The Congressional Globe, Volume 13, Part 2: Twenty-Eighth Congress, First Session Page: 410
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410
APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE.
April, 1844.
28th Cong 1st Sess.
Improvement of Rivers and Harbors—Mr. Belser.
H. of Reps.
property of this Government? I no where find
such a power in the Constitution. It is, there-
fore, I contend, a reserved power, and cannot be ex-
ercised until granted by the people. When the
revenue is collected in the treasury; l't is, to all in-
t;nts and purposes, the property of the General Gov-
ernment. If Congress nad such a power, she might
give away this revenue; but when given away, there
would be a deficit in the treasury, would not, then,
Congress have the power to impose higher duties,
to replenish the treasury made empty by such gifts?-
I have already said, that to impose a duty, was to
levy a tax to the same amount. ■ If, then, Congress
may constitutionally give away the revenue when
collected, she has power to tax the people for the
sake of giving it away. I would now ask, if any
one one will affirm that Congress has the power to
tax the laborer, or the rich man, even, for the sake
of giving it away? It may be answered, that she
has no power to impose taxes, except for the ob
iects specifically pointed out in the Constitution; for
her powers are not inherent, but delegated, and are
limited strictly to the terms of the grant. It is,
therefore, plain that Congress has not the power to
give away the property of the General Government.
In this connexion, I would inquire if the distribu-
tion of the proceeds of the public lands among the'
several States is a gift? A gift is when A transfers
his property to B, to hold for B's own use, without
an equivalent at the time, present or expectant; snd
when an equivalent is expectant only nominally,
with no prospect of the expectancy ever being real-
ized, it is then a gift, in the full sense of the word.
Let A-represent the General Government, and B the
several States. A, in this act of distribution, trans-
fers his own property—namely, some three or four
millions of revenue a year—to B. This A does
without any equivalent at the time, or without the
expectation of any equivalent. It is therefore obvi-
ous that the distribution is a free gift.
We have seen that the public lands are the prop-
erty of the General Government; that the revenue
arising from them is the property of the General
Government; that Congress has not the power to
give away the property of the government; and that
to distribute the proceeds of the public lands is a
giving away such property. Is it not plain, then,
that the whole distribution act is unconstitutional,
and has no foundation in law?
Having arrived thus far in our examination, I
will now turn to the tariff more immediately, and
will examine the several operations of a tariff for
protection, and a tariff for revenue.
11" a tariff" were entirely prohibitory, there would
be no revenue collected on the articles prohibited.
In this state of things, the government would have
to be supported by a direct tax, unless some other
source of revenue could be devised. This is the ex-
treme of the ease, when consideied one way. There
is also another extreme, whose result as to revenue
is the same. It is where there are no duties at all
on imports. Here, as in the other case, there would
be no revenue; and the government would have to
be supported as before Hence it appears that there
is an intermediate point betwixt entire prohibition
on the one hand, and free trade on the other, at
which the greatest amount of revenue may be col-
lected. As you go above this point towards entire
prohibition, the revenue will decrease in a precise
proportion to the distance you go; not in a direct
proportion, however, but in a proportion inverse.
From the first step taken beyond the point at which
the greatest amount of revenue would be derived,
more revenue will be prohibited from coming into
the treasury than would be by the second step;
more for the second step than for the third; and so
on till, at the last step towards entire prohibition,
there would be very little imported; which step be-
ing taken, there would be none at all.
„ I will suppose one hundred and twenty per cent,
ad valorem to be an entirely prohibitory duty, and
twenty per cent, the maximum point. I will also
suppose that there are four steps betwixt this maxi-
mum point and the prohibitory point of one hundred
and twenty per cent. These steps would be a rise
each of twenty-five per cent. With a tariff of forty-
five per cent, ad valorem, we should have, say
twelve million dollars collected yearly. Eight mil-
lion wonld be prohibited from coming into the
treasury which did come in when the duties were
twenty per cent.
"Raise the duties to seventy per cent., and six mil-
lion dollars would be collected in the treasury, and
six million dollars prohibited by the last rise.
Raise the tariff to ninety-five per cent., and two
million dollars would be collected, and four million
dollars would be prohibited by the last rise of the
tariff.
Raise the duties to one hundred and twenty per
cent., or to an entire prohibition, and nothing would
be collected in the treasury, and two million of dol-
lars prohibited by the last rise of twenty-five per
cent. - ;
It will thus be perceived that each succeeding rise
in the duties brings into the treasury an amount of
revenue less in proportion to the increase of duties.
Here we have the result of laying on duties above
the maximum revenue point. I will now examine
the policy of high protective duties for revenue.
Whenever the government is in want of funds to
meet its current expenses, these funds, according to
our present policy, must be raised by duties on im-
ports. If we put on prohibitory duties, or duties
above the maximum revenue point, the very means
which we use to procure funds dries up the sources
from which the funds are to be drawn. The policy
is very like that of the man who, owning a mill
. short of water to keep its machinery in motion,
should go up the stream and erect prohibitory dams
to turn the water that ran to his mill, some other
way. After he had erected prohibitory dams
enough, the mill would stop. Now let this govern-
ment represent the mill, the revenue the stream, and
the millman erecting his prohibitory dams the men
laying on high protective duties, and I have no-
thing more to say on this point. I cannot consid-
er, therefore, prohibitory duties in the light of rais-
ing a revenue, but in the light of protection only.
It now becomes necessary to inquire who are bene-
fited by this high protection, ana who are injured?
In the first place, the manufacturers are benefited.
This is evident from the fact that they ask this pro-
tection. Suppose bioadcloths can be bought in our
market at three dollars per yard: If, at this time, a
duty should be put on of one dollar and fifty cents
per yard, the price of broadcloths would immediate-
ly lise from three dollars to four dollars and fifty
cents per yard. For every yard of broadcloth the
manufacturer made, he would be benefited by the
duty in operation one dollar and fifty cents. If he
should sell twenty thousand yards per year, he
would put into his pocket, by the protective policy,
thirty thousand dollars. Here would be a fortune
made in the short space of one year by a single dash
of the protective policy.
Again: if common factory sheeting could now be
bought for six cents per yard, and a protecting duty
should be laid on of four cents per yard, the Manu-
facturer would immediately raise his price to ten
cents. If he should make and sell five million
yards per -year, he would realize a profit from
the protective system of two hundred thousand
dollars. Such would be the effect in all manufac-
turing establishments, providing they come under
the protecting wing of the government.
1 am aware that it has been contended by gentle-
men in this debate that prices do not rise upon the
imposition of duties, and examples have here been
cited to show that articles, after a duty is laid on,
can be bought as cheap as they were before. No
doubt instances of this kind can be found; but they
are only exceptions to the common rule, and there
is always a reason for their temporary existence.
However it may be as to these incidental cases,
the fact is, that the manufacturer raises his price to a
j level with the prices of foreign articles; and it can
| easily be made to appear that foreign articles must
sell, after a duty is imposed, as much higher as the
duty per cent, imposed. If this is not the effect of a
protecting duty, why does the manufacturer ask
| for protection?
The merchant buys the article of the foreign mer-
i chant and pays him a living profit. The duty must
be paid before the article is offered for sale in our
market. Now the question arises, who pays it?
Not the foreign trader, becausc that would sink his
profit. Who buys it? The home merchant. But
he does not lose the amount of the duty, because
that would sink his profit. If neither the foreign
merchant nor the home merchant pays this duty,
who does' The answer is obvious, the consumer;
and he pays it in addition to the former price. For
example: the foreign merchant sells broadcloth, in-
cluding a living profit, at two dollars per yard. The
home merchant buys and sells again, including his
profit, at two dollars and fifty cents per yard. A spe-
cific duty is imposed of one dollar per yard, The
importing merchant must now have three dollars
per yard, provided he pays the duty. The home
merchant must sell at three dollars and fifty cents,
and the buyer is obliged to pay the additional sum.
