had triangulated, or whatever, and tried to be sure that we were in the right place, and he was astounded and he said, "Well, did you use your range finder?", and I said we don't have a range finder, and of course we had no radar. Well, he was very upset about all of this and he said, "I want you to go back to Pearl before everybody else and I want you to go to that yard and tell them you're to get whatever equipment you can possibly get that will help you in doing this." He, of course, didn't understand that a range finder relied on having a relatively smooth platform, and our ships rolled and tossed around, so no self-respecting range finder would have worked on them. I think they were designed for much larger ships. **** But in any event we did go back to Pearl and I remember going to the yard and when we tied up at one of the docks, going to the Foreman who was in charge and saying that we had been sent back by this Captain and that we were to be in this invasion and we were supposed to get whatever we could get. First of all, the Captain was dissatisfied with the number of signal lights we had. We only had one signal light and so we were to get another signal light, this that and the other. The foreman looked at me and said, "You know what your priority is? Zero!" Anyway, fortunately for us, we were moored near a repair ship called the *Ajax* which was

**** In a contemporaneous letter to his family, Hollander wrote: "We've been bawled out pretty much these last few weeks (the SCs) but it doesn't upset me because I know that the guys who are trying to judge the values, just don't know the nature of the beast, and the handicaps under which we operate. They think in terms of navigation from level bridges and never realize that we roll even in port. However, yesterday, I'm proud to report, the Commodore interlarded his harsh words and phrases with a "well done," special to the *1066*. I was amazed."

brand new, and we tied up alongside of it and started talking to their crew about various things. I wanted desperately to get a radar if I could, because I figured since we were to be the control vessel, I wanted to be sure I was exactly in position. Well, the only radar for sub chasers was going to be one nobody had, it was a Raytheon SF-1 which was also to be used on PT boats. So I asked the people on the *Ajax*. Well, they were just dying to do something, and I said, "Suppose I got a radar. Could you guys put it on?" They said, "Oh, we can install it." Well I said, "Then I'd have to have a place for the radar operator to sit." Well, they figured that out. They got the extra signal light put in. In the meantime my Gunner's Mate went up to the ammunition dump at Aiea, I think it was called, and picked up two old 50-caliber machine guns and brought them back. Various changes had to be made in the ship because of the assignment we had. We had a whole magazine below the front deck where the 40 millimeter gun was. We also had on deck, behind the gun, storage containers that had ammunition in them as well. In preparation for our acting as control vessel for the landing they ripped out virtually all of the magazine that was below decks and put extra radios in. We knew we were going to be assigned additional radio operators and also additional signalmen because we would now have extra radios and two signal lights. In addition to that, as I mentioned, the *Ajax* had put up on the fantail these two unauthorized 50 caliber machine guns. We installed a couple ammunition lockers right on the deck, right by the machine guns, but we also needed to have some place to store the extra ammunition for them. So we used what was called the after lazarette which was general storage space. It had rope and all kinds of junk in there to which we added some 50 caliber ammunition. Actually, when we went out of Pearl one day for gunnery practice, we were throwing up more ammunition in the air against the sleeve than these destroyers were throwing up. It was fantastic. You never saw so much stuff. Anyway, this was the kind of hit or miss basis on which we had to operate.

WINKLER: Things must have been getting awfully crowded as you were taking on all the people.


HOLLANDER: We didn't take on the additional signalmen and radiomen, and the control party until we were actually on the eve of the invasion. But we did take on the radar operator and a Pharmacist's Mate at Pearl.

I went to Fifth Phib Headquarters and asked about radar and they said there's no radar for sub chasers yet. It's going to be the Raytheon SF-1 and there is only one here and that's being tested in the laboratory. So I went to the laboratory and I talked to the guy in charge and I said, "Look, we are supposed to control this invasion and I just got bawled out for not having adequate equipment. What about this radar? Could we possibly get it from you?" He said, "If you can get it out to your ship and you can get it installed, I'll give it to you." So I got a crew to row in, we had a small dingy, we rowed in this dingy to the landing where this laboratory was, picked up the radar and rowed it out to the ship, took it on the ship and got the *Ajax* people started. They, in short time, a couple of days, had it installed. Then I had a radar but nobody to operate it. So, I had a friend who had been in the Gilbert Invasion, John Hartwell, who I knew was now teaching at the CIC School which was about five miles from Pearl.

