Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of Texas, during the latter part of the Tyler term, 1874, and the first part of the Galveston term, 1875. Volume 42. Page: 438

438 ROGERS V. iAGLAND. [Term of
Opinion of the Court.
REEVES, J. The material facts of this case as developed on
the former trial, are indicated in the opinion of the court, reported
in 34 Texas, 617, reversing the judgment of the District
Court, and remanding the case for another trial.
After the trial in the District Court, and before Mrs. Ragland
sued out the writ of error from the judgment which was
reversed, the case being certified to the County Court, the administrator,
Rogers, applied for and obtained an order from the
County Court directing the sale of the lots described as 0, P,
and W, and the fractional lot, and other lots not in controversy
in this suit. The administrator reported the sale of these
lots, to John M. Brownson, to the County Court. The sale
was confirmed, with an order to make title to Brownson. After
the decision of the Supreme Court, Mrs. Ragland, in her
amended petition, filed in September, 1871, claims these lots as
part of the homestead, alleging that the administrator, Rogers,
had obtained the order of sale pending the writ of error in the
Supreme Court, and making Brownson a party. The defendants
pleaded in bar of the plaintiff's suit the judgments of the
District and County Courts and the proceedings in both courts,
and other matters not necessary to be noticed. Exceptions
were sustained to these defenses, and the cause was submitted
to the jury with the following result:
"We, the jury, find for the plaintiff the following lots, lot
"four, block 71, and lots, 0, P, and W, and the frac"
tional lot set forth in the petition, all of which do constitute
" the homestead." And thereupon the order of the Probate
Court directing the sale of lots 0, P, and W, and the fractional
lot, was vacated and set aside, and the sale made in accordance
therewith declared null and void, and the lots decreed to the
plaintiff as part of her homestead, awarding the writ of possession,
and further ordering that the plaiutiff be confirmed in
her title to and possession of lot four in block seventy-one as
constituting part of her homestead.
The defendants moved for a new trial on the following
grounds: