Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, during the latter part of the term beginning December 2, 1872, and closing November 28, 1873, and during the term beginning December 1, 1873, and until the change of judges made under the amendments to the Constitution adopted on December 2, 1873. Volume 39. Page: 572

                                
658           GALVESTON Co. v. TANrKE:RSLEY.    [Term of
and intention of the convention, still they had no power or
authority to do so. These grants were solemn acts of a contract
made with the several counties, and this contract with
Galveston county was duly executed years before the adoption
of the constitution. The state had parted with the title to a
body corporate, capable of receiving and holding title to land,
and she has not the power or authority, under the constitution
of the United States, to recall her grants or violate her executed
contracts at pleasure. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87;
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 570.
In the latter case the court says: "A contract is a compact between
two or more persons. ..     . A grant, in its own
nature, amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the
grantor, and implies a contract not to reassert it."  In the same
case the court says: "It may also be admitted that corporations
for mere public government, such as towns, cities and
counties, may in many respects be subject to legislative control.
But it will hardly be contended that, in respect to such
corporations, [658] the legislative power is so transcendental
that it may, at its will, take away the private property of the
corporation, or change the use of its private funds." We think
the supreme court of the United States has settled the question
of the power in the state to violate a contract or recall a grant.
But we do not interpret article 9 of the constitution as intending
to annul its executed grants.  There were many counties
that had not had patents issued, and that act might prevent
the further issuance of patents; besides the grants were made
for school purposes, and the legislature might very properly
control the schools and the school fund, at least so far as to
insure its proper application to the purposes for which the
land was granted. We think Galveston county had a right to
prosecute her suit to final judgment, and, in case she obtained
a judgment, the right to hold the land in her own name for
the purposes for which it was granted.
The other only question which requires notice here is in regard
to the boundary. Appellant admits that the appellees
have a good title for the lands occupied by them, unless they
are on the Galveston county league; and appellees virtually
572