The Congressional Globe, Volume 13, Part 1: Twenty-Eighth Congress, First Session Page: 101
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CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE,
101
subject of negotiations between this country and for-
eign Governments, would be to establish a rule
which, in all probability, would be '.attended with
much difficulty. He therefore rose to call the atten-
tion of the Senate to the subject, that the resolution
might not pass entirely unobserved, rather than for
the purpose of throwing any obstacles in the way of
the passage of tlie resolution. If the Senator train
Ohio had no objection, he would move that the Ab-
ject be laid on the table for the present, and that it be
called up at some future time.
Mr. ALLEN was well aware that the Senator
from Kentucky could have none but a proper mo-
tive for the motion which it was his intention to
make; but he was also equally well aware that the
mass of the people west of the Alleghanies felt a
deep interest in the question of the immediate occu-
pation of the Oregon Territory by this Government
He thought that the apprehensions of the Senator
from Kentucky were entertained without sufficient
foundation. He held that to refuse this inquiry
on the grounds taken by the Senator from Kentuc-
ky, would be to establish, for the first time, a prece-
dent which might be worked to the detriment of the
best interests of the country. It was not proposed
by this resolution to establish any new precedent.
The precedent on which it rested was as old as the
Senate itself; and, on reference to its journals, it
■would be found that this mode of calling on
the Executive for information in relation to a
subject of this nature has been pursued almost as
much as on any other subject of information. He
knew very well, that, by the Constitution of the
United States, the President of the United States
had the initiation of all negotiations with foreign
governments; but that is all he has. He has not
the sole and absolute power to bind this Govern-
ment, independent of any act of the other branch of
the Government, designated by the Constitution to
ratify his acts. The Senator asked, why call for
this information pending the negotiation now going
on? His (Mr. Alley's) answer was, why call for
it after the negotiation is concluded—when all is
done for good or for evil that the Executive can do?
It was but a poor remedy for the evil done, to call
on him to furnish the grounds of his. decision in the
matter. The example of the manner in which the
British treaty had been negotiated should admonish
the Senate on this point.
The Senate of the United States has a duty to
perform; but it is impossible for it to effect anything
m arresting public calamity, if it does not interfere
till the work of calamity is so far advanced that it
cannot be arrested. The Senate need not be remind-
ed of the discussions which the British treaty had
given rise to in this chamber. All that took place
on that subject had been made known to the public.
But he would appeal to the Senators in the majority,
and ask them, was it not within their recollection
that, against the strongest arguments, the treaty was
agreed to by two-thirds of the body, on the ground
that the Executive had acted in the matter, and that
the honor of the country would be compromitted by
any departure from the negotiation concluded. It
was maintained, in defence of this course, by two-
thirds of this body, that the calamity of the country
would be greater in refusing tlie concurrence of
the Senate, than in accepting the treaty as it was.
Yet the treaty was made before the Senate could act:
it was consummated within the reach of a strong
man's voice from the Seriate, though it contained
provisions repugnant to the sense of a large majority
of this body: still it went through with a majority of
two-thirds, because, each Senator acting on the state
of the case saw that it was too late to do otherwise
than confirm the act of the Executive. Could it be
imagined that so many Senators, standing here as
the Representatives of sovereign States themselves,
would have agreed to a treaty by which one of the
States of this Union was to be dismembered, and
nearly a fourth of its territory taken from it and cast
as an additional fragment into the territory of the
British Empire,—could it be imagined that two-thirds
of this Senate would have had any occasion to give
their vote for the confirmation of such a treaty in the
shape in which it w as presented for confirmation, had
the rights of this body been exercised before the nego-
tiation of it had been brought to a conclusion?
True, the Senatp had had the correspondence of the
two Governments along with the treaty; but it was
too late; it was at a time when it could effect no
good, and was therefore of no use. Here, now, was
an opportunity of profiting by the example. A
treaty is negotiating Between this Government and
the Govenwwnt of Great Britain, in relation to the
Territory of Oregon. He remembered seeing in
the newspapers, since the last session of Congress,
me fact stated, that a call had been made on Mr.
Peel, the British minister, in Parliament,*as to what
was doing about this very negotiation. His an-
swer, couched in all the ambiguity familiar to
ministers in his situation, was such as, with-
out being very definite, conveyed the idea that
such a negotiation was going on as would
eventually secure the rights and welfare of
the British empire. This negotiation was going on
after the Senate of the United States-had passed a
bill for the occupation of the territory, and made
the question a legislative question; and now it is
going on, while a bill lately introduced is actually
the subject of present legislation, in conformity with
the expressed wishes of the American people.
Having reason to believe that a negotiation was
going on upoft a subject of legislative action, it was
proper that the nature of the negotiation should be
known to the legislative body pending the act of
legislation, lest a conflict of action might take place
between the executive and legislative departments
of the Government. Now, he held that it was the
right of the Senate of the United States, pending a
negotiation anywhere, or for any object, to demand
of the President of the United States, that he shall
place before this body, information as to all the steps
and stages of that negotiation previous to its conclu-
sion. The Senate, by the Constitution, is made a
part of the negotiating power; and if it is to exercise
its power only after another power has been exer-
cised, which renders its power impotent, it is in
effect left without the power conferred upon it by
the Constitution.
He undertook to say that the language of this
resolution is the precautionary language always
employed in like resolutions calling for information
in relation to the correspondence of this Government
with foreign Governments. The President has
the authority to make the first move. He acts in
advance of the Senate—with it, or with it not. The
condition of any question being known to him, he
is better able to judge the propriety and policy of
entering upon the negotiation.
It is a matter addressed to his own judgment.
