Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of Texas, during the latter part of the Tyler term, 1874, and the first part of the Galveston term, 1875. Volume 42. Page: 80

80 EPPErSON v. THE STATE. [Tyler Term,
Opinion of the court.
ment, upon the general ground of the insufficiency of the
indictment, with several others that related more to its
form than to its substance, and need not therefore be
discussed. The indictment charged that the defendant
fraudulently represented to Mary Roland, wife of Denton
Roland, that Denton Roland had sent him to her to get a
side of bacon for his, defendant's, own use, and that she
delivered to him the side of bacon, &c. In the concluding
part of the indictment, it alleges that defendant, by means
of the said fraudulent representations, did swindle the said
Denton Roland out of the value of the said side of bacon,
&c. The facts stated in the indictment are here recited
only to an extent to show its substantial deficiency. It
should have stated that the side of bacon was acquired by
means of the fraudulent representation made by him to
Mary Roland. That was the most essential part of the
charge, as contemplated by the statute, which embraces
three leading ingredients, which are, (first,) the acquisitioii
of the personal property of another; (second,) by
means of a fraudulent representation made to the person
from whom it is acquired; (third,) with intent to appropriate
the same to the use of the party so acquiring. (Pas.
Dig., art. 2426, (773a.)
It should have been directly alleged in this case that
defendant acquired the side of bacon by means of the
fraudulent iepreesentation (setting it out) made to Mary
Roland, from whom he obtained it, with such other allegations
as would have made the offense complete. This
requisition was not fulfilled by averring in the conclusion
that Denton Roland was swindled out of the value of the
side of bacon by means of such fraudulent representation.
That may have been the statement of a correct legal conclusion,
from the real facts of the case, but it was not the
statement of facts upon which such legal conclusion could
be based.
For this defect in the indictment, the motion in arrest