Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of Texas, during the latter part of the Tyler term, 1874, and the first part of the Galveston term, 1875. Volume 42. Page: 428
This book is part of the collection entitled: Texas Reports and was provided to The Portal to Texas History by the UNT Libraries.
Extracted Text
The following text was automatically extracted from the image on this page using optical character recognition software:
'428 ROGERS v. IRAGLAND. [Term of
Argument for plaintiff Brownson.
law, there can be no change or enlargement of the homestead
after the debtor's death, as against the creditors of his estate.
If there be no homestead an allowance in lieu of it is provided
for; but if there be a homestead, that is the homestead which
is to be set apart to the widow and children. The homestead
which the husband held exempt from forced sale while he
lived, and when lie died, is, in our view of the law, the homestead
which is exempt from the claims of his creditors after his
death. The exemption attaches to the very property itself, to
that property as to which the world has had notice that it was not
liable for debt, not to a floating right, which may be located
upon property which has been the basis of large credits, and
in regard to which no exemption was ever thought of, either
by the decedent himself or by those who dealt with himn.
We conclude, therefore, that the land in controversy was
not a part of Dr. Ragland's homestead during his lifetime, and
that his widow could not make it homestead, by selection,
after his death. We further conclude, that even if the land
was homestead, yet, as the question of homestead was adjudicated
against the plaintiff, and she failed to prosecute her writ
of error until after the land was sold under order of court, for
the payment of debts, and passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser, that sale cannot now be disturbed.
Phillips, Lackey & Stayton, for plaintiff in error, Brownson.
Upon the question presented by the appeal from Probate
Court, we submit, that if the main charge of the court upon
the question of homestead be the law, that it is but too manifest
that the verdict of the jury under the evidence cannot be
sustained. The rural character of the property in controversy is
so fully determined by law (see Act V. of February, 1840, 279,
Section 14; Pasehal's Digest, Articles 622, 596, 598, 600), and
by the evidence in this case, that we do not deem it necessary
further to consider that question, and we will only briefly notice
the law which we believe applicable thereto. Regarding the
. .
Upcoming Pages
Here’s what’s next.
Search Inside
This book can be searched. Note: Results may vary based on the legibility of text within the document.
Tools / Downloads
Get a copy of this page or view the extracted text.
Citing and Sharing
Basic information for referencing this web page. We also provide extended guidance on usage rights, references, copying or embedding.
Reference the current page of this Book.
Texas. Supreme Court. Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of Texas, during the latter part of the Tyler term, 1874, and the first part of the Galveston term, 1875. Volume 42., book, 1881; St. Louis, Mo.. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28531/m1/436/?rotate=90: accessed April 25, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; .