Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action Page: 266
xi, 335 p. ; 27 cm.View a full description of this book.
Extracted Text
The following text was automatically extracted from the image on this page using optical character recognition software:
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN GROWTH AND ACTION
United States has repeatedly expressed its great in-
terest in the continued independence and territorial
integrity of Iran and has given and will continue to
give concrete evidence of this interest.
On May 20th Iran refused to arbitrate the issue
and went forward with the seizure of the plant
facilities. Secretary Acheson in a statement on
May 23rd denied that the United
U. S. urges States sought to intervene in the
Britian and quarrel54 but on the 26th the State
Iran to reach Department admonished Iran and
agreement urged a negotiated settlement. That
same day the British government
referred the nationalization move to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, citing the unilateral
breach of contract as a basis for its reference.
These procedures availed nothing and on June
26, 1951 the United Kingdom withdrew all Brit-
ish tanker vessels from Abadan and dispatched
a cruiser to the Persian Gulf. Premier Mossadeq
appealed to President Truman for American sup-
port of Iran's position. Meanwhile the Interna-
tional Court voted on July 5, by 10 to 2, asking
Iran to restore the status quo in the dispute until
it could be arbitrated. The British government
accepted the Court's decision but the Iranians
rejected it. On July 8th President Truman ad-
dressed an appeal to Mossadeq. In this the Presi-
dent requested Iran to accept the Court ruling
and offered the assistance of Mr. W. Averell
Harriman, administrator of the mu-
President tual aid program, as advisor and
Truman mediator.55 Premier Mossadeq, in
appeals to his reply of July 11th, accepted the
Mossadeq offer of Mr. Harriman's services,
but would not agree to further con-
cessions. Mr. Harriman arrived at Teheran on
the 15th. He immediately began conferences
with the Iranians and with the British mission in
Teheran. These talks proved fruit-
Britain places less and the negotiations were sus-
oil issue pended by the British on August
before the 22, 1951. On September 12th Mos-
UN Security sadeq sent an ultimatum to the
Council British, dispatching it through the
State Department, a barely dis-
54See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIv:891-92, June 4, 1951 for
Sec. Acheson's statement.
55See ibid., XXv:129-30, July 23, 1951, for Pres. Truman's letter
to Mossadeq.guised insult to the British.56 Complete occupa-
tion of the Abadan oil facilities by the Iranian
government began on the 27th and on the follow-
ing day the United Kingdom appealed to the
Security Council to examine the question. The
Council began debate on the issue on October 1,
1951.57
During the week of October 15-19 the Security
Council held daily meetings on the question. Pre-
mier Mossadeq, at the invitation of the Council,
appeared in behalf of his position twice. He ar-
gued that the Council was not competent to hear
the British complaint. But, he said, he was will-
ing to resume direct negotiations with the Brit-
ish government if London would recognize the
matter as a domestic dispute and not an interna-
tional matter. When the British failed to agree,
the Council on October 19 voted 8 to 1 (the
U.S.S.R. in opposition and the United Kingdom
and Yugoslavia abstaining) to defer decision un-
til the International Court ruled on its own
competence to hear the case.
Mr. Mossadeq then decided to make a personal
appeal to the United States govern-
Mossadeq ment. He arrived in Washington
makes a on October 31st and for almost two
personal appeal weeks conducted a campaign of his-
to the trionics, public and private argu-
United States ments, and threats-all of which
failed to win him the goal he sought.
On the 13th of November the State Department
announced that no agreement with Mossadeq
could be achieved. Thereupon, the temperamen-
tal Premier returned home where,
Mossadeq's on the 25th, he won parliamentary
appeal fails approval for immediate elections
which he felt would uphold his
cause in defying the British government, the In-
ternational Court, and the UN itself.
The year 1952 was marked primarily by in-
ternal conflicts within the Iranian government
and by the demonstrable failure of the Iranians to
make a success of operating the pe-
U. S. continues troleum facilities taken over in the
aid to Iran nationalization move. Insofar as
Iranian-American relations were
56See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXv:547-50, Oct. 1, 1951, for
the exchange of US-Iranian messages.
57See ibid., XXV:615, Oct. 15, 1951, for Mr. Austin's statement
justifying UN consideration of the dispute.266
Upcoming Pages
Here’s what’s next.
Search Inside
This book can be searched. Note: Results may vary based on the legibility of text within the document.
Tools / Downloads
Get a copy of this page or view the extracted text.
Citing and Sharing
Basic information for referencing this web page. We also provide extended guidance on usage rights, references, copying or embedding.
Reference the current page of this Book.
Air University (U.S.). Extension Course Institute. Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action, book, April 1959; Alabama. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1077937/m1/280/: accessed July 16, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting National WASP WWII Museum.