This, then, is the case with foreign articles; and as
the rule is, that the domestic must keep _ pace with,
them, it is plain that both domestic and foreign arti-
cles of consumption are sold to the consumer after
the duty is imposed, at a price as much higher as
the duty per cent, imposed. We hence see the bene-
fit which manufacturers receive from high duties.
I will now trace the effects on the other portions
of the community. I will commence with the farm-
er. It is evident that he pays a certain amount more
in consequence of high duties, than he would were
not these duties imposed. If he consumes two hun-
dred dollars worth of articles, exclusive of the duty,
and a duty of fifty per cent, is imposed, then the
duty takes out of his pocket one hundred dollars. If
factory cloth is three cents per yard higher than it
would be, owing to the duty, and he wishes to buy
one hundred yards of it for domestic use, he must
pay in the single trade three dollars for the duty. So
in all other cases.
1 will now take the case of the young man, who
is poor, and has nothing but his hands with which
to help himself. This young man must have a suit
of clothes. Let us see how much the high tariff will
benefit him.
At a low tariff.price he could buy his broadcloth
say at two dollars per yard, and three and a half
yards would make him a suit. The cost of cloth
would be only seven dollars. Let a duty of one
hundred per cent, be imposed, as is frequently the
case, and he must pay fourteen dollars for the same
cloth. This is not all. He must pay a duty
for his silk, for his buttons, and all the articles
necessary, so that by the time his suit is com-
pleted, the high tariff will have cost him a ten
dollar bill; and when it is considered that the poor
young man has to pay these ten dollars into the cof-
fers of the rich manufacturers, the' buiden seems
doubly hard. This same law will hold good among
the whole non-manufacturing class of our country.
The manufacturing class is estimated to be within
one-tenth of the whole. This one-tenth is benefited
to the detriment of nine-tenths; and, as a general rule,
the benefit may be rated by the amount of protection
put on, and the detriment to the nine-tenths may be
measured by the same rule.
I will now trace the effects of this protection on
the merchant. It cannot rationally be denied that in
times of high protection the mercantile business must
be diminished ,_and also be less profitable. There-
verse of this is sometimes attempted to be proved,
but the simplest process of reasoning will show its
fallacy.
If one million cords of wood were to be hauled
yearly from one town to another, and teamsters
enough had already prepared themselves for hauling
that quantity, and by a prohibition, only five hun-
dred thousand cords were to be hauled-, how evident
it is that woodliaulding, after the prohibition, would
be a less profitable business than before. The rea-
son is, that so many would be prepared to haul that
wages would be immediately reduced; for all would
rather work for low wages than not work at all, arid
the owners knowing this would employ the lowest
bidder. Equally true is it, that, if fifty million
were wont to be yearly exported, and the same
amount imported, and ships and men enough were
ready to do all this, the prohibition causing only half
this amount to be imported and exported, would
produce a similar detrimental result on wages and
the profit of ship owners. The result follows as a
necessary consequence; and to deny it is to deny the
plainest conclusions of reason and practice.
REMARKS MR. BELSER,
OP ALABAMA.
1844—
certain
In the House of Representatives, .iprtZ 18,
On the bill making appropriations for
rivers and harbors.
Mr. BELSER assured the Chon, that with the
present disposition of the House to take the ques-
tion. he could not detain them as long as he desired;
for he viewed this as one of the most important sub-
jects that could be brought befme Congress. It
was neither more nor less than the question
whether the old exploded system of internal im-
provements was to be revived; and if it was, the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Air. Adams] would
have good reason to re;oice at the restoration
of his principles. He was fur doing justice to
every politician, for awarding to liirn whatewr
benefit or good might result from his acts; and if
anything substantial was to flow out of the measure
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United States. Congress. The Congressional Globe, Volume 13, Part 2: Twenty-Eighth Congress, First Session, book, 1844; Washington D.C.. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth2368/m1/420/: accessed May 6, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.