WINKLER: CIC, that's Combat Information Center.

HOLLANDER: Yes. I called Johnny up and I told him what the situation was and I told him also, which I haven't mentioned, that I'd gone to the Fleet Personnel Headquarters and they had one radar operator who they'd just taken off the cruiser *Baltimore* because he was sea sick. I said, "Oh my God, if he was sea sick on a cruiser he's no good for me". But then I called Hartwell and I said, "Do you think there is any chance, is there anybody there that can operate this SF-1 radar?" He said, "Yes, there's an instructor, but he's teaching people to operate it on PT boats." I said, "Do you think there is any chance I could swap a sick sea operator for this one?" He said, "I don't know, but come on out and we'll see." So I hitched a ride out to the CIC school and John took me to the Executive Officer and I told him that we were to control the landings in this invasion and I had to know I was exactly 2,000 yards off the beach or whatever I was supposed to be. I had a radar and I needed an operator and I understood that he had one. Could I swap this guy that was sea sick. And he just ate me up. He said, "What do you think we run this school for." and so forth and so on, "Not for you guys." I don't know who he was running the school for. But anyway, he got done eating me up and then I said to him, "Take me to the Commanding Officer." The Commanding Officer was a Captain named Cecil. The Exec took me to Captain Cecil and John went too. I went through the same routine. I was going as control vessel for this invasion and I had to know where I was and I'd been chastised for not having the proper equipment and I'd gotten a radar and I had a radarman to swap and so forth and so on and he gave me the same line of who did I think he was running this school for. Then he turned to the Exec and said, "Give him the man." That guy was going through the floor. I almost went through the floor too. Anyway, that's how I got my radar operator. The *Ajax* was marvelous. They fixed the radar properly and did everything properly and I got my new radarman. His name was Nix. Anyway, we got it fixed up so that by the time we were ready to leave we were pretty well equipped. There was a little plaque on the Charthouse of the *SC 1066* that the *Ajax* gave us and it said, "First ship alongside USS *Ajax*" and the number of our ship. I was sure grateful to those guys.

I mentioned before how we had learned about refueling at sea on the way out to Pearl. I did not mention that we learned the importance of having centrifuged fuel which meant that it had been carefully processed to make sure that there were no contaminants in it. This was because, as I mentioned, we had pancake engines which were very sensitive engines. We had injectors. The fuel would be injected into the engine through a sort of strainer. I guess that's what the injector was like. In any event, if the fuel was not centrifuged and was not perfectly clean, ultimately these injectors would get clogged and the engines would stop. You couldn't run them that way. One result of that was, later having learning this, our Motor Machinist stocked up on injectors so that we always were able to change to a clean set. Actually when we broke down at sea later on, and I'll tell you about the times when that happened, once it was out near Truk, we were able to make the necessary repairs. But anyway, that was one of the important lessons we learned.



Plaque installed by USS Ajax

Anyway, I think we're at the point now where we're on our way to Kwajalein for the invasion and we were again assigned to escort LSTs. The Commanding Officer of the screen was on a destroyer, but the rest of us were all sub chasers and smaller vessels.

June 22, 1997


WINKLER: Today, is June 22nd, and we're again here at the home of Mr. Bernard Hollander, and we're going to pick it up where you were departing Hawaii with the Task Force. Is there any other thing from last time that you wanted to talk about?

HOLLANDER: Did I mention the rehearsal at Maalaea Bay? I think I did.


WINKLER: Yes.

