Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, during the latter part of the Austin term, 1884, and the Tyler term, 1884. Volume 62. Page: 279
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1884.] BUnKS v. BENNtrTT. 279
Opinion of the court.
been conducted in the district court, since that time. This appeal is
from the action of that court upon an account of the administratrix,
Mrs. Burks, the court below having disapproved and disallowed
several items of account as well as a sale of the lands of the estate,
on the ground that the county judge, John S. Sproull, who approved
the claims and ordered the sale, was disqualified. Upon the contest
in the court below it was made to appear that he had never been
appointed, nor had he ever qualified as temporary administrator of
the estate. Hence that cannot be considered as ground of disqualification
of the county judge in the matters now before the court.
But it is shown by the record that at the time of qualifying as
county judge he was, and still is, a creditor of the estate, holding
two small claims against it, which had been allowed by the administratrix
and approved by his predecessor in office.
Therefore, the important question now before the court is as to
whether that fact disqualified Judge Sproull from making orders,
approving claims, and directing sales of property in that administration.Our constitution declares that "No judge shall sit in any case
wherein he may be interested." This declaration rests upon a just
and obvious principle. Its enforcement is essentially necessary in
protecting the citizen against injustice and wrong. The impartiality
which it requires of a judge is incompatible with his having a
pecuniary interest in the subject-matter of the litigation over which
he presides. The extent of the interest is .immaterial; whether it
be large or small does not affect the principle. If the judge has a
pecuniary interest in the subject-matter of the litigation, he is disqualified
and cannot sit in the cause. This principle so forcibly
commends itself to our sense of justice that here, as in other states
it has been incorporated in and made part of the organic law. And
our superior courts have at all times vigorously enforced that provision,
as well as those kindred provisions which relate to the disqualification
of judges. Garrett v. Gaines, 6 Tex., 435; Chambers
v. Hodges, 23 Tex., 112; Hodde v. Susan, 58 Tex., 389; Slavin v.
Wheeler, 58 Tex., 23; Gains v. Barr, 60 Tex., 676.
One who owns and holds approved claims against an estate is pecuniarily
interested in it; is interested in every order approving or
disapproving claims against the same; in every order directing the
sale of property of the estate. The creditor, in short, is pecuniarily
interested in every proceeding in the administration, from the ap
pointment of an administrator until his claim is paid.
This is such a direct pecuniary interest as would incapacitate a
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Texas. Supreme Court. Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, during the latter part of the Austin term, 1884, and the Tyler term, 1884. Volume 62., book, 1885; Austin, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28512/m1/301/: accessed April 23, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; .