Reports of cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas during Austin term, 1851, and a part of Galveston term, 1852. Volume 7. Page: 48

                                
95-96                    SUPREME COURT.
The State v. Dclesdcnier.
is provided that " bills " shall be read on three several days before they shall
have tile force and effect of laws.
By section 22 of tle sale article it is declared that no [95] "bill or resolution
'  having once been rejected shall be passed into a law durillng the same
sessiOlln.
Every " bill   t which shall have passed both Houses of the Legislature shall
be preselltel to tle Governor for approval. (Art. 5, sec. 17.)
Every ordler, resolution, or vote to which tlhe concurrence of botl Houses of
tle Legislature m1ay be necessary must be approved by the Governor, or, in
case of his disapproval, shall be repassed by botli Houses, accordill to the rules
and limitations prescribed ill the case of a bill. (Art. 5, sec. 18.)
Bills and resolutions are lamed in contradistilection; both do not mean one
and the same thing; if they (do, unnecessary terms are lade use of in tlie Constitution.
The characteristic feature of a resolution is its enacting clause, "Be
it resolved; "' were any other term used, it would( cease to be a resolution.
"When the House commands, it is by an order. Bu3t facts, principles, and
their own opinions and purposes, are expressed in the form of resolutions."
(Cong. Main., p. 150.)
Of the right of the State to appear in her own courts and prosecute suits in
her own behalf there caln be no question; it is anl incident of sovereignty, not
dependent upon any statute. It might, with much propriety, be said that it is
the duty of the Executive of the State, under that provision of the Constitution
which declares that 'h le shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed,"
(art. 5, sec. 10,) to cause legal proceedings to be instituted by the proper law
officers in all cases when tile laws of the State are infracted or its rights
invaded.
But it would be a great neglect of duty on the part of the attorney general
not to institute such proceedings :\lmen tile opinion of the Legislature and Executive
Departments as to its necessity lias been clearly expressed.
The provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Texas are similar to
those of the State Constitutioln. (See art. 1, sec. 20, 21, and 27.) If there was
alny doubt as to the meaning [96] and appllication of those terms alld provisions
now under consideration, we coill(l refer to the uniform practice of Congress
as a legislative interpretation. The framers of tile new Constitution 111doubtedly
used terms and el)rcessions witli the menanilg that was familiar and
sanctioned by long usage.
If the joint resolution of February, 1848, has lot the force and effect of a
law for tile want of tile exacting clause prescribed by article 3, section 4, then
tile defelldant in tilis case Ilas no rights whatever, because tile Bryan scrip, upon
which tile patent is based, was issued under the authority of a jolt resolution,
and the provision of the Constitition of the Repulblic is equally emplatic with
that of the State Constitution, that the style of all laws silall be: '~ Be it enacted,"
&c. (Art. 1, sec. 22, Hart. Dig., 28.) If tils elacting clause is lecessary
to give a resolution tile force and effect of a law, then the Bryan scrip was
issue(l without authority of law and is wholly worthless. We thell conclude
that the joint resolution of February, 1848, conferred upon the attorney gelleral
ample authority to institute tile present suit. This resolution is a public
statute, of wliicll the court is bound to take judicial Iotice; it was lot lecessaly
that tile petition sllould Iave averred this authlority-it was not necessary
to prove it. Tlie State was not prosecuting her suit, in the present inhstalice,
by virtue of a special enactment creating an exception to a general irlle, but
she was exercising an unqlestionable right, incidclt to her sovelrigllty; the
right to sue was not in any way dependent 1upoIn the joint resolution-the resolution
was tile expression of Icer purposes, made for the direction of 1er officer:
if lie hlad been called upo to exhibit his authority to appear in 11er belltlf,
lie had only to refer to tile public statute book.
In other respects the petition was sufficiently formal. The title of the plaintiff
to the land in controversy, her ownership and right of possession, were
averred. There was no necessity of describing the character of her title. Iad
48