HOLLANDER: One of the things that I omitted to say was that there was another class of sub chaser, same length and size, that had two straight 8 General Motors engines and they didn't have nearly as many maintenance problems but they couldn't go nearly as fast either. But that was a whole different class of SCs and that was part of the reason that when we got to Pearl, no one was really prepared for us. The Service Force was faced with six sub chasers that were coming out from San Francisco to the Hawaiian Sea Frontier, all of which had General Motors pancake engines and pitch shifters and that kind of stuff that they'd never dealt with and there was no General Motors representative in Pearl Harbor then as far as I know, who could provide maintenance.

Anyway, we're now out of Pearl Harbor on our way to Kwajalein and the trip was rather uneventful until the next to the last night I guess, or the last night en route. I was sleeping on the deck I remember, and all of a sudden the radar operator yelled, "Captain, Captain." I said, "What's the matter?" and he said, "There are 16 large ships on the radar screen," and I said, "If they aren't ours, then too bad." It was undoubtedly part of the coverage of the landing which was to start taking place the next day. We went to one of the transports, I can't remember which, where the Control Officer and Chief Beachmaster for the landing was, and picked him up. The extra radio operators--I think we had at least two extras--and the extra signalmen that we had to have in order to do the control communications had been picked up at some point, I can't remember when. On board our ship during the assault, we fed and slept three Army majors (supply, medical, and tank specialist) plus First Lieutenant Barry Sudgen, a representative of the commanding general; plus Commander Coleman; Lieutenant Commander Black; Lieutenant (jg) Harry Baker, the communications officer; and a number of others, including a Marine officer. Anyway, the next morning we proceeded to the west end of Kwajalein Island. The attack was to take place, the landings were to take place at the western end. There were also landings at the northern end of the Atoll, but this was at the southern end. We took up our position on the line of departure which was, at the beginning, 3,000 yards off the west end of Kwajalein Island. We had as back-up for that duty, the SC 539, with whom we had



Crew of the SC 1066. Ltjg. Hollander stands (uncovered) right center in the back.



**USS SC 1066 refueling en route from Saipan to Pearl Harbor, July 1944
and USS SC 1065 steaming off Avila, California, summer 1943.**

come out all that way. During the course of the landings at Kwajalein, one of the Japanese had not done his job and it turned out that these Islands which had not been visited by anybody from America other than missionaries years and years before, had been charted carefully by the Japanese during their occupation of this area. As a result of somebody's mistake, we captured all the Japanese navigational charts from Kwajalein and probably even east of there all the way to Tokyo. And of course this made a tremendous difference in what happened later in the ability of the United States to move into the various atolls and islands and have some clear knowledge of what they were going to encounter under the water.

WINKLER: We were talking about the captured charts.

HOLLANDER: The Japanese were very meticulous about their chart making and they had measured the depths in each of the lagoons and the atolls that were on the way to Tokyo. Also, of course, the areas around the various islands like Saipan, Guam, and Eniwetok which was of course an atoll. And the fact that we captured, I say we, of course we had nothing to do with it, but whoever got them, got them. Among these charts, was a very detailed chart of Eniwetok Atoll. I learned afterwards that it had been planned to continue to Eniwetok sometime later because that was the next step toward the Marianas. But with the capture of this chart which showed a cleared channel right through both entrances of the atoll and showed very carefully what buoys there were and what the depths were in fathoms and where mines were, which was of course terribly important, this speeded up the decision to go ahead to Eniwetok. Another part of that decision was the fact that it had been anticipated that the Task Force that attacked Majuro while our group was attacking Kwajalein would meet stiff resistance there, but instead, the Japanese had only four people on this atoll. So a whole group of Army and Marine troops that hadn't even been tested at Majuro were available and could go up to Eniwetok. So plans were accelerated very quickly and it became clear that that's what we were going to do. We were employed as sort of a mail ship to go among the large ships that were anchored at Kwajalein to deliver the new orders.