Either it is right, or it is wrong, to lay the corres-
pondence relative to the pending negotiation before
the Senate. If it be right, he can send it here. If
wrong, he will keep it to himself, and inform the
Senate that it is not expedient for the public service
yet to disclose the correspondence.
But this resolution was not only right on general
principles, but it was particularly important that it
should be adopted, when the question to which it
refers was a subject of legislative action. When the
Senate is acting on the Oregon bill, is it not to know
what may be the consequences of passing that bill?
And how is it to know it, if the state of
the case is concealed from the Senate? It
will, if not informed on this subject by the
Executive, be legislating in the dark. The Presi-
dent may be bound to one state of things, while
Congress, by its solemn law, binds the country to
another; and then the spectacle is presented to the
world of the question standing on two totally dif-
ferent grounds in consequence of the simultaneous
action of two branches of the Government, the one
acting without the requisite knowledge of the action
of the other. Whatsoever may be the consequence
of communicating the information called for, the
country is ready and willing to meet it. He (Mr.
Allen) remembered to have read a report of Mr.
Peel's speech after the Senate had passed the Oregon
bill of last session, in which he said that bill, had it
become a law, would have been a cause of war.
This was the declaration made by the prime minis-
ter of England in his place in Parliament, and there-
fore it cannot be supposed that it was a declaration
made without authority, or without a motive.
It was a declaration made for the purpose of
admonishing the Congress of the United States,
that, under the threat of war, it should keep still on
the subject of the Oregon Territory, and leave the
matter to negotiation. Cause of war! A declara-
tion made by the British minister with regard to
the action of one branch of this Government 111 re-
lation to its own territory—a territory as large as
that of England, three times multiplied! If that
British minister thought that such a delaration was
calculated to make any impression on the represent-
atives of the people of this country, he was great-
ly mistaken. It could have no operation on the
American people, and certainly shouw have none on
their representatives.
He (Mr. Ali.es) now wanted to see what the
state of this negotiation was, and he wanted the
American people to see "it. If it' w necessary ja
prepare for the alternative of war or (he surrender
of their territory, the American people will -send
millions to maintain their rights the moment they
know the fact. '
Should this resolution be laid on the table—which
he (Mr. Allen) trusted it would not; for, if it was,
it could not be from any other motive-them the mo-
tive which would resist the action of the Senate on
the bill lately introduced—no Senator would be
able to say that he should vote knowingly- wisely,
and with that action necessary for deliberative legis-
lation. That he could vote on the bill while nego-
tiation on the subject of it was going on between the
two Governments, and vote understanding^ with-
out the information called for by this resolution,
seemed to him impossible. It could not be done. The
Senate, in the absence of that information, would
have to legislate in the dark, and that by its own
volition; because it commanded it to the dark, where
the power existed of commanding the light. The
Senate puts this resolution on the table, and then
and then votes to put the bill also on the table, on
the plea that it knows not what has been done with
regard to the negotiation. Would this be a satis-
factory excuse to the country for not acting on the
bill, after the Senate had refused to obtain the infor-
mation necessary for its action? For his part, he
should not return to his constituents with any
such excuse. _ He would not go home and
tell his constituents that certain negotiations
were going on, concerning which he had re-
fused to make any inquiry, and therefore he had
not been ready to act upon the bill; and especially,,
after the intimation of the British minister that the
action of the Senate, had it become a law, would
have been considered a cause of war. He (Mr.
Allen] did not know that it would actually have
been a cause of war; but if it had been, he could
say that the country was prepared to meet the con-
sequence.
If the resolution now under consideration should
fail before the Senate in its present capacity, he
should try it again when the Senate should as-
sume another capacity, when it would be unques-
tionably within its province to call for the informa-
tion. If the Senator from Kentucky thought proper
to renew his motion to lay the resolution on the
table, he (Mr. Allen) should feel constrained to
demand the yeas and nays on that question.
Mr. MOREHEAD rose to renew his motion. He
had not intended, m making the motion, to give rise
to a discussion on the merits of the resolution. He
had expressed to the Senate the doubt swhich he en-
tertained as to the propriety of adopting a resolution
like this, at the present stage of the negotiation. He
was not satisfied with regard to the propriety of the
action of the Senate on the resolution then. He had
not risen to make any opposition to it. His sole
object was to delay action on the subject, until the
Senate should have an opportunity of reflecting
more deliberatety on the resolution. This was the
only object he had in view. It was his desire that
the members of that body should have time to make
up their minds on the subject. It was one of much
importance, and should be calmly and deliberately
considered.
He was not very clear that it was the duty of the
Senate, at any time pending a very important and
delicate negotiation, the interruption of which might
lead to war, to interfere with the negotiation in
progress and carrying on by that department of the
Government to whom the Constitution has entrusted
the power of carrying on such negotiations. That
they should interfere with the movements of that
department, he was not sure was proper for the
Senate to do. He did not know whether there
were any precedents on the subject or not; but that
was of very little importance, as he considered this
the exercise of a right, if it existed, which was ad-
dressed to their judgment and sense of propriety.
The question was whether, in the pending of nego-
tiations, it should be their duty to interfere with the
progress of such negotiations. He desired to have
some time for reflection; and it was with that view
he renewed the motion to lay the matter on the ta-
ble. He hoped the considerations of the resolu-
tion would be postponed till next Tuesday.
Mr. ALLEN said that it might then be too late;
but if the Senator from Kentucky wished the post-
ponement for information, and did not consider that
the object of the resolution would be defeated by th^
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United States. Congress. The Congressional Globe, Volume 13, Part 1: Twenty-Eighth Congress, First Session, book, 1844; Washington D.C.. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth2367/m1/125/: accessed April 23, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.