Peace Despite the Filibusters Page: 2 of 2
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For more than 8 months the Treaty of
Versailles languished in the Senate, while
it was made the subject of a political assault
the like of which the American people had
not up to that time seen. It was more
than a year later, in excess of 3 years after
the armistice, that finally the United States
made a separate peace with its former enemy,
Germany.
The opponents of the League had control of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
which for months held the treaty away from
the Senate floor, and made its hearings the
platform for the dissemination of the prop-
aganda which was eventually to destroy the
League in the Senate. Likewise the op-
ponents of the League had control of the
parliamentary procedure upon the Senate
ffoo-. This accentuated the evil of the two-
thirds requirement, because the considera-
tion of the treaty was so manipulated that
it was not allowed to come to a vote in the
Senate when it might have had a two-thirds
vote of the Senators voting upon its ratifi-
cation.
It will be remembered that while the Sen-
ate debated the League of Nations the world
waited for peace. The 25 other Nations be-
sides ourselves which had been signatories
of the Treaty of Versailles waited to know
what the United States would do about
ordering the affairs of the world.
After this spectacle the American people
began to wonder whether, with the two-
thirds rule in effect, the United States
could effectively have any foreign policy, or
could make the kind of decisions which a
great Nation has to make concerning world
affairs.
The executive branches of the other prin-
cipal powers of the world have authority to
negotiate international agreements. When
ratification by their parliamentary bodies is
necessary it is a matter accomplished with
dispatch. These powers, therefore, are able
to make international commitments and to
inform authoritatively other nations what
they will and what they will not do,
But what can an American President or
Secretary of State commit this Nation to, and
what responsible advice can the American
Government give any other power as to our
course, so long as any international agree-
ment is subject to unlimited delay in com-
mittee in the Senate, and then to unlimited
debate upon the Senate floor, and then to
the requirement of a two-thirds vote when
eventually its consideration is reached?
Surely what Russia is to do after the war,
and what England will do in the same pe-
riod, will depend to a large extent upon what
we are prepared to do. It is obvious that if
Russia and England are going to have to rely
upon their own strength for their future
security they must achieve a strategic posi-
tion after the war which will give them the
safeguards upon which they are willing to
rely. The alternative is international under-
standing and commitments by which we will
all agree to band together against the aggres-
sor and to use force if necessary and such
other means as may be required to restrain
international aggression and to maintain the
peace of the world.
How long will Russia and England, in de-
termining what territory they will occupy
when the enemy is crushed, be willing to
wait for the Senate, according to its present
procedure, to make up its mind as to what
America will do? Or how long will these
604937-8407CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
countries jointly wait upon the Senate de-
termining what we are willing to commit our-
selves to after the war, when those two Gov-
ernments can at any time under their gov-
ernmental procedure enter into effective
agreements and understanding about their
own courses?
Moreover, with our system of political
parties in the United States, there will always
be a certain number of Senators who will
make political capital even out of a treaty
concluding a war which the opposite party in
control of a government may negotiate. That
is a severe indictment, but I suggest to good
citizens that it has occurred in the past.
John C. Calhoun, when he was Secretary
of State, wrote concerning the fight over the
treaty providing for the annexation of Texas:
"I cannot but hope that the treaty would be
sanctioned * * * when the Presidential
election will be over, and the party motives
that have led to laying the treaty on the
table shall have passed away."
In the fall of 1919 Senator Albert J. Bev-
eridge wrote to Will Hays, chairman of the
Republican National Committee: "* * *
if Wilson gets this thing [the League of
Nations] through, especially if he gets it
through with Republican support, I think
that our prospects of winning [the national
election], which 3 months ago seemed a cer-
tainty, will be gravely diminished."
Even if it were possible to get a vote upon
a treaty at any time in the Senate, the two-
thirds rule is almost prohibitive of ratifica-
tion of the kind of treaty which has to be
made after a world war today. The power
of filibuster, which the Senate jealously pre-
serves, makes it possible, however, for even
less than a third to defeat a treaty, for a few
determined men under the rules of the Sen-
ate can even keep a measure from being made
the pending business before the Senate.