A funny thing happened during that period. We were told to pick up the Admiral in charge of the escort carriers, Ragsdale, does that sound familiar? Anyway, I was told to pick him up from one of the jeep carriers and take him over to the *Rocky Mount* which was Admiral Turner's flagship and communication ship. I picked this gent up and ostensibly he was going over to discuss what his function would be at Eniwetok. I picked him up and one of the officers met him when he came aboard and brought him up to the flying bridge where I was. He said to me, "Captain, what ship did you come over on?" I said, "This one." He said, "No, I don't mean that, I mean what ship were you carried on?" and I said, "This one." I don't think he believed me, but it was a funny episode. It shows the sea worthiness of these small ships that nobody ever thought, I don't think, would ever be used for this kind of duty.

I think February the 1st was when we acted as control vessel for the initial landing at Kwajalein Island and after that, we acted as control vessel for landings at various of the

other small islands in the chain of the atoll its the southern end. When it was decided to go to Eniwetok, we were ordered with the SC 539 to do the same job there. On February 15th we sortied from Kwajalein with the Eniwetok Attack Force which was under the command of Admiral Harry Hill. We escorted some tankers and LSTs, and of course, with other ships, we screened them up to Eniwetok. The trip was uneventful. Last minute chart revisions were delivered by air en route. It took about two or three days as I recall. D-day for landing on the first island to be attacked, Engebi, was to take place on February 18th which it did. When we arrived outside of Eniwetok Atoll, we had to wait for all the large ships to go in first and I think the Japanese, anticipating that the ships would hit a mine, didn't fire a shot, neither at the large ships that went in through the eastern Deep Passage between Parry and another island, or the southern Wide Passage through which we went. But anyway, all the ships went right up the marked channel and there was no problem. They had been preceded, of course, by a minesweeper and we were delayed coming in long enough for the area to be swept. The next day we marked the line of departure for the initial attack on Engebi, the only island with an airstrip.

WINKLER: How do you go about marking a line of departure?


HOLLANDER: First, we used our radar to be sure we were the proper distance from the landing beaches. We used that and then established our position at the center of the imaginary line of departure by taking tangents on the various islands, using these very good Japanese charts we had. Then we anchored. There was only one point marking the center of the line of departure, it wasn't a wide street or something of the sort. What would happen is we would be anchored some 2,000 yards or other distance off the beach with the LSTs and the transports anchored behind us. The LSTs would launch their amphibious tanks and the transports would lower the troops to the water in LCVPs which were small landing craft and which had a front door that dropped down when they hit the beach. The troops were carried in LCVPs in small numbers, and the tanks and each wave of LCVPs would circle on either side of us until they were dispatched from the line of departure when the Control Officer, who was on our ship, would signal them to go at the specified time. It was very carefully timed so they would not run into the support fire that was being thrown into the beach. At Kwajalein where, like Tarawa, there were reefs between the line of departure and the landing beaches, amphibious tanks (LVT(A)s) were used as well to carry the troops over the reefs. They were launched from LSTs. At Eniwetok, where the landings were made on the inside (lagoon side) of the atoll, the tanks and LCVPs went directly to the beaches. If we had to go off station for any reason, the 539 was there relieve us and mark the position.

WINKLER: What are you doing at the time as the Commanding Officer of the ship? You have a team on board. Basically are you performing any duties or are you just letting them do theirs?

HOLLANDER: They're doing their thing on our ship. At Kwajalein there was the Navy Beachmaster who was the Control Officer in charge of the landings, and the Army or Marines, depending on who was landing at that particular spot, would have a


ADDENDA "K" TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX H-1 OF CPG 51.11 ATTACK ORDER

A106-44



LCI Fire

LCI Fire



Wave																Beach Arrival	
1-10 LVT	o	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	o	v	v	v	v	v	o	Z Hour
2-12 LVT	o	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	o	v	v	v	v	v	v	o	Z Plus 5 Min.
3-15 LVT	o	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	o	v	v	v	v	v	v	o	Z Plus 10 Min.
4- LCI's	T	T	T	T	T						T	T	T	T	T	Z Plus 15 Min.	
5-12 LVT	o	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	o	v	v	v	v	v	v	o	Z Plus 20 Min.

