The following text was automatically extracted from the image on this page using optical character recognition software:
@ffice of the Attornep Qeneral
*tate of Texas
DAN MORALES December 12, 1996
ATTORNEY GENERAL
The Honorable Stephen H. Smith Letter Opinion No. 96-136
District Attorney, 119th Judicial District
124 West Beauregard Re: Whether a county may use a five cent
San Angelo, Texas 76903 surcharge on the sale of items from vending
machines in the county courthouse for an employee
benefit fund (ID# 38943)
Dear Mr. Smith:
You ask whether the use of a fund accrued from a five cent surcharge on purchases from
vending machines in the county courthouse to buy "small gifts, plaques, or flowers for funerals,
weddings, or retirement of county employees" would violate article H1, section 52 of the Texas
Constitution. In our view, it would not.
As you explain the situation, "Many County Courthouses have vending machines on their
premises. Often, the only benefit of the machines is employee convenience. Some counties, however,
receive an extra five cents per item sold and use these funds for the sole purpose of buying small gifts,
plaques or flowers for funerals, weddings, or retirements of county employees."'
Article !, section 52 of the Texas Constitution reads, in relevant part, "[T]he Legislature
shall have no power to authorize any county ... to grant public money or thing of value. .-. to any
individual ... ." You ask whether the use of the fund you describe for the purposes you describe falls
afoul of this section.
You suggest that article m, section 52 may not apply because of "the insignificant value of
five cents per item sold." We disagree. First, it is the disbursement rather than the collection of the
fund which would arguably violate section 52. Second, there is in any event no de minimis exception
in the constitutional language.
However, we agree that the increase in employee morale likely to flow from the practice you
describe does serve a public purpose. This office has repeatedly considered the question of whether
improvement of employee morale constituted such a public purpose. In Attorney General Opinion
JM-1156, we held that leasing state-owned space for child care facilities at less than fair market value
did not violate article III, section 51, the analogous constitutional provision dealing with state
property, because "improv[ing] employee performance is a public purpose." JM-1156 (1990) at 5.
In Letter Opinion No. 88-94, we held that the inclusion of a single guest for each employee at an
'You do not describe how and under what authority the counties collect this surcharge. Accordingly, we will
assume for the purpose of this question, but we do not decide, that the county has authority to collect such a surcharge.
