Texas Attorney General Opinion: V-1226 Page: 4 of 6
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Hon. Gene Maddin, page 4 (V-1226)
of Article V are not governed by the provisions of Sec-
tion 56 of Article III of the Constitution of Texas.
Garvey v. Matthews, supra; Harris County v. Crooker,
21 S.W. 792 (Tex.Civ.App. 1920), affirmed 112 Tex. 450,
248 S.W. 652 (1923); Jones v. Anderson, 189 S.W.2d 55
(Tex.Civ.App. 1945, error ref.).
If Section 14 of the act relating to the coun-
ty judge may be severed from the remaining portion, it
is our opinion that' the act is valid and constitutional.
In 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3rd
Ed. 143) 178-179, Sec. 2404, it is said:
"In determining separability, legislative
intent governs,, but intent that the act be en-
forced in so far as valid is not the sole con-
sideration. If the legislature so intended,
the valid parts of an act will be upheld 'un-
less all the provisions are connected in sub-
ject matter, dependent on each other, operating
together for the same purpose, or otherwise so
connected together in meaning that it cannot
be presumed the legislature would have passed
the one without the other.' To be capable of
se parate enforcement, the valid portion of an
enactment must be independent of the invalid
portion and must form a complete act within
itself. The law enforced after separation
must be reasonable in light of the act as
originally drafted. The test is whether or
not the legislature would have passed the
statute had it been presented with the in-
valid features removed." (Emphasis added.)
The act contains no severability or saving
clause. However in Christopher v. City of El Paso, 98
S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tex.Civ.App. 1936, error dism.), the
court said:
"We do not concur in the contention
that the invalidity of the exemption pro-
vision, in the absence of a saving clause,
renders the entire act unconstitutional.
While it is true that the provision is in-
cidental to the main purpose of the act, yet
it is capable of being separated from the
act without materially affecting that main
purpose.
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Texas. Attorney-General's Office. Texas Attorney General Opinion: V-1226, text, August 1, 1951; (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth266044/m1/4/: accessed April 26, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.