Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of Texas, during the latter part of the Tyler term, 1874, and the first part of the Galveston term, 1875. Volume 42. Page: 430
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430 ROGERS V. RAGLAND. [Term of
Argument for plaintiff Brownson.
employment, and which they cannot obtain within a city or
town; and for them the law protects a home determined not
by value but by acres. Thus upon grounds of the highest reason
has the law-making power of the government established
and protected a home for every family that will avail itself of
the same, and that there may be no confusion or uncertainty in
regard to the extent of the same, has fixed the several standards
by which each shall be measured. Can any power, save
legislative, exempt something different, and undertake to erect
a mixed standard for the determination of the extent of this
somethin g? The homestead right once vesting, and then being
rural in its character, would not be affected by its being subsequently
incorporated into, and actually being made a part of a
town (see Bassett v. Messner, 30 Texas, 604), and the foregoing
can have no application to such a case.
The second and third we consider together. The law protects
to the plaintiff in this case just what it protected to Dr.
Ragland, so far as the homestead is concerned (there being in
point of fact a homestead), and protects nothing to them which
it did not protect to him. If we are correct in the position
that a mixed homestead cannot exist, it follows, that if Dr.
Ragland had a homestead, in point of fact, in the town of Victoria,
that it is that homestead which vests in the plaintiffs,
and not another. The exempt property vested by operation
of law, without decree of court, in the plaintiffs immediately
upon the death of Dr. Ragland. (Sossaman v. Powell, 2 l Texas,
664.) This operation of law, though silent, is as effective, and
shows as fully the legal determination of the right as though
upon the most solemn adjudication. In such case it can with
as little propriety be claimed that the right to select something
else than the real homestead exists, where there had been a
formal setting apart of the homestead by decree, as in the case
where the law silently and effectively vests the right. In the
absence of a statute so permitting, can it be claimed that the
plaintiffs may elect to take another piece of land as homestead,
than that which the law declares to vest instanter, even with
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Texas. Supreme Court. Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of Texas, during the latter part of the Tyler term, 1874, and the first part of the Galveston term, 1875. Volume 42., book, 1881; St. Louis, Mo.. (texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28531/m1/438/: accessed January 18, 2018), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, texashistory.unt.edu; .