6-	Ship's Boats-As Assigned	Ship's Boats-As Assigned	Z Plus 25 Min.
7-	Same as Wave #6	Same as Wave #6	Z Plus 30 Min.

etc

x Buoy

Control Boat
SC 1066

x Buoy

TO TRANSPORT AREA

K. G. Mc Gilvary
K. G. Mc GILVARY
Flag Secretary

GLOSSARY	
A	- LVT-AL
L	- LCI
v	- LVT
o	- LVT Flankers
T	- LCI's with tanks.

representative of their General on our ship. We had extra radiomen and signalmen as I mentioned, and there was somebody from the Medical Corps of the Service that was involved in the landing. There was also an Ordnance Officer. All of these officers knew where various things were. The whole purpose of having us in close to the beach was to avoid the problems they had at Tarawa where nobody really knew which LSTs had the hospital beds for the wounded and nobody knew which LSTs had the ammunition that might be needed, or the water supplies. And of course the General's representative was there in case there was any tactical problem that they had to handle. At Eniwetok, which was a much less complex operation, we had a much smaller control party aboard, although this time we had an AP reporter and photographer aboard for several days. Once I had gotten the ship to its position on the line of departure and until I was asked by the Control Officer to move up closer to 1,000 or 1,500 yards off the beach, which we frequently had to do after the initial waves had landed, there really wasn't anything we had to do except act as a floating buoy.

WINKLER: Now for the most part you really had a ringside seat for this whole invasion. Behind you, you had the gun support ships, the transports, in front of you there is the beach. Any observations as to the invasion itself as far as the gun fire?

HOLLANDER: It varied. It was very sporadic. At Engebi there was practically no opposition, there was some but it was mostly machine gun fire or something of that sort. Nothing that really threatened us. We were under fire a couple of times, but we never assumed that this was really dangerous because it was mostly small arms fire. Speaking of being under fire, we encountered some friendly fire at one of the later landings, I can't remember whether it was Perry or Eniwetok. We had a real scare because all of a sudden while we were marking the line of departure for that landing, we saw machine gun bullets hitting the water all around us from our own planes that were coming in. They were supposed to be strafing the beach. That was scary I can tell you, but fortunately we had no casualties from that.

WINKLER: There was no artillery coming in from shore?

HOLLANDER: The artillery on these landings would be, I understand from what I've read, I mean, I had no part in it, but usually the day before the main objective was about to be attacked the artillery would be landed by small boats or, I'm not sure how they got to shore, but they went as sort of an advance party. They would go to the adjacent islands on either side of the objective, some of which were not even occupied, to set up the artillery so that could be coordinated with the fire from the ships.

WINKLER: The thrust of my question was were there any counter battery fire from the Japanese?

HOLLANDER: None that we could ascertain. I think there may have been but it wouldn't have been directed at us. Actually, at Parry we saw one of our own carrier planes shot down in flames, but it turned out that this plane was hit because it flew into the

U.S. artillery fire which preceded the landings. I remember at one of the later islands, either Parry or Eniwetok, we were told to fire on a hulk that had been reported to be firing on some of our incoming aircraft and we fired on it with our 40 millimeter gun, and I think the 20 millimeters also and probably our machine guns, but it turned out that there was nobody on it, and it was a false alarm. That's about it really. There wasn't much more.

I mentioned we had to lead various landing craft to positions off different islands for later landings. Eniwetok Island was a much stronger objective than Engebi according to what I found out or read since that time. But the most Japanese were on Parry Island which was an island that was adjacent to what they called Deep Passage, the deep eastern entrance to the atoll. There, as I mentioned before, our ships had just gone right through without a shot being fired. I gathered from the materials I've seen afterwards that the Japanese had been instructed to hold their fire, and just when the actual invasion came, which they knew was coming, they would then attempt counter attacks. There was an elaborate, as you would expect from Tarawa, system of fox holes and coconut palm defense pill boxes on Parry and Eniwetok. Actually at Engebi, which is where the air strip was, and that's why we hit that first I think, there were four tanks right on the beach that had been unloaded, apparently shortly before we arrived. There also was a lot of unopened ammunition, so the Japanese obviously anticipated that sooner or later they were going to be attacked. But they never really got their defenses in strongly and I think that accounts for the lack of opposition on Engebi. There was plenty of opposition on Parry and to a lesser extent on Eniwetok.

