Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action Page: 68
xi, 335 p. ; 27 cm.View a full description of this book.
Extracted Text
The following text was automatically extracted from the image on this page using optical character recognition software:
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN GROWTH AND ACTION
League Assembly adopted the report on Feb-
ruary 24, 1933, whereupon the Japanese delega-
tion walked out of the Assembly. Secretary
Stimson wrote to the American Minister at
Geneva approving in general of the League's
action.
SECRETARY STIMSON TO HUGH R. WIL-
SON, AMERICAN MINISTER TO SWITZER-
LAND, WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 25, 1933:
. . . In the situation which has developed out of the
controversy between China and Japan, the purpose of
the United States has coincided in general with that
of the League of Nations . . . while the League of
Nations has been exercising jurisdiction over a con-
troversy between two of its members, the Govern-
ment of the United States has endeavored to give
support, reserving to itself independence of judgment
with regard to method and scope, to the efforts of
the League in behalf of peace. . . . In the light of
its findings . . . the League has formulated a meas-
ured statement of conclusions. With these conclusions
the American Government is in general accord. . . .
In so far as appropriate . . . the American Govern-
ment expresses its general endorsement of the prin-
ciples . . . recommended.
This Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition5
attempted to create a moral sanction against
aggression which it was hoped would be but-
tressed by support from Britain,
The Japanese France, and other European powers.
attack The Europeans failed to take up the
Shanghai challenge. The Japanese, knowing
that the United States, in the midst
of a depression and influenced by isolationist
sentiment, would not move alone, disregarded
the American protests. Soon afterwards, Japan
attacked the Chinese at Shanghai, and President
Hoover, reluctant to involve the United States in
a war, refused to support suggestions for an
economic boycott of Japan. With the events of
1931-32 Japan, relatively unopposed, was riding
high in the Far East.
3. Inter-American Affairs: 1920-1936
Latin America, long a focal point of American
foreign policy, continued to pose problems in the
postwar era. The United States was involved in
the financial policies of half of the republics to
the south in these years; and, in several, forces of
American marines were in virtual occupation of
6 Not to be confused with Sec. Stimson's reversal of the
Wilson policy on recognition as discussed on p. 69 below.the country to insure political stability and fiscal
responsibility.
The policy of Mexico in nationalizing mineral
and oil resources stirred up trouble with that re-
public. Civil war in Nicaragua endangered pri-
vate American investments there.
Improved Gradually, the Coolidge administra-
relations with tion, through Stimson in Nicaragua
Latin America and Dwight Morrow in Mexico,
brought about improvements in
these two countries.6 The presence of President
Coolidge and Secretary Hughes at the Havana
Conference of 1928, and a good-will tour of eleven
of the Latin American countries by President-elect
Hoover at the end of that same year did much to
set relations with the twenty republics on a more
friendly course. (41)
Most significant in this period
US repudiates was the acceptance by President
Roosevelt Coolidge and Secretary Stimson of
corollary on the narrow interpretation of the
Monroe Monroe Doctrine by Reuben Clark,
Doctrine Undersecretary of State. In this
memorandum Clark repudiated the
Roosevelt corollary of 1904.7
THE CLARK MEMORANDUM ON THE
MONROE DOCTRINE, WASHINGTON, DE-
CEMBER 17, 1928: . . . The Doctrine does not
concern itself with purely inter-American relations; it
has nothing to do with the relationship between
the United States and other American nations,
except where other American nations shall become
involved with European governments in arrange-
ments which threaten the security of the United
States, and even in such cases, the Doctrine runs
against the European country, not the American na-
tion, and the United States would primarily deal
thereunder with the European country and not with
the American nation concerned. The Doctrine states
a case of the United States vs. Europe, and not of
the United States vs. Latin America. Furthermore,
the fact should never be lost to view that in applying
this Doctrine . . . our Government has over and
over again driven it in as a shield between Europe
and the Americas to protect Latin America from the
political and territorial thrusts of Europe. . . . Nor
should another equally vital fact be lost sight of, that
the United States has only been able to give this
protection against designing European powers be-
cause of its known willingness and determination
"" Stimson, who had been Secretary of War under Presi-
dent Taft, went to Nicaragua as personal agent of President
Coolidge. Morrow was appointed ambassador to Mexico. Stimson
later became Secretary of State under President Hoover, and was
again Secretary of War under President Franklin Roosevelt.
' See pp. 51-52 above.68
Upcoming Pages
Here’s what’s next.
Search Inside
This book can be searched. Note: Results may vary based on the legibility of text within the document.
Tools / Downloads
Get a copy of this page or view the extracted text.
Citing and Sharing
Basic information for referencing this web page. We also provide extended guidance on usage rights, references, copying or embedding.
Reference the current page of this Book.
Air University (U.S.). Extension Course Institute. Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action, book, April 1959; Alabama. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1077937/m1/82/: accessed July 16, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting National WASP WWII Museum.