Many filibusters have revealed that power
and the willingness of the Senators to exer-
cise it adamantly. Debate on the League of
Nations showed than there was a little group
o Senators who would forego no power to
defeat the League. Surely the isolationists
and those who do not believe in international
collaboration are in the Senate today, and
they are determined to use every means with-
in their power to prevent the setting up after
this war of the kind of international organ-
ization, and the kind of world collaboration,
which most of us believe essential to the
winning of the peace and to the prevention
of World War No. 3.
One naturally asks what can be done. Sev-
eral of us, including myself, have proposed
a constitutional amendment which will pro-
vide for the ratification of treaties either by
majority of the Senate, or a majority of the
Senate and House of Representatives. I ad-
vocate that ratification be by majority of the
Senate and the House. The House should
have a part in making peace comparable to
its part in the declaration of war. The House
is the body closer to the people. Surely the
principle of providing checks upon the power
of the Executive and balance between de-
partments of Government can adequately be
obtained by preventing any treaty negotiated
by the executive department becoming ef-
fective unless it is agreed to by a majority of
the Senate and the House.
I go further, however, and provide that a
majority of the Senate and the House must
have authority effectively to fix the time
of the vote. In other words, to prevent a
filibuster,Lot an amendment to the Constitution
can be proposed to the legislatures of the
States only by a two-thirds vote of the
House of Representatives and the Senate.
While I believe the House is prepared to
abolish the two-thirds rule in favor of a
majority rule in the Senate and the House,
the Senate, I am sure, is not ready to do so,
and will not do so.
The alternative under the Constitution is
for two-thirds of the States to propose such
a constitutional amendment to the Con-
gress. In that case it would be obligatory
upon the Congress to provide for a consti-
tutional convention to consider such a pro-
posed amendment. If such a convention
submitted a proposed amendment, then it
would be the duty of the Congress to submit
the proposal to the States for ratification
by the legislatures, or conventions, as Con-
gress might determine, in three-fourths of
the States. While everyone who believes in
the abolition of the two-thirds rule should
work for action in the State legislatures, it
is vain to hope that we can accomplish any-
thing effective by the end of this war.
The only effective way, therefore, to cir-
cumvent the two-thirds rule, although that
does not overcome the senatorial power of
filibuster, is to seek the adjustment of post-
war problems and international collabora-
tion on the part of our Government by exec-
utive agreement, approved by a majority of
those voting in the Senate and the'House.
The executive agreement with such ap-
proval by the Congress is historically as old
and almost as well recognized as the treaty.
in fact, Washington himself used the device
of the executive agreement approved by the
Congress. Since his time about 1,200 com-
pacts with foreign governments have been
concluded by the executive- agreement
method, while only some 800 treaties have
been ratified.
You may wonder about the difference be-
tween the treaty and the executive agree-
ment. It is doubtful if anyone could draw
a definition which would accurately describe
the difference in the two in the light of our
history. While there are many good theo-
ries, it may be said that an executive agree-
ment is an instrument pertaining to inter-
national affairs which the Senate and the
house are willing by a majority vote to treat
as an executive agreement, binding upon
this Nation, while a treaty is such an instru-
ment which the Congress will not recognize
unless it is ratified by two-thirds of the
Senators voting upon its ratification. Con-
gress, therefore, has the power of substitut-
ing a majority rule of the Senate and House
for the two-thirds rule of the Senate,
The present machinery does not prevent
the Congress and the executive from so work-
ing together that we can have an effective
foreign policy, and can make decisions on
international affairs with promptness and
responsibility. The danger is in whether
Congress will allow a minorty of the Senate
to abuse the power to defeat an effective
foreign policy.
One readily sees, then, how important it
is that the views of Members of Congress be
known upon this vital question. It is doubt-
ful if any attitude of a Member of Con-
gress is as important to the winning of the
peace and the prevention of World War No. 3
as whether he, or she, is willing to break the
stranglehold of the minority of the Senate
upon our power to participate in foreign
affairs.U.3 GOVE ? NT PAR INTING OFFICE: 944
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Pepper, Claude, 1900-1989. Peace Despite the Filibusters, article, 1944; Washington D.C.. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1479719/m1/2/: accessed July 9, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Private Collection of Mike Cochran.