There was an unfortunate event that took place in connection with the landings on Parry Island. One of the destroyers that was laying down fire support in anticipation of a landing the first day, somehow or another misfired and hit two or three of the LCI gun boats which were preceding the landing waves. The LCIs had rockets on them and so they were a part of the fire support that was to take place. And of course nobody anticipated any of them were going to get hit, but they did. It was the *Haley*, the destroyer was the *Haley*. This resulted in a inquiry on the *Indianapolis* following the invasion in which I think everybody was suspicious that we were off station. But during the inquiry, we were able to show that our position on the line of departure had been verified by one of the larger minesweeps which had dropped a buoy right where we were supposed to be and when we anchored and I turned around, there it was. So we were confident there was no problem, as indeed the Inquiry's findings of fact later showed. The finding that went to Admiral Hill on this accident that had taken place, this friendly fire accident, said that on the basis of the Japanese chart plot, and the buoy that had been dropped by the minesweeper *Oracle*, we were exactly in the place we were supposed to be. *****

***** Admiral Hill's report of March 18, 1944 stated as a "known fact:" "Position of SC 1066. This position has been checked by plotting on a Japanese navigational chart and is believed correct as shown. The correctness of this position is also checked by the proximity of the buoy placed there a couple of hours previously by the ORACLE." The report is included as an appendix.



Ltjg. Hollander inspects a Japanese tank on Engebi.

Anyway, in the course of doing our duties there after the atoll was secured, we were put on the usual duty of screening the entrances with antisubmarine sonar to try and detect any possible incoming submarines or anything that might show up. These assignments were all uneventful. I should mention that the atoll was secured something like the 21st of February. We were on these various routine antisubmarine duties after that.

After Eniwetok had been secured, we were able to take care of an important piece of unfinished ship's business. At Pearl Harbor, in the middle of the night before we sailed for the Marshalls, our quartermaster returned from shore leave and began chasing the pharmacist's mate around the ship with a knife, waking the entire crew in the process. Because we were constantly underway or busy with control duties, there had been no time for any disciplinary action. When we found that the cruiser *Portland* was anchored near us in the Eniwetok lagoon and learned that there was space available in the brig, we hurriedly held a Captain's Mast at which, to his surprise, the man was sentenced to three days in solitary confinement for "conduct to the prejudice of good conduct and discipline." Some years later, this same man stopped me on the street in Washington and thanked me for straightening him out.

And then on March the 2nd, our starboard engine began to race and we found that apparently the starboard shaft had broken. We had not encountered any reef or underwater obstruction that we knew of and it later turned out that only the intermediate shaft, the outer shaft was broken. The pitch shifting shaft which was inside was intact. We discovered this when Admiral Hill's staff had us come alongside a tug and they sent a Repair Officer with diving equipment down to look at the starboard screw and shaft. We were operating only on our port engine after that. The repair officer suggested, and Admiral Hill ordered that we shackle the starboard shaft with a chain and then run the chain between the propeller blades and then run it to the after strut. I think it was because they were not familiar with this kind of propulsion that they made this mistake, because most propeller shafts stick out of the strut, but this one had a strut behind it. What they seemed to be concerned about was that the propeller might spin around and fly off or something, and of course, we weren't concerned about that because we knew the strut was behind it. Why they insisted on this after examining under the ship I can't tell you. I put in my objection and that was as far as it went. Anyway, shortly after that we were assigned to escort one of the LSTs to Kwajalein. Of course, we were going on one engine all this time, the port engine, but as I mentioned before, because the LSTs go very slowly, much slower than the sub chasers were capable of at cruising speed, we had been on one engine all the way from San Francisco to Pearl, so this was nothing new.

