The Congressional Globe, Volume 13, Part 1: Twenty-Eighth Congress, First Session Page: 258
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•238
CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE.
the one brought forward by tiie gentleman from
Virginia as soon as they were brought fac'e;* toface,
and an application attempted to . the present case.
What was the construction that the doctrine he laid
down required of all legislative and judicial tribu-
nals of the country? He understood it to mean that
they must stand away from all the barriers which
the constitution has erected between those powers
which belong to this government, and those which
belong to the States by whom it was created.
And when he heard gentlemen descanting with so
much eloquence on the unappreciable value of har-
mony in all the parts of the complicated system of
government under which we live, he implored them
to bear in mind that the only way to preserve this
harmonious action was the observance of the maxim,
"Stand away from the barriers which the constitu-
tion has erected between the powers of the federal
government and the powers of the States;" avoid
touching the great boundaries which divide the two;
and when a conflict arises between them, give such
a construction as will be in favor of the latter. The
danger of collision from the workings of the dif-
ferent parts of our system of government.being in
the hands of different functionaries, all will admit is
the great pdlril to which our political system is ex-
posed. 1 hat was the great peril to which all fede-
ral governments must of necessity be exposed; and
by no skill of contrivance, by no patriotism, by no
enlightened conduct, can we guard against such eol-
isions, which must of necessity occur, and which
are sometimes so alarming as to threaten the exist-
ence of the system.
He would ask, then, if it was not the solemn duty
of the House to study the perils to which we are
exposed, and exercise its wisdom in avoiding them.
How (said Mr. C.) can you do this, if this govern-
ment will not act on the principle of carefully ab-
staining from trenching on those rights which the
States have reserved to themselves? Again: for the
purpose of showing how utterly inapplicable the
law maxim of the gentleman from Virginia was to
the question before them, he would suppose there
were two conflicting statutes; and that on the side
of one stood arrayed the States of New Hampshire,
Georgia, Missouri, and Mississippi; while, on the
side of the other, stood, in a position irreconcilable
with it, the law of Congress: which of these two
statutes opposite to, and irreconcilable with each
other, should have the benefit of this hard straining
to give such a construction to it as to give it opera-
tion and effect, and save it from being pronounced
null and void?
He put that question to gentlemen, and he asked
them how they would escape from the dilemma.
When they undertook to apply such a principle of
construction as that of straining hard to give such a
construction to a statute as would give it a certain
desired effect, he asked which enactment should
have the benefit of such a maxim. It seemed to
him to be too plain a question to require an answer,
though it might not correspond with that which the
argument on the other side had impliedly furnished.
The statutes of State Legislatures must be tried by
the same principle of construction as was applied to
the statutes of this government; and between two
conflicting statutes of State and general legislation,
they were not at liberty to apply the principle of
straining hard to give effect and operation to the
statutes of this government as against the statutes of
the States. They should do no such thing, but
carry them both to the grand and only test by
which they could be tried—to the "constitution to
which they were both subordinate. To this test
the House must take both the State laws and the
enactment of Congress, which were both passed by
legislative bodies, that were alike sworn to support
the constitution of the United States—legislative
bodies that were both empowered by the constitu-
tion to judge of their respective powers under the
constitution. If they had then two conflicting
statutes, both passed by assemblies under the con-
stitution, and under an oath to support it, they
must not give one an advantage over the other in the
application of a principle of construction, but try
them both by the test of the constitution to which
they were both subordinate. And now he brought
them to that test, as to a supreme law, to which
they must equally bow.
But haying dwelt long enough on the principle of
construction by which they were to be governed,
he would proceed to another part of his task. He
begged leave to call the attention of the House to
one or two passages from the report of the minority
of the Committee of Elections. He then read ex-
tracts from the report referred to, and commented
thereon at length, to prove the fall&y Of its argu-
mentation; and he asked if Congress could, - by
simply repealing a pre-existing law on the subject of
elections, leave the people of the States without any
law whatever? He asked the minority of the com-
mittee to come up to that question^ and to answer him
whether, in the name of a repeal or alteration of a
law, they were to repeal a pre-existing law and
leave the people without any regulations whatever.
Mr. CATLIN then spoke as follows:
I have not deemed myself called upon to occupy
the time of this House with any remarks upon the
various subjects which have been hitherto brought
before it for debate. I may, perhaps, have felt that
their discussion should be left to those whose con-
stituents were more particularly interested in these
subjects than were my own; or I may have been
restrained by the sentiment that my first introduc-
tion here would excuse me in taking but few liber-
ties in a hall graced by the presence of veterans in
the work of legislation.
But in the resolutions now before the House are
presented grave and important questions of consti-
tutional law—questions involving the powers and
duties of Congress and of this House, and deeply
affecting the rights of the States and of the people.
While upon one hand it is declared that the 2d sec-
tion of an act of Congress, approved June 25, 1842,
is not a law made in pursuance of the constitution of
the United States, and valid, operative, and binding
upon the States;" upon the other hand, it is as-
serted that four of the sovereign States of this con-
federacy are not entitled to representations upon the
floor of this House. These are, indeed, grave and
important propositions; arid, perhaps, I should have
contented myself with listening W the able and in-
teresting debates to which they lead, and at their
close have given a silent vote.
But, sir, we have been told by honorable gentle-
men upon this floor, that these questions are to be
carried by them before the people—that there they
will be discussed, and that the decision of the people
will be sought upon them. Before the people of
the State which I have the honor here, in part, to
represent, these questions have been already taken;
and before that people they have been already dis-
cussed; they were discussed, too, at the extra ses-
sion of the legislature of Connecticut in 1642, and
it was there solemnly resolved by that body, that
the second section of the act in question was in-
valid, inoperative, and void. The chief executive
magistrate of Connecticut, a gentleman distinguished
for his high legal attainments, approved that reso-
lution. On the first Monday in April last, the people
of that State approved it; and it now stands as
their deliberate and solemn decision upon the prop-
sitions now before this House.
