Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, during the latter part of the Austin term, 1884, and the Tyler term, 1884. Volume 62. Page: 26

26 HEARNE V. GILLETT. [Austin Term,
Opinion of the court.
person as they might name in lieu of themselves, the title that was
conveyed by said Daniel E. Watrous to said Columbus C. Hearne,
and also under the title said grant of eleven leagues of land to said
Nixon."
The fifth clause of that agreement is as follows: "It is further
stipulated and agreed that all the parties hereto shall respectively
execute to each other deeds of conveyance for all the right, claims
and title that each may have or supposed to have had in and to the
parcels or lots of ground that may be partitioned, allotted and set
apart under the foregoing covenant and agreement, to each of the
parties hereto, when said partition and allotments shall be made."
In pursuance of said agreement the partition was made and deeds
executed. There was no reservation of the certificate in the deed
executed by Mrs. Hearne to the appellant. But it is claimed that
such reservation arises by implication from the language used in the
second clause of the agreement, and especially when read in the
light of the circumstances attending the transaction, and that inference
is not affected by the fifth clause of the agreement.
One of the primary rules of construction is, that the entire instrument
must be taken and considered together. If the instrument,
when thus considered, is susceptible of a reasonable construction, by
which all its provisions are made to harmonize, and by which full
effect is given to its various parts, then that will be considered the
correct interpretation.
To adopt the construction contended for by the appellant would
result in giving to the second clause its utmost force and effect,
without the least regard whatever to the subsequent clause. If it
should be conceded that, standing alone, the reservation of the cer
tificate might be implied from the former, still, if any effect is to be
given to the latter, then that implication would be overcome. For,
by the express terms of that clause, " all the right, claims and title "
that each of the parties thereto had, or was supposed to have, to
the particular land was to pass by the conveyances made in accordance
therewith.
As has been seen, the location of the certificate upon the land
constituted a claim to the same; such title as would support a suit,
or upon which to predicate a plea of three years' limitation. Then,
according to the plain import of the language used, it follows, to the
extent the land conveyed by Mrs. Hearne was covered by the
certificate, that it passed to the appallee with the land. That construction
is in harmony with, and in no way militates against, the
second clause of the agreement.