I have a note on March the 6th in the deck log that at Eniwetok the Atoll Commander and a doctor from his staff came over to look over the ship because at this time more than a third of the complement of the ship were ill. I think it was from flies, and ultimately I got sick and after we returned to Kwajalein, I was taken over to the *Cascade* which was a submarine tender, I believe, a much larger ship that had a sick bay and medical staff. I was there for a number of days from mid-March to early April.

WINKLER: Do you think it was from Malaria?

HOLLANDER: No, it was actually bacillary dysentery. I suffered as much from the treatment as anything else because they gave me sulfadiazine which was one of the sulfa drugs that they were using at that time. My knees swelled up and my eyes began to water, even more than what the initial problem had been. I never realized this until I got to Pearl Harbor and went to the sick bay there, and the doctor there said what you have is a reaction to sulfadiazine. I had been sick, there was no question about that. We think it was from the flies. There were a lot of dead bodies around and there were a lot of flies. As I said, a third of the crew was sick so you knew something was wrong.

Finally on April 11th, we got our order to join a convoy of seven LSTs and some LCIs that were on their way back to Pearl. Of course, our engine shaft could not have been repaired at Eniwetok or Kwajalein so it made sense. It wasn't until May the 4th, after we had gotten back to Pearl, that they completed the repairs to our starboard shaft in the dry-dock. That was just in time to find out that they were forming up for a rehearsal of invasions of Saipan, Guam, and Tinian. So the next thing we knew, on May 14th we were on our way to Maalaea Bay at Maui for a rehearsal, the same kind that we had before the Marshall Invasion.

WINKLER: Were there any lessons learned from the Kwajalein and Eniwetok invasions that were applied to this rehearsal?

HOLLANDER: Well, actually it's funny that you asked that. I remember when we reported at Maalaea Bay in Maui for rehearsal with the usual assignment, mark the line of departure for the transports, we got a signal light blinker from one of the ships that had been in the Kwajalein or Eniwetok landings, or maybe both, welcoming us back to the invasion fleet. It's funny. I later found in a Fleet Organization Chart that we were the only sub chaser that was listed as attached to the 5th Fleet, I could understand why after this.

I mentioned that after the invasion at Eniwetok, we had an inspection by the Atoll Commander because of the sickness. We also had an inspection when we got back to Kwajalein by whoever was in charge of the anti-submarine operation there, who was very, very critical of our ship. What he didn't realize was that we had been doing control vessel work, and the ship really, not only in appearance but in actuality, was very changed. I think I mentioned to you that the forward magazine had been altered and below deck the magazine was practically non-existent because of extra radios. What I didn't tell you, I forgot to tell you, was what happened when this inspection took place in Kwajalein. This officer was looking over the ship and as I said, he was very critical. He was particularly critical in his report about the fact that he found that the "after magazine" had a lot of supplies and other things in it. Well of course the "after magazine," that he was talking about is what was really the "after lazarette," which originally had been a storage space for extra equipment, line and so forth, and now was serving as well as an additional magazine for the 50 caliber machine guns that we had set up on the stern. So we were really amused

when his report said that the after magazine had a lot of other things in it besides ammunition.

