Texas Attorney General Opinion: MW-185 Page: 2 of 3
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Honorable Patrick J. Ridley - Page Two (MW-185)
You suggest that this provision is unconstitutionall because it requires the judge to dismiss
charges if the three stated conditions are met, allowing him no discretion. You suggest
that it violates article II, section 1 of the Constitution which provides for the separation of
powers, and article V, section 1 of the Constitution which vests judicial power in justices
of the peace.
However, it is well established that the legislature may give judges responsibilities
which do not require the exercise of judicial discretion. See Jarnagin v. Garrett, 69
S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App. Texarkana 1934, writ ref'd); Koll v. State, 157 S.W.2d 377
(Tex. Crim. App. 1941). A judge may be assigned ministerial duties, which are duties
prescribed and defined with such precision as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion
or judgment. Jarnagin v. Garrett, spra. Once the defendant complies with the three
conditions under section 143A(a)(2), we believe the court has a ministerial duty to dismiss
the charge.
You next ask for an interpretation of the following language of section 143A(b): "and
the evidence presented is accepted by the court." You suggest that this provision refers
to common law rules of evidence and means that the judge must admit the evidence
presented by a defendant unless there is an objection to it. However, section 143A(b) uses
the term "accepted" rather than "admitted." Moreover, since section 143A(a)(2) spells out
the kind of evidence which defendant must present, the judge need not rule on relevancy.
He need only determine whether the evidence conforms to the requirements of section
143A(a)2). We believe the language you inquire about contemplates that the judge will
evaluate the evidence presented by the defendant that he has successfully completed an
approved defensive driving course and accept it if in fact it complies with the statutory
requirements.
SUMMARY
Section 143A(a)(2) of article 6701d, V.T.C.S., does not unconstitu-
tionally deprive a justice of the peace of judicial discretion. The
section requires him to evaluate evidence presented by the
defendant that he has successfully completed a defensive driving
course.
Very truly you,
MARK WHITE
Attorney General of Texas
JOHN W. FAINTER, JR.
First Assistant Attorney General
TED L. HARTLEY
Executive Assistant Attorney Generalp. 592
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Texas. Attorney-General's Office. Texas Attorney General Opinion: MW-185, text, May 28, 1980; (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth272030/m1/2/: accessed April 26, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.