Texas Attorney General Opinion: JM-523 Page: 3 of 4
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Mr. Lias B. "Bubba" Steen - Page 3 (JM-523)
nor requested the services rendered by the assessing
agency. (Emphasis added).
456 S.W.2d at 207. Similarly, Attorney General Opinion MW-551
emphasized that it did not purport to address a situation where the
state acted in a manner that indicated a willingness to pay a fee. In
the question presented, the state is requesting water service from the
city.
Maverick stands for the proposition that the city cannot impose
an involuntary monetary obligation on the state without express
legislative authorization. Accordingly, the city cannot treat state
property in the same manner as private property with regard to special
assessments for local improvements. It does not follow, however, that
the city cannot charge th . state for the actual cost of extending
service which the state expressly requests. As indicated previously,
the fees in question are intended to include both the actual costs of
providing new water service to a specific site and the estimated
proportional cost of building the general infrastructure. To the
extent that the city can determine the actual costs, both general and
specific, attributable to extendingg service to the state, we do not
believe that Maverick prevnts the city from requiring the state to
pay those costs as a cond:Ltion of extending service. The city may
not, however, assess the state for its pro-rata share of the cost of
local improvements which provide benefits that are too general to
specifically apportion to each user.
Further, we emphasize that any "exemption" for state property
from special assessments by political subdivisions is limited to
property used exclusively for public purposes. It is well-settled in
Texas that the constitut Lonal and statutory exemption of state
property from taxes applies only when the property is used exclusively
for public purposes. See Satterlee v. Gulf Coast Waste Disposal
Authority, 576 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1978); State v. Houston Lighting and
Power Co., 609 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1980, writ
refd n.r.e.); Attorney General Opinion MW-430 (1982); see also
Central Appraisal District )f Erath County v. Pecan Valley Facilities,
Inc., 704 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1985, no writ). We believe
that the courts of this state would apply similar restrictions to the
common law "exemption" from special assessments announced in the
Maverick case. This conclusion finds support in the sources relied
upon in Maverick. For example, one such source states the general
rule as follows:
Apart from constitutional or statutory authori-
zation public property . . . used for public
purposes is not L.iable to special assessment for
local improvement:;. . . . (Emphasis added).p. 2405
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Texas. Attorney-General's Office. Texas Attorney General Opinion: JM-523, text, July 17, 1986; (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth272963/m1/3/: accessed April 25, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.