Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action Page: 67
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THE UNITED STATES CALCULATES THE PRICE OF WORLD LEADERSHIP
there should develop . . . a controversy arising out
of any Pacific question . . . which is not satisfactorily
settled by diplomacy . . . they shall invite the other
. . . Parties to a joint conference to which the whole
subject will be referred for consideration and ad-
justment. . . .
Throughout the decade following the war the
United States was mainly concerned with main-
taining the Open Door policy as it related to
China. The Washington conferences
End of the saw the termination of the Anglo-
Anglo- Japanese alliance of 1902, the re-
Japanese statement of America's Open Door
alliance policy, and a general reduction of
naval armaments among the powers
interested in the Far East. Thus the United
States succeeded in stabilizing the Pacific situation
to this extent. Under the League mandate system
Japan gained administrative control over a num-
ber of former German island possessions.4 She
was forbidden to fortify these islands, but as is
now known, she proceeded to disregard this pro-
hibition and created a string of outlying bases
which she used effectively in World War II.
Japan's final emergence as a world power dates
from these days after World War I. The clash of
interests between the United States
Japanese and Japan became more marked
are excluded during the late 1920's and early
from 1930's. The Immigration Act of
United States 1924, which in effect abrogated the
Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908,
angered the Japanese, who were thereby excluded
from entry into the United States, even on a quota
basis. Japanese public opinion grew increasingly
anti-American, and anti-American -demonstrations
were frequent.
By the time Japanese had occupied South Man-
churia in September 1931, relations
Japan invades between Washington and Tokyo
Manchuria were decidedly cool. The American
in 1931 State Department assumed a lead-
ing part in protesting Japanese ag-
gression as these notes sent by Secretary of State
Henry L. Stimson indicate.
SECRETARY STIMSON TO AMBASSADOR
DEBUCHI, WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 22,
1931: . . . This situation is of concern, morally,
legally, and politically to a considerable number of
4 These were the islands in the Marshall, Caroline, and
Marianas groups (except for Guam), and other small is-
lands in an area between 1300 and 175 East Longitude
and from the Equator north to the Tropic of Cancer.nations. It is not exclusively a matter of concern to
Japan and China. It brings into question at once
the meaning of certain provisions of agreements,
such as the nine power treaty . . . and the Kellogg-
Briand pact. . . .
SECRETARY STIMSON TO COUNCIL OF
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, WASHINGTON, OCTO-
BER 5, 1931: . . . On its part the American Gov-
ernment acting independently through its diplomatic
representatives will endeavor to reinforce what the
League does and will make it clear that it has a
keen interest in the matter and is not oblivious to
the obligations which the disputants have, assumed
to their fellow signatories in the pact of Paris as
well as in the nine power pact should a time arise
when it would seem advisable to bring forward
those obligations. . . .
When the League Council on October 20 voted
to invoke the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the United
States was allied with the League authorities in
an informal, but active way. Japan refused to halt
her invasion of Manchuria and in January 1932
Secretary Stimson, acting independently of the
League, but in line with its policy, addressed iden-
tical notes to China and Japan. These notes set
forth what became known as the Stimson Doctrine.
SECRETARY STIMSON TO JAPANESE AND
CHINESE GOVERNMENTS, WASHINGTON,
JANUARY 7, 1932: . . . the American Government
deems it to be its duty to notify both
TheStison the Governments of the Chinese Re-
The Stimson public and the Imperial Japanese Gov-
Doctrine ernment that it cannot admit the
legality of any situation de facto nor
does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement
entered into between those governments . . . which
may impair the treaty rights of the United States or
its citizens in China . . . and that it does not intend
to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which
may be brought about by means contrary to the
covenants and obligations of the pact of Paris. . . .
Ambassador Joseph C. Grew reported from
Tokyo to Secretary Stimson, on August 13, 1932,
that growing animosity toward the United States
was developing in Japan. He said
United States further that the Japanese military
cooperates machine would welcome war. Early
with the in January 1933 the Japanese ex-
League tended the boundaries of their new
puppet state of Manchukuo (Man-
churia) by occupying the North China province of
Jehol. Meanwhile the Lytton Commission, ap-
pointed by the League of Nations to investigate
the Japanese actions in Manchuria, made an ad-
verse report condemning Japanese aggression. The67
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Air University (U.S.). Extension Course Institute. Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action, book, April 1959; Alabama. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1077937/m1/81/?rotate=90: accessed July 16, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting National WASP WWII Museum.