Now getting back to the rehearsal in mid-May for the Marianas invasion. It went very much like the first one. The only thing was, you asked had anything been learned. I am sure that it had, certainly we had learned a lot, having done the control operation on a lot of the previous landings. The ships that were being used as transports this time, a lot of them had just come over from Europe. The war was about at an end in Europe, if it hadn't ended already. It ended by May 8th. These transport officers, of course, had had no experience with amphibious landings at all. This was brand new to them. I found very quickly that the commanding officer of the transport division to which I was attached for the simulated landing; Transport Division 10, had had no experience in this kind of landing. I went over to his ship and met with him and he was delighted to have somebody who had done a similar operation before. Actually, with him sitting there, I laid out the plan showing where we would be and how his LCVPs would be positioned. So when you say was something learned, at least experience was gained that we could put to good use. We had picked up our control party (an ensign, two signalmen, and four radiomen) from the USS *Knox* at Eniwetok and departed for Saipan on June 9, 1944. Our assignment this time was different because Saipan was a much bigger island, and now they had some larger patrol vessels, PCEs they were called, that could handle more people on board for the control party. So they were going to be used for the main landings. On D-Day, June 15 at Saipan, our assignment was to go through the motions of a landing, I think it was 5,000 yards outside the main harbor of Garapan in the northern part of Saipan, with the objective of immobilizing part of the Japanese defense force while the actual troop landings were to take place at the same time considerably further south at Charan Kanoa, I think the name of the place was. The operation went off perfectly well. There was no problem. There is really very little to report after we did the demonstration landing. We went south to assist where the main landings which were being controlled by control officers on PCEs who were handling the southern landings. We were on duty, on one thing or another, mostly antisubmarine work around Saipan until, get this, the starboard shaft broke again. And so we were limping around again on one engine. Despite that fact, for six nights we screened LSTs on retirement from Saipan because of Jap planes in the area. Eventually we were assigned to convoy some LSTs to Tarawa in the Gilberts, via Eniwetok and Kwajalein. From Tarawa we returned to Eniwetok, and then were ordered to go back to Pearl Harbor for repairs, escorting a net tender called the *Keokuk* (AKN 4). Five times we had to stop to repair our port engine by changing injectors or fuel filters. We twice refueled and took on water en route, and much later, I had the unusual luck of receiving from the *Keokuk*, pictures of the *1066* refueling at sea.

Anyway, when we arrived at Pearl Harbor, on July 27, at what were then the DE docks at Bishop's Point, there was an Ensign waiting on the dock for us and when we tied up he told me that Admiral Nimitz had sent him to congratulate us on being the first ship back from the Marianas' invasion. Coincidentally, the *SC 1065*, my previous command, was tied up nearby. The next day we moved to the Navy Yard for repairs and on the 30th of July in Pearl, I was detached from the *SC 1066* and my Exec, Lieutenant (jg) Albury

Bull, took over as Commanding Officer. I should mention that Admiral Hill was tied up at the same dock and I went and paid a courtesy call on him at that time. And also, I think that President Roosevelt was there on the *New Jersey* or one of the other large ships at Pearl at the same dock.

Epilogue

Having reviewed the deck logs of both the *SC 1065* and *SC 1066* for the periods covered in my narrative, and also having re-read my personal records and the contemporaneous letters I sent home, I am struck by how lucky I was to have experienced the events I've described during my eighteen month service with the "splinter fleet," January 29, 1943 to July 30, 1944. To have experienced a submarine attack on my first convoy and to have participated in the first assault on an enemy-held position where an SC served as the primary control vessel, was hardly the sort the boring duty that escorting coastal convoys and carrying out routine antisubmarine assignments normally would have entailed. It is true, however, that we paid a price. At Eniwetok in February 1944, I reported to Admiral Hill that our crew had had only one and a half days ashore in the previous six weeks and after the Saipan invasion in June of that year, I noted that we'd been underway for 25 of the previous 27 days. In contrast, at Treasure Island in San Francisco, we'd been considered a 50 percent operating ship, three days out and three days in port. The pay-off, however, was that the *SC 1066* was designated as in command of the two ship control unit (TU 51.14.5) for the Eniwetok Attack Force, and was later listed as the only SC attached to the Fifth Fleet. After I left, the *SC 1066* performed similar control duties at Iwo Jima in February 1945 and at Okinawa in April 1945 and so earned a total of four battle stars. I last saw the *SC 1066* when I was Navigator of the *USS Medea* (AKA 31), and she came alongside in a cloud of smoke at Saipan. I had the satisfaction then of being able to provide the crew with a supply of fresh fruits and vegetables--a luxury as I knew from my own experience. Sadly, the ship ended up as a typhoon casualty, running aground on the beach at Buckner Bay, Okinawa in mid-September 1945. *SC 1066* was decommissioned there on January 21, 1946.

My first command, *SC 1065*, also served as a control ship for amphibious operations in the later stages of the war. *SC 1065* returned to the United States to remain in commission in the United States Navy until February 9, 1948, when she was transferred to the Maritime Commission for disposal.

