Texas Attorney General Opinion: JC-212 Page: 3 of 5
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The Honorable Ken Armbrister - Page 3
Constitution article III, sections 51 and 52 for city to donate public funds to school district to build
schools within city boundaries; building schools is not a municipal purpose). The highest court of
Kentucky has held that a city could not appropriate funds to a school district to supplement the
salaries of its teachers. Board of Educ. of City of Corbin v. City of Corbin, 192 S.W.2d 951
(Ky. 1946). The Kentucky state constitution, like the Texas Constitution, prohibited any city
from appropriating money to any corporation, association or individual. Id. at 952 (citing KY.
CONST. 79). While education is
a municipal function or purpose; nevertheless, it is a function
exclusively delegated to school districts as arms of the State
government; and, even though the district's boundary is conterminous
with the boundary of a city, it is, in legal contemplation, as distinct
therefrom as a district whose boundary does not even border thereon.
Two municipalities, for their respective purposes, may govern the
inhabitants of a given territory; but the one may not interfere with the
other in the exercise of specified authority; nor may it under Section
179 [of the Kentucky Constitution] reap a reward at the expense of
the other.
Id.
The City of Port Arthur may not donate its public funds to a school district to assist it in
carrying out school purposes, nor may it appropriate public funds to be used solely for school
purposes. A city may spend its public funds only to carry out a municipal purpose, although the fact
that there is an incidental benefit to a private person or another entity from the expenditure does not
invalidate it. Barrington, 338 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1960); see State ex rel. Grimes County Taxpayers
Ass 'n, 565 S.W.2d at 258. This rule applies to all public funds of a city, whether derived from tax
revenues or other sources. See TEX. CONST. art. III, 52.
The city attorney's letter suggests that the school children represent the city as well as the
school district, and that their representation serves a municipal purpose that justifies the expenditure
of public funds. The decision in Davis v. City of Taylor, 67 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. 1934), gives some
support to the idea that representing the city in other states serves a public purpose and municipal
purpose. In Davis, taxpayers sought to enjoin the expenditure of city funds for a board of city
development, established by a charter provision to promote the growth, advertisement, development,
improvement and increase of the taxable values of the city, on the ground that the expenditure was
not for a public purpose or a municipal purpose. Id. at 1034-35. The Supreme Court stated that no
exact definition of "public purpose" could be made, quoting as follows from McQuillen on
Municipal Corporations: "What is a public purpose cannot be answered by any precise definition
further than to state that if an object is beneficial to the inhabitants and directly connected with the
local government it will be considered a public purpose." Id. at 1034 (quoting 6 McQUILLEN ON
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 2532, at 292 (2d ed. 1940)). The court held that the city's expenditure
of funds to advertise its advantages served a public purpose and a municipal purpose, noting that(JC-0212)
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Texas. Attorney-General's Office. Texas Attorney General Opinion: JC-212, text, April 20, 2000; (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth274521/m1/3/: accessed April 26, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.