Reports of cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas during part of Galveston term, 1852, and the whole of Tyler term, 1852. Volume 8. Page: 8
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- 15-16 SUPREME COURT.
Iadley v. Tankersley.
the rule, [15] "that where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed
in general terms, the Legislature should be understood to mean what
they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction."
And when the intent of a statute is plain nothing is left to construction.
Now, where the Legislature have plainly said " the deed shall be " good
and effectual, both in law and equity, there is nothing unambiguous, and consequently
no room for construction. There are no words which will bear the
sense contended for in support of the demurrer, which is that it shall only be
good and effectual in law and equity if the assessor and sheriff have duly complied
with every direction given them in the act. In these words " the will of
the Legislature is obvious," and in such a case our Supreme Court, in the case
referred to, says "all the laws and rules of construction by analogy or intendment
cease." Lord Coke lays it down "that all acts of Parliament shall be
taken by a reasonable construction to be collected out of the words of the acts
themselves according to the true intent and meaning of the makers." (5
Rep., p. 6.) And again, "the good expositor," says Lord Coke, "makes every
sentence have its operation. He gives effect to every word. He does not
construe it so that anything shall be vain or superfluous, nor yet make exposition
against express words." (Barham's case, 3 Rep., 117.)
The Congress of Texas, in the act of 1840, provides for the raising of a
revenue by direct taxation, and in that act they carefully direct the revenue
officers in every step of duty in the assessment, collection, and sale of property.
Did they not know if these directions were duly complied with a title
would pass even without a deed? Or, in other words, had the words "which
deed shall be good and effectual both in law and equity" been wholly omitted,
would not the court hold that the sheriff's deed passed the title of the
delinquent tax-payer if all the preliminary steps had been duly taken ? Of this
there can be no doubt; and if so, I ask, will not the court, by holding that
these steps must still be shown to have been taken, [16] deny to the words
" which deed shall be good and effectual in law and equity " any effect whatever,
and render them wholly "vain and superfluous?" How can the court,
as good expositors, give to those words effect and operation by holding that
the deed is dependent for its effect upon the preceding acts of the revenue
officers ? In the revenue laws of the United States and of all the States of the
United States except the State of North Carolina, no validity whatever is
attached to the deed of the tax-collector. There the deed depends wholly for
its effect or validity upon the performance of each and all the requirements of
the law by the revenue officers, and is only executed to take the sale out of the
statute of frauds. (4 Pet. R., 359; 4 Cr. R., 403; 2 Con. R., 151; 4 Wheat.
R., 77; 6 Wheat. R., 119.) And cases in several of the States have decided
that it is incumbent on the purchaser to show that the directions of the law
had been complied with, and in many States it is held that the deed is not even
primafacie evidence of such compliance, whilst in Kentucky it is held that a
deed for the land sold for non-payment of taxes is a primafacie evidence that
the requisites of the law had been complied with, but proof of the contrary is
admissible. (3 Bibb. R., 326; 3 Mon. R., 311.) The same doctrine prevails in
Connecticut and Massachusetts. In Tennessee the doctrine is, that "it was
sufficient for a purchaser of land sold for taxes to show such proceedings as the
law requires to be of record, and all not required to be of record will be presumed
to be regular." (Barry v. Rhea, 1 Tenn. R., 345.) And will the court,
after they have examined and find there is no provision giving any validity
whatever to the deed of the tax-collector (and much less such an one as is
contained in our statutes, declaring it to be good and effectual both in law and
equity,) in any of the statutes of the United States, or in the States where the
above decisions and all others, except North Carolina, have been made, say
that the validity of the deeds made under the act of 1840 shall be tested by the
same rules applied by the [ 7] courts of the United States to sales made under
the revenue laws of the United States?
8
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Texas. Supreme Court. Reports of cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas during part of Galveston term, 1852, and the whole of Tyler term, 1852. Volume 8., book, 1901; Houston, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28566/m1/16/: accessed May 6, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; .