Texas Attorney General Opinion: O-7515 Page: 2 of 3
This text is part of the collection entitled: Texas Attorney General Opinions and was provided to The Portal to Texas History by the UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.
Extracted Text
The following text was automatically extracted from the image on this page using optical character recognition software:
Hon. nest Guinn - Pae 2
"The Leozilature shall not, except as otherwise
provided in this Conatitution, pas any local or
special laws, . . revalatins the affairs of
counties, cities, towns, wards or school districts;
S. . crti offices or prescribe the powers
and duties of officers, in counties, cities, tow.ms,
election or school districts; . . . .#
It is manifest that the law under consideration regulates
the affairs of the county to which it aopnies, create an office, and
prescribes the power and duties of sucWh officers. It applies only
to counties in thi~ State having a population of more than One Hundred
Thousand (100,0033) inhabitants and les than One Rundred Fifty Thous-
and (150,000) inhabitants and containing one city of One Hundred
Thousand (100,000) inhabitants as shown by the latest Federal Censas.
In the case of County of Bezar vs. Tynan, 97 SN. 2d 467
the Supreme Court of Texas announced the principle which controlleA
the mattar at hand, as follow:
Notwithstading it is true that the Lerislature
may classify counties upon the basi; of population for
the purpose of fixing comloenation of county and pre-
cinct officers, yet in doing so the classification
must be based upon a real distinction, nd anust not
be arbitrary or a device to give what is in substance
a local or special law the form of a general law,"
It is stated in our Opinion No. 0-22211
"A law which applies only to a part of a natural
class of persons or things aust predicate its in-
losion of the part and exclusion of the balance upon
characterstice s peculiar to the part which, consider-
iag the objects and purposes of the law, afford reasonable
ground for restricting the application of the law to the
part. Classification must be reasonable and natural, not
arbitrary and capricious. Arbitrary designation is not
classification. The vice of local or special laws .ttbat
they rest on arbitrary designation; thrat thoy do not embrace
and affect all of the class to which they are naturally re-
lated, 25 R.b. ppi $15-a16) 12 Am. Jur. p. 146; Smith v.
State (Ct, Or, App.), 49 S.e (2d) 739; Randolph v. State,
(Ct. Cr. App.), 36 SN., (2d) 4,4; Clark v. Finley, 93 Tex.
171, S4 s.. 343;1. * *'
Our opinion was approved by the Court in Oakley va, Kent, 1 L..
(2) 919.
Upcoming Pages
Here’s what’s next.
Search Inside
This text can be searched. Note: Results may vary based on the legibility of text within the document.
Tools / Downloads
Get a copy of this page or view the extracted text.
Citing and Sharing
Basic information for referencing this web page. We also provide extended guidance on usage rights, references, copying or embedding.
Reference the current page of this Text.
Texas. Attorney-General's Office. Texas Attorney General Opinion: O-7515, text, 1946; (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth264792/m1/2/: accessed May 4, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.