Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action Page: 91
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THE UNITED STATES WINS WORLD LEADERSHIP IN WAR
safeguarded and that China shall retain full sov-
ereignty in Manchuria. . . . The Kuril islands shall
be handed over to the Soviet Union. It is under-
stood that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia
and the ports and railroads referred to above will
require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek. The President will take measures in order to
obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal
Stalin. . . . For its part the Soviet Union expresses
its readiness to conclude with the National Govern-
ment of China a pact of friendship and alliance
between the USSR and China in order to render
assistance to China with its armed forces for the
purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.
Another facet of the Yalta discussions which
was withheld from public knowl-
The treatment edge for a time was the decision
of postwar concerning German reparations and
Germany the dismemberment and occupation
of Germany. The agreement on rep-
arations was published March 19, 1947.
SECRET AGREEMENT ON GERMAN REPA-
RATIONS, YALTA, FEBRUARY 11, 1945: . . .
Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by
her to the Allied nations in the course of
Secret the war. Reparations are to be received
agreements in the first instance by those countries
which have borne the main burden of
on Germany the war, have suffered the heaviest
losses and have organized victory over
the enemy. . . . Reparation in kind is to be exacted
from Germany in three following forms: (a) Re-
movals within two years from the surrender . . . to
be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying
the war potential of Germany. (b) Annual deliveries
of goods from current production for a period to be
fixed. (c) Use of German labor. . . . The Soviet and
American delegations agreed . . . [that] the repara-
tion commission should take in its initial studies as
a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet
Government that the total sum of the reparation
. . . should be 20 billion dollars and that 50 per
cent of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. The British delegation was of the opinion
that, pending consideration of the reparation ques-
tion by the Moscow reparation commission, no figure
of reparation should be mentioned.
The agreements as to dismemberment and a sup-
plementary definition of occupation policies were
made public on March 25, 1947.
SECRET AGREEMENT ON DISMEMBER-
MENT OF GERMANY, YALTA, FEBRUARY 11,
1945: It was agreed that . . . the Surrender Terms
for Germany should be amended to read as follows:
. . . [the three powers] shall possess supreme author-
ity with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such
authority they will take such steps, including the
complete disarmament, demilitarization and dis-memberment of Germany as they deem requisite for
future peace and security. . . .
SECRET AGREEMENT ON FRENCH PARTIC-
IPATION IN THE OCCUPATION OF GER-
MANY, YALTA, FEBRUARY 11, 1945: It was
agreed that a zone in Germany . . . should be allo-
cated to France. This zone would be formed out of
the British and American Zones. . . . It was also
agreed that the French Provisional Government
should be invited to become a member of the Allied
Control Council for Germany.
There has been considerable controversy, ever
since 1945, as to the desirability and propriety of
some of these agreements. Partisan critics of
American foreign policy as con-
The continuing ducted by the late President Roose-
debate over velt have intimated that there may
the Yalta have been other secret commitments
agreements made at Yalta which have not yet
been published. Numerous individ-
uals connected with the American State Depart-
ment have denied that such additional secret
agreements were made.9 As recently as March 2,
1953, Charles E. Bohlen, ambassador-designate to
the Soviet Union, told a Senate committee ques-
tioning him that he did not hold with the belief
that President Roosevelt was to blame for enter-
ing into these agreements with the Russians. Since
Mr. Bohlen was Roosevelt's principal interpreter
at Yalta and, while not in a policy-making
capacity at the conferences, an authoritative
observer of Russian wartime and postwar poli-
cies, his testimony on this point is particularly
valuable.
In Mr. Bohlen's view the agreements on Po-
land were a recognition by Churchill and Roose-
velt that the Russians were, at the time of Yalta,
in actual control of Poland. Therefore the
attempt was made to mitigate the effects of Rus-
sian control. According to Mr. Bohlen, ". . . the
alternative was to ignore Eastern Europe. You
could not afford not to make the attempt that
was made at Yalta." As for the secret agreement
on Russian participation in the Far Eastern war,
Mr. Bohlen said that in hindsight it appeared
Y For several years a project was under way in the
Department of State to publish all the documents in its files
relative to the Yalta Conference. Thispublicationswas delayed,
reportedly because of the unwillingness of Sir Winston churchill
to give the British government's consent to the inclusion of
documents involving joint Anglo-American discussions and com-
munications concerning the Yalta meetings. However, in response
to demands from Republican Congressmen, the State Department
reversed its policy of not issuing the documents and, on Mar.
16, 1955, published the series with some deletions for security
reasons.91
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Air University (U.S.). Extension Course Institute. Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action, book, April 1959; Alabama. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1077937/m1/105/: accessed July 16, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting National WASP WWII Museum.