Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action Page: 64
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN GROWTH AND ACTION
tions. For many reasons, the League became the
liveliest issue of the 1920 presidential campaign;
and when James M. Cox, the Democratic candi-
date, was handily defeated by Warren G. Harding,
the Republican nominee, American membership
in the League was deemed impossible. This fact
was strengthened by the inclusion of restrictive
phraseology in a separate treaty of peace with
Germany, signed early in the new administration.2
THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, BERLIN,
AUGUST 25, 1921: . . . That the
United States shall not be bound by the
Separate peace provisions of Part I of that Treaty [of
with Germany Versailles], nor by any provisions of
that Treaty . . . which relate to the
Covenant of the League of Nations, nor shall the
United States be bound by any action taken by the
League of Nations, or by the Council or by the As-
sembly thereof, unless the United States shall ex-
pressly give its assent to such action. . . .
The failure of the United States to join the
League of Nations at its outset was one of the
chief contributory reasons for the
The League League's ultimate failure to achieve
without success. True enough, internal weak-
the US doomed nesses in the Covenant provided
to failure added reasons for the League's in-
ability to solve the problem of world
organization. But without America as a member,
the League became in essence a tool of the leading
European powers to maintain their control of
existing systems and counterbalanced alliances.
In spite of its rejection of the League, the
United States did not withdraw entirely from
international commitments. The. United States
took the lead in attempts to limit
Washington armaments and to discourage resort
Conference to war for the settlement of inter-
of 1921-22 national disputes. Secretary of State
Charles Evans Hughes, guided the
settlements of the Washington Conference of
1921-1922. In one of a series of treaties resulting
from this conference, the United States, the Brit-
ish Empire, France, Italy, and Japan signed an
agreement to limit the number and size of capital
ships in their respective navies.(36) They also
agreed to scrap some existing ships to reduce the
totals to the limits set forth in the treaty. By
2 On July 2. 1921 the Congress, by joint resolution, declared
the war with Germany at an end. Such a resolution in May 1920
had been vetoed by President Wilson.further agreement, the three major naval powers,
the United States, Great Britain, and Japan,
pledged a limitation on fortifications and naval
bases.
THE WASHINGTON TREATY ON THE LIMI-
TATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT, WASHING-
TON, FEBRUARY 6, 1922: . . . The United
States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the
status quo at the time of the signing of the present
Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases,
shall be maintained in their respective territories and
possessions. . . . The maintenance of the status quo
. . . implies that no new fortifications or naval bases
shall be established in the territories and possessions
specified. . . .
The five powers above mentioned were joined
by Belgium, China, the Netherlands,
Treaty to and Portugal in another treaty re-
protect China specting interests in China. This
Nine-Power Treaty bound the sig-
natory powers and any later countries which ad-
hered to it to safeguard the independence of
China.
THE NINE-POWER TREATY, WASHINGTON,
FEBRUARY 6, 1922: . . . The Contracting Powers,
other than China, agree: '(1) To respect the sover-
eignty, the independence, and the territorial and
administrative integrity of China; (2) To provide
the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to
China to develop and maintain for herself an effec-
tive and stable government; (3) To use their in-
fluence for the purpose of effectually establishing and
maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for
the commerce and industry of all nations through-
out the territory of China; (4) To refrain from tak-
ing advantage of conditions in China in order to
seek special rights or privileges. . . . not to support
any agreements by their respective nationals . . .
designed to create Spheres of Influence or to pro-
vide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive oppor-
tunities in designated parts of Chinese territory. . . .
Later in the decade following the armistice, the
United States was one of the moving spirits
behind a campaign to outlaw war which culmi-
nated in the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
Geneva This agreement grew out of the Ge-
Conference neva disarmament conference of
of 1927 1927 at which American delegates
attempted to have the 5-5-3 capital
ship ratio of the Washington Treaty of 1922 ap-
plied to lesser naval vessels. The conference was a
failure because of the unwillingness of France and
Italy to participate and of Great Britain and
Japan to reach a compromise with the United64
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Air University (U.S.). Extension Course Institute. Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action, book, April 1959; Alabama. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1077937/m1/78/: accessed July 16, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting National WASP WWII Museum.