In vindication of the opinions of the people and of
the legislature of Connecticut thus expressed—opin-
ions in which I most fully concur, and in accordance
with which I shall vote when the question is taken
upon this subject here, I would submit a few re-
marks to the indulgent consideration of this House.
The fifth section of the first article of the consti-
tution of the United States provides that "each
House shall be the judge of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of its own members." In view
of this provision of the constitution, I cannot doubt
that this House is constituted the judge of the elec-
tions, returns, and qualifications of those claiming
seats here, from the States of New Hampshire,
Georgia, Mississippi, and Missouri, as well as from
all the other States in this confederacy; and that it
is as competent for this House to determine the
rights of those claiming under elections by general
ticket, as of those claiming under district elections.
Of these questions, this House is constituted the
sole, exclusive, and omnipotent tribunal to judge;
and its decisions cannot be revised, reversed, or set
aside, by any other branch or department of this
government. Indeed, the question of jurisdiction
seems to bo fully settled by the section of the consti-
tution to which I have referred. From the report
of the committee to whom it was referred to inquire
"whether the several members of this House have
been elected in conformity with the constitution and
laws," it appears that the members from the States
of New Hampshire, Georgia, Mississippi, and Mis-
souri were elected by general ticket, in accordance
with the long established laws and usages of those
States respectively—and that under these laws and
usages, their elections, returns, and qualifications,
were perfect and complete.
But it is protested that, by the second section of
"An act for the -apportionment of representatives
among the several States, according to the sixth
census," approved June 25th, 1842, the election
laws of the States which I have named,, so far as
they relate to the manner of electing representatives
in Congress, have been altered, abrogated, or repealed;
and that, inasmuch as the legislatures of those States
respectively did not provide for the election of their
representatives by districts, but suffered their elec-
tions to proceed by general ticket, the sitting mem-
bers from those States were not elected' in conform-
ity with the constitution and laws; and hence are
not entitled to their seats upon this floor.
This presents the direct question whether the 2d
section of the apportionment act of June 25, 1842,
is or is not a law made in pursuance of the consti-
tution of the United States, and valid, operative,
and binding upon the States. If it is such a law, it
is, of necessary consequence, paramount to the
election laws of those States, so far as it comes in
conflict with them; the congressional election in
those States must be held upon a principle new and
unknown to their legislation at the time the elec-
tions were in fact held; and it follows that the mem-
bers from those States are now occupying seats up-
on this floor to which, under the constitution and
laws, they are not entitled. But, if the section in
question is not such a law, then the election laws of
those States at the time of their respective elections,
were themselves in full force and binding, and there
is an end of the doctrines of the protest.
This last proposition I assert: that the laws un-
dep which the late congressional elections were held
in the States of New Hampshire, Georgia, Missis-
sippi, and Missouri, were then constitutional, in
full force, valid, operative, and binding; and that
the members elected under those laws were elect-
ed in conformity with the constitution and laws,
and are entitled to their seats in this House.
That the election laws of those States once pos-
sessed the vitality, and power, and authority, which
I ascribe to them, is by no one denied. That all or
any of those States had superseded or repealed those
laws, is by no one pretended; nor is it pretended
that either the legislatures or the people of any of
those States had cast off or disavowed those laws,
as unwise, unsafe, unequal, or unjust. The legis-
latures of those States had severally discharged the
high and responsible duties imposed upon them by
the constitution; they had respectively prescribed
the times, places, and manner of holding elections
of senators and represenfatives; and of them the
constitution required no farther action. The people
of those States were thus fully supplied by their
several legislatures with all the means necessary to
enable them to exercise the inestimable franchise of
electing, in their own way, their own representatives
in the councils of this confederacy.
Has anything transpired which has had the pow-
er and effect to annihilate or modify this hard-
earned, dear-bought, invaluable privilege? Has any-
thing transpired which has had the power and ef-
fect to restrain or alter the mode or manner of the
exercise of that privilege? No, sir, nothing.
There are no provisions in the second section of
the apportionment act of 1842 which can effect a
change in the extent of this right, or in the manner
of its exercise.
For myself, I am prepared to admit that the pow-
er to make regulations prescribing the times, places,
and manner of holding elections for representatives;
and the power to alter the regulations prescribed by
the State legislatures touching the same particulars,
is, by the fourth section of the first article of the con-
stitution, vested in the Congress of the United States.
The terms of the grant are full, clear, and explicit;
the contemporaneous exposition of the constitution
conceded this power to Congress; the seven or more
States who, in their conventions, strongly objected
to this clause of the constitution, fully admitted—
nay, claimed—that it conferred dangerous power up-
on Congress; and these States and statesmen who
have vainly endeavored to procure the exclusion of
this clause from the constitution, have left no room
for doubt in my mind that upon Congress has the
constitution of the United States devolved the power
in question.
But, sir, it is a naked power. It was conferred
with great jealousy and reluctance. It was not con-
ferred with any view that Congress should exercise
it, as matter of course. No, sir. It was admitted,
the other day, by the honorable gentleman from
Tennessee, that "this clause was inserted in the con-
stitution so' that the government should have the
power of perpetuating itself, and for no other pur-
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United States. Congress. The Congressional Globe, Volume 13, Part 1: Twenty-Eighth Congress, First Session, book, 1844; Washington D.C.. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth2367/m1/282/: